COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 61270 ISMAEL ABDULLAH : ACCELERATED CASE : : Plaintiff-Appellant : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : CONVENTION & VISITOR'S BUREAU : OPINION : : PER CURIAM Defendant-Appellee : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: OCTOBER 10, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. 128927 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: JEROME SILVER 3421 Prospect Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 For Defendant-Appellee, Convention Center & Visitor's Bureau of Cleveland: JAMES L. GLOWACKI 510 Leader Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendant-Appellees, ARA Leisure Services, Inc. and The City of Cleveland: PHILIP J. WEAVER, JR. TERRY J. DUNN CRONQUIST, SMITH, MARSHALL & WEAVER 500 National City-East Sixth Bldg. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 -2- PER CURIAM: On November 15, 1986, plaintiff-appellant Ismael Abdullah ("appellant") attended the National Coalition of Title One Parents ("Title One") Convention in Cleveland. During dinner appellant, along with many other members of the convention, became ill. Appellant subsequently filed a negligence complaint against defendants-appellees Convention and Visitor's Bureau of Cleveland ("Bureau"), ARA Leisure Services, Inc. ("ARA"), and the City of Cleveland ("Cleveland") alleging that he had suffered food poisoning. In response, appellees filed motions for summary judgment. ARA and Cleveland supported their motions for summary judgment by providing appellant's hospital report stating that appellant was suffering from vomiting secondary to a viral infection. They also provided an Ohio Department of Health report on the outbreak of illness at the convention, which concluded, inter alia, that "[a] viral or bacterial infection as a cause for the outbreak [of illness] is unlikely based on laboratory and epidemiologic data." Bureau provided an affidavit in which its president, Dale Finley, averred that Bureau did not provide any convention space or food services to the convention. He further averred that Title One selected the facilities used during the convention. Appellant responded by supplying an affidavit in which he averred that individuals at the hospital told him he had food poisoning and that it was his understanding other members of the -3- convention had been diagnosed as having suffered from food poisoning. Appellant further averred that the statement in his hospital report concerning viral infection could not have been made by the individual who examined him. In addition, appellant attached the medical reports, taken three days after the outbreak of illness, of two other members of the convention who had become ill. One report concluded the patient had suffered from "[p]robable hysterical reaction to other people being sick with food poisoning, although, the patient may well have been affected by food poisoning." The other report diagnosed the patient as suffering from "presumed poisoning." The trial court subsequently granted appellees' motions for summary judgment. Appellant appeals and contends the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. "In reviewing a summary judgment, the reviewing court must follow the standard set forth in Civ. R. 56(C) ***." Petrey v. Simon (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 285, paragraph one of the syllabus. Civ. R. 56(C) states that summary judgment shall be rendered if 1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; 2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; and 3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. -4- Upon a review of the record, we find the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellant also argues the trial court failed to comply with this court's order on remand. Appellant previously appealed this case and we dismissed and remanded it pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B). Appellant argues that on remand the trial court was required to find "no just cause for delay". Such a finding, however, is only required when all the parties, or all the claims, have not been properly terminated. In the instant case, all the parties, and all the claims, have been properly terminated. As a result, there was no reason for the trial court to find "no just cause for delay". See Civ. R. 54(B). Judgment affirmed. -5- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. JOHN F. CORRIGAN, JUDGE LEO M. SPELLACY, JUDGE PATRICIA BLACKMON, JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .