COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60062 ANGELA FARACI, ET AL. : : : PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : PAUL MEDINGER : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 9, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Juvenile Court Division, 88-73308. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellants: Robert P. DeMarco, Esq. Robert P. DeMarco & Associates 1620 Midland Building 101 Prospect Avenue, N.W. Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For Defendant-Appellee: Robert J. Vecchio, Esq. Vecchio & Schulz Co., L.P.A. 720 Leader Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- SWEENEY, JAMES D., J.: Plaintiff-appellant Angela Faraci ("Faraci") appeals from the trial court's order of May 10, 1990, whereby the court found that defendant-appellee Paul Medinger ("Medinger") was not the natural father of Faraci's minor child in this paternity action. For the reasons adduced below, we affirm. Prior to beginning the substance of this appeal, it is noted that Faraci's two assignments of error herein do not contest the trial or the verdict of that trial. Rather, appellant takes issue with alleged error in a a pre-trial hearing on a proposed written settlement agreement, which, in fact, was rejected by the court on May 7, 1990, following the hearing. Therefore, our analysis will be restricted to the proceedings surrounding the proposed settlement agreement. A review of the record reveals that plaintiff filed her complaint to determine paternity on December 30, 1988. See R.C. 3111.04. Defendant filed his answer with leave of court, generally denying paternity, on February 27, 1989. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 11, 1989, naming her minor daughter, Lisa Therese Faraci, date of birth March 16, 1989, as a new-party plaintiff. An amended answer was filed by defendant May 17, 1989. At a referee's hearing held on January 23, 1990, the results of genetic testing were received. These tests did not exclude the defendant as being the father of the child, finding that the probability of paternity was 97.7%. The case was continued for trial to the court. -3- On April 24, 1990, the court held a hearing in open court on 1 the proposed settlement agreement. At the hearing, the defendant, for purposes of the hearing and the agreement, admitted that he was the father. (R. 5, 27). The court took testimony from the two adult parties, as well as heard comments by their respective counsel. The court grew uncomfortable with the proposed agreement due to its belief that: (1) the amount of $10,000.00 would not adequately provide for the reasonable care and support of the child throughout its minority [R. 16-17]; (2) the language in the agreement that prohibited subsequent contact between the plaintiff and the child, and the defendant, was not in the future best interest of the child [R. 14-15]; (3) there may be a possibility of conflict between the agreement's terms regarding the lump sum payment and providing health care insurance and the then newly enacted paternity statutes contained 2 in R.C. 3113.21-.218 [R. 16, 21-23] ; (4) the failure to join the welfare department as a party to the agreement, or obtain a waiver from that department for past care and support of the child, could create problems in the future, [R. 24]; and, (5) 1 The proposed agreement, in summary, provided that in exchange for the admission of paternity and payment in lump sum of $10,000.00 by the defendant, the plaintiff would forever release and discharge defendant from any and all claims of past, present and future support, including medical expenses and all other expenses associated with the birth, rearing, support and care of the child. This agreement, although signed by defendant, was never signed by the plaintiff. 2 These statutes were effective as of April 11, 1991, approximately two weeks before the hearing on the proposed agreement. -4- there were misrepresentations of fact on plaintiff's part as to her employment, ability to obtain child care, and welfare status. [R. 25]. The court then, on the record at the hearing, informed counsel and the parties that due to the court's misgivings, the proposed agreement would not be accepted at that point and the admission of paternity given during the hearing would be vacated and the case was scheduled for trial on May 8, 1990. (R. 26- 27). No objection was raised by counsel as to the court's action at the hearing. At trial, defendant was found not to be the natural father of the child. Appellant raises two assignments of error for review: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION OF PATERNITY. II THE DISREGARD OF THE ADMISSION OF PATERNITY, RECONSIDERATION OF PRIOR ADJUDICATION, AND REJECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE CONSTITUTES A GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The arguments raised in these assignments address the pre- trial hearing on the proposed settlement agreement, to-wit: (1) the court's order vacating defendant's admission of paternity at the hearing made for purposes of adopting a proposed settlement agreement; and (2) the court's rejection of the proposed settlement agreement at the hearing. The judgment of May 10, -5- 1990, arising from the trial, is not addressed in these assignments. It is noted in this case that counsel for plaintiff, at no time, objected to the court's determination to vacate defendant's conditional admission of paternity and not accept the proposed settlement agreement. Any error therein is waived and may not be raised on appeal. See Walker v. Cadillac Motor Car Div. (1989), 63 Ohio App. 3d 220, 227, motion to certify record overruled in (1989), 46 Ohio St. 3d 703. Assignments overruled. Judgment affirmed. -6- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Juvenile Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JOHN T. PATTON, P.J., and AUGUST PRYATEL, J.*, CONCUR. JAMES D. SWEENEY JUDGE (*SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT: August Pryatel, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District.) N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .