COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59336 STATE OF OHIO : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : ISAAC TALLEY : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 7, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. CR-234071. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Esq. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113 For Defendant-Appellant: Jonathan Garver, Esq. 1404 E. 9th Street Suite 300 Cleveland, OH 44114 -2- MATIA, J.: Defendant-appellant, Isaac Talley, appeals from his plea of guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter. The appellant's appeal is not well taken. I. THE FACTS A. THE INDICTMENT AND ARRAIGNMENT OF THE APPELLANT On December 8, 1988, the appellant was indicted by the grand jury of Cuyahoga County for one count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02. On December 16, 1988, the appellant was arraigned whereupon a plea of not guilty was entered to the one count of murder as charged in the indictment. B. THE APPELLANT ENTERS A PLEA OF GUILTY TO LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER On February 8, 1989, the appellant retracted his original plea of not guilty to the offense of murder and entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to Crim. R. 11(C), to one count of manslaughter, a violation of R.C. 2903.03. The appellant waived his right to a presentence report and the trial court immediately imposed sentence at the conclusion of the change of plea hearing. The trial court sentenced the appellant to incarceration within the Correctional Reception Center, Orient, Ohio, for a term of five years to twenty-five years. Thereafter, the appellant brought a delayed appeal from his plea of guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter. -3- II. THE SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The appellant's sole assignment of error is that: "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER PRIOR TO ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY PLEA, AS REQUIRED BY CRIM. R. 11(C)(2) AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES." A. ISSUE RAISED: APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY DID NOT COMPLY WITH CRIM. R. 11(C) AND WAS THUS DEFECTIVE The appellant, in his sole assignment of error, argues that his plea of guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter was defective. Specifically, the appellant argues that the trial court failed to comply with the mandate of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) which required that the appellant "understand" the nature of the offense of voluntary manslaughter prior to entering a plea of guilty. The appellant's sole assignment of error is not well taken. B. CRIM. R. 11(C) AND A PLEA OF GUILTY Crim. R. 11(C), which deals with a trial court's acceptance of a plea of guilty to an offense which constitutes a felony, provides that: "(1) Where in a felony case the defendant is unrepresented by counsel the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant, after being readvised that he has the right to be represented by retained counsel, or pursuant to Rule 44 by appointed counsel, waives this right. "(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such -4- plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: "(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation. "(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence. "(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself." C. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CLAIM OF A DEFECTIVE GUILTY PLEA Compliance with Crim. R. 11(C) requires that an oral dialogue occur between the trial court and the defendant in order to properly determine whether the defendant fully comprehends the consequences of his plea of guilty. "Adherence to the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) requires an oral dialogue between the trial court and the defendant which enables the court to determine fully the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea of guilty or no contest." State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus. In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has established that a trial court, in accepting a plea of guilty, need only substantially comply with the mandates of Crim. R. 11. -5- "In United States v. Brogan (C.A. 6, 1975), 519 F.2d 28, the court held that substantial compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 was sufficient. The court further commented that rote recitation of the rule was not necessary, stating: "'We believe that we have not yet reached the state where Courts will require the parroting of any rule; nor should we encourage a defendant to trifle with the court.'" State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 86, at 92. D. TRIAL COURT COMPLIED WITH CRIM. R. 11(C) IN ACCEPTING PLEA OF GUILTY A review of the plea of guilty entered by the appellant to the offense of voluntary manslaughter, reveals that: 1) the appellant was advised of the term of incarceration that could be imposed by the trial court with regard to the offense of voluntary manslaughter; 2) the appellant acknowledged that no threats or promises had been made with regard to the plea of guilty; 3) the appellant acknowledged his confidence in defense counsel and further acknowledged a complete understanding of the effect of his plea of guilty; 4) the appellant acknowledged his right to trial by jury or a judge, the right to confront all witnesses, the right to subpoena witnesses, the right to refuse to testify, and the right to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; and 5) the appellant was informed of the nature of the pending offense of voluntary manslaughter. -6- It should be noted that the prosecutor spread upon the record the specific elements of the pending offense of voluntary manslaughter: "And Judge, if there is then no objection I would move at this time to amend the indictment itself to delete in the caption the Revised Code Section 2903.02 and insert in lieu thereof 2903.03. To add to the language within the body of the indictment wherein it says defendant caused the death of Richard Ruffin while under the influence of sudden passion or fit of rage, either of which was brought on by provocation occasioned by the victim sufficient to incite Mr. Isaac Talley, the person here, to use deadly force, did knowingly cause the death of Richard Ruffin." In the case sub judice, a review of the record clearly demonstrates that the appellant made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. The trial court substantially complied with Crim. R. 11(C) in accepting the appellant's plea of guilty to the offense of voluntary manslaughter and it is evident from the record that the appellant understood the nature of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Judgment affirmed. -7- It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. KRUPANSKY, C.J. and BLACKMON, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA PRESIDING JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .