COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60252 FRANCES LANDSMAN, ET AL. : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : : JOHN M. BAKER : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: MARCH 26, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case No. 178328. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-appellant: Michael Shane, Esq. Shane & Shane Co., L.P.A. 55 Public Square 1460 Illuminating Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For Defendant-appellee: Richard J. McGraw, Esq. Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos Co., L.P.A. 55 Public Square 2150 Illuminating Building Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1994 - 3 - SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Plaintiff-appellant Phillip Landsman filed this appeal subsequent to a jury verdict against defendant-appellee John Baker. On count one of the complaint, $7,500.00 was awarded to Mr. Landsman, as the executor of the Estate of Frances Landsman for injuries caused by appellee to Frances Landsman in an automobile accident. Appellant, as an individual, appeals the jury award of zero dollars on count two of the complaint which stated a cause of action for loss of consortium. At trial, appellant took the stand, but was prohibited from testifying as to his own heart attack which had occurred subsequent to his wife's car accident. On direct examination, the appellant testified: Q Did you have anything happen to you physically around that time? MR. McGRAW: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Q Were you able to be active and assist your wife during that time? MR. McGRAW: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Q Were there things that your wife did for you before that she couldn't do after the accident that she had done before? A Yes, sir. Q Would you tell us about it? - 4 - A Well, her activities were limited with regard to taking care of the house and with regard to shopping and cooking. Q Well, did she do anything else for you, did she take care of the home as a homemaker, sir? A Yes. Not following the accident, though. She did all these things before, but following the accident her activities were much limited. She needed help in those areas. Q Are you on medication today, sir? MR. McGRAW: Objection. THE COURT: The question again? MR. McGRAW: What relevancy does that have, Mr. Shane? You are making faces at -- THE COURT: Question, Counsel. The objection is sustained. Please keep this relevant. Q Did you rely on your wife's efforts and work to take care of any of your needs prior to this accident? A Not prior to the accident. I mean, except as a wife would do with her husband. I worked and I depended on her to do the things she would do for me at the house. Q How did this accident with its effect on her affect you? A Well, I had to go to the hospital myself -- MR. McGRAW: I object. I move to strike that portion of the answer. THE COURT: That portion of the answer will be stricken. The Jury will disregard that. The objection is sustained. Counsel, I remind you to - 5 - keep this relevant to the issues in this case. MR. SHANE: May I approach the sidebar, sir? THE COURT: You may. - - - (Thereupon, discussion was had between Court and counsel at the sidebar, out of the hearing of the Jury and off the record.) and off the record.) Q As a result of this accident, Doctor, were there any things that your wife did for you that she was unable to do because of the injuries from this accident? THE COURT: That she was able to do previous to the accident that she was unable to do subsequent to the accident? MR. SHANE: Yes. A Most everything. She began to deteriorate fairly rapidly after the accident. I depended on her more after the accident because of what happened to me. She couldn't help me in these areas. May I be specific? MR. McGRAW: Move to strike. Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. The Jury will disregard anything that happened to the witness who is here who was not involved in the accident directly. MR. SHANE: Thank you. No further questions. (T. 36-39.) Appellant sets forth one assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO FRANCES LANDSMAN'S DETRIMENT IN NOT ALLOWING TESTIMONY REGARDING - 6 - LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND OF SERVICES BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PHILLIP LANDSMAN. Loss of consortium was defined by the Supreme Court in Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. (1970), 22 Ohio St. 2d 65: "Consortium" consists of society, services, sexual relations and conjugal affection which includes companionship, comfort, love and solace. Appellant was permitted by the trial judge to testify as to his loss consistent with this definition. The judge did not permit testimony as to the health of appellant who was not present at the time of the accident. Appellant contends in essence that by prohibiting him from testifying as to his heart attack, the judge also prohibited him from testifying as to his loss of consortium. However, it is clear from the transcript that the judge considered testimony regarding appellant's health as irrelevant. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Evid. R. 402. Rulings on admission or exclusion of evidence, based on relevancy, are within the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Renfro v. Black (1990), 52 Ohio St. 3d 27. The Renfro court also stated: The issue of whether testimony or evidence is relevant or irrelevant, confusing or misleading, is best decided by the trial judge, who is in a significantly better position to analyze the impact of the evidence on the jury. Columbus v. Taylor - 7 - (1988), 39 Ohio St. 3d 162, 164, 529 N.E. 2d 1382, 1385; Calderon v. Sharkey (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 218, 24 O.O. 3d 322, 436 N.E. 2d 1008. In Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 83, the court discussed abuse of discretion: We have repeatedly held that "[t]he term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Steiner v. Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 [19 O.O. 148]; Conner v. Conner (1959), 170 Ohio St. 85 [9 O.O.2d 480]; Chester Township v. Geauga Co. Budget Comm. (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 372 [2 O.O.3d 484]." State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 151, 157-158 [16 O.O.3d 169]; Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219. "'[A]n abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in * * * opinion * * *. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. In order to have an "abuse" in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias. * * *'" State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, 222. In the case sub judice, we find no abuse of discretion in prohibiting appellant from testifying as to his own heart attack, which was unrelated to the automobile accident involving his wife. Appellant's assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 8 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellants his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DAVID T. MATIA, C.J., and SARA J. HARPER, J., CONCUR. JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .