COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59359 : FLORENE MORGAN : : JOURNAL ENTRY Plaintiff-Appellant : : and -vs- : : OPINION : EASTOWN EAGLE SUPERMARKET : : Defendant-Appellee : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER 14, 1991 OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court Case No. 140563 JUDGMENT: Affirmed. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: __________________________ APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: HENRY C. EPP MARK A. GREER EPP & HAMILTON COMPANY Seventh Floor, Bulkley Bldg. 1200 One Erieview Plaza 1501 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Cleveland, Ohio 44115 -2- PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J.: Appellant Florence Morgan timely appeals the trial court's decision that granted appellee Eastown Eagle Supermarket's motion for summary judgment. The issue on appeal is whether the court erred in granting the motion when the evidence showed that appellant slipped and fell on ice and snow that had been naturally accumulated and was shoveled onto a walkway located on appellee's premises in an area used to obstruct shopping carts. Because we hold that the trial court did not err, we affirm. The facts in this case showed that on February 11, 1987, appellant drove to appellee's premises, Eastown Eagle Supermarket. She parked her vehicle and approached the supermarket. She eventually reached some poles, approximately fifteen inches apart, that formed a walkway along the building and prevented the removal of shopping carts into the actual parking lot. Although the walkway nearer to the store's entrance was clear from ice and snow, the appellant chose to enter the store by going between the poles. The snow was shoveled into piles approximately twelve inches high around the bottom of the poles. Appellant stepped over a pile of snow along the row of poles, using her right hand to hold on to one of the poles in order to support herself. She stepped down on the other side of the pile of snow, onto what appeared to her to be a clear spot on the ground. When she released the pole with her right hand, she slipped and fell to the ground realizing that she had slipped on -3- some ice. The appellant testified that she did not observe any defects in the actual pavement itself. Thereafter, appellant went into the store and remained in the store for five or ten minutes. Eventually, she left the store and returned to her vehicle without further difficulty. For her assignment of error, the appellant states: The trial court committed prejudicial error in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment when the evidence presented by defendant and the evidence submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the defen- dant's motion showed that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning plaintiff-appellant's claim for negligence against defendant-appellee. In Ohio, the general rule is unequivocal that an owner of property is not liable for injuries to business invitees caused by a slip and fall on natural accumulations of ice and snow. LaCourse v. Fleitz (1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 209, 210; Debie v. Cochran Pharmacy-Berwick, Inc. (1967), 11 Ohio St. 2d 38, 40; Sidle v. Humphrey (1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 45, 49-50; Jeswald v. Hutt (1968), 15 Ohio St. 2d 224, 227. See, also, Tyrell v. Investment Assoc., Inc., supra. When the top portion of a natural accumulation of snow and ice is removed, the accumulation of snow and ice remaining is still a natural accumulation. It is only where a landowner has superior knowledge of a hazardous condition greater than that which would ordinarily be anticipated from a natural accumulation of ice and snow or where the accumulation itself is unnatural that a landowner may be held liable. Coletta, et al. v. Univer- -4- sity of Akron (August 25, 1988), Franklin App. No. 88 AP-102, unreported, Mihula v. Slavin Tailors (1970), 24 Ohio St. 2d 48. Applying these rules of law to the instant appeal, we must begin with the premise that the appellee owed no duty to appel- lant for injuries she sustained as a result of a slip and fall on natural accumulations of ice and snow. Nevertheless, the inquiry does not end after a statement of this premise. Appellee, presumably through its agent, caused the snow to be shoveled into piles around the poles. There was ice on the ground underneath where the snow had been removed, and appellant slipped on this ice. Coletta is both persuasive and factual similar on the issue of whether the plowing or shoveling to remove a natural accumulation automatically changes the nature of the accumulation of ice and snow from natural to unnatural. The Franklin County Court of Appeals held that the accumulation of snow and ice remaining is still a natural accumulation. We agree. The appellant produced no evidence that appellee had superior knowledge of a hazardous condition greater than that which would ordinarily be anticipated from a natural accumulation of ice and snow. Appellant produced no evidence that we could reasonably construe to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the appellee's superior knowledge. Therefore, we can not deem summary judgment to have been improper. Finally, the appellant produced no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the accumulation being -5- unnatural. The appellant testified that there were no defects in the pavement and that it was level. There was no evidence presented like that in Stinson v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation (1987), 37 Ohio App. 3d 146. In Stinson, the snow was piled on an incline and the freeze-thaw cycle resulted in water running down off the incline and turning back to ice on the sidewalk. We held, in Stinson, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the ice on the sidewalk, under these circumstances, was an unnatural accumulation. We, therefore, hold that when a plaintiff business invitee presents no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the landowner's superior knowledge of the hazardous condition, greater than that which would ordinarily be anticipated from a natural accumulation of ice and snow, nor any evidence that the accumulation was unnatural summary judgment is proper when the top portion of a natural accumulation is removed because the remaining accumulation of ice and snow is also natural, for which a landowner owes a business invitee no duty. This is not to say that a landowner would not be liable when he alters the natural accumulation of snow and ice by plowing in such a manner that the area is more treacherous than reasonably expected. Smith v. Fraternal Order of Eagles (1987), 39 Ohio App. 3d 97. Finally, because we do not believe that the shoveling created a condition more substantially dangerous than that reasonably anticipated, we do not address the issue of -6- appellant's responsibility to exercise some degree of care for her own safety. Bowins v. Euclid General Hosp. (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d 29. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. KRUPANSKY, C.J., and DAVID T. MATIA, J., CONCUR. PATRICIA A. BLACKMON JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .