COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60212 ROSS EQUIPMENT CORPORATION : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : NANCY GREGG : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 2, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. CP-158246 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: L. JAMES JULIANO, JR. #0005993 DENISE A. DiPASQUALE #0042457 1440 LEADER BUILDING 526 SUPERIOR AVENUE EAST CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114-1401 For Defendant-Appellee: LAWRENCE S. BENJAMIN #014777-90 6151 WILSON MILLS ROAD SUITE 200, HIGHLAND PLACE HIGHLAND HEIGHTS, OH 44143 -2- SPELLACY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant Ross Equipment Corporation ("Ross") appeals from the trial court's decision to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Nancy Gregg ("Gregg"). Ross also argues that it should not have been ordered to remove a judgment lien it obtained against Gregg. On October 14, 1988, Ross filed a complaint against Gregg, its former employee, alleging that Gregg had embezzled approximately fifty thousand dollars and requesting compensatory and punitive damages. Ross also joined Society National Bank as a defendant, alleging that it negotiated fraudulent instruments. On November 9, 1988, Ross executed a "Release and Assignment of Claim" with plaintiff The Cincinnati Insurance Company of Cin- cinnati ("Cincinnati Insurance") which stated in pertinent part: NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the aforesaid payment to the undersigned [Ross], by said Company [Cincinnati Insurance], the Undersigned hereby *** assigns and set[s] over unto said Company all its rights, claims, actions, or causes of action accrued, or to accrue, which the undersigned now has, or hereafter can have, resulting from, or growing out of the act, or acts resulting in said default under said Bond, and the undersigned hereby appoints said Company, or its authorized representative, its Attorney-in-- Fact for the purpose of signing the name of the undersigned to any and all papers necessary to enjoy the rights herein provided and assigned to said Company. On December 20, 1988, Ross's original complaint was amended and Cincinnati Insurance was added as a plaintiff. -3- In or around August 1989, Gregg was convicted of forgery, uttering and theft while an employee at Ross. As part of her sentence, the criminal trial court ordered Gregg to pay $35,000 in restitution. On October 19, 1989, Ross obtained a judgment lien against Gregg based on the criminal trial court's order that she pay restitution. On February 20, 1990, Gregg filed a "brief in support of oral motion to remove judgment lien." On March 5, 1990, the trial court ordered Ross to remove its judgment lien. On April 2, 1990, Gregg filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching the November 9, 1988, release and assignment executed between Ross and Cincinnati Insurance. On April 4, 1990, all claims involving Ross, Cincinnati Insurance, and Society National Bank were dismissed. On April 5, 1990, all claims between Cincinnati Insurance and Gregg were dismissed. On June 18, 1990, Ross filed a brief in opposition to Gregg's motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had not assigned all of its claims to Cincinnati Insurance. Ross attached a letter to its brief sent by its attorney to Cincinnati Insurance's attorney, and signed by both, dated December 27, 1989, which stated in pertinent part: As we discussed in our recent telephone conversation, I would like you to confirm that the language in the November 9, 1988 release and assignment which states: ... the undersigned hereby assigns and sets over unto said Company all its rights, claims, actions, or causes of action accrued, or to accrue, which the undersigned now has, or hereafter can have, resulting from, or -4- growing out of the act, or acts resulting in said default under said Bond ... refers only to amounts which The Cincinnati Insurance Company has paid on this claim and for which Cincinnati has not been reimbursed. On July 3, 1990, the trial court granted Gregg's motion for summary judgment. Ross appeals and raises the following assignments of error: THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT NANCY GREGG'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST CONCERNING GREGG'S FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT, AN ASSIGNMENT BY ROSS EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, AND DAMAGES. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER THAT A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY A COURT IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHICH ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO PAY RESTITUTION TO A THIRD PARTY MAY BE USED TO OBTAIN A JUDGMENT LIEN IN FAVOR OF THE THIRD- PARTY. I. In its first assignment of error, Ross contends the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Gregg. Ross's assignment of error lacks merit. Reviewing the evidentiary materials before the trial court, we find that all genuine issues of material fact have been litigated and that, even construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Ross, a reasonable trier of fact could only conclude that Ross released and assigned all of its claims against Gregg to Cincinnati Insurance. Finally, we find that Gregg is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. -5- Accordingly, Ross's first assignment of error is not well taken. II. In its second assignment of error, Ross contends the trial court erred when it ordered that the judgment lien against Gregg be removed. We find that we lack jurisdiction to address Ross's assignment of error. App. R. 3(C) provides in pertinent part "[t]he notice of appeal *** shall designate the judgment, order, or part thereof appealed from ***." Ross's notice of appeal only designates the trial court's order granting summary judgment as the judgment or order appealed from. As we noted in Parks v. Chessie System Railroad (September 19, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 59894, unreported: App. R. 3 must be construed in light of the purpose of a notice of appeal, which is to notify appellees of the appeal and advise them of "just what appellants *** [are] undertaking to appeal from." Maritime Manufactures, Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 257, 258-259. This court has previously held that we are without jurisdiction to review a judgment or order which is not designated in the appellant's notice of appeal. Schloss v. McGinness (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 96, 97-98; see also Carey v. Carey (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 243, 246. Maritime, on the other hand, reached the opposite conclusion, holding that an appellate court did not lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal even though the "notice of appeal mistakenly specified that the appeal was taken from the order denying the motion for new trial rather than from the final -6- judgment entered on the merits." Maritime, supra, at 260. Id. at 3-4. Maritime is distinguishable from this case. In Maritime, the order denying the motion for new trial was linked to the final judgment entered on the merits and, as the court noted, the appellee should have been aware of what appellee was appealing. In this case, the two orders are clearly separate, one relates to the merits of the case and the other concerns a judgment lien based upon an order in a separate case. There was no reason, therefore, for Gregg to anticipate that Ross intended to appeal from the trial court's order requiring Ross to withdraw its judgment lien against her. Thus, we find that we are without jurisdiction to review the trial court's order. Accordingly, Ross's second assignment of error is not before this court. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN MCMANAMON, J., AND KRUPANSKY, J., CONCUR LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .