COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59301 MICHAEL F. WAIWOOD, ET AL : : Plaintiffs-appellants : : JOURNAL ENTRY -vs- : AND : OPINION CITY OF STRONGSVILLE, ET AL : : Defendants-appellees : : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT : OF DECISION : OCTOBER 10, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING : Civil appeal from Court of Common Pleas : Case No. CP 152,121 JUDGMENT : APPEAL DISMISSED DATE OF JOURNALIZATION : APPEARANCES: For plaintiffs-appellants: For defendants-appellees: DONALD P. McFADDEN, ESQ. WILLIAM D. BUSS, II, ESQ. McFADDEN & ASSOCIATES REID, BERRY & STANARD 1700 Standard Building 1300 Illuminating Bldg. 1370 Ontario Street 55 Public Square Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 - 2 - J.F. CORRIGAN, J., Plaintiffs Michael Waiwood, Ann Waiwood, and their minor children appeal from the order of the trial court which granted "final" summary judgment to defendants the City of Strongsville, the Strongsville Police Department, and various Strongsville Police Officers in the Waiwoods' action for damages for an alleged wrongful arrest and prosecution. For the reasons set forth below, we lack jurisdiction, and dismiss the appeal. I. On October 5, 1986, Ann Waiwood was in an automobile collision and received a traffic citation. The citation was subsequently dismissed at Waiwood's costs. Thereafter, on May 7, 1987, the Berea Municipal Court sent Waiwood a bill for $24.00, the costs due. By June 10, 1987, Waiwood had not yet paid the costs, and the court ordered Waiwood, by letter, to appear for a hearing on the matter. This letter further advised that failure to "pay or appear will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest for contempt of court." Waiwood did not pay or appear as ordered and on June 27, 1987, Strongsville police officers attempted to execute an arrest warrant on Waiwood at her home. An argument and scuffle ensued between Michael Waiwood and the officers, and Michael Waiwood was subsequently charged with resisting arrest and assault, and Ann Waiwood was charged with resisting arrest. Both were convicted of all charges following a jury trial. On direct appeal of those convictions, this court - 3 - determined that since Waiwood owed "costs" and not a "fine," the trial court had no jurisdiction to order her to appear, and therefore lacked authority to issue an arrest warrant. Thus, this court determined that Ann Waiwood's arrest was unlawful, and reversed the convictions for resisting the arrest of Ann Waiwood. See, Strongsville v. Waiwood (March 16, 1989), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 54799, 54800, 54801, 54802, 54803. This court upheld Michael Waiwood's convictions for assault and resisting his own arrest, however. Id. On June 27, 1988, the Waiwoods filed this civil action against defendants in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that defendants had violated their constitutional rights, and that defendants were liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and "malicious abuse of process." In August 1988, defendants petitioned for removal of the action to federal court, and in September 1988, the pendent state claims were remanded to the Court of Common Pleas. Defendants moved for summary judgment on October 21, 1988, asserting with respect to the claims arising out of state law that they were entitled to judgment on the malicious prosecution, and "false arrest" claims. The trial court denied this motion and in January 1990, defendants filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment asserting that, pursuant to Courtney v. Rice (1988), 46 Ohio App. 3d 133, they were entitled to summary - 4 - judgment on the malicious prosecution, "false arrest," and false imprisonment claims. The trial court granted this motion, indicating on a half sheet journal entry that its judgment was "final." Plaintiffs now appeal. II. As a general rule, the scope of a court's decision is limited by the nature of the motion and the order or relief sought. 1 Baldwin's Ohio Civil Practice (1988), 200, Section T 21, 26. Further, pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B): "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of such determination, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2505.03 provides in relevant part: "(A) Every final order *** may be reviewed on appeal by a court of common pleas, a court of appeals, or the supreme court, whichever has jurisdiction." R.C. 2505.02 in turn defines a "final order" as: - 5 - "An order that affects a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment *** is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial." An order of a court is a final appealable order only if the requirements of both Civ. R. 54(B) and R.C. 2505.02 are met. Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St. 3d 86, syllabus. In this case, defendants moved for summary judgment as to only three of the five state law claims of plaintiffs' complaint, and the trial court could therefore dispose of only these claims. Thus, the journal entry granting summary judgment disposes of fewer than all of the claims asserted. In addition, the entry did not determine that there is "no just reason for delay." Accordingly, the judgment rendered is not final pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B). Moreover, the judgment does not determine the action and prevent a judgment for plaintiffs or defendants and is therefore not final pursuant to R.C. 2505.22. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Appeal dismissed. - 6 - It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J., and FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR. JUDGE JOHN F. CORRIGAN N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announce- ment of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof, this document will be stamped to indicate journaliza- tion, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .