COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60832 ACCELERATED DOCKET : JEFFRY C. GERBER : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION : ANNE M. GOSPICH : : PER CURIAM Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER 7, 1991 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Bedford Municipal Court Case No. 89-CVF-2463 JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: JEFFRY C. GERBER, pro se ANNE M. GOSPICH, pro se Attorney at Law 37830 Bunker Hill Drive 5010 Mayfield Road Solon, Ohio 44139 Lyndhurst, Ohio 44124 -2- PER CURIAM: Appellant Jeffry C. Gerber timely appeals the trial court's decision that ordered the judgment satisfied for an amount less than the amount awarded in its prior judgment. The prior judgment ordered appellee Anne M. Gospich to pay $1,500.00 on or before June 1, 1990 by certified check; the failure of appellee to pay within the time period entitled appellant to the full judgment, which was $2,422.00 plus interest. This appeal was filed and briefed as an accelerated appeal pursuant to Local R. 25 of this court. The threshold question in this appeal is whether a satisfaction of judgment is proper when it is for an amount that is less than the amount originally ordered by the trial court. In compliance with App. R. 11.1, it is the opinion of this court that appellee did not satisfy the judgment against her because the money offered for satisfaction was less than the amount of the judgment and not timely tendered under the settlement agreement. Additionally, this court is not of the opinion that the judgment is void and a fraud upon the court. This case is reversed and remanded to the trial court. The essential facts of this case were not disputed. On June 30, 1989, appellant filed a complaint for the non-payment of legal fees and requested the sum of Two Thousand Four Hundred and Forty-two Dollars, plus interest. -3- On December 29, 1989, appellant's counsel and appellee signed an agreed judgment entry: that plaintiff was granted judgment for the amount paid for in the complaint; the judgment could be vacated and the case marked "settled and dismissed with prejudice at [appellant] plaintiff's cost, if appellee paid to appellant One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars by certified check or money order payable to appellant's counsel on or before June 1, 1990." On September 6, 1990, the appellant filed a motion for instructions in which the trial court was requested to determine what amount appellee owed appellant. On September 11, 1990, the trial court held, "If $1,500.00 was not paid by June 1, 1990 by certified check, then appellant was entitled to full judgment of $2,442.00 plus interest." On October 5, 1990, a different judge declared the $1,537.00 bank check issued by the appellee on September 28, 1990 to be a satisfaction of the judgment. On November 2, 1990, appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment. On November 5, 1990, appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant's first two assignments of error are as follows: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DENIED PLAINTIFF DUE PROCESS, BY SUA SPONTE SATISFYING THE JUDGMENT FOR 40% OF THE AMOUNT AGREED BY DEFENDANT AND ORDERED BY THE COURT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY DENYING NOTICE AND A HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF "SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT. -4- The Supreme Court of Ohio has established that satisfaction of a judgment does not occur until an injured party receives "full compensation." See Seifert v. Burroughs (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 108, 110. This same rule applies to the offer and acceptance of a settlement amount "followed by the trial court's journal entry that the judgment is satisfied." Id., citing, Gholson v. Savin (1941), 137 Ohio St. 551. Consequently, full compensation is determined by the amount of judgment or an amount agreed upon by the parties for satisfaction and release. The proponent of a motion to satisfy the judgment must demonstrate what the parties intended as a replacement for the judgment awarded. See, Board of Commrs. of Columbiana Cty. v. Samuelson (1986), 24 Ohio St. 3d 62, 63. The intention of the parties, in the instant case, is not in dispute. The agreed judgment entry clearly states that settlement and satisfaction of the judgment for $1,500.00 plus costs was conditioned upon payment by certified check on or before June 1, 1990. (Emphasis added.) The trial court further clarified in its September 11, 1990 journal entry that if it was not paid by June 1, 1990, then satisfaction of judgment would require payment of $2,442.00 plus 10% interest from March 30, 1987 and costs. Since the trial court's journal entry, dated October 5, 1990, was not for full compensation because it was for less than the amount ordered by the September 11, 1990 journal entry, it should be vacated. Appellant's first assignment of error is well taken. -5- Appellant's second assignment of error raises issues of due process which are inapplicable to the instant case. It is axiomatic that satisfaction of a judgment only requires full compensation. See Seifert, supra. Once a trial court enters a final appealable order, [such as an entry for satisfaction of judgment], then notice of the judgment is required by the United States Constitution and Ohio Constitution so that a party is given the opportunity to appeal. Moldovan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Welfare Dept. (1986), 25 Ohio St. 3d 293. In the instant case, the intent of the parties was not in dispute. Therefore, due process is served by this appeal. Appellant's second assignment of error is not well taken. Appellant's third assignment of error states that: THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS BOTH VOID AND VOIDABLE. Our disposition of the other assignments of error renders this issue moot, but we address it to satisfy our responsibil- ities under App. R. 12(A). This assignment of error is premised upon this court's consideration of the appellant's motion to vacate and the assumption that appellee committed a "fraud upon the court." This court has held that the notice of appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate and it is, therefore, not properly before this court. Dempsey v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (1985), 20 Ohio App. 3d 90. -6- Moreover, the legal principle of "fraud upon the court" is limited to fraudulent misrepresentations by an officer of the court and will not lie against a pro se litigant. Turoczy v. Turoczy (1986), 30 Ohio App. 3d 116. Appellee is a pro se litigant and as such did not commit a fraud upon the court. Appellant's request for sanctions is, therefore, denied. Appellant's third assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment reversed and remanded. -7- This cause is reversed and remanded. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee his costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, JUDGE JOHN F. CORRIGAN, JUDGE, CONCURS ANN DYKE, PRESIDING JUDGE, CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY (TWO JUDGES CONCUR; ONE JUDGE CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY) N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .