COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 61316 : ACCELERATED DOCKET JOSEPH LAMANTIA : : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION ANTHONY SORENSON : : : Defendant-Appellee : PER CURIAM : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 17, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. 136926 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: RUDOLPH J. GERACI GERACI & LaPERNA CO., L.P.A. 2191 East 19th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For defendant-appellee: RONALD V. RAWLIN RHOA, FOLLEN & RAWLIN CO., L.P.A. 1850 Midland Building 101 Prospect Avenue, West Cleveland, Ohio 44115 - 2 - PER CURIAM: On May 4, 1987, a car driven by defendant-appellee Anthony Sorenson ("appellee") collided with a 1982 Toyota owned by plaintiff-appellant Joseph LaMantia ("appellant"). Appellant subsequently filed a negligence action against appellee, alleging that, as a result of the accident, personal property was taken from the Toyota, the Toyota depreciated in value, and he lost the use of the Toyota for an extended period of time. In response, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Appellant appeals the trial court's judgment: "In reviewing a summary judgment, the reviewing court must follow the standard set forth in Civ. R. 56(C) ***." Petrey v, Simon (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 285, paragraph one of the syllabus. Civ. R. 56(C) states that summary judgment shall be rendered if 1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; 2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; and 3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. First, appellant contends appellee is liable for the loss of his personal property taken from the Toyota after it had been towed from the scene of the accident. In Popovich v. Pechkurow (1956), 76 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 202, the court noted that: *** when, between negligence and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes a willful, malicious, and criminal act of a third person which causes the injury - 3 - but was not intended by the negligent person and could not have been foreseen by him, the causal chain between the negligence and the accident is broken. See, also, Taylor v. Webster (1967), 12 Ohio St. 2d 53, 56. Upon a review of the record, we hold the trial court could properly find that reasonable minds could only conclude that the criminal act of stealing personal items from appellant's Toyota could not have been foreseen by appellee. Second, appellant contends appellee is liable for the loss of use of the Toyota. It is clear that "one who recovers the full value of a motor vehicle completely destroyed by the negligent acts of another or the full value thereof less wreckage or salvage value where the vehicle is damaged beyond repair may not also recover for the loss of the use of the vehicle." Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tarver (1947), 148 Ohio St. 82, 83. Although appellee supports his motion for summary judgment by supplying documents from appellant's insurance carrier indicating the Toyota was a total loss, he fails to demonstrate how much money appellant actually received from his insurance carrier. Thus, a genuine issue remains as to whether appellant recovered the full value of the Toyota, or the full value less salvage value. Consequently, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on this issue. Finally, appellant contends appellee is liable for the $250 deductible from his insurance coverage. Appellee argues appellant failed to sufficiently plead this claim for relief in his complaint. - 4 - "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief *** shall contain *** a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ***." Civ. R. 8(A). In his complaint, appellant alleges "[a]s a result of the accident, *** [his] automobile depreciated in value." We find this pleading to be sufficient, appellant did not have to specifically state that he paid the deductible. Accordingly, appellant's appeal is well taken to the extent that the trial court should not have entered summary judgment on the issues of loss of use and the $250 deductible. Judgment reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. - 5 - This cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Journal Entry and Opinion. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of said appellee(s) costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. JOHN F. CORRIGAN, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE PATRICIA BLACKMON, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .