COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59694 JACK FISCHER : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL : TRANSIT AUTHORITY, ET AL. : : Defendant-appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : DECEMBER 19, 1991 OF DECISION : CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. 176,277 JUDGMENT : AFFIRMED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellees: William J. Schulz, Esq. Lawrence E. Gawell, Esq. 720 Leader Building Greater Cleveland RTA Cleveland, OH 44114 615 Superior Avenue, N.W. Cleveland, OH 44113 - 2 - PATTON, J., Plaintiff-appellant Jack Fischer ("appellant") appeals from an order that dismissed his pro se complaint with prejudice due to his failure to appear at a case management conference. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision below. The facts briefly are as follows: Appellant filed a complaint against defendant-appellees the Greater Regional Transit Authority ("R.T.A.") and its bus driver, James Salone (collectively "R.T.A.") for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of an accident. During the regular course of litigation, a case management conference was scheduled for November 16, 1989. Per appellant's request, the conference was re-scheduled for March 20, 1990. The journal entry, filed on February 22, 1990, ordered that the failure of appellant to attend the case management conference would result in a dismissal. Appellant failed to appear. The trial court, pursuant to its prior order, dismissed appellant's case with prejudice. Appellant's timely appeal asserts that: IT WAS UNREASONABLE AND, THUS, ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE APPELLANT'S CASE AT A CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his case with prejudice. Specifically, he argues the case should not have been dismissed because these types of conferences are regularly unattended by counsel without having - 3 - their cases dismissed, and he was indeed represented at the case management conference by his mother, Barbara Fischer, a layperson, who was granted a power of attorney to act on appellant's behalf. Appellant's contentions lack merit. Civ. R.41(B)(1) reads: Failure to Prosecute. Where the plaintiff fails to prosecute, or comply with these rules or any court order, the court upon motion of a defendant or on its own motion may, after notice to the plaintiff's counsel, dismiss an action or claim. The Ohio Supreme Court in Rambaur v. Leis (1982), 1 Ohio St. 3d 89, syllabus, held: Pursuant to Civ. R. 41(B)(1), it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to dismiss an action, with prejudice, for lack of prosecution when a plaintiff voluntarily fails to appear at a hearing, without explanation, when the court has directed him to be present and his location is unknown. Because the power to dismiss for lack of prosecution is within the sound discretion of the trial court, appellate review is confined solely to whether the trial court abused that discretion. Id., at 91. The United States Supreme Court concluded in Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1962), 370 U.S. 626, that the trial court has the power to dismiss with prejudice based upon the plaintiff's failure to appear at a pretrial conference. The court stated that a court has inherent power to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution because of the control necessary to "manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id., at 630-631. - 4 - Appellant's reasons on appeal clearly do not indicate the trial court abused its discretion. Further, appellant's argument that he was indeed represented at the case management hearing by an attorney, to-wit: his mother, to whom he gave a power of attorney, is untenable. R.C. 4705.01 reads in relevant part: 4705.01 Practice of law; prohibition. No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any action or proceeding in which he is not a party concerned, either by using or subscribing his own name, or the name of another person, unless he has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance with its prescribed and published rules. Except as provided in section 4705.09 of the Revised Code or in rules adopted by the supreme court, admission to the bar shall entitle such person to practice before any court or administrative tribunal without further qualification or license. A power of attorney does not authorize a layperson to practice law. A power of attorney is a written instrument granting authorization to an agent to perform specified acts in behalf of his principal. 3 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1978), Powers of Attorney, Section 36. As such, this instrument did not authorize appellant's mother to act as his attorney-at-law. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. - 5 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. NAHRA, P.J. FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J. CONCUR JUDGE JOHN T. PATTON N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .