COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 59206 E-S COMPANY : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : JEROME S. KRAYZEL, ET AL. : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: NOVEMBER 14, 1991 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. 070772 JUDGMENT: REVERSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: THOMAS C. SCHRADER (0013460) WALTER V. EHRNFELT (0040261) McDonald, Hopkins, Burke & Haber Co., L.P.A. 300 National City Bank Bldg. 629 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 For Defendant-Appellee: DAVID C. EISLER The Marion Building, Suite 700 1276 West Third Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 -2- SPELLACY, J.: Plaintiff-appellant E-S Company ("appellant") appeals from the trial court's judgment, wherein the trial court granted defendants-appellants Jerome S. Krayzel and Rosemarie A. Krayzel's ("appellants") motion to receive credit for a security deposit. The facts giving rise to the instant appeal are as follows: On July 27, 1982, appellant obtained a judgment in the amount of $7,576.06, plus interest and costs, against appellee- Jerome S. Krayzel in the Cleveland Municipal Court. Said judgment pertained to cognovit notes signed by appellee-Jerome S. Krayzel. On August 11, 1982, appellant recorded the judgment in the Judgment Lien Docket. As a result, appellant received a valid and subsisting lien against appellee-Jerome S. Krayzel's one-half interest in the real properties located at 7217 Parkard Circle, Middleburg Heights, Ohio and 13592 Havendale Drive, Brook Park, Ohio. On November 5, 1982, appellant obtained a judgment in the amount of $25,813.56, plus interest and costs, against appellees in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. Said judgment pertained to past due rent and taxes. On November 5, 1982, appellant recorded the judgment in the Judgment Lien Docket. As a result, appellant obtained a valid and subsisting lien against appellees' Middleburg Heights property and Brook Park property. On February 10, 1984, appellant filed in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court a complaint for foreclosure of judgment lien, -3- appointment of receiver, and equitable relief. Appellant sought the foreclosure of appellees' Middleburg Heights property and Brook Park property, in order to satisfy its judgments from the proceeds of a Sheriff's Sale. On June 17, 1985, the trial court ordered the sale of appellees' Middleburg Heights property and Brook Park property. The Sheriff's Sale was scheduled for August 5, 1985, but appellees filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. Therefore, the proceedings in the trial court were stayed due to the bankruptcy filing. Throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, appellees defaulted and failed to perform in accordance with the Chapter 13 plan. Thus, on February 27, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court terminated the stay and permitted appellant to initiate and/or renew foreclosure proceedings against appellees' properties. In order to reinstate the foreclosure proceedings, appellant filed, on July 19, 1989, a motion for an alias order of sale. The trial court granted appellant's motion and ordered the sale of appellees' Middleburg Heights property./1\ On September 18, 1989, appellees' Middleburg Heights property was sold at a Sheriff's sale, and on October 23, 1989, the trial court confirmed the sale. After the sale, the proceeds were disbursed in satisfaction of the judgment liens. /1\ Appellees' Brook Park property had already been sold at a Sheriff's Sale on June 5, 1989, as a result of foreclosure pro- ceedings in a separate case. -4- On October 17, 1989, appellees filed a motion to receive credit for a security deposit they had previously paid to appellant. On January 2, 1990, the trial court granted appellees' motion. Appellant was ordered to pay to appellees the sum of $5,722.43. Said sum represented the amount of the security deposit plus interest. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently raised the following assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S [SIC] MOTION TO RECEIVE CREDIT FOR SECURITY DEPOSIT WHERE SUCH CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. In its sole assignment of error, appellant argues that appellees should have been precluded from collaterally attacking the two judgments it obtained against them in 1982. Appellant claims that the two judgments rendered in 1982 were final judgments, and appellees could not challenge them during the foreclosure proceedings. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Willoughby (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 51, this court held that a valid underlying judgment cannot be attacked in subsequent proceedings. In Federal, supra, FDIC obtained a judgment on a note and received a certificate of judgment lien. In a subsequent action, FDIC filed a verified creditor's bill seeking proceeds from Laurence Willoughby's insurance policy, after a fire destroyed his home. Willoughby attempted to attack the prior judgment by raising issues in a counterclaim. This court found that Willoughby was prohibited -5- from raising such an attack under the doctrine of res judicata. This court held: The doctrine of res judicata operates now to prevent repeated attacks on a final judgment and applies not only to what was determined but also every question which might properly have been litigated in the prior case. Federal, supra, at 54. We find that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the instant case. In this case, appellant obtained two valid judgments against appellees and then received two certificates of judgment lien. Appellees failed to attack the two judgments by either direct appeal or by seeking relief pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B). We conclude that appellees were prohibited from attacking the prior judgment during the foreclosure proceedings. Clearly, the issue of receiving credit for a security deposit was one that would have been properly litigated in the prior cases. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion to receive credit for a security deposit. Appellant's assignment of error is well taken and is sustained. Trial judgment is reversed. -6- This cause is reversed. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant(s) recover of said appellee(s) their costs herein. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. DYKE, P.J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .