COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60199 STATE OF OHIO : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : : and -vs- : : OPINION : JAMES DOTSON : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 26, 1992 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 234451 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: John T. Corrigan Michael A. Wypasek Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 605 Terminal Tower By: William D. Mason Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2203 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 1 - ANN McMANAMON, P.J.: James Dotson challenges his guilty plea on one count of aggravated burglary and one count of robbery with an aggravated felony specification. He raises one assignment of error claiming his pleas were involuntary. Upon review of the record, we affirm. Dotson was indicted in 1989 on one count of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery and robbery. All three counts contained an aggravated felony specification. On October 19, 1989, Dotson entered into a plea in which the aggravated robbery count and aggravated felony specification were to be nolled in exchange for a plea of guilty on the aggravated burglary and robbery counts with an aggravated felony specification. The court accepted the plea and sentenced Dotson to concurrent terms of five to twenty years for the aggravated burglary and eight to fifteen years on the robbery count. Dotson claims his pleas were not voluntary because: 1) he was promised lenient sentences, but in fact, received much harsher sentences than anticipated; 2) his pleas were coerced by threats made against his grandfather; 3) he has a low I.Q. and did not realize the full consequences of his pleas. Before entering a plea, a defendant must be advised of basic constitutional rights pursuant to Crim. R. 11(C), which provides in part: - 2 - "(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: "(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. "(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. "(C) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his right to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself." A defendant must be informed about these rights before accepting a plea which waives them. State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 473. A trial court need not use the exact language of Crim. R. 11(C) to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights but need only explain them "in a manner reasonably intelligent to that defendant." Id. at paragraph two of syllabus, citing State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 342, modified. Substantial compliance with Crim. R. 11(C), however, is required when accepting a guilty plea, State v. Flint (1986), 36 Ohio App. 3d 4; State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 86, and a determination of that is made from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Carter (1979), 60 Ohio St. 2d 34. An examination of the record fails to support Dotson's claim that his pleas were involuntary or defective. At the pretrial - 3 - hearing, the trial judge explained all of Dotson's constitutional rights pursuant to Crim. R. 11(C). We recognize that defense counsel initially told Dotson that if he pled guilty to the charges, "The judge is going to give you eight years." The prosecutor repeated this statement, but the trial judge immediately corrected him, telling Dotson that he would receive a "minimum of eight years." The court then informed defendant that he would be pleading guilty to aggravated burglary which carries a minimum penalty of five, six, seven, eight, nine or ten years to a minimum of twenty-five years. Dotson was informed also that he would be pleading guilty to robbery, an aggravated felony of the second degree which carries a minimum penalty of eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve to fifteen years. Dotson responded both times that he understood the charges and the penalties involved. As to Dotson's other claims of involuntariness, we find them to be unsupported by the record. Defense counsel informed Dotson that, if he accepted the plea bargain, "We're going to drop your grandpa's charge completely." It is not clear from the record what involvement, if any, the grandfather had in this case. Nevertheless, we note the judge's later questions to defendant and his responses that no threats or promises had been made in exchange for his pleas. Finally, defense counsel admitted Dotson's I.Q. was borderline, but iterated that he "is competent to stand trial and understands what is going on" and by no means was he "mentally - 4 - retarded." In spite of his purportedly low intelligence, we find Dotson understood the nature and consequences of his pleas. Based on the trial court's statements and inquiries of defendant that he understood the charges and penalties involved and Dotson's response in the affirmative, we conclude both pleas were voluntary. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. - 5 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, J., KRUPANSKY, J., CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE ANN McMANAMON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .