COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60154 CITY OF CLEVELAND : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION SCOTT BALLOU : : Defendant-appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : MAY 21, 1992 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Cleveland Municipal Court : Case No. 88 CVH 19872 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: For defendant-appellant: BRIAN FRITZ, ESQ. c/o City of Cleveland Law Department Room 106, City Hall 601 Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, OH 44114 JOHN W. HICKEY, ESQ. 3794 Pearl Road Cleveland, OH 44109 - 2 - PATTON, J. Defendant-appellant Scott Ballou ("appellant") received numerous parking tickets issued by the City of Cleveland between the dates of November 7, 1985 and September 4, 1986. On or about June 24, 1988, a judgment was entered against the appellant through the Parking Violations Bureau of the City of Cleveland in the amount of $1,025. On February 10, 1989, the appellant filed a motion to vacate judgment in the Cleveland Municipal Court. On June 27, 1989, the City of Cleveland filed a brief in opposition to the motion. The trial court overruled the motion to vacate judgment on June 18, 1990. This timely appeal followed. Appellant's sole assignment of error provides: WHETHER THE CITY OF CLEVELAND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF O.R.C. 4521.02 BY CONTIN- UING TO USE THE TRAFFIC CITATION, THAT IS THE PARKING TICKET, WHICH WAS IN USE PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF THE PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU AND THEREBY FAILED TO GIVE THE PROPER NOTICE TO DEFEN- DANT/APPELLANT AS REQUIRED BY O.R.C. 4521.03. Appellant argues the parking citations issued to him between the dates of November 7, 1985, and September 4, 1986 do not comply with the requirements contained in R.C. 4521.03(B). We find that the parking citations issued to the appellant were in compliance with the requirements contained in R.C. 4521.03. We further find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate how the alleged discrepancies prejudiced him. Therefore, we affirm the Cleveland Municipal Court's judgment. - 3 - R.C. 4521.02 authorized the "local authority" to decriminalize parking citations. R.C. 4521.02(A) provides in relevant part: (A) A local authority that enacts any ordinance, resolution, or regulation that regulates the standing or parking of vehicles and that is authorized pursuant to section 505.17 or 4511.07 of the Revised Code also by ordinance, resolution, or regulation may specify that a violation of the regulatory ordinance, resolution, or regulation shall not be considered a criminal offense for any purpose, that a person who commits the violation shall not be arrested as a result of the commis- sion of the violation, and that the violation shall be handled pursuant to this chapter. Effective on December 18, 1984, the City of Cleveland established the Parking Violations Bureau pursuant to Revised Code Chapter 4521. The parking ticket constitutes the summons and complaint for purposes of informing the recipient of the nature of the infraction and the procedures for contesting the violations. The statutory requirements for parking citations are contained in R.C. 4521.03(B), which provides: (B) The parking ticket adopted by a local author- ity pursuant to division (A) of this section shall be used by its law enforcement officers in all cases in which a person is charged with committing a parking infraction in its political subdivision. Each parking ticket shall contain provisions that advise the person upon whom it is served that the person must answer in relation to the parking infraction charged in the ticket and that certain penalties may result from a failure to timely answer, indicate the allowable answers that may be made and that the person will be afforded a hear- ing if he denies in his answer that he committed the parking infraction, specify the entity to which, the time within which, and the allowable manners in which the answer must be made, indicate the penalties that may result from failure to - 4 - timely answer and the fine that arises from the parking infraction, warn that failure to timely answer or to appear at a requested hearing will be considered an admission of the parking infraction, and warn that a default civil judgment potentially may be entered against the person and, if differ- ent, the owner of the vehicle if the person fails to timely answer or to appear at a requested hearing. Appellant contends that the parking citations he received between November 7, 1985 and September 4, 1986 did not clearly 1 comport with the R.C. 4521.03(B) requirements. Specifically, appellant maintains that the parking tickets do not state that the violator will be afforded a hearing if he denies committing the parking infraction and that failure to appear will be consid- ered an admission of the parking infraction. This court has previously indicated that absent a showing by defendant that the City's failure to use the prescribed ticket prejudiced his right to know the nature and cause of the accusa- tion, or his ability to defend against that accusation, the summons and complaint, i.e., the ticket, would not be considered defective or invalid. Cf. Cleveland v. Winchell (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 186, 188. The parking tickets issued to the appellant state: You must, within 15 days, answer this infraction by admitting the parking infraction, admitting the parking infraction with an explanation of the circumstances, or denying the parking infraction and requesting a hearing. 1 The parking tickets issued under the authority of the City of Cleveland Parking Violations Bureau were amended on July 21, 1986. - 5 - Appellant argues the language is merely permissive and does not clearly convey the message that if a hearing is requested it will be afforded. However, the language specifically provides for the denial of a parking infraction and a request for a hearing. Had the appellant denied the parking infractions and requested hearings, it is reasonable to conclude that hearings would have been conducted. In the instant case the appellant never requested a hearing nor was he denied a hearing. Instead, the appellant chose to ignore the citations by failing to provide any response whatsoever. Under these circumstances, we find that the appellant was not prejudiced by the City's failure to use the exact language contained in R.C. 4521.03(B). The tickets also state: Failure to answer within 15 days will result in a $5.00 penalty and may result in additional penalties prescribed by ordinance and default judgment against you. Appellant argues that the language fails to put him on notice that a failure to timely answer or appear at a requested hearing will be considered an admission of the parking infrac- tion. However, the language used specifically provides that failure to answer will result in entry of a default judgment. Given the above language, we conclude appellant was put on notice that a judgment would be entered against him absent a timely response. Additionally, appellant has failed to demonstrate that - 6 - he was adversely affected by the City's failure to use the exact language contained in R.C. 4521.03. Consistent with the foregoing, the judgment of the Cleveland Municipal Court is affirmed. The appellant has failed to demon- strate a meritorious claim or defense. Therefore, the motion to vacate judgment was properly overruled. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 17, 20. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JAMES D. SWEENEY, J. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .