COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59958 GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORP. : : Plaintiff : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION NORMAN MULLINS : : Defendant/third-party : plaintiff/appellant : : vs. : : MIC LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION : : Third-party defendant/ : appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : MARCH 26, 1992 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 138,624 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For defendant/third-party WILLIAM L. TOMSON, JR. plaintiff/appellant: Attorney at Law 11221 Pearl Road Strongsville, Ohio 44136 For third-party defendant/ ROBERT F. LINTON, JR. appellee: Attorney at Law 2500 Terminal Tower Cleveland, Ohio 44113-2241 - 1 - FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J.: Third-party plaintiff/appellant, Norman Mullins, appeals from the judgment of the common pleas court which granted the motion for summary judgment of third-party defendant/appellee, MIC Life Insurance Corporation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, filed suit against appellant in replevin and for the balance owing on an installment sales contract stemming from appellant's purchase of a 1984 GMC tractor. Appellant filed an answer and third-party complaint against appellee, alleging that appellee breached a contract of disability insurance by refusing to make payments on the installment sales contract upon appellant's total disability. Appellant's third-party complaint also sought compensatory and punitive damages for appellee's alleged bad faith failure to accept and pay his claim. Appellee timely answered and, there- after, filed its motion for summary judgment. The pertinent facts are as follows: On July 14, 1980, appellant was involved in a motorcycle accident in which he hit his head on the concrete, which caused - 2 - damage to an optic nerve in his right eye. Appellant was ren- dered legally blind in his right eye due to such accident. Additionally, appellant sought, and received, worker's compensa- tion benefits for his injuries, which included the injury to his right eye. Appellant's worker's compensation file attached to appellee's motion for summary judgment contains various medical reports describing appellant's injury to his right eye as being a total loss of vision. On June 2, 1986, appellant purchased a policy of disability insurance from appellee. The certificate of credit life and disability insurance, in pertinent part, states "[a] period of Total Disability must begin while this Form is in force." At the time appellant purchased the instant disability policy, he worked as a truck driver for Service Masters Trans- port, Inc. Service Masters chose to overlook the fact that appellant never applied for certification as a truck driver with the Department of Transportation due to the injury to his right eye. Moreover, appellant stated he would not have qualified for certification. Sometime in the summer or early fall of 1986, Service Mas- ters went out of business. Thereafter, appellant applied for benefits under the instant policy of disability insurance for an injury to an optic nerve occurring on July 14, 1980. Appellee initially approved appellant's claim, but later closed his file with no further payments. - 3 - In appellant's deposition testimony, he states his total disability is that he is "unable to work because of [a] lack of vision in one eye," which occurred as a result of the accident of July 14, 1980. Based on the above evidence, the trial court found in favor of appellee. Appellant timely appeals, raising the following sole assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Appellant argues a material issue of fact exists precluding the trial court from having properly granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. This argument lacks merit. A court reviewing the granting of a summary judgment must follow the standard set forth in Civ. R. 56(C). Stegawski v. Cleveland Anesthesia Group (1987), 37 Ohio App. 3d 78. Civ. R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment can be granted, it must be determined that: *** (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327. In construing the language of a contract of insurance, the Ohio Supreme Court has noted, in Marginian v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 345, 347: - 4 - *** [W]here the provisions of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous Courts may not indulge themselves in enlarging the con- tract by implication in order to embrace an object distinct from that contemplated by the parties, Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. (1939), 136 Ohio St. 49 [15 O.O. 570], paragraph one of the syllabus, nor read into the contract a meaning not placed there by an act of the parties, Motorists Ins. Co. v. Tomanski (197- 0), 27 Ohio St. 2d 222, 226 [56 O.O. 2d 133]; Olmstead v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St. 2d 212, 216 [51 O.O.2d 285], nor make a new contract for the parties where their unequivocal acts demonstrate an inten- tion to the contrary, Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1973), 34 Ohio St. 2d 138, 140 [63 O.O.2d 232]; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Hart- zell Bros. Co. (1924), 109 Ohio St. 566. In the present case, the policy in question is clear and unam- biguous. It states "[a] period of Total Disability must begin while this Form is in force." Appellant's deposition testimony establishes his claimed disability is that he is "unable to work because of [a] lack of vision in one eye," which occurred as a result of an accident on July 14, 1980. In fact, in appellant's application for benefits under the instant policy, he cites an injury to an optic nerve occurring on July 14, 1980 as the cause of his disability. However, the instant policy did not become effective and in force until June 2, 1986. Thus, appellant's total disability did not begin while the policy was in force. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's claim for breach of the instant disability policy. Moreover, reasonable justifica- tion existed for appellee to deny appellant's claim for benefits - 5 - since appellant's total disability did not begin while the policy was in force. See, Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 277; and Staff Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong (1988), 37 Ohio St. 3d 298, 302-303. Thus, appellant's claim for bad faith failure to accept and pay his claim must also fail. Appellant's sole assignment of error is, accordingly, over- ruled. Judgment affirmed. Judgment affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this ap- peal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATTON, J. HARPER, J. CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE FRANCIS E. SWEENEY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .