COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59405 NED THORTON, aka : NED THORNTON : : Plaintiff-appellant : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION MEREDIA SUBURBAN HOSPITAL : : Defendant-appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : NOVEMBER 21, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Bedford Municipal Court : Case No. 89-CVF-3794 JUDGMENT : REVERSED AND REMANDED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiff-appellant: For defendant-appellee: JAMES S. SCHOEN, ESQ. ROBERT E. SMALL, ESQ. 8536 Crow Drive, Suite 110 13320 Lorain Avenue Macedonia, Ohio 44056 Cleveland, Ohio 44111 - 2 - J.F. CORRIGAN, J., Plaintiff-appellant Ned Thornton appeals from the order of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of defendant- appellee Meredia Suburban Hospital. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand. I. Appellant commenced this suit in Bedford Municipal Court on September 10, 1989, alleging that a demand for payment notice sent to appellant by appellee violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, specifically R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03. The matter proceeded to trial on January 30, 1990. At the close of appellant's case, the trial court granted appellee's oral motion for directed verdict. This appeal timely follows. II. For his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that a directed verdict was inappropriate because the notice sent by appellee simulated an official document and contained false statements in violation of R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03. Pursuant to Civ. R. 50(A)(4) a motion for a directed verdict must be granted where: "*** the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party ***." - 3 - In determining a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Civ. R. 50(A)(4), the evidence submitted must be given an interpretation most favorable to the party against whom it is made, including not only direct or positive evidence, but also any reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Rinehart v. Toledo Blade Co. (1985), 21 Ohio App. 3d 274, 275. Under R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03 no "supplier" shall commit an unfair, deceptive or unconscionable act in connection with a "consumer transaction." As defined in R.C. 1345.01(A) a consumer transaction includes providing services that are primarily personal in nature. While physicians are specifically exempted from this definition, a hospital is not. Therefore, appellee must abide by the provisions of chapter 1345. It is a deceptive and unconscionable act or practice as defined by R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03 for a supplier, in the process of collecting or attempting to collect upon a claim of debt arising from a consumer transaction, to use any statement or notice which simulates an official document; which falsely represents or implies that it is officially authorized, issued, or approved; or which falsely represents the status of any legal proceedings or other facts. Liggins v. May Co. (1977), 373 N.E. 2d 404, 406. The notice used by appellee in the within matter was titled "DEMAND FOR PAYMENT" and identified appellee as "Creditor" and appellant as "Debtor." The document had no official court name - 4 - or title. However, the notice contained a seal (albeit illegible for this court's review) and appeared in form to be an official document. Under Liggins, supra we find that this notice was deceptive and unconscionable as it simulates an official document. Furthermore, the language used in the notice itself must be reviewed under the Liggins test. The notice stated that: "You are hereby notified this is the FINAL NOTICE for payment on your overdue draft of $569.00 to the above named creditor. If payment is not received on or before the 24th day of January, 1989, proceedings will be taken against you by default." This mere threat of future action does not violate R.C. 1345.02 or 1345.03. However, the statement that, "proceedings will be taken against you by default," implies that appellant lacks standing to defend himself against the creditor's action. A reasonable jury could have found that this was an exaggeration or misstatement of law or fact which would bring appellee's action within the prohibition of R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03. We therefore find that a directed verdict in favor of appellee was not appropriate and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. - 5 - It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Bedford Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, P.J., and JAMES D. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN F. CORRIGAN N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .