COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 61320 RICHARD P. DeMARCO, ET AL : ACCELERATED DOCKET : Plaintiffs-appellants : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION CITY OF PARMA, ET AL : : Defendant-appellee : PER CURIAM : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : OCTOBER 24, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CP 150,868 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiffs-appellants: For defendant-appellee Gerald T. McFaul: NICHOLAS M. DeVITO, ESQ. STEPHANIE TUBBS-JONES CHRISTOPHER M. DeVITO, ESQ. CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 1000 Terminal Tower MICHAEL POKORNY, ASST. Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 ALSO LISTED: TODD M. RASKIN, ESQ. RICHARD A. WILLIAMS, ESQ. 30670 Bainbridge Road Solon, Ohio 44139 - 2 - PER CURIAM: Appellant, Richard DeMarco, appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Cuyahoga County and Deputy Doe II. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. I. Appellant was arrested by the Parma Police on January 21, 1987, on information supplied via computer from the Stanton, California Police Department. Appellant was then turned over to the County Sheriff's Department and incarcerated in County Jail. Appellant was released on January 22, 1987, approximately 24 hours after his arrest. Appellant filed suit on June 6, 1988 against the City of Parma, Officer Doe I, Cuyahoga County, and Deputy Doe II, essentially claiming unlawful arrest. The suit against Cuyahoga County is the subject of this appeal. Cuyahoga County filed a motion for summary judgment on April 13, 1990, which was denied. On November 20, 1990 Cuyahoga County filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 12, 1991 the trial court reconsidered and granted Cuyahoga County's motion for summary judgment. This appeal timely follows that judgment. II. For his first assignment of error appellant contends that: "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE IT WAS OUT OF RULE AND RES JUDICATA PURSUANT TO ISSUE PRECLUSION." - 3 - An order overruling a motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable order but is reviewable on appeal from a subsequent adverse final judgment. Balson v. Dodds (1980), 62 Ohio St. 287. In addition, "an order overruling a motion for summary judgment is subject to revision at any time prior to the entering of a final judgment in the case to correct an error made by the court. If the trial court errs in overruling a motion for summary judgment, it is not necessary that that court wait until the judgment is reversed upon appeal, but, instead, the court may correct its error either upon a motion for reconsideration or upon a new motion for summary judgment predicated upon the same law and facts." Makey v. Lenigar (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 458, syllabus. For these reasons we find appellant's first assignment of error to be without merit. III. For his second assignment of error appellant contends that: "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT." Appellant's four arguments under this assignment of error are: "A.THE COUNTY'S FAILURE TO ACT REASONABLY AND IN GOOD FAITH IS INTRINSICALLY A SUBJECTIVE TEST WHICH PRESENTS A JURY ISSUE. "B.THE 'OBJECTIVE LEGAL REASONABLENESS' TEST OF FEDERAL 'QUALIFIED IMMUNITY' DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR. "C.THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR APPLIES TO COUNTY SHERIFF'S UNDER OHIO LAW. - 4 - "D.THE SETTLEMENT REACHED BETWEEN APPELLANT AND DEFENDANT PARMA RENDERED THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING DEFENDANT PARMA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MERELY DICTA AND MOOT." We address these arguments in order. A. Where a police officer makes an arrest without a warrant at the request of another police agency, all reasonable doubts concerning the reasonableness of the information on which the arresting officer acts should be resolved in his favor. Johnson v. Reddy (1955), 163 Ohio St. 347. Pursuant to R.C. 2935.05, when such a warrantless arrest is made the person arrested must be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Appellees established in their motion for summary judgment that they acted upon information provided by the Parma Police Department in detaining appellant. Appellees further established that the information was reasonable, and that they took appellant before a magistrate with all practicable speed. Appellant introduced no evidence that negates these determinations, therefore, appellant's first argument is without merit. B. & C. R.C. 311.05 states that: "The sheriff shall only be responsible for the neglect of duty or misconduct in office of any of his deputies if he orders, has prior knowledge of, participates in, acts in reckless disregard of, or ratifies the neglect of duty or misconduct in office of the deputy." - 5 - In his brief in opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment, appellant has presented no evidence that the sheriff ordered or had knowledge of the acts of the deputies in this case. Further, appellant has never amended his complaint to name Deputy Doe II. Therefore, appellant's second and third arguments are without merit. D. This matter is not properly before this court as the City of Parma and Officer Doe I are not parties to this appeal. The trial court properly granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant put forth no evidence that established that a genuine issue of material fact existed in this case. Therefore, appellant's fourth argument is without merit. For these reasons we find appellant's second assignment of error without merit. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - This cause is affirmed. It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN F. CORRIGAN, PRESIDING JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the Court and time period for review will begin to run. .