COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60210 SOUTHSIDE SERVICE COMPANY, INC. : : Plaintiff-Appellant : JOURNAL ENTRY Cross-Appellee : : AND vs. : : OPINION MONARCH STEEL COMPANY : : Defendant-Appellee : Cross-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 2, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court No. 163782 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant/ BLAIR N. MELLING Cross-Appellee: CLARENCE B. RADER Melling & Junkin & Bell 31 Columbus Road Bedford, Ohio 44146 For Defendant-Appellee/ JONATHAN R. COOPER Cross-appellant: Benesh, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff 1100 Citizens Building 850 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 2 - KRUPANSKY, J.: Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant on defendant's counterclaim in an action for breach of contract. Defendant has filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion to consolidate the judgments in the case. The relevant facts follow: Defendant Monarch Steel Company (hereinafter "Monarch") is in the business of providing cut steel for use in industry. In February 1988, Monarch purchased some used machinery which needed repair from another company. It then sought estimates or proposals to repair the machinery from several companies, including plaintiff, Southside Service Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Southside"). With regard to one piece of equipment, a 72-inch steel slitting machine (hereinafter referred to as the "72-inch slitter"), the proposal Southside submitted set forth certain items known to be in need of repair (i.e., "repairs requested and required") and quoted an estimated cost of $13,000 for labor and $5,000 for materials to put the machine "into full production." The proposal stated the following: This is an estimate of repairs, your actual cost may be higher or lower depending upon the sets of machining, reconditioning of hydraulic motor, new materials, and additional work that may be required while performing the work covered on the attached page. The labor amount estimate is accurate to about 15%. The material estimate is based on - 3 - historical data and similar experiences. Should the actual cost exceed our estimate figure, at your request, we would be glad to supply the necessary invoices to validate the extra amounts. Materials are generally invoiced at 15% over cost. Monarch accepted Southside's proposal and paid Southside $4,500 to commence the repair work, the balance of the money owed to be paid upon completion. Southside then initiated repairs to the 72-inch slitter. Shortly thereafter, in April 1988, Monarch sought a proposal from Southside with respect to certain Delta Brands Leveler Line machines (hereinafter "cut-to-length line"). Southside submitted a proposal which stated "the repairs requested and required" and also stated the following: This job will be billed by time and materials not to exceed $53,600. Labor is charged at $32.50 an hour with materials at approximately cost plus 16%. A bonus of 25% of the difference between the actual billed invoice (less cost of extra work) and the not to exceed price will be paid after completion of repairs. * * * Prices are based on one order for all the work quoted and to have full access to the machine when we arrive. In addition, we require the uninterrupted use of the machine as we work on it. Work on this line can begin as early as May 5, 1988 with completion no more than nine weeks from start. Two men will work eight hour shifts continuously from start to finish during normal working hours on regular working days. (Emphasis added.) - 4 - Attached to the proposal were two items to be "completed with the costs added to the original quoted price (not included in the $54,000 proposal . . .)," viz., a gear assembly and a motor. Thereafter, Monarch paid $13,400 to Southside so that repair would commence on the cut-to-length line. While Southside was engaged in repairing these items of machinery, Monarch orally requested Southside to repair a 60- inch steel slitting machine (hereinafter "the 60-inch slitter") "on a time and material basis." The costs of repair to this machine were billed to Monarch at $1,387.04. Monarch further made an oral request of Southside to begin repairs on two 60-ton cranes. Southside ordered parts for the cranes, which cost $3,883.70. The evidence adduced at trial indicated when Monarch began using the machinery Southside was in the process of repairing, many problems occurred. The machinery did not work properly or failed to work at all. As a result, Southside was called repeatedly by Monarch during this time to rectify the situation. However, Monarch remained unsatisfied by Southside's performance. In August 1988, Southside informed Monarch the repairs on the 72- inch slitter and the cut-to-length line were completed. Shortly thereafter, Monarch informed Southside it did not require further services; moreover, it had hired another company, Maintenance For Industry (hereinafter "Maintenance") to complete any repair work remaining in order to put the machines in good working order. - 5 - Monarch thus, in August 1988, stopped making payments on invoices received from Southside after having by that time paid a stipulated amount of $52,409.37. Maintenance was eventually paid $62,105.72 by Monarch to complete the repairs on the machines. Thereafter, Southside filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against Monarch, stating the following: Defendant is now indebted to the Plaintiff on account in the amount of Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Forty-seven and 95/100 Dollars ($60,247.95), a copy of the account ledger being attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A". (Emphasis added.) Monarch answered, denying it owed Southside any money and filed a counterclaim against Southside, stating as follows: 9. Plaintiff failed to properly complete the services that it undertook for Defendant, causing substantial damages to the Defendant's property. WHEREFORE, Defendant demands judgment as follows: (a) dismissing the action against Defendant; (b) awarding Defendant the costs and disbursements of this action; (c) awarding judgment on Defendant's counterclaim in an amount to be proved; and 1 There was no exhibit attached to the complaint as stated in defendant's answer, however, the account was later marked as Exhibit H and received into evidence at trial without objection. The account ledger showed Monarch as having paid Southside $52,794.57 on its account. - 6 - (d) such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. (Emphasis added.) Prior to trial, the parties submitted a stipulation as to the following facts: 1. Monarch Steel paid Southside Service, Inc. a total of $52,409.37. 2. Southside Service, Inc. billed Monarch Steel in the amount of $112,615.90. 3. Monarch Steel Company paid Maintenance For Industry $62,105.72. Furthermore, the parties stipulated to the admissibility of the following documents: 1. Proposal dated March 2, 1988, by Southside Service, Company, Inc. to Monarch Steel Company relating to repairs requested and required on the 72" Delta slitter. 2. Proposal dated April 25, 1988, by Southside Service Company, Inc. to Monarch Steel Company relating to repairs requested and required on the Delta cut-to-length line. 3. Southside Service Company, Inc. invoice no. 6047 dated August 16, 1988. [Repairs to and materials for 60-inch slitter, totalling $1,387.04.] Both parties submitted trial briefs to the court for its consideration. Thereafter, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Plaintiff presented the testimony of Thomas Hull, executive vice president of Southside. Mr. Hull testified Southside performed all its obligations under the written and oral agreements with Monarch. He testified that Southside promptly responded to all - 7 - Monarch's complaints concerning the difficulties in running the machinery and further testified that Southside fulfilled its obligation to put the machinery in "running condition." As to amounts owed Southside by Monarch, during Mr. Hull's testimony, the balance due on Monarch's account was again stipulated to be $60,247.95. However, Mr. Hull admitted on cross-examination that Southside was still working on the 72- inch slitter in early August 1988, nearly a month after the specified nine-week repair time. Furthermore, on cross- examination, he gave the following testimony: Q. During the time that Southside was working on the 72-inch slitter, did it maintain some production after you had it on line? A. Yes, it did. Q. Did Southside engage in any efforts in order to keep the 72-inch slitter working? A. We were requested -- we made the repairs whenever there was a breakdown, and it was always to get it back up and running. * * * Q. Once that gearbox was installed, was the cut-to-length line operational? A. Yes, we ran a coil of steel through with their personnel, and that's the last contact we had, other than coming back one time. Q. After that point in time, how many service calls did you make after that point in time on the cut-to-length line? - 8 - A. We made one call back because they complained about a problem. *** * * * Q. You did finish the cut-to-length line, correct? The cut-to-length line worked when your guys were done? A. Under our proposal. Q. And the 72-inch slitter worked when you were done, correct? A. Yes. Q. The 60-inch slitter worked when you were done, correct? A. No. Q. It did not work? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. It did not work at all? A. It was running. It wasn't running production though. As far as I know, they had run some paper through it to see if it would cut, but they would never run steel through it, and there was still much more that needed to be done on that. Q. You didn't finish that? A. No. Q. I think your testimony was, you weren't asked to finish that? A. No. Defendant presented the testimony of three people, viz., 1) David Kaufman, co-chairman of the board of Monarch; 2) William Zabukovec, plant superintendent in charge of maintenance and repair of equipment for the owners of Monarch; and 3) Tony Perez, - 9 - master millwright for Maintenance. Defendant's witnesses gave convincing testimony that the repair work done by Southside was of poor quality, necessitating further repairs to the machinery and causing Monarch to incur damages in "lost revenue," due to the fact orders for steel had to be "farmed out" or rejected while the machinery was not operating properly. No money figure, however, was given as the amount of Monarch's "lost revenue." At one point in Mr. Perez's testimony, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: All right, Now, you started at a 20-percent efficiency, according to your estimates; is that correct? THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. The way I base that was I watched, I observed and I see that they were like only slitting two coils of steel per day out of this machine, and then at the very end there, they were getting eight, nine, ten coils a day out of that machine. THE COURT: That's when you concluded your final repair? THE WITNESS: Yes. That was in November, your Honor. THE COURT: What percentage of your total repair was a rework of something that had already been done by Southside? THE WITNESS: I say 35 to 40 percent. THE COURT: Thirty-five to 40 percent of your work was a rework of something that had previously been done by Southside? - 10 - THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: What percentage of your work was new repair performed by you over to correct inefficiencies in the machine? Forty percent -- 35 to 40 percent was rework. What percentage was new work on your part? THE WITNESS: I'd say about the same. THE COURT: Well, then, that would leave approximately 30 percent of work that was done over and above what was required to put it back on line, either for efficiency, better efficiency or for safety factors; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's right. THE COURT: That would total your 100 percent? THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. *** * * * THE COURT: Thirty-five to 40 percent that you said was rework. The counter of that, would you say then that 60 to 65 percent of the work that was done by Monarch was done correctly? THE WITNESS: By Maintenance for Industry or Monarch? THE COURT: I'm sorry. By Southside. THE WITNESS: That 60 percent was done good by Southside. - 11 - THE COURT: Of the work that they did, using your figures of 35 to 40 percent was rework of what they had done, would it be a fair assumption to say that the work that they had performed, that 60 to 65 percent of it was correct and accurate? THE WITNESS: No. I may be wrong with percentages, but I, you know, when I was there, I did not ask who did the work, or you know, who did this. All I know is that when this all came about, I know it was rework. I didn't know who previously was in there. THE COURT: But you didn't have to rework every item that was done to bring the machine up to what you have described as a 20 percent mode? THE WITNESS: Your honor, I look at it, as I did everything, to bring the machine up to standard. Everything I could possibly do to bring it up to standard. Thereafter, on July 2, 1990, the trial court issued a judgment entry with findings of fact and conclusion of law in the case, stating in pertinent part the following: The evidence in this case clearly shows that the Plaintiff, by improper repair or omission, breached its contract with the Defendant to repair the 72 inch slitter and the cut-to-length-line to full, sustained operational capacity. *** * * * The evidence also shows that the second contractor (Maintenance For Industry, Inc.) did re-repair certain component parts and - 12 - repaired and/or replaced omitted components of the machinery in question and provided additional modifications for safety and/or efficiency, which was outside of the scope of the original repair contract. The court finds as a matter of law that the Plaintiff is entitled to quantum meruit for repairs, rebuilt component parts, and for materials supplied. IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff recover of the Defendant in quantum meruit on the Complaint in the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($45,000.00) plus interest of 10% per annum from date of Judgment. IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant recover of the Plaintiff on the Counterclaim for breach of contract the sum of Sixty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Nine Dollars and Thirty-Seven Cents ($69,409.37) plus interest of 10% per annum from the date of Judgment and costs. Plaintiff timely appealed to this court from the foregoing judgment entry. Thereafter, on July 9, 1990, defendant filed a post-judgment motion captioned "Motion to Consolidate Judgments Entered and Modify Findings of Fact, Opinion and Judgment 2 Entry." On July 12, 1990, the trial court overruled the aspect of the motion which requested consolidation of the judgments. Defendant's cross-appeal in the case sub judice challenges the trial court's ruling on its post-judgment motion. 2 The modification requested was the correction of a typographical error in the judgment entry. The trial court granted this aspect of defendant's motion. - 13 - The assignments of error will be addressed in the order filed. Plaintiff's sole assignment of error follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING ITS JUDGMENT ON THE DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM AS SAID JUDGMENT IS UNSUPPORTED BY, AND IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF, THE EVIDENCE AS PRESENTED AT TRIAL. This assignment of error has merit. Southside argues the judgment of $69,409.37 for Monarch on its counterclaim is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial, being in excess of the maximum amount Monarch proved. Southside therefore urges this court to remand the case on the issue of damages awarded to Monarch. App. R. 12(C) sets forth the authority an appellate court has with respect to the issue of manifest weight of the evidence, stating the following: (C) Judgment in Civil Action or Proceeding When Sole Prejudicial Error Found Is That Judgment of Trial Court is Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence. In any civil action or proceeding which was tried to the trial court without the intervention of a jury, and when upon appeal a majority of the judges hearing the appeal find that the judgment or final order rendered by the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence and do not find any other prejudicial error of the trial court in any of the particulars assigned and argued in the appellant's brief, and do not find that the appellee is entitled to judgment or final order as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or final order of the trial court and either weigh the evidence in the record and render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered on that evidence or remand the case to the trial court for - 14 - further proceedings; provided further that a judgment shall be reversed only once on the manifest weight of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) However, this court is mindful of the restraint imposed by Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 77, wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio stated as follows: While we agree with the proposition that in some instances an appellate court is duty- bound to exercise the limited prerogative of reversing a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in a proper case, it is also important that in doing so a court of appeals be guided by a presumption that the findings of the trier-of-fact were indeed correct. The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony. The interplay between the presumption of correctness and the ability of an appellate court to reverse a trial court decision based on the manifest weight of the evidence was succinctly set forth in the holding of this court in C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 279 [8 O.O.3d 261]: "Judgments supported by competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of a case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence." * * * A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of an error in law is - 15 - a legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence is not. The determination of credibility of testimony and evidence must not be encroached upon by a reviewing tribunal, especially to the extent where the appellate court relies on unchallenged, excluded evidence in order to justify its reversal. Id. at 79, 81. (Emphasis added.) Even with the caution imposed by Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, supra, it is clear the judgment of the trial court in the case sub judice is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the trial court's decisions on some points of law were supported by competent, credible evidence, the amount of the judgment awarded is not so supported. In its Findings of Fact, Opinion and Judgment Entry, the trial court stated as follows: The herein case, for both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, is a multi-faceted case in contract. The primary contract relates to the repair of the 72 inch slitter and the cut-to-length-line to full, sustained operational capacity. There is, however, by the very nature of the machinery itself (its component parts included) certain subcontracts which, while relating to the final objective of the overall contract, create individual items of contractual responsibility. The trial court then stated the evidence clearly showed the following: 1) Southside breached its contract with Monarch to repair the machinery to "full and sustained operational capacity"; 2) however, certain component parts were repaired or replaced properly by Southside, and there was no need for re- - 16 - repair on those specific items; and 3) Maintenance did re-repair certain component parts and provide additional modifications outside the scope of the original repair contract. Without stating how much each of these findings was worth in concrete figures based upon the evidence, however, the trial court merely stated that Southside was entitled to just compensation for repairs done and property and materials supplied. The trial court further stated Monarch was entitled to recover damages from Southside for breach of contract. The trial court then made the following award: 1) $45,000.00 to Southside on a theory of quantum meruit, in spite of the fact that Southside's original suit had been on an account and also without hard figures based upon the evidence to support the judgment, and 2) $69,409.37 to Monarch for breach of contract, in spite of the fact Monarch's counterclaim stated no specific sum as damages and the evidence showed Monarch had paid Maintenance $62,105.72. In Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, supra, the supreme court stated as follows: In conclusion, we note that our holding in the instant case should not be construed to absolutely bar a court of appeals from ever reversing a trial court decision as being against the manifest weight of the evidence; in a proper case, a reviewing court can and should so reverse. Rather, this decision stands as a reaffirmation of the judicial philosophy of appellate review as enunciated in C. E. Morris, supra. - 17 - The case sub judice is a proper one for reversal based upon App. R. 12(C). The stipulations of the parties were that Monarch had already paid Southside $52,409.37 and Monarch had also paid Maintenance $62,105.72. It is important to note the following: 1) the amount awarded to Monarch on the counterclaim against Southside, viz., $69,409.37, is $7,303.65 more than Monarch had paid Maintenance; 2) however, the trial court found Maintenance had done work for Monarch over and above what was necessary to correct Southside's errors or omissions; and 3) at the close of the evidence, the trial court stated as follows: The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence presented for the complaint on the count to go to the jury as a contractual obligation. The Court finds that on the counterclaim, that there is sufficient evidence for the counterclaim to go to the trier of fact on the basis of a breach of contract. The Court does, however, find that there is not sufficient evidence been presented to sustain a loss of earnings or benefit of the bargain under this particular set of circumstances. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court determined there was no documentary evidence supporting a claim of "lost revenue." Therefore, its decision to award Monarch $69,409.37 has no basis in the evidence. The amount paid by Monarch to Maintenance was $62,105.72. The trial court determined part of this amount was over and above what was necessary to correct what was poorly done - 18 - by Southside. Yet, the trial court awarded Monarch more than the total amount Maintenance charged Monarch to repair the machinery. Moreover, the trial court did so after specifically stating Monarch had not proved its claim of lost revenues. Southside had a duty to perform its services in a workmanlike manner. Barton v. Ellis (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d 251. Failure to so perform services rendered Southside liable for damages measured by the cost to repair the deficient work. Id. However, Monarch was required to prove its damages with reasonable certainty. Gahanna v. Eastgate Properties, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 65. Moreover, this court has stated the following: Incidental damages resulting from a *** breach may be awarded only if there is some evidence on the manner in which these damages were calculated, including a breakdown of the costs of the components of such damages. A company employee may not simply testify that an estimated lump sum is the amount of damages. Kinetico v. Independent Ohio Nail Co. (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 26. The record in the case sub judice fails to reflect how the trial court arrived at its calculation of the damages sustained by Monarch as a result of Southside's breach of the contract. This distinguishes the case from Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, supra, wherein the trial court denied the defendant's counterclaim and awarded plaintiff the full contract price. In Seasons Coal Co., the trial court held defendant had failed to - 19 - prove its case; its decision was affirmed by the supreme court on appeal. However, in the case sub judice, the trial court found Monarch had proven its case, but it remains unclear how the trial court arrived at $69,409.37 in damages when Monarch failed to provide a reasonably certain calculation of its damages. Kinetico, supra. Therefore, Southside is correct when it asserts the judgment on the counterclaim is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Southside's sole assignment of error is well taken. However, this does not dispose of the case sub judice. The court sua sponte is compelled to invoke the doctrine of "plain error" to also address the amount and the lack of specificity of the trial court regarding damages awarded to plaintiff. The court is mindful of the following admonition: Implementation of the plain error doctrine is to be taken with utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. [citation.] The plain- error doctrine permits correction of judicial proceedings when error is clearly apparent on the face of the record and is prejudicial to the appellant. [citation.] Although the plain-error doctrine is a principle applied almost exclusively in criminal cases, *** the doctrine may also be applied in civil causes ***, if the error complained of "would have a material adverse affect on the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings." Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 207, 209 [24 O.O.3d 316]. Reichert v. Ingersoll (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 220 at 223. - 20 - In the case sub judice, although the complaint was on on account with a specific figure set forth as due and owing, the trial court stated plaintiff breached its contract with defendant. The trial court then stated the following: The evidence also shows that certain component parts were repaired and/or replaced by the Plaintiff; that they were repaired properly, and that there was no necessity to repair those specific components. The evidence also shows that the second contractor (Maintenance For Industry, Inc.) did re-repair certain component parts and repaired and/or replaced omitted components of the machinery in question and provided additional modifications for safety and/or efficiency, which was outside of the scope of the original repair contact. The Court finds as a matter of law that the Plaintiff is entitled to quantum meruit for repairs, rebuilt component parts, and for materials supplied. IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff recover of the Defendant is quantum meruit on the Complaint in the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($45,000.00) plus interest of 10% per annum from date of Judgment. This court stated the following in Freeman v. Westland Builders, Inc. (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 212: Findings of fact and conclusions of law are prepared for the sole purpose of "enabl[ing] a reviewing court to determine the existence of assigned error." [Citation omitted.] "The function of the separate finding (sic) of fact and law is to determine whether or not the court was correct in its application of the law to the facts; and further, whether or not the court's findings - 21 - of fact were consistent with the evidence in the case." [Citation omitted.] The trial court has the duty of issuing findings regarding all of the ultimate facts which are determinative of the case. A mere recital of the evidence presented is not a finding of fact. (Citations omitted.) In the case sub judice, the trial court reached its "findings of fact" without any analysis of the hard evidence in the case, i.e., the money figures presented by the parties concerning the costs to repair the machines. Without an itemization by the trial court in concrete money figures of damages incurred on the claim and counterclaim, this court has no way of analyzing how the trial court reached its final judgment figure for each party. Inasmuch as the judgment and its enforcement is the end and aim of the whole litigation, to satisfy this purpose it must so dispose of the matters at issue between the parties that they and such other persons as may be affected, will be able to determine with reasonable certainty the extent to which their rights and obligations have been determined. Licht v. Woertz (1929), 32 Ohio App. 111 at 115. However, *** A judgment not in accordance with the allegations of the pleadings, the issues therein raised, or the prayers therein contained, will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Id. Regarding this problem, in its brief to this court on appeal Monarch states the following: - 22 - The Trial Court's judgment is explainable as follows. The Trial Court awarded $69,409.37 to Monarch on its Counterclaim and $45,000 to Southside in quantum meruit damages for work completed by it, leaving a net judgment of $24,409.37 in favor of Monarch. The Trial Court could have arrived at that number as follows: Southside was entitled to be compensated for several items: the repairs which were completed, the repairs to the 60" Slitter, and the crane parts. As more fully set forth above, Southside had billed Monarch $112,615.90 but according to undisputed testimony only did 20% of the work amounting to $22,523.18. In addition, it had completed the repairs to the 60" Slitter in the amount of $1,387.04 and had supplied $3,883.70 work of crate parts for a total of $27,793.92. Given the evidence submitted, the Trial Court could have found that Southside was entitled to that amount. Southside had been paid $52,409.37 on its original billings by Monarch. Therefore, any payment above that should be rebated to Monarch. That rebate totals $24,615.45 outstanding and due to Monarch for improper work repairs and omissions. That amount is approximately the $24,409.37 amount awarded to Monarch by the Trial Court. The shortfall may be explained by work which the Trial Court may have found was done by Maintenance for Industry over and above what was necessary to restore the machinery to first class operating condition. (Emphasis added.) However, how the trial court could have arrived at the final judgment figure in the case sub judice is of no concern. This court declines the invitation to speculate on the how the trial court might have arrived at its final figures since no concrete money figures on the breakdown of damages is contained in the trial court's separate findings of fact and conclusions of law. In spite of Monarch's "explanation," it is patently obvious from the judgment entry that "the court below attempted to but - 23 - did not perform its function adequately. It disposed of difficult issues by deciding it could not decide them." Taylor v. Taylor (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 79. The issues of specific sums of money due and owing the respective parties were simply "resolved by avoidance." However, "a court does not determine issues by concluding they are difficult." Taylor v. Taylor, supra. Therefore, this case must be remanded to the trial court for a clarification on the issue of damages. There must be a breakdown in concrete money figures based upon the evidence on how the trial court arrived at its final figures in awarding $45,000.00 to Southside on its cause of action on an account and $69,409.37 to Monarch on its counterclaim. The plain error doctrine sub judice extends to the trial court's rendering its verdict for Southside in quantum meruit without notice to Monarch, thereby depriving Monarch of due process, when Southside sued on an account. This court is still required to address the assignment of error Monarch raises in its cross-appeal, pursuant to App. R. 12(A). This assignment of error follows: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE CON- SOLIDATION PORTION OF MONARCH'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE JUDGMENTS ENTERED AND MODIFY FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY. As a result of this court's disposition of the first assignment of error, to a certain extent this assignment of error - 24 - may be moot. However, to the extent this court must address it, the assignment of error is well taken. Monarch argues the trial court in effect ordered two judgments when only one was proper. This argument is persuasive. Although "[a] decision to permit a setoff of judgments is within the trial court's discretion," Thomas v. Papadelis (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 359, a review of the record in the case sub judice reveals the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by refusing to combine the judgments rendered into one sum. It has already been noted that in the case sub judice, Monarch made no specific claim in its pleading as to an amount of damages it sustained as a result of Southside's breach. Civ. R. 54(C) states in pertinent part the following: (C) Demand for Judgment. *** Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled; however, a demand for judgment which seeks a judgment for money shall limit the claimant to the sum claimed in the demand unless he amends his demand not later than seven days before the commencement of the trial. Additional service of process is not necessary upon such amendment. (Emphasis added.) Since Monarch did not claim a sum certain in the demand, i.e., in its counterclaim, it is reasonable to assume the trial court separated the awards in order to "clarify" its judgment. This is ordinarily a proper course of action. Taylor v. Taylor (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 79. However, from this court's discussion - 25 - of Southside's assignment of error it is obvious the trial court failed in any attempt to render a clear judgment. Moreover, the facts of the case sub judice are closely analogous to those of Betz v. Timmon (1963), 119 Ohio App. 239, wherein the court stated the following: As appears from the pleadings, the controversy here arose under two contracts between the parties *** The 1959 contract was the subject of the first cause of action and the 1958 contract was the subject of the second cause of action in the second amended cross-petition above referred to. Careful examination of the exhibits attached to the amended petition indicates that, although the suit was on account, it related to the same two contracts as those referred to in the first and second causes of action of the cross-petition. In a situation such as this where adverse claims are made relating to the same or related subject matter, the trial court may make findings in favor of either party but should render only one judgment and that in favor of the party having the greater amount due. In the case of Gordon v. Steinmetz (1905), 71 Ohio St. 372, the Supreme Court of Ohio so held, the first paragraph of the syllabus reading: "When in an action for the recovery of money only, the defendant in his answer, sets out a counterclaim or set-off, there may be a finding in favor of each party, but only one judgment is proper, and that for the difference between the amounts of the findings and for the party in whose favor is the greater amount ***." Accord, Baldwin v. Baldwin (1946), 37 Ohio Law Abs. 400. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the consolidation portion of Monarch's motion to consolidate - 26 - judgments entered and modify findings of fact, opinion and judgment entry. Accordingly, Monarch's assignment of error also has merit. Therefore, this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion for the analysis of damages awarded on the claim and the counterclaim. - 27 - This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN McMANAMON, P.J. SPELLACY, J. CONCUR JUDGE BLANCHE KRUPANSKY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .