COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60926 WILLETTA CRILE, ET AL : : Plaintiffs : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION THOMAS W. HALL, ET AL : : Defendants-appellees : : [Appeal by Joseph Bancsi : : Appellant] : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : DECEMBER 5, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CP 162,862 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For defendant-appellee, For appellant, Barbara Hall: Joseph Bancsi: JAMES WILSMAN, ESQ. JOSEPH BANCSI, ESQ. KELLEY, McCANN & LIVINGSTONE 19915 Lake Road BP America Building Rocky River, Ohio 44116 200 Public Sq., 35th Floor Cleveland, Ohio 44114-2302 For defendant-appellee, Home Insurance Co.: GEORGE W. STUHLDREHER, ESQ. Bulkley Bldg., 6th Floor 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44115 - 2 - J.F. CORRIGAN, J., Appellant, Joseph Bancsi, Esq., appeals from the order of the trial court awarding $15,024.50 in damages in favor of Barbara Hall and Home Insurance Company, and against Willetta Crile and appellant, jointly and severally. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. I. This action stems from two lawsuits in the Common Pleas Court in which appellant represented plaintiffs, Willetta Crile and her minor son, Sokrates Frantzis. The first case was dismissed by plaintiffs' motion. In the second case, summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants. The defendants then moved for attorney's fees as sanctions under Civ. R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. The trial court held a hearing on that motion on March 9, 1990. In an order dated March 30, 1990 the trial judge made several specific findings that appellant violated Civ. R. 11 in his position as attorney for the plaintiffs in the underlying case. The trial judge further found that the appropriate sanctions would be an award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The trial judge then ordered that attorney fees be granted, in favor of the defendants, and that the fees be taxed as costs. The trial judge subsequently entered a supplemental judgment clarifying the previous entry. This supplemental entry, dated November 19, 1990, ordered that the previously awarded attorney - 3 - fees be taxed to appellant and Willetta Crile jointly and severally. It is this supplemental entry of judgment that appellant now challenges. II. For his sole assignment of error appellant contends that: "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN IT MADE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN A FINAL, UNAPPEALED JUDGMENT AND WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT BY SUCH CHANGES, WHEN THE ORIGINAL, FINAL JUDGMENT DID NOT CONTAIN SUCH JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT." Essentially, appellant's argument is that the trial court's action went beyond the correction of a mere clerical mistake that is warranted by Civ. R. 60(A). Civ. R. 60(A) provides in pertinent part that: "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." As this court observed in Dentsply International, Inc. v. Kostas (1985), 26 Ohio App. 3d 116: "*** The term 'clerical mistake' does not mean that it must be made by a clerk. The phrase merely describes the type of error identified with mistakes in transcription, altercation or omission of any papers and documents which are traditionally or customarily handled or controlled by clerks but which papers or documents may be handled by others. It is a type of mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which does not - 4 - involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney." Dentsply International, Inc., supra, at 118, quoting In Re Merry Queen Transfer Corp. (E.D.N.Y. 1967), 266 F. Supp. 605, 607. However, Civ. R. 60(A) goes beyond the correction of mere clerical errors. It also provides for corrections arising from "oversight or omissions." Portner v. Portner (June 27, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 49173, unreported. The trial court, in its entry dated March 30, 1990, made numerous findings with regard to appellant. The following excerpts from that order are demonstrative of the court's findings: "*** The respondent Joseph Bancsi, as counsel not only in the divorce case, but as counsel for the plaintiffs in both civil cases, alleged a conflict of interest, or dissemination of privileged information and further alleged 'an appearance of impropriety' against Barbara Hall. "*** This court finds that there never was a cause of action for conflict of interest, there was no breach of any privilege nor dissemination, nor was there even an appearance of impropriety. So while there was never any support factually or legally for the cause of action in Case Number 135632 there was even less justification for the filing of Case Number 162862 in that the Domestic Relations Court had already made specific findings as to these alleged issues in Barbara Hall's favor. Further, there was no cause of action for either Taki [Sokrates Frantzis] or for Willetta Crile. There was no basis in fact; there was no basis in law; and there were no damages proximately caused by the alleged conduct. The complaints filed in the two cases fail in all terms and - 5 - conditions and are vexatious, frivolous and in certain respects, a sham. "*** This court finds that the attorney did not exercise reasonable and diligent investigation and did not have a good faith belief that his position was supported by known facts or reasonable inferences and further that it was not the subject of well settled law, nor was it supported by good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of the well settled law. ***" R.C. 2323.51(B) provides that a court may award attorney fees to any party to an action adversely affected by frivolous conduct, and that the award may be made against a party, his counsel of record, or both. The trial court has specifically found that the conduct of appellant was actionable under this statute. The findings are exhaustive with regard to appellant's misconduct. Based upon these findings by the trial court, we can only conclude that the failure to name appellant as a liable party was an "oversight or omission" on the court's part. The clarification of the court's order was not one that involved further legal decisions as the court was quite specific in its original entry as to its intentions. Furthermore, the imposition of Civ. R. 11 sanctions against appellant has not violated his right to procedural due process. As this court has previously ruled, prior to the imposition of Civ. R. 11 sanctions the trial court should hold a hearing so as to give the parties an opportunity to address the issue. Thom's Inc. v. Rezzano (Nov. 10, 1988), Cuyahoga App. No. 54541, 54671, - 6 - 54691, unreported; Warner v. Zuccola (Dec. 24, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 53070, unreported. The record reflects, and appellant does not dispute that, such a hearing was held on March 9, 1990. Clearly, appellant was awarded that process which was due. Appellant has failed to otherwise defend this case or raise factual issues in a procedurally correct manner. For these reasons we find that appellant's assignment of error is without merit. Judgment affirmed. - 7 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DAVID T. MATIA, P.J., and HARPER, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN F. CORRIGAN N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .