Subj : Numbers stations To : Digital Man From : Angus McLeod Date : Mon Aug 15 2005 08:53 pm Re: Numbers stations By: Digital Man to Angus McLeod on Mon Aug 15 2005 12:46:00 > > True, but it is feasible for a security system to set up receiver farms > > and capture many (if not all) of the transmissions from numbers stations, > > and apply them as potential OTP's to signals to see if they give sensible > > results. > > But do you think that's common? Such a system would have to use voice > recognition technology to archive and compare the numbers. And it'd have to > constantly scanning all frequencies. Seems unlikely. Well, you never can tell with billion-dollar budgets like the FBI, CIA, NSA and so forth, WHAT they are doing -- but probably not. > > I think it would be much more secure to send the OTP via some > > un-eavesdroppable mechanism (even sneaker-net) and then use the numbers > > stations to send the encrypted signals over the broadcast bands. > > I agree. But lets for argument's sake, say I want to send some very sensitiv > data to you (in Barbados) from here (in California). sneaker-net isn't viabl Ah! I've spent a lot of timethinking about this! :-) > A direct analog modem-to-modem connection would probably be pretty secure, b > I have to know your phone number, you have to be setup to receive at a speci > time, etc. The problem of how to send secure messages boils down to how to send a secure key. If I suddenly needed to send you a cast-iron secret message, it would be difficult. I have to assume that The Enemy is watching every transmission -- reading my mail, watching my internet traffic, listening to my phone, and watching me so if I go to an Internet Cafe, they can probably get copies of that traffic too. They are also watching you. You and I have no previously arranged key. So how do I get the key to you without them getting a copy as well? The problem becomes worse if I must prevent them from even *knowing* that we are sending encoded messages between us. I could make a pottery ashtray. In the ashtray I could conceal an OTP. I send it to you. When you tell me you have received it and it is undamaged, I instruct you to break the ashtray and recover the OTP, and decode the following message. Now The Enemy know we are exchanging messages, but they don't have the key (or did they X-ray the ashtray?!) so they can't know what the message is. But if I have to conceal the fact that messages are being passed at all, how do I get you to know thatb there is even a message that needs decoding, far less get a key to you? > Obviously, there are many ways to solve this problem of key > distribution. Yes, but other than hand-carried OTP's, I can't think of anything that is 100% guaranteed not to have been compromised. > I just thought the shortwave radio method sounded cool. And the fact > that the numbers traffic has *increased* in the past 10 years means it > must be effective. I still think that the numbers traffic must be the *message* and not the key itself. The OTP must be handed to the agent back in Mossad headquarters *before* he sets off for Tehran. Then he listens for broadcasts on a memorized schedule on an innocent shortwave receiver... O --- þ Synchronet þ CQ DX! The ANJO BBS calling on 56K dial-up... .