Dan Shoom Kingston IS Five Part Series on Nafta Part 3 ------ In a gesture of goodwill to the International Socialists the federal Liberal government has made up its mind (sic) on NAFTA in time for the Socialist Worker deadline. Debating whether or not Jean Chretien broke a campaign promise by implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the changes he announced on December 2 misses the crucial point. Even if he had gotten everything he was asking for it would have made little difference. The changes he wanted would not stop NAFTA from creating a protectionist trade bloc. Neither would NAFTA cease to be an excuse for corporate bosses and right-wing governments to extort concessions from workers, and undermine social programs, health, safety and environmental regulations in all three countries. The Liberal's famous red-book, which includes the promises they made during the election, claims that they would "renegotiate both the FTA [the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement] and NAFTA to obtain: -a subsidies code; -an anti-dumping code; -a more effective dispute resolution mechanism; and -the same energy protection as Mexico." Environmental and labour standards, the red book states, have been addressed by the (bogus) side-deals agreed to by Canada, the US, and Mexico in August. If satisfactory changes were not negotiated, the FTA and NAFTA would be cancelled, but only as a last resort. After the election Chretien also promised to get the US and Mexico to agree that Canada would not be forced to export bulk water under NAFTA. On subsidies and anti-dumping, Chretien won an agreement from the US and Mexico to establish codes by December 31, 1995. This is essentially a part of the FTA that was dropped in NAFTA. In the FTA, which has been in effect since January 1, 1989, Canada and the US were supposed to devise codes within seven years. Yet no discussions ever occurred. Chretien simply won back an empty promise. Even if codes are established, which is unlikely, it is not clear what difference these codes would make for most workers, and other opponents of NAFTA. Dumping occurs when a company sells its product at a supposedly unfairly low price. In fact, dumping is an old tactic for shedding excess stock or winning new markets. Dumping into poor or underdeveloped countries is often a away in which multinational corporations expand their imperialist control. Between Canada and the U.S., however, dumping is entirely a conflict between different businesses. Workers who take a side in such a dispute are supporting one business over both the bosses and workers of another. Dumping is simply a way to blame 'foreigners' and not a nation's own ruling class for its economic problems. Subsidies, like tariffs, will be considered barriers to trade under NAFTA. While tariffs make the prices of goods from elsewhere higher, (they are like the duty you pay on some goods when you cross a national border), subsidies make prices lower. 'Subsidy' is a vague term that can include government handouts to business so that they can sell their products cheaper. While socialists would not miss such 'corporate welfare', there are other possible definitions to consider. Subsidies can also include development schemes that would encourage investment in economically depressed regions. In this sense, any native self-government plan that would involve assisting native businesses could be declared a trade barrier under NAFTA. Social programs, like medicare, can also be called subsidies, because the government pays for something that businesses elsewhere have to pay for. It is precisely this type of government spending that helps people that the FTA and NAFTA are meant to whittle down. Chretien says that successful negotiations on subsidies and dumping will eliminate the need for a better dispute mechanism. In other words, just as the FTA did not eliminate trade wars between Canada and the US, neither will NAFTA. Only now they'll be even more complicated with Canadian provinces and Mexico added to the battles. Concerns over energy and water involve two principles of NAFTA: national treatment and proportional-sharing. National treatment means that Canada (or the U.S. or Mexico) must treat American or Mexican buyers of any commodity the same as Canadians. Something for sale in Canada cannot be prohibitted for sale to Americans or Mexicans. Proportional-sharing clauses oblige Canada (or the U.S.) to continue exporting the same proportion of its supply of these non-renewable resources as were sold over the previous 36 months even in the case of a national shortage. If Canada were to limit exports due to a shortage it would be liable to pay compensation to American or Mexican buyers. Mexico won an exemption from proportional-sharing of its energy in NAFTA. It did so at the expense of losing the same market access as Canada gained by agreeing to proportional sharing. Chretien wanted the same protection as Mexico. This posed a problem. If Canada were to lose its market access he would have come under pressure from energy exporters, especially from Alberta's oil endustry. Chretien's tried to get the best of both. He made a unilateral declaration that his government interprets NAFTA as "not requiring any Canadian to export a given level or proportion of any energy to another NAFTA country" in the event of a shortage or to conserve Canada's resources. Even though this directly contradicts the proportional-sharing clauses neither the U.S. nor Mexico have to date contested this interpretation.This means it may well stand up in any trade dispute over Canada's energy. On the question of water environmentalists have expressed a concern that NAFTA forces water exports in a couple of ways. Some say that the national treatment clauses stop Canada from prohibitting the sale of water to the US or Mexico if it is for sale within Canada. The statement released December 2 by Canada, the US and Mexico would seem to satisfy this fear. It states "nothing in NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA party to ... begin exporting water in any form." However, the statement may refer only to water in its natural state in lakes, rivers, icebergs, etc. The second fear is that once the tap is turned on, it can't be turned off. Once Canada begins to sell water to the U.S. it can't stop in order to maintain supplies to Canadians. The statement is silent on this issue. While NAFTA may not force water to be exported, the important point is that it makes large-scale water exports more likely to occur, and more difficult to stop once begun. There are good reasons to be concerned about the export of energy and water. Megaprojects, like the James Bay Hydroelectric project, the shipping of petroleum, uranium mining, to name just three, have profoundly negative effects on the ecosystem and on the livelihood of people in their way. They are often undertaken without regard to the wishes of native people and native land rights. Whether water is transported in bottles, pipelines, tankers, or canals there are environmental hazards. Wendy Holm and Donald Gutstein, who have written on water issues under NAFTA, point out "Water exports pose serious risks to the environment. Supertanker sales and large-scale diversions could result in the exportation of micro-organisms to other environments, changes to the salinity and micro-climate of ocean outfall sites, and the loss of biological diversity, wildlife habitat, and large tracts of prime land because of flooding." Water exports can also violate native water rights. B.C. Klahoose Band natives threatened a lawsuit in 1990 over a plan to ship 12.4 billion litres of water to Santa Barbara, California. Conservation programs may also be at risk with NAFTA. Programs must be weighed against their economic impact and adhere to market principles. So, for example, Ontario Hydro's modest efforts to promote energy conservation, already on the chopping block of fiscal restraint, could be challenged as an unfair barrier to trade. Opponents of NAFTA are also worried that it infringes on national sovereignty. (This is a tricky issue; when Patrick Buchanan invokes sovereignty he's speaking of the loss of American culture to Mexican immigrants.) They mean two things when they speak of sovereignty. First, they often mean the ability of governments to place restrictions on business. These restrictions include environmental regulations, workers rights and many other progressive concerns. While socialists should support such concerns, we must point out that rather than looking to national governments for solutions we must work towards building the capacity for workers and other oppressed groups to internationally unite in struggle to win positive changes, not just on a national level but everywhere. The second way in which sovereignty is used is more troubling. In this sense Canada should have priority over Americans or Mexicans in their access to Canadian energy or water in the event of a shortage or crisis. This puts the interests of Canadians for water to drink, to cook, or to bathe, or drive over that of Americans and Mexicans. A compassionate policy would put the interests of people to fuel and clean water for basic survival ahead of the interests of big business, regardless of nationality. This can appear at times to be putting nationalism ahead of environmentalism. One prominent environmentalist has criticized NAFTA because "conservation-related policies would only be acceptable if they were accompanied by similar restrictions on domestic production or consumption." Wendy Holm, uses the example of the Rafferty-Alameda dam project in southern Saskatchewan as an example of what's wrong with NAFTA. Once the water is offered for sale to Saskatchewan farmers, she says, it must also be offered to farmers in North Dakota. This is a strange basis to oppose NAFTA: that we should not be subject to the same conservation measures we want to impose on the U.S. Practically, the stakes are higher with respect to the U.S. since its needs for energy and water, for both people and business, are so much greater than Canada's. But projects like the Rafferty-Alameda dam are wrong, not because the water will be exported. They are wrong because they are environmentally hazardous and violate native land rights. The concessions Chretien won do little to satisfy the concerns of opponents of NAFTA. But his task was made easier by the nationalist terms in which this opposition is usually expressed.