Notes 1. Steward (1955: 15-29) distinguishes between unilinear, universal and multilinear evolution. Unilinear posits a series of stages through which all societies are thought to pass. Universal formulates stages through which human culture as a whole is said to develop. Multilinear evolution analyses separate cultures with a view to formulating general laws which can account for those parallel developments that do occur. Sahlins and Service (1960) distinguish between specific evolution (specialized adaptationn to particular niches) and general evolution (the idea of the overall progressive development of biotic and cultural forms). 2. Ekholm and Friedman cite several other studies that document the existence of a sphere of private capital accumulation in areas that have been characterized as theocratic centralized economies (Ekholm and Friedman 1982: 100, Note 15). They cite Farber's (1978) work, which "demonstrates the very high degree of commercialization of the Babylonian economy (the existence of parallel movements of prices of different goods and services and wages, a general price level, and economic cycles)." See also Adams, 1984. These findings support Curtin's (1984) contention that something like price-setting markets operated in ancient economies. 3. Steward (1955: 11-15) elaborates the differences between biological and social evolution. In biological evolution diffusion is non-existant and parallel developments are rare, and not the focus of analysis. Cultural evolution takes account of diffusion and attempts to explain the causation of parallel developments in unconnected societies (see also Sahlins and Service, 1960). 4. While these independent nuclear families are certainly the simplest known groups, their status as evolutionary predecessors has been disputed (Service, 1960). As related by Fried (1967: 56-57) these independent families, and also the more integrated patrilineal bands, may be disintegrated groups forced into harsh territories by more developed societies. The original hunter-gatherers occupied the choicest territories, as they had no competition from societies with greater levels of socio-cultural integration. Service (1962) claims that "sodalities," forms of social integration that crosscut localities and require symbolic representation, constitute the major distinction between cultural and pre-cultural human groups. Nevertheless, recent archeological studies cited by Haas (1982: 9) support Steward's contention a "family-band" form of organization prevailed among the Great Basin Shoshoneans for several thousand years prior to contact with Europeans. 5. Renfrew (1975: 12) points out that an important difference which distinguishes true states from the Polynesian chiefdoms is that the latter lacked permanent regularly functioning central places. The redistributive centers performing redistribution functioned only periodically. 6. Reciprocity could be involved in such a relationship, as when a serf receives one chicken a year from his lord in return for subservient obedience. 7. Adams is describing features of the Aztec empire, a conquest state which emerged long after the earlier Teotihuacan and Tula states, but he claims that these institutional forms may tell us about the nature of the earlier primary states in the formative period, about which we have little direct evidence. 8. Teotihuacan in the valley of Mexico is thought to have founded a distant colonial city, Kaminaljuya, in the highlands of Guatemala to control the Cacao trade with the lowlands of the Pacific coast (Service, 1975: 176-177), or to control obsidian production (Blanton, et. al., 1981: 141). 9. The notion of semi-periphery has been used to analyze various aspects of the modern world-system. Several definitions of this term can be gleaned from theoretical works (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982: 47; Wallerstein, 1979) as well as from historical interpretive works (Wallerstein, 1980; Arrighi, 1985). I have found the following explicit definitions: 1. sub-imperialism, the exercise of political-military influence by middle-level states against weaker states in a region, possibly at the behest of a core power (Marini, 19) or the use of a middle-level group to help maintain colonial rule over other peoples (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982: 47) 2. areas with "intermediate" types of labor control, i.e. share-cropping in Southern France in the sixteenth century Wallerstein, 1979: 38) 3. exploited from the core above, and exploiter of the periphery below 4. a mixture of high wage core production and low wage peripheral production 5. an intermediate group in the core/periphery hierarchy which depolarizes that hierarchy 6. an area containing both core and peripheral production in which a large state operates to integrate these contradictory areas 7. states with intermediate levels of power-capability vis-a-vis other states. 10. Nativist" reactions to both semi-peripheral and peripheral conquerors occurred in Mesopotamia and in Egypt. The Semitic Akkadians were overthrown by the Sumerians, who then established their own centralized empire, the Third Dynasty of Ur empire. In Egypt the alien Hyksos conquered the Nile valley, but were overthrown by the Egyptian aristocracy after a long struggle. 11. I have not been able to find independent confirmation of the notion that Upper Egypt (the south) was more pastoral or less developed at the time of the first dynasty. Emery's (1961) study of archaic Egypt makes no mention of developmental differences between north and south in his chapter on the unification of Egypt under the first dynasty. 12. For a somewhat different but related view of the nature of Aztec hegemony see Hassig (1985: Chapter 5). 13. It should be noted that Blanton, et. al. (1981) use potsherd evidence to indicate periods of free market versus periods of state-controlled pottery production. In their reckoning, a period in which low quality, uniform-style pots were produced indicates state control, whereas higher quality and more differentiated pots indicate the operation of a market. This operationalization is certainly questionable. 14. Oppenheim (1969), critiqueing Diakonoff, contends that, from the middle of the third millenium "conquest, or rather raids for booty against weaker neighbors, form an inherent part of the foreign policy of every kingdom in and around Mesopotamia" (Oppenheim, 1969: 36). The difference between the primary empires and the "warrior empires" with regard to their quantitative reliance on exploitation of peripheral areas may be only a matter of degree. The much larger size of the later empires makes their depredations and tribute-taking look stupendous. Herodotus listed the twenty satrapies of the Persian empire and the yearly tribute that they paid in silver, gold dust, eunuch boys, ebony, etc. (Cook, 1983: 78-79). 15. This interpretation of the Peloponnesian wars is the most common one among historians (e.g. McNeill, 1963; Sealey, 1976) but it is disputed by de Ste. Croix (1972), who depicts Sparta as the aggressor. 16. But not, of course, the historical consequences which the Phoenicians had pioneered, especially the formation of a commercialized trade network in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and further East. Herm (1975) contends that the Phoenician heritage also is seen in the theological doctrine of predestination, espoused first by the Phoenician, St. Augustine and later made a central feature of Calvinism. Powerful merchants will employ religious notions, or invent them, which legitimize their wealth, but this line of ideological inheritance from the oriental Phoenician capitalists to the later Protestant capitalists is an interesting footnote to Weber's work. 17. Braudel (1972, Volume 1: 583) describes the Eastern trade during the sixteenth century A.D. Thus: "But the West could not have survived on internal exchange alone. During the middle years of the century, in particular, western stocks were replenished by shipments from the Levant, which with its smaller population had more grain available for export, usually at lower prices." 18. Rather than leaving the analysis of civilizations to "idealists" or relegating them to the "superstructure" it may be valuable to consider the interactions between world-system boundaries and civilizations. Just as we analyze nation-building, ethnic and class solidarities and consciousness as causes and consequences of social development, so we can study civilizational processes. The work of Toynbee (Tomlin, 1978), Sorokin (1941) and especially Kroeber (1957, 1963) might be a good starting point for a new historical materialist approach which examines civilizational and world-system processes. 19. Chirot's (1985) restatement of Weber's account of the rise of the West acknowledges that our interest in the difference between Occident and Orient is partly motivated by the need for collective identity. Like the ancients, we need a story of our origins. See Said (19). 20. Eisenstadt's (1980) refinement and elaboration of Weber's and Parsons's efforts tries to go beyond Eurocentricities by including a few oriental societies in the circle of the chosen. This is a noble attempt at culturalist universalism and a further improvement on the shift from theological philosophy to universal social science. 21. This modification was suggested by Samir Amin's (1980) analysis, which uses the notion of uneven development to account for how "peripheral" Europe was able to become capitalist and to, in turn, peripheralize the older core areas of the Eurasian world-system. It is also contained in Ekholm and Friedman's (1980) discussion of a global approach to anthropology.