COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 57388 JAMES YAROSH, ET AL. : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : STEVEN D. UNIK, ET AL. : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLEE : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CASE NO. 113,152 JUDGMENT: APPEAL DISMISSED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant: STEVEN McGOWAN 55 PUBLIC SQUARE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 For Defendant-Appellee, Steven D. Unik: LYNN L. MOORE GALLAGHER, SHARP, FULTON & NORMAN BULKLEY BUILDING, 7TH FLOOR 1501 EUCLID AVENUE CLEVELAND, OHIO 44115 For Defendant-Appellee, Strongsville Cafe: RICHARD McGRAW 2150 ILLUMINATING BUILDING CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 and JOSEPH GAMBINO 11221 PEARL ROAD STRONGSVILLE, OHIO 44136 -2- SPELLACY, J.: On July 14, 1986, plaintiff-appellant James Yarosh ("appellant") and his parents, James E. Yarosh and Joan C. Yarosh, filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against several defendants, including defendants-appellees Steven D. Unik and The Strongsville Cafe ("appellees"). The complaint also named the City of Strongsville and several John Does. A review of the record indicates that service of process was completed on appellees, The City of Strongsville, and John Doe, d.b.a. Phase II. Subsequently, Ohio Bell Telephone Company ("Ohio Bell") was added as a defendant and it was also properly served a summons. Thus, it is clear from the record that an action had commenced against appellees, The City of Strongsville, John Doe, d.b.a. Phase II and Ohio Bell. On April 8, 1987, the trial court granted Ohio Bell's motion to dismiss. Thus, Ohio Bell was dropped as a party defendant. On June 21, 1988, a stipulation for dismissal was journalized. In the judgment entry, defendant-The City of Strongsville was dismissed pursuant to Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a)./1\ On December 20, 1988, a jury trial commenced. On January 10, 1989, the trial court issued a journal entry adopting the jury's verdict. In its journal entry, the trial court entered judgment in favor of appellee-Unik against appellant. The trial /1\ Although Ohio Bell had been dismissed by the trial court, the stipulation for dismissal also named Ohio Bell. -3- court also entered judgment against appellant and in favor of appellee-The Strongsville Cafe. After the trial court denied appellant's motion for a new trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal to this court contesting the trial court's rulings. Based upon a careful review of the record in this case, we find that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal at the present time, since there is a lack of a final appealable order. Civ. R. 54(B) provides: (B) Judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of such determination, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Hence, a judgment which does not dispose of all the claims or parties in a given action, and which does not contain the words "no just reason for delay" pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B), is not a final order and, therefore, must be dismissed by an -4- appellate court for lack of jurisdiction. Stewart v. Midwestern Indemn. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 124. In the instant case, the record clearly reflects that the trial court never disposed of appellant's parents' claims for the loss of support and companionship of appellant. Further, the record contains no adjudication of the claims against John Doe, d.b.a. Phase II. John Doe, d.b.a. Phase II was properly served and still remains a party-defendant below. We conclude that since there has not been an express determination that there is "no just reason for delay", the action has not been properly terminated as to all the claims, and jurisdiction remains with the trial court. This court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to review this appeal and, accordingly, it is dismissed pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B). Appeal is dismissed and this case is remanded for further proceedings. -5- It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants their costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. DYKE, P.J., and PATTON, J., CONCUR. LEO M. SPELLACY JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate journalization, at which time it will become the judgment and order of the court and time period for review will begin to run. .