COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59953 : IN THE MATTER OF: : ALBERT SEARCY : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION : DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT MARCH 26, 1992 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Juvenile Court of Common Pleas Court Case No. 8911841 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: HOWARD DUNN SALVATORE AMATA Dept. of Human Services 1276 W. 3rd Street 3955 Euclid Avenue Suite #307 Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J.: Gorman Searcy, plaintiff-appellant, timely appeals the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court's decision finding his minor son, Albert Searcy, dependent and ordering permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. The facts are as follows: Gorman and Cora Searcy were married in 1986 and their minor son Albert was born on February 27, 1989. Sometime after Albert's birth, the hospital notified Human Services of Cora Searcy's mental health problems and their concerns of her ability to care for Albert. After a number of complaints were filed and dismissed by Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services, the case proceeded to trial on December 15, 1989, and the trial court found Albert to be dependent. There were a number of witnesses called to testify regarding Albert's dependency. The first was Dr. Rosa So, a psychiatrist at the Cleveland Psychiatric Institute. She testified that over several years Cora Searcy has repeatedly been hospitalized for multiple psychiatric episodes. It was her medical opinion that Mrs. Searcy's mental illness would have an effect on her ability to take care of her child. Dr. So diagnosed Mrs. Searcy's condition as bysolar disorder and schizophrenia. Additionally, she testified that Gorman Searcy was very helpful at times but he had no control over his wife and her psychotic episodes. Dr. So testified that Mrs. Searcy experienced normalization whenever she -3- was discharged from the hospital and took her medication. Mrs. Searcy's periodic relapses would occur when she failed to take her medication as prescribed and as needed. Finally, Dr. So did not think that Cora Searcy was in a position of mental capability to care for her child. Lois Burke, a licensed social worker, testified during the trial and stated that she was employed at Community Guidance, Incorporated, a mental health agency, and that Cora Searcy was a client of hers. She testified that Cora Searcy was not compliant with her counseling or her doctor's appointments at the agency. It was her testimony that Mrs. Searcy made statements that she did not need help, nor any services, and that her medication made her ill. The record further reflects Mr. Searcy's inability to control his wife's taking of her medication. Cynthia Pittman, a Social Worker from Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services, was assigned to the case of Albert Searcy. She also testified and stated that Mrs. Searcy was sincere in wanting to care for her child but she was indeed concerned about Mrs. Searcy's ability to do so. Mr. Pittman was also concerned with the safety of the child because of Cora Searcy's psychotic episodes. Her observations relating to Gorman Searcy were insightful as well. She testified that Mr. Searcy admitted that he had no control over his wife's psychotic episodes. Ms. Pittman testified also that Mr. Searcy tended not to admit that his wife had a real illness. Instead, he felt that his wife's problems -4- were caused by Albert's absence from the home. Ms. Pittman also testified that Mr. Searcy was of the mindset that there was nothing he could do to make sure his wife got the medication that she needed or the follow-up care that was absolutely necessary. It was the opinion of Ms. Pittman that Gorman Searcy would be unable to handle the day-to-day responsibilities of caring for Albert Searcy. Her opinion was based on a few factors. The first was Mr. Searcy's previous history of having four other children removed to the custody of Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services. There was also apparently a period of about one year when Gorman Searcy did not have a residence. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Gorman Searcy was unable to insure his wife's compliance with her medical instructions and all of his energy was consumed in taking care of his wife, making it difficult for him to take care of the infant. Ms. Pittman felt that Mr. Searcy would just be overwhelmed. Appellant argues three interrelated assignments of error, consequently, they will be addressed together. They state: THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION FINDING THE CHILD TO BE DEPENDENT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN NO PROOF WAS PRESENTED REGARDING FATHER/APPELLANT'S INABILITY TO PROPERLY CARE AND SUPPORT THE CHILD OR THAT THE CHILD'S CONDITION OR ENVIRONMENT WAS SUCH AS TO WARRANT THE STATE IN ASSUMING HIS GUARDIANSHIP. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES FAILED TO PROVIDE IT WAS IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY AND THE CHILD COULD NOT OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH FATHER/APPELLANT. -5- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY PRIOR TO RECEIVING A WRITTEN REPORT FROM THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM. Gorman Searcy's argument that the complaint filed in this case was premised on R.C. 2151.04(B) and (C), which read in pertinent part: As used in this chapter, "dependent child" includes any child: (B) Who lacks proper care or support by reason of the mental or physical condition of his parents, guardian, or custodian; (C) Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of the child, in assuming his guardianship; These provisions were the underpinnings of the decision of the trial court. In re: Campbell (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 34, 36 holds that where the state can show that the "condition" or "environment" into which a newborn baby will enter is such as to justify the state's preventing that child from entering that environment, it is clear that the state may intervene and have the child declared a dependant child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C). The Butler County Court of Appeals went on to discuss the painstaking considerations involved in such a decision. The court stated at 36: By focusing on the environment, which can be viewed and evaluated with or without the child, the legislature has chosen to permit the state to intercede in family affairs at this early stage. A juvenile court should not be forced to experiment with the health and safety of a newborn baby where the state can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that placing the child in such an environment would be threatening to the health and safety of that child. -6- There is a danger that such dependency proceedings will be used overzealously by those who, with the best of intentions, are too quick to justify the taking of a child from its natural parents. Id. To justify permanently removing children from their parents at such an early age, the risk of imminent harm must be great and the potential for a successful reunification slight. Id. Appellant argues no evidence was presented on environment in the instant case, comparable to the evidence presented in Campbell. We do not agree. Because the facts on environment were different than those presented in Campbell, there was nevertheless sufficient evidence for the determination of dependency. Perhaps, the most persuasive evidence presented in the trial was the testimony of Dr. Rosa So. She presented qualified expert testimony that Cora Searcy's mental illness, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, have an impact on her ability to take care of her child. Consequently, she concluded that she did not think that Cora Searcy was in a position of mental capability to care for her child. Dr. So pointed to a number of factors that would have an adverse impact on the child's environment. First, there was the fact that Mrs. Searcy has been repeatedly hospitalized for multiple psychiatric episodes. Secondly, Mrs. Searcy will not take her medication as needed and prescribed. Thirdly, as it relates to Gorman Searcy, he has no control over his wife and her psychotic episodes. -7- This evidence is compounded and corroborated by the social workers involved, whose role it is to make an accurate assessment of the child's environment. Lois Burke of Community Guidance, Incorporated testified that Mrs. Searcy has not been compliant with her counseling or doctor's appointments at the agency. Additionally, she testified that Mrs. Searcy has made statements that she did not need the agency's help, services, and the medication made her ill. Lois Burke, like Dr. So, noted Mr. Searcy's inability to control his wife's medication taking. Cynthia Pittman, a Social Worker from Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services, who was assigned to the case of Albert Searcy, testified about her observations of Mr. Searcy. The first thing she noticed was that he admits that he has no control over his wife's psychotic episodes and does not admit that his wife has a real illness. Ms. Pittman also testified about Gorman Searcy's mindset that there was nothing he could do to make sure his wife got the medication and follow-up care that she needed. Cynthia Pittman ultimately concluded that Gorman Searcy would be unable to handle the day-to-day responsibilities of caring for Albert Searcy. She based her conclusion on Gorman Searcy's previous history of having four children removed to the custody of her department and his inability to control his wife. Ms. Pittman concluded that all of his energy is consumed in the care of his wife and the addition of an infant would be simply overwhelming. -8- This court may not view the concept of environment in a vacuum. While Gorman Searcy is in all likelihood sincere about the effort he would make to care for his child, the enigma that his wife's psychiatric condition brings to the environment cannot be overlook. Mr. Searcy has expressed his inability to control his wife's psychiatric episodes, the taking of her medication, and her compliance with outpatient services. This combination makes for a potentially explosive situation in the Searcy home, of which Gorman Searcy by his own admission cannot control. Therefore, we do not find the decision to declare Albert Searcy a dependent, under these circumstances, against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence in this case easily and reasonably, shall be construed to reflect that Albert Searcy's environment at home warrants the state's assumption of guardianship and permanent custody because it is in the best interest of Albert to do so. On the issue of the guardian ad litem's failure to file a written report prior to the trial court's decision, we conclude that during the closing of the proceedings the guardian ad litem was given an opportunity to provide the trial court with his opinion. His opinion was that temporary custody of Albert Searcy be granted to the County and not permanent custody. He further said "it may be shortly in the future that permanent custody should be asked for again." -9- With this opinion on the record, it was harmless error for the trial court not to obtain a written report from the guardian ad litem. There is no reason to assume that the written report of the guardian ad litem would be inconsistent with the statements he made during the proceedings. Lastly, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion on these facts to award permanent custody to the County because the guardian ad litem recommended temporary custody with some indication that permanent custody may need to be considered in the future. Assignments of error one, two, and three are overruled. Judgment affirmed. -10- It is ordered that Appellee recover of Appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DAVID T. MATIA, C.J., and DYKE, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .