COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59510 : RODNEY J. FLEMING : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellee : : and -vs- : : OPINION : SUSAN MARIE FLEMING : : Defendant-Appellant : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT DECEMBER 19, 1991 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Domestic Relations Division Common Pleas Court Case No. D-185389 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JOSEPH G. STAFFORD LAWRENCE RAFALSKI 310 Lakeside Avenue, West 691 Richmond Road 100 Courthouse Center Suite 200 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Richmond Hts., Ohio 44143 -2- PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J.: Appellant Susan Marie Fleming timely appeals the trial court's judgment granting both parties a divorce, dividing the marital property, and awarding Appellee Rodney J. Fleming custody of the minor children and child support. The parties proceeded to trial in November of 1989. On December 1, 1989, the evidence was submitted to the trial court, which found insufficient grounds to grant a decree of divorce. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to incompatibility as grounds for divorce. The trial court ordered the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the division of property and custody of the minor children. The trial court adopted Appellee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and overruled Appellant's objections thereto. The divorce decree awarded Appellee custody of the children and divided the marital estate consistent with Appellee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant assigns four errors on appeal, however, on August 30, 1991 by leave of this court Appellant voluntarily dismissed all assignments of error pertaining to the issue of custody. Thus, the sole assignment of error before this court is the first one, and the sole issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the division of the real property of the parties. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. The findings of fact and conclusions of law "in pertinent part," provide for the division of the marital assets. -3- The marital residence at 13326 Mohawk Trail, Middleburg Heights, Ohio, was stipulated to have a fair market value of $130,000.00. The first mortgage on this property was $32,000.00 and a second loan on the property from Appellee's father was valued at $12,000.00. Appellee also contributed $30,000.00 from the sale of a previous home, for a down payment. The trial court found that the mortgage, loan and down payment of Appellee offset the marital value of the home and concluded it was a marital asset in the amount of $56,000.00. A residential lot at sub lot 3 Mohawk Trail purchased by Appellant was stipulated to have a fair market value of $48,000.00. The lot was titled to both parties, but Appellant paid $10,000.00 as a down payment on the property. The trial court found that the down payment of Appellant offset the marital value of the lot and concluded it was a marital asset in the amount of $38,000.00. The marital fraction of Appellee's Ford Motor Company pension was 50%, and the trial court concluded that Appellant was entitled to 25% of the pension. Appellant has in her possession a Mercury Topaz automobile, and Appellee has in his possession a Grand Marquis automobile. The trial court concluded that the Mercury Topaz had a fair market value of approximately $5,000.00, but the Grand Marquis had no value to Appellee because of the finance payment of $262.00 per month. -4- Appellant has in her possession federal and state tax refund checks in the amounts of $5,982.00 and $214.00, respectively. The contents of the marital residence have an approximate value of $3,500.00. The marital debts include a debt to Dr. Nancy Huntsman in the amount of $1,025.00, a Mastercard debt in the approximate amount of $1,000.00, Appellee's debts to his father in the amount of approximately $4,000.00, and the $12,000.00 household loan. Finally, Appellee's income in 1988 was $57,559.00 and Appellant's yearly income was estimated to be approximately $20,000.00. The trial court adopted Appellee's proposed divorce decree journal entry as its own: Appellee was awarded custody of the minor children and child support from Appellant in the amount of $63.09 per week. Appellee was ordered to maintain medical insurance for the minor children. Appellant was granted visitation. Both parties were ordered to share equally any medical expenses not covered by insurance. Appellee was awarded the marital home, its contents and the automobile in his possession. He was also ordered to pay his Mastercard debt of $1,000.00, Dr. Huntsman's bill of $1,025.00 and all debts owed to his parents. Appellant was awarded the residential lot, the automobile in her possession, 25% of Appellee's retirement benefits from Ford Motor Company, payment of $5,152.00 from Appellee and the -5- proceeds of federal and state tax refund checks for $5,982.00 and $214.00, respectively. Appellant's sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY MAKING AN INEQUITABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT INVOLVING THE PARTIES' REAL PROPERTY. Appellant contends the trial court erred in using the parties' property down payment as non-marital contributions. We disagree. In Gaines v. Gaines (June 18, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52318, unreported, this court considered the issue of whether property is marital or non-marital. The concept of transmutation is an exception to the general rule that property acquired by a party prior to the marriage is not marital property. Transmutation is the process by which non-marital property has changed to marital property or vice versa. "Non-marital property may be changed into marital property when a gift of non-marital property is made to both parties as cotenants. Non-marital property also may be changed into marital property if it is commingled with marital property." Baldwin's Ohio Domestic Relations law (1984), at 250; CF. Black v. Black (June 4, 1981), Cuyahoga App. No. 43005, unreported. Therefore, the fact that certain property is brought into the marriage by one party is not necessarily determinative of its disposition upon divorce. Sanzenbacher v. Sanzenbacher (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3D 180; Furrow v. Furrow (Apr. 11, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 48741, Unreported. Id. At 5- 6. "Flat rules have no place in determining a property division." Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 356. The Ohio Supreme Court determined a reviewing court is limited to determining whether under the totality of the circumstances, the -6- trial court has abused its discretion. E.g. Briganti v. Briganti (1984), 9 Ohio St. 3d 220, 222. A careful review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion. In Black, this court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to consider the property brought to the marriage under R.C. 3105.18(B)(10), where the other spouse's contribution to that property was its improvement or appreciation after purchase. Id. at 8. In the case, sub judice, this court considered Appellee's $30,000.00 contribution and Appellant's $10,000.00 contribution in a manner consistent with Black, supra. These amounts are not in dispute and there is no evidence that they are not consistent with the parties' intentions. Appellant also argues that the overall division of property was an abuse of discretion, because it was unequal and did not consider the parties' incomes, the length of the marriage, Appellant's standard of living and Appellant's contribution to the marital residence. We disagree. The mere fact that a property division is unequal does not alone amount to an abuse discretion. See, Cherry, supra. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, this court will presume that the trial court considered all the factors in R.C. 3105.18, including incomes, length of the marriage, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage and property brought to the marriage. See, Medovic v. Medovic, (Sept. 26, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 59019, unreported. (Citations omitted.) -7- In the case, sub judice, the Appellant fails to demonstrate that the property division does not take into consideration the factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.18. Therefore, there is no evidence of an abuse of discretion and Appellant's sole assign- ment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed. -8- It is ordered that appellee recover of Appellant his costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DYKE, P.J., and SPELLERBERG,* J., CONCUR. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON JUDGE (*JUDGE THOMAS R. SPELLERBERG, SENECA COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT.) N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .