COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NOS. 59552, 59746 THOMAS L. ROSS, ET AL. : : PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SOLON CITY : OPINION SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. : : DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: DECEMBER 12, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. 142637 JUDGMENT: APPEAL DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiffs-Appellees: BRUCE ALLEN BLAIR HODGMAN 13111 SHAKER SQUARE, #304 CLEVELAND, OHIO 44120 For Defendant-Appellant, Solon City School District Board of Education: DENNIS M. O'TOOLE ROBERT J. GARGASZ WARHOLA, O'TOOLE, LOUGHMAN, ALDERMAN & STUMPHAUZER 506 BROADWAY, FOURTH FLOOR LORAIN, OHIO 44052-0528 For Defendant-Appellee, Blue Cross/Blue Shield: JOHN D. ZOLLER 1920 SUPERIOR BUILDING 815 SUPERIOR AVENUE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114-2701 -2- SPELLACY, J.: On January 13, 1988, plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants Thomas L. Ross and Karen A. Ross ("appellees") filed a complaint against defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Board of Education of Solon City School District ("appellant") and defendant-Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Northern Ohio ("Blue Cross"). In their complaint, appellees claimed that appellee-Thomas L. Ross fell down a flight of deteriorated steps at a public school owned and operated by appellant. Appellees alleged that appellant knew or should have known of the condition, but it failed to keep the steps in repair and free from nuisance. Appellees sought a judgment against appellant for the injuries allegedly suffered by appellee-Thomas L. Ross. Appellees also requested damages for appellee-Karen A. Ross' loss of comfort, society and companionship of her husband. Appellees added Blue Cross as defendants, because it had an interest in the proceedings as a subrogee with respect to appellee-Thomas L. Ross' medical expenses. On January 29, 1988, Blue Cross filed its answer, counterclaim and cross-claim. In its counterclaim and cross- claim, Blue Cross claimed that it, as assignee and subrogee of appellees, was entitled to judgment against appellees and appellant for medical and hospital charges incurred by appellee- Thomas L. Ross. On April 7, 1988, appellant filed a reply to Blue Cross' cross-claim. Appellant basically denied Blue Cross' allegations -3- and also set forth several affirmative defenses. On June 24, 1988, appellant filed a separate answer to appellees' complaint. On July 18, 1989, appellees, with leave of court, filed a motion to dismiss Blue Cross' counterclaim and cross-claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On August 1, 1989, Blue Cross filed its brief in opposition to appellees' motion to dismiss. On August 8, 1989, the trial court denied appellees' motion to dismiss Blue-Cross' counterclaim and cross-claim./1\ Thus, Blue Cross remained a party to the instant case. Just prior to the commencement of the trial, appellant filed a motion to prevent Blue Cross from participating in the trial. Appellant also requested the trial court to reconsider its prior decision which allowed Blue Cross' subrogation claim to exist. The trial court never ruled upon appellant's motion. On February 20, 1990, the trial commenced and it continued until March 1, 1990. Subsequently, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found that appellee-Thomas L. Ross was 40% negligent and that appellant was 60% negligent. Thus, it entered judgment in favor of appellees in the amount of $180,000. On March 7, 1990, the trial court issued its order in accordance with the jury's verdict. Several post-judgment motions were filed by appellees and appellant regarding the jury's verdict and award, costs, and /1\ Also, on August 8, 1989, the trial court denied appel- lant's motion for summary judgment on appellees' complaint. -4- prejudgment interest. On March 29, 1990, the trial court issued an order with the following rulings: 1) denial of appellants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 2) denial of appellants' motion to reduce the award by collateral sources; 3) denial of appellees' motion for prejudgment interest; and 4) granting of appellees' motion to tax costs in the amount of $3,575.80. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the jury's verdict while appellees filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order pertaining to the post-judgment motions. On May 31, 1990, this court granted appellees' motion to consolidate both appeals. Appellant raises five assignments of error and appellees raise two assignments of error in their cross-appeal. However, we need not address any of the assignments of error, because this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the instant appeals./2\ Civ. R. 54(B) provides as follows: (B) Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of such determination, any order or other form /2\ Also, we need not address appellees' motion to strike portions of appellant's reply brief, which was filed in this court and referred to the panel hearing this case on its merits. -5- of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Accordingly, a judgment which does not dispose of all the claims or parties in a given action, and which does not contain the words "no just reason for delay" pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B), is not a final order and, therefore, must be dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction. See Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 124. In the instant case, the trial court failed to adjudicate appellees' claim against Blue Cross and Blue Cross' counterclaim and cross-claim. There is nothing in the record indicating that Blue Cross was either dismissed voluntarily or dismissed by the trial court. In addition, there is no certification by the trial court of "no just reason for delay." Thus, we find that the trial court did not enter a final appealable order. Hence, this consolidated appeal is dismissed and remanded for further proceedings. -6- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. ANN MCMANAMON, P.J. AND HARPER, J., CONCUR LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .