COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 60169 VIOLA NELSON : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY vs. : and : OPINION SIDNEY A. FOREMAN, D.D.S. : : Defendant-appellee : : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION : DECEMBER 19, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from : Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 912,199 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED. : DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : _______________________ APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: VIOLA NELSON, pro se 1184 East 175 Street Cleveland, Ohio 44110 For defendant-appellee: ROY A. HULME Attorney at Law 113 St. Clair Building Cleveland, Ohio 44114 - 1 - FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, P.J.: Plaintiff-appellant, Viola Nelson, appeals from the judgment of the common pleas court which denied her motion to vacate judg- ment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. On March 20, 1990, appellant filed pro se a "Motion to Vacate Dismissed August 13, 1974 AND Request for Oral Hearing" (sic.). Apparently, appellant sought relief from an August 13, 1974 judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B). Appellant, in her motion, alleged that she had a meritorious claim against appel- lee, Sidney A. Foreman, D.D.S., and that she has attempted pro se to remedy the numerous errors of the court and its officers which delayed and denied her a trial on her complaint. A complete recital of the allegations raised in appellant's pro se motion would be futile. Essentially, appellant alleges the following: Appellant originally filed a dental malpractice action against appellee on November 29, 1972. Appellant states that due to her attorney's negligence, the original case was dismissed on August 12, 1974 with prejudice when it should have been dismissed without prejudice. Appellant thereafter retained another attorney on July 12, 1975 to refile her case. The case was then - 2 - refiled; however, again due to her attorney's negligence, the refiled case was also dismissed. Appellant then requested her second attorney to resign on December 22, 1976. However, she alleges she was unable to obtain his resignation until November 11, 1983. Appellant next states she filed a complaint on March 28, 1985 and, on May 8, 1985, a motion to vacate the judgment dated October 3, 1975. Meanwhile, appellant alleges she sought aid from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office as well as the Presiding Judge of the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. Apparently, appellant's motion of May 8, 1985 was denied on October 17, 1985, and defendant's motion for summary judgment on the March 28th pleadings was granted. Appellant thereafter unsuccessfully appealed those decisions to this court and the Ohio Supreme Court. Thereafter, on October 31, 1985, appellant unsuccessfully brought suit in the U. S. Federal District Court. Appellant's next step was the instant motion to vacate wherein the preceding allegations were made. Further, the only factual materials submitted therewith are: Exhibit "A," a copy of the docket from the original November 29, 1972 complaint; Exhibit "B," a letter dated July 19, 1973 from appellant's second attor- ney requesting the court to enter his firm as counsel for plaintiff; and Exhibit "C," a copy of the journal entry for the original action dismissing the case pursuant to Civ. R. 41(B)(1). - 3 - Based upon the above evidence and allegations, the trial court overruled appellant's motion. Appellant timely appeals, raising the following assignments of error: I. DID THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS RECK- LESSLY AND/OR INTENTIONALLY MISHANDLE THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FILED BY APPEL- LANT BY DISMISSING THE CAUSE PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 41(B)(1)? (A) DID THE COURT SYSTEM AND COUNSEL RETAINED BY APPELLANT COMPOUND THE RECKLESS AND/OR INTENTIONAL MIS- HANDLING OF THE CASE FILED BY APPELLANT? II.DID THE COURT ERR IN OVERRULING APPEL- LANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE DISMISSAL ON AUGUST 13, 1974 AND THE REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING FILED ON MARCH 20, 1990? Essentially, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling her motion to vacate. This argument lacks merit. The standard for determining whether a motion for relief from judgment should be granted under Civ. R. 60(B) is found in GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 146. In that case, the court held: To prevail on a motion brought under Civ. R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ. R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ. R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. Id., syllabus. - 4 - Furthermore, in Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 39 Ohio App. 2d 97, at 103, this court stated: The movant has the burden of proving that he is entitled to the relief requested or to a hearing on the motion. Therefore, he must submit factual material which on its face demonstrates the timeliness of the motion, reasons why the motion should be granted and that he has a defense. (Emphasis added.) An appellate court will not disturb an order denying relief from judgment unless the trial court has abused its discretion by that ruling. Associated Estates Corp. v. Fellows (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 112, paragraph three of the court's syllabus. Appellant's first assignment of error challenges the pro- priety of the trial court's actions in handling the original complaint. However, it is well settled that a motion for relief from judgment is not a substitute for a direct appeal from the judgment challenged. Colley v. Bazell (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 243, 245. Therefore, this aspect of appellant's argument lacks merit. Furthermore, appellant has failed to demonstrate that her motion was brought within a reasonable time. Authority need not be cited to support the proposition that an approximate fifteen- year delay from notice of the August 13, 1974 judgment to filing of the motion to vacate is unreasonable. Appellant merely argues that her counsel's negligence, along with the alleged inherent ineptness of the court system, deprived her of her day in court. However, it is well settled that the negligence of a party's - 5 - attorney is imputed to the party for Civ. R. 60(B) purposes. GTE, supra, at 153; Argo Plastic Products Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 389, 392. Thus, "if an attorney's conduct falls substantially below what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client's remedy is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice." GTE, supra, at 152. Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling appel- lant's motion to vacate. Appellant failed to demonstrate that her motion was brought within a reasonable time. Judgment affirmed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SPELLACY, J. BLACKMON, J. CONCUR PRESIDING JUDGE FRANCIS E. SWEENEY N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .