COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59972 STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-appellee : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION CALVIN REDDING, JR. : : Defendant-appellant : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MARCH 5, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Criminal appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CR-246,603 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellee: STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES Cuyahoga County Prosecutor TIMOTHY MILLER, Assistant HENRY J. HILOW, Assistant Justice Center, Courts Tower 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 For defendant-appellant: REGIS E. McGANN Attorney at Law 450 Standard Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 3 - FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, P.J.: Defendant-appellant, Calvin Redding, Jr., and his mother, co- defendant Marcia Redding, were each indicted on one court of murder (R.C. 2903.02) with a firearm specification. Appellant and co-defendant pleaded not guilty. After a jury trial, appel- lant and co-defendant were found guilty as indicted. Appellant timely appeals his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The pertinent testimony of appellant states that on May 18, 1989, he was awakened by his mother and father, Calvin Redding, Sr., arguing downstairs. After about five minutes, his sister, Sanya Redding, came into his room. Appellant testified he heard his mother yell, "Get off me." After a while, appellant stated he heard a thump going downstairs, at which time he told his sister he was going to find out what was going on. Appellant, seventeen years old at the time, went downstairs into the basement and saw his father choking his mother. Appel- lant pleaded with his father to stop and attempted to grab his father around the waist, but was elbowed to the floor. Mean- while, appellant testified his father continued to choke his mother. Appellant then stated he picked up a gun and shot his father twice from behind to prevent his father from choking his - 2 - mother. Appellant testified that his father immediately turned around, as if his father were coming toward him, when the gun went off three more times. Appellant then broke down in tears as his mother took the gun from his hands and told him everything would be all right. Thereafter, appellant went back upstairs and told his sister to go off to school. Sometime after the shooting, appellant went to his girlfriend's house and told her he shot his father because his father was beating up on his mother. Appellant admitted that it was not until the weekend before his mother's trial for the instant murder that he told the police, through his lawyer, that he shot his father. Addition- ally, appellant testified to having been physically abused by his father. At approximately 5:30 to 6:00 p.m. on May 18, 1989, Devon Redding, appellant's cousin, visited appellant's house. Devon testified that while on the front porch with appellant, she asked him for a glass of water. Appellant stated she could go into the kitchen and get it, but when she proceeded to go into the kit- chen, Marcia told her not to as the kitchen was not straightened up. Later, back on the porch, Devon asked where her Uncle Calvin was, to which Marcia replied, "He ain't got home from work yet." Dennis Ranc, Calvin, Sr.'s employer, also testified to hav- ing spoken with appellant and Marcia Redding on May 18, 1989. Mr. Ranc spoke with appellant twice that day. Appellant first - 3 - told Mr. Ranc, at approximately 9:00 a.m., that Calvin, Sr. had already left for work. Mr. Ranc spoke with appellant again at 1:30 p.m. Finally, Mr. Ranc testified that he spoke with Marcia Redding at approximately 5:00 p.m. and that she became very upset and worried after learning that Calvin, Sr. had not shown up for work. Both Sanya Redding, appellant's fourteen-year-old sister, and Marcia Redding corroborated much of appellant's testimony, except that Sanya stayed upstairs during the shooting. Sanya further stated that it was not until her father's funeral that appellant told her that he shot their father. Additionally, Marcia Redding testified that Calvin, Sr. took his gun out of his dresser drawer and threatened her that morning. Marcia further stated that after the shooting, she attempted to clean things up. Marcia stated she got the kids ready for school and then went to work until 4:00 p.m. Upon returning home, Marcia proceeded to place a few shells into the gun in case Calvin, Sr. came up from the basement. When appellant came home, she placed the gun under a pillow in the couch. At approximately 7:00 to 7:30 p.m., Marcia went to her parents' house, where she told her brother, Larry Ford, that she had shot and killed Calvin, Sr. At 9:37 p.m., Larry Ford called the police, who responded to the Reddings' residence. To protect her son, Marcia testified she told the police (and gave them a written statement) that she shot Calvin, Sr. during a - 4 - domestic argument. On cross-examination, Marcia denied shooting the victim twice before running out of bullets. She further denied that appellant re-loaded the gun and fired the final three shots (thereby leaving three live rounds in the gun's chamber as found by the police). Additionally, George Redding, the victim's brother, testified that the gun in question belonged to Marcia and not the victim as Marcia testified. Mr. Redding further stated that Marcia told him she killed his brother because she was "tired of arguing and fighting." Officers Robinson and Arko and Detectives Adrine and Gold- stein each testified concerning the investigation into this matter. Officer Robinson stated that Marcia Redding told him she shot the victim. Officer Robinson further found the murder wea- pon under the couch, along with a box containing forty-two live rounds remaining of fifty shells. The semi-automatic .25 caliber handgun contained three live rounds in its chamber, which can hold up to six shells. Detectives Adrine and Goldstein testified that there were no visible marks, bruises or contusions on Marcia Redding's body, nor did she complain of any when asked. Detec- tive Goldstein further stated there was no appearance of a strug- gle downstairs in the basement. Dr. P. S. Screenivasa Murthy performed the autopsy on the victim's body. Dr. Murthy observed five gunshot wounds to the victim's head and an abrasion over the victim's eyebrow. - 5 - Specifically, Dr. Murthy testified the gunshot entrance wounds were to the back of the neck, the back of the head, the right temple, the top of the head, and the right side of the head. Further, the victim could have had some purposeful movement after receiving the wounds to the back of the neck and head; however, the other three entrance wounds were all lethal and paralyzing injuries collectively and individually. Dr. Murthy also testified that stippling, a term used to describe the colored speckles of burnt gun powder near an entrance wound, was detected near the entrance wound to the top of the victim's head. This would indicate that the distance from the muzzle of the gun to the entrance wound was no greater than six to eight inches at the time the gun was fired. Further, fouling, which is the disposition of burnt and unburnt powder on the surface of the skin near the entrance wound, was detected near the entrance wound to the victim's right temple. Fouling materials travel slightly further than stippling materials and indicate a twelve- to eighteen-inch distance between the muzzle of a gun and the entrance wound at the time the gun is fired. Sharon Rosenberg, also with the Cuyahoga County Coroner's Office, testified as to various tests performed on the victim and corroborated Dr. Murthy's testimony concerning the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the entrance wounds at the time the gun was fired. It was her opinion that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the entrance wound to the victim's - 6 - right temple was two to three inches; six inches from the muzzle to the entrance wound above the victim's right ear; and approxi- mately fifteen inches from the muzzle to the entrance wound on top of the victim's head. It was her further testimony that the shots fired into the back of the victim's head and neck were shot from a distance greater than twenty-four inches. Dr. Lynn Bravo Rosewater, as an expert witness, testified on appellant's behalf concerning post-traumatic stress disorder from which, she claimed, appellant suffered. Dr. James R. Brown tes- tified as a rebuttal witness, stating that Dr. Rosewater, in her diagnosis, may have failed to verify the information provided her by appellant and she may have failed to take into account malin- gering, which is the intentional producing of false or grossly exaggerated symptoms by a patient in order to achieve a certain goal. Finally, Frank Nechyatal, an assistant principal at appel- lant's high school, testified, on rebuttal, as to appellant's absenteeism and suspension for fighting and other gang-related incidents. Lastly, Rocco Olivero, appellant's English and home- room teacher, testified, on surrebuttal, on appellant's behalf. Based upon the above evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of murder in violation of R.C. 2902.03, with a firearm specification. Appellant timely appeals, raising nine assign- ments of error. - 7 - Appellant's first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO CONDUCT AN INDIVIDUAL POLLING OF THE JURY THUS DEPRIVING THE APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Appellant argues the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to conduct an individual polling of the jury. This argument lacks merit. Crim. R. 31(D) provides: When a verdict is returned and before it is accepted, the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the court's own volition. If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberation or may be discharged. In the present case, the trial court asked the jury: *** for a show of hands if this is the verdict that you have returned in relation to the State of Ohio versus the Reddings? Would you indicate by raising your right hands? All 12 members of the jury have, in fact, indicated that this is their verdict. While Crim. R. 31(D) requires the trial court, at the request of any party, to poll the jury concerning its verdict, the rule is silent as to how a jury poll is carried out. Crim. R. 57(B) provides that "[i]f no procedure is specifically proscribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules of criminal procedure, and shall look to the rules of civil procedure and to applicable law if no rule of criminal procedure exists." Civ. R. 48 provides, in pertinent part, upon request of either party, the jury shall be polled by - 8 - asking each juror if the verdict is the verdict of that juror. Civ. R. 48 merely requires that each juror be polled, but does not require that each juror be polled individually, as opposed to collectively. It is well established, and deeply embedded within our common law, that the purpose of a jury poll is to provide a defendant his fundamental right to meet the jury face to face when the verdict is delivered and to demand of each member his separate verdict. See: Seargent v. State (1841), 11 Ohio Reports 472; State v. Engles (1844), 13 Ohio Reports 490; Rose v. State (1851), 20 Ohio Reports 32; and City of Dayton v. Allen (1959), 94 O.L.A. 129. In the present case, we find appellant was afforded his fundamental right to meet the jury face to face and demand of each juror his separate verdict. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is over- ruled. Appellant's second assignment of error follows: THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO TAKE ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION ALTHOUGH AWARE OF ITS BAILIFF'S IMPROPER COMMUNICATIONS WITH JURY DURING ITS DELIBERATIONS. Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to take any corrective action concerning alleged improper communication between its bailiff and the jury. This argument lacks merit. - 9 - Misconduct by the court's bailiff in communicating to the jury during its deliberations (except to ask if it has agreed on a verdict) is a violation of R.C. 2945.33 and will be presumed to be prejudicial to a defendant against whom, after such communica- tion, a guilty verdict is returned by such jury. State v. King (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 93, paragraph 2 of court's syllabus; State v. Lane (1988), 48 Ohio App. 3d 172, modified on reconsi- deration, 49 Ohio App. 3d 158; and State v. Adams (1943), 141 Ohio St. 423. In the above-cited cases, the complaining party produced some evidence of substantive misconduct on the part of the court's bailiff to invoke the presumption of prejudice. See, also, State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 164, paragraph 13 of court's syllabus. In the present case, appellant notes that certain jury questions had been addressed to the court through its bailiff at around 11:00 a.m. on May 8, 1990. Appellant alleges that a conversation then took place between the court's bailiff and the jury in which the jury was told to continue deliberating. The jury continued to deliberate until 1:30 p.m. that day without any answers to its questions. The next day, when the jury convened around 9:00 a.m., the trial court answered its questions. Thereafter, at 11:50 a.m., the jury returned its verdict. However, appellant fails to produce any substantive misconduct on the part of the trial court's bailiff. Rather, appellant merely alleges some communication took place between the court's bailiff and the jury. Furthermore, the trial court - 10 - did respond to the jury's questions on May 9th, and the jury continued to deliberate after that court's response. Thus, any error in the jury's continued deliberation on May 8th is harmless since the jury deliberated the following day after receiving further guidance. Therefore, we find appellant's second assignment of error lacks merit. Appellant's third, eighth and ninth assignments of error raise similar issues and will be considered jointly. They state: THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE ISSUE OF AIDING AND ABETTING IN ITS INITIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PRO-CESS OF LAW WHEN IT MODIFIED ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON AIDING AND ABETTING IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE JURY. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT PROCEEDED TO CONSTRUCTIVELY AMEND THE INDICTMENT TO CHARGE UPON A THEORY OF AIDING AND ABETTING WHEN NONE WAS ALLEGED BY THE PROSECUTION. In appellant's third assignment of error, appellant initially argues the trial court erred by reducing the culpable mental state required for a conviction of murder from "purposely" to "purposely or knowingly." Appellant contests the following jury instruction: Now, in connection with the evidence in this case, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that this defendant, Calvin Redding, Jr. or Marcia Redding knowingly or purposely aided, helped, assisted, encouraged, directed, or acted in concert with each other for the purpose of committing this crime, they are regarded as if they were the - 11 - principal offenders and are just as guilty as if they each, personally, performed every act constituting this offense. In charging the jury, the court must state to it all matters of law necessary for the information of the jury in giving its verdict. R.C. 2945.11. The murder statute (R.C. 2902.03[A]) provides that "[n]o person shall purposely cause the death of another." The complicity statute (R.C. 2923.03[A]) provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpa- bility required for the commission of the offense, shall *** [a]id or abet another in committing the offense." Finally, R.C. 2901.22 provides a definition for the term "purposely." While the inclusion of "knowingly" in the above jury in- struction on aiding and abetting in the commission of murder constitutes error, we find such error is harmless. First, the trial court correctly charged the jury on murder. The court then defined "purposely," and thoroughly discussed the term in seven succinct paragraphs, as it related to the charge of murder. Furthermore, nowhere in the trial court's charge to the jury does the court discuss or define the term "knowingly." Finally, the court's charge on aiding and abetting emphasized that the parties must act "in concert with each other for the purpose of commit- ting this crime ***." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, this court can say that the inclusion of the term "knowingly" in connection with "purposely" in the aiding and abetting portion of the trial - 12 - court's charge to the jury constitutes harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Crim. R. 52(A). Appellant cites this court's decision in State v. Mabry (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 13, as authority requiring reversal in the present case. However, Mabry is distinguishable from the present case. In Mabry, this court held the trial court committed preju- dicial error through portions of its jury instructions which allowed the jury to find the requisite culpable mental state re- quired for each offense to be "present in the mind of the defen- dant, or another or others whom he aided and abetted ***." In the present case, the trial court's instructions clearly required the requisite culpable mental state to be present in the mind of the appellant. Appellant also argues the court's instructions on aiding and abetting were prejudicial error because the court failed to inform the jury that "[n]o person shall be convicted of compli- city under this section [R.C. 2923.03(C)] unless an offense is actually committed, ***." However, appellant failed to object at trial to this alleged prejudicial omission in the trial court's instruction. Therefore, appellant waived any right to assign as error this alleged prejudicial omission. Crim. R. 30(A). Appellant additionally argues the trial court's charge is unconstitutional in that it is framed such that if one of the parties were found to have the specific intent necessary for a conviction for murder, it could be presumed to be present in the - 13 - aider and abettor. This argument lacks merit. Appellant simply fails to point out which portion of the court's charge permits the jury to presume specific intent, and this court cannot con- ceive of that portion to which appellant objects. Finally, appellant argues the trial court failed to speci- fically instruct the jury pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(D). However, this subsection requires the relevant cautionary charge only where an alleged accomplice testifies against a defendant. In the present case, appellant was not entitled to the relevant cautionary charge because Marcia Redding testified on her own behalf and not against appellant. Therefore, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. In appellant's eighth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by repeating its original charge on aiding and abetting in response to the jury's inquiry to define aiding and abetting. However, as previously discussed, the court's inclusion of the term "knowingly" is harmless. Moreover, in response to the jury's inquiry, the trial court continued by emphasizing that the parties must act "in concert with another for the purpose of committing a crime." (Emphasis added.) The court's following paragraph again re-emphasized that each person must have "a common purpose to commit a crime ***." Therefore, in light of the trial court's emphasis on the term "purpose" and its omission of the definition of "knowingly," we - 14 - conclude the court's charge, in response to the jury's inquiry, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Crim. R. 52(A). Appellant next argues the following portion of the trial court's modified charge is unconstitutional in that it allowed the jury to: *** infer the aider or abettor's purpose to kill where the facts show that the participants in a felony entered into a common design and either the aider or abettor knew that an inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be employed to accomplish a felony or the manner of its accomplishment would reasonably be likely to produce death. However, this portion of the court's charge is a correct state- ment of the law and is entirely consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's holdings in State v. Scott (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 155, 165, and State v. Lockett (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus, reversed on other grounds, Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586. Finally, appellant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by expanding the charge to include conspiracy. However, we note appellant failed to specifically object to that portion of the trial court's charge which merely included the phrase "parti- cipate as a co-conspirator" among the acts which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the accused could be convicted as an aider or abettor. Therefore, appellant waived such objec- tion for purposes of appeal. Crim. R. 30(A). Moreover, we note that R.C. 2923.03(A)(3) includes conspiracy as an act prohibited under the complicity statute. - 15 - Therefore, appellant's eighth assignment of error is over- ruled. Finally, in appellant's ninth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by constructively amending the indictment to charge the appellant with aiding and abetting. Appellant argues the indictment only charged him with purposely causing the death of Calvin Redding, Sr., and to charge him with aiding and abetting denied him his due process rights to be put on notice of the specific charge. This argument lacks merit. R.C. 2923.03 specifically provides that "[a] charge of com- plicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense." Moreover, where the evidence adduced at trial could reasonably be found to have proven the defendant was an aider and abettor, a jury instruction by the trial court on that subject is proper. State v. Perryman (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 14. In such circumstances, a defendant, through his attorney, has legal notice of the possibility that the jury might be given a complicity instruction, even though he has been charged and tried as a principal offender. Hill v. Perini (6th Cir. 1986), 788 F.2d 406. Therefore, appellant's ninth assignment of error is without merit. Appellant's fourth assignment of error follows: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN - 16 - REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEFENSE OF A THIRD PERSON, THE APPELLANT HAD NO DUTY TO RETREAT IN HIS HOME. Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury that appellant had no duty to retreat since he was in his home while in defense of a third person. This argument lacks merit. If a person in good faith and upon reasonable ground believes that a family member is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, such person may use reasonably necessary force to defend the family member to the same extent as the per-son would be entitled to use force in self-defense. State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 247, paragraph one of the syl-labus. To establish self-defense, the defendant must show: "*** (1) *** [he] was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) *** [he] had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of *** force; and (3) [he] must not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. ***" Id., at 249, quoting State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 74. The elements of self-defense are cumulative, and only when a defendant has demonstrated the first two elements of the defense is he entitled to rely on the rule that there is no duty to re- treat from one's home. See, State v. Jackson (1986), 22 Ohio App. 3d 281, 284, cert. den. (1986), 480 U.S. 917; and Willi- ford, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus. - 17 - In the present case, the trial court's charge to the jury substantially followed the elements of self-defense as contained in Robbins, supra. However, the trial court omitted any refer- ence to lack of a duty to retreat or avoid danger from one's own home. Nonetheless, we find any error in the trial court's charge to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant relied on the testimony of his mother, Marcia Redding, Dr. Rosewater and himself to establish his claim of defense of a family member. However, by his own testimony, appellant claimed that he shot the victim twice from behind while the victim choked appellant's mother. Appellant, also, claimed the victim appeared to turn toward him and the gun went off three more times. Marcia Redding also testified that appellant shot the victim from behind while the victim choked her. Moreover, no evidence was presented by the state which would suggest that appellant or his mother could have retreated during the incident in question. To the contrary, the state's theory of the case was to refute any claim of defense of another. Thus, the trier of fact must have necessarily re- jected appellant's claim concerning the first two elements of the defense of a family member. Therefore, we hold the court's failure to give an instruction that there exists no duty to retreat from one's home is harmless and did not contribute to appellant's conviction. State v. Jackson, supra. Accordingly, appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled. - 18 - Appellant's fifth assignment of error states: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ANY TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME. Appellant argues testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome should have been admitted to aid the jury in fully understanding the actions taken by the co-defendant, Marcia Redding, as well as for a full understanding of her testimony. This argument lacks merit. Admission of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome is to assist the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only means of escape. State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, paragraph three of the syllabus. Such testimony is pertinent "to determine whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger when considering the issue of self-defense." Id., at 216. In the present case, co-defendant Marcia Redding did not claim self-defense. The only defense raised by either defendant was defense of a family member. Therefore, testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome was not relevant inasmuch as Marcia Redding did not raise the defense of self-defense. Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is over- ruled. - 19 - Finally, we come to appellant's sixth and seventh assignments of error. They state: THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DENIED THE APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO REPEATEDLY PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE APPELLANT'S CHARACTER THROUGH QUESTIONS CONCERNING IRRELEVANT COLLATERAL MATTERS. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING THE APPELLANT'S CREDIBILITY TO BE REBUTTED BY EXTRINSIC PROOF OF SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF HIS CONDUCT. Appellant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting testimony of appellant's character in violation of Evid. R. 404(B) and by allowing appellant's credibility to be rebutted by extrinsic proof of specific instances of his conduct in violation of Evid. R. 608(B). This argument lacks merit. Evid. R. 404(B) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Evid. R. 404(B) is essentially an extension of Evid. R. 404(A), which is intended to preclude a prejudicial attack on a defendant's character. State v. Smith (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 137, 140. Generally, extrinsic acts may not be used to prove the inference that the accused acted in conformity with his other acts or that he has a propensity to act in such a manner. Id. However, Evid. R. 404(B) permits "other acts" evidence for "other - 20 - purposes," including, but not limited to, certain enumerated issues. Id. Appellant initially argues the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Frank Nechyatal during the state's case-in-chief concerning appellant's absence from school on May 18, 1989. However, except for one objection which was sustained, appellant waived any alleged error by failing to object to this testimony. In any event, appellant's absence from school on the date in question is highly relevant to the issues of preparation, plan and knowledge, at least as it relates to his actions after the shooting. Appellant also argues it was prejudicial error to allow the prosecution to inquire of the co-defendant, Marcia Redding, into various matters including appellant's absenteeism, suspension from school, and involvement with gangs and fighting. However, Marcia Redding's knowledge of appellant's absenteeism and suspen- sion from school for fighting was highly relevant to refute the claim that after the shooting, Marcia told appellant to go to school. As such, her knowledge of appellant's absenteeism and suspensions is admissible to the issues of preparation, plan and knowledge, at least relative to after the shooting. Therefore, appellant's sixth assignment of error is overruled. Finally, appellant contends the trial court committed rever- sible error in allowing the rebuttal testimony of Frank Nechyatal concerning specific instances of misconduct, including appel- - 21 - lant's absenteeism and suspensions for fighting and gang-related incidents. Evid. R. 608(B) provides, in pertinent part: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if clearly probative of truthfulness or un-truthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. As the Ohio Supreme Court has noted in State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St. 3d 306, paragraph two of the syllabus: Other than the Evid. R. 609 exception for certain criminal convictions, a witness' credibility may not be impeached by extrinsic proof of specific instances of his conduct. Such conduct may be inquired into only by the intrinsic means of cross-examination within the guidelines set forth in Evid. R. 608(B). In the present case, the rebuttal testimony of Frank Nechyatal was offered to impeach the credibility of appellant through specific instances of conduct. Mr. Nechyatal's testimony was intrinsic in nature. See: Kamel, supra, at 311. However, unlike the rebuttal testimony offered in Kamel, supra, we find Mr. Nechyatal's testimony to be harmless. In Kamel, a prosecution for child endangering and involuntary manslaughter, the defendants denied ever having punished their children by grabbing a child's ear and slapping him in the face. In order to rebut these denials, the state presented testimony from a witness who - 22 - observed the defendant pull one of his children upward by the ear and beat the boy's face. The court noted the great potential impact of such testimony as it related to a specific example of child abuse on defendant's part, and it tied into testimony that the deceased child had sustained ear injuries as a probable re- sult of a grabbing force. However, the testimony of Mr. Nechyatal does not relate to a specific example of appellant using deadly force, nor does it tie into any other testimony relative to the events which took place leading to the murder of Calvin Redding, Sr. Accordingly, appellant's seventh assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 23 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, J. HARPER, J. CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE FRANCIS E. SWEENEY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .