CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORLD-SYSTEMS From this survey of different types of world-systems what can we conclude about their similarities and differences, and what can be said about the nature of system transformation? First, the question of system logic is clearly not directly answerable by distinguishing empirical world-systems one from another. Single systems contain different logics, although one or another may be dominant. We must, we are forced to, deal with the messy idea that different modes of production are articulated with one another in the same world-system. This is unfortunate. It would have been ever so much simpler if there had been a nice fit between world-system types and modes of production. World-system types: similarities and differences At this point I want to remind the reader of the qualifications and apologies offered at the beginning of this section (page 1), and hope that other scholars will be provoked by the above to address the empirical claims and theoretical problems raised herein. Whereas my tone may have sounded to definite in places, the hunt bagged only hypotheses, not proven conclusions. The following is in the nature of a political discussion, some of which is based on the above analysis. Political action can not, unfortunately, wait until the final word or certain proof is in. Although the broad taxonomy I employed lumped together many things which perhaps should have been kept separate, it at least provides us with a set of categories to begin the task of sorting and comparing. The world- system types discussed were: 1. stateless, classless world-economies 2. primary state-based world-economies 3. primary world-empires 4. complex secondary world-systems 5. commercializing world-systems 6. the capitalist European subsystem Despite the apparently chronological ordering, it should be remembered that these are not unilinear stages of development. All world-systems were stateless before about 4000 B.C. and some isolated ones were still stateless as late as the 18th century A.D. Primary states emerged in different areas at different times, and so did primary empires. Stateless world-systems did exist and their inter-societal trade networks were important for the provisioning of both material necessities and prestige goods. Intersocietal exchange was predominantly marketless, being based on reciprocal gift-giving among lineage heads. Intersocietal exchange of prestige goods was probably important in the emergence of chiefdoms. Only chiefdoms exhibited core/periphery hierarchies and these were unstable because of the chief's lack of autonomy and lack of independent access to resources. The primary state-based world-economies were city-state theocracies at first. A redistributive temple economy was erected over the continuing reciprocity of lineages. These soon developed differentiated political- military structures. And they also developed private accumulation of wealth through land ownership. Some market activities may have existed, but the economies remained predominantly based on reciprocity within lineages and redistribution by the state. Core/periphery relations developed based on conquest, booty and tribute-taking but these were not central aspects of the mode of production. Long distance trade, whether state-administered or market, was mostly based on equal exchange. Interstate systems exhibited balance of power mechanisms, and uneven development allowed semi-peripheral marcher states to overtake older core areas and to establish empires. A prestige goods economy between city-states promoted uneven development and cultural interpenetration in the core areas. The primary empires were formed through conquest by semi-peripheral marcher states. Secondary centers which had recently adopted state- formation and production for exchange, but which had egalitarian political institutions surviving from their previous mode of organization, unified the separate states of the primary world-economies. The apparatus of rule varied from direct central appointment of governors (Akkad) to indirect "feudal" granting of fiefs to loyal local leaders (Inca, Chou, Aztec). Some of the primary empires succeeded in their efforts to monopolize trade and profitable production, creating marketless redistributive economies--the Inca and the Egyptians. In others, market forces expanded outside of state control both within the boundaries of the empires and in autonomous ports of trade in interstitial regions. Expansion of production for exchange and commercial trade was severely hampered by the efforts of state monopolization and the scarcity of money. Usury facilitated the acquisition of trade goods for use, but stifled the growth of production for exchange. Some prestige goods began to function as money, especially for the payment of mercenaries. But a generalized monetary system did not exist. Conquest of peripheral regions and the extraction of booty and tribute occurred, but was not a central mode of accumulation, except, perhaps, for the Aztecs. The primary empires expanded over older core areas and extracted surplus from them. Relations with peripheral areas were primarily defensive, fending off the raiding attacks of desert and hill nomads. Long distance trade was often organized by sending colonies of artisans to produce a manufactured good at the site of a rare but heavy raw material, or by organizing colonial settlements to produce food in new areas. Complex secondary world-systems combined empires and interstitial regions. Except in China, the formulation that a world-empire expands to encompass a world-economy does not hold. As with the primary empires, the larger warrior empires which unified several primary empires were formed through conquest by semi-peripheral marcher states. These integrated politically areas of prior civilizational development which had already become linked by economic exchange, and created new links by conquering areas beyond the existing economic networks. The analogy to ecological succession, in which more complex forms of life establish themselves over the tops of earlier levels of biotic energy accumulation, suggests itself. But the new forms also developed qualitatively new types of integration. The warrior empires were primarily dependent on "forcible exchange," by which they extracted booty and tribute from both older core and peripheral areas. The core/periphery structure was the main source of support for these warrior empires, although waves of nomadic raiders, the "high barbarians" of the Eurasian steppe, continued to threaten the newly expanded empires. Autonomous cities engaged in market trade within these empires, and autonomous city-states operated in semi-peripheral regions and in the interstices between empires. The Phoenician city-states emerged as the first sovereign polities in which merchant traders held state power. They extended market relations to the Mediterannean littoral, carrying core products and products of their own manufacture. The Greek city-states combined a territorial redistributive system based on the polis (an association of communal and private land-holders) with a commercialized economic imperialism. The Greeks profited from a hierarchical division of labor between core manufacturers and capital-intensive agriculture and peripheral producers of grain and precious metals. The Eurasian and Chinese commercializing world-systems exhibited increasing monetization, agricultural production for exchange, and capitalist manufacturing. The commercial trade between India and China eventually linked both directly through their exchanges with one another and indirectly through their involvement in the South Seas regional trade network. The Hellenization of the Mediterranean and the Near East further expanded trade and increased the intensity of the exchange of fundamental goods over a wide area through the commercialization of olive oil, wine and manufacturing for export. States and empires were learning to combine tributary modes of production with market exchange, but control of state power by merchant capitalists was confined to interstitial regions. Semi-peripheral areas continued to be the source of new marcher states (Macedonia, Rome, Arabia) and the source of new accommodations between tributary and capitalist modes of production (Greece, Rome, Arabia, Parthia). But old core areas such as India and China also experimented with adaptation to, rather than suppression of, market forces. Conquest states came also from the peripheral steppe nomad alliances. The Chinese world-empire experienced a near transformation to capitalism during the Sung and Ming dynasties. Core/periphery relations were extended by the Roman Empire deep into Europe and by the Chinese and Indian civilizations into Indochina and the South Pacific. These trade relations often promoted state-formation in peripheral tribal societies, but the states so formed were culturally, materially and sometimes politically dependent on the older core areas. Some, however, succeeded in emerging as independent mercantile states trading bulk goods in local and regional markets. The Wallersteinian problem of the incorporation of external arenas into the capitalist world-economy has been confused by two issues. The first is the attempt to identify a single mode of production with each ostensible world-system and therefore to downplay the extent to which capitalism operated as a mode of production articulated with the tributary modes within the commercializing empires and interstitial regions. Thus for Wallerstein the trade between the European capitalist world-economy and the allegedly separate world-empires must have been non-essential trade of presciosities. These "external arenas" were then incorporated into the European world-economy. My interpretation separates the institutional nature of exchange from the boundaries of world-systems. Wallerstein sometimes claims that world- economies are always capitalist and world-empires are always non-capitalist, but at other points he admits the possibility of non-capitalist world-economies (Wallerstein, 1979). The confusing and strained efforts to characterize trade between Europe, the Ottoman Empire, India and China as epiphenominal before their peripheralization by the emerging European sub-system is unnecessary once we allow for equal exchange within a multicentric Eurasian world-system. As I have already pointed out, Europe was never, or only very temporarily, a separate economic network even if we use the "fundamental commodities" definition. The emergent dominance of capitalism within the semi-peripheral European subsystem was crucial for the eventual peripheralization of the older core areas, but this transformation was only possible because of the increasing commercialization of the older areas. This epigenetic theory of the rise of the West is the most important modification of the Wallerstenian world-system perspective which is suggested by my comparison of different kinds of world-systems.21 The capitalist European subsystem exhibited many of the same features as earlier world-systems, as argued by Ekholm and Friedman. It developed an important and necessary core/periphery structure which was reproduced, not eliminated, as Europe became the core of a global world-system. The capitalist world-economy has not been as devoted to, or dependent upon, core/periphery exploitation as the warrior empires were, but the political advantages for class solidarity in capitalist core states of having an underdeveloped periphery, not to mention the extra resources gained from imperialism, may have been a main element in preventing the development of socialism in capitalist core states. Many regional sub-systems, as well as the primary state-based world- economies, and the early Chinese and Indian world-systems, had interstate systems. Many of these were long-lasting and exhibited many of the features we see operating in the contemporary global interstate system. A multicentric core experienced uneven development, with the rise and fall of hegemones. The balance of power mechanism often operated to promote alliances among weaker members against those that were stronger. Various institutions of diplomacy and "international law" have been present in the historical interstate systems. We have noted fairly long-lasting interstate systems in Sumer, Mexico, Peru, the valley of the Ganges, Chou China, the Greek city-states, the Italian city-states, and perhaps in Egypt before the Old Empire and in Ancient Pakistan (Harrapa-Mohenjo-daro) as well. Also we ought to pay attention to the "international relations" among empires. When these interact by trade and political-military means they constitute an inter- state system. The institutional nature of interaction, the levels and types of competition, the operation of the balance of power mechanism, institutions of diplomacy and alliance and the nature of international organizations are all matters which a close comparative study of interstate systems should consider. Relevant sources are Chatterjee (1975), Modelski (1964), Walker (1953) and Gilpin (1981). But there is an important difference between the interstate system of the capitalist world-economy and earlier interstate systems. In ours the dominant hegemones are those states that are successful in competitive commodity production and pursue a policy which is predominantly oriented toward supporting profitable trade. That is, they are internationally- oriented capitalist states in which an important share of state power is held by people who hold private wealth and invest both nationally and abroad. This fact accounts for another important difference between the interstate system of the contemporary world-system and earlier ones. Earlier hegemones were much more ambivalent in their commitment to accumulation through production and trade. They often opted for a policy of conquest imperialism. Thus it was Athens, the core state most involved in export and trade, that tried to convert the Greek interstate system into an empire. The declining hegemones in our interstate system never commit to that option, although they sometimes contain parties who favor it. This is because the international capitalists, who are the core of the core in a capitalist world-system, utilize the international institutions which permit foreign investments to be secure in a capitalist world-system (see Chapter). Thus their investments come to be spread outside of their home state, and they opt in favor of international "liberalism" rather than imperium. Attempts at imperium come rather from second tier core powers, upwardly mobile ones, that are blocked by the particular form in which the "liberal" structure of power is constructed. And none of the attempts to unify the core by conquest have succeeded, at least not yet. Another, difference, is that our interstate system encompasses the whole world-system, and there are no more external arenas. Intervention from outside is no longer possible. All history is now world history, and the logic of our system has only itself to contend with. Core/periphery relations It should be said that the above study can only be considered a first foray into comparative core/periphery relations. Very little of the literature on ancient world-systems focuses on regional divisions of labor or the interaction among societies at different levels of development. And I have certainly not read all the literature which does address these questions. I have had to stretch the meanings core, periphery and semi- periphery as they have become defined for describing the modern world-system and I'm sure that more clarification of concepts is needed. For the purposes of a preliminary overview I tried to be flexible, and this has, no doubt, produced some confusion. Do other world-systems than our own have core/periphery hierarchies, as Ekholm and Friedman argued? Everyone would have to answer yes. Does every historical core create its own unique periphery (frontier) as Lattimore claims, or can we make useful generalizations about types of core/periphery relations? We argued that stateless world-systems do not have institutionalized core/periphery relations, although the case of chiefdoms was somewhat problematic. We found that some types of world-systems seem to be more focussed on core/periphery exploitation than others. And indeed, we found instances when particular peripheral formations seemed to exploit their cores! We found cases in which manufactured goods were produced in the periphery and shipped to the core, apparently in exchange for less processed goods. We found many caes where semi-peripheral socieites conquered older core areas. In other cases it was clearly peripheral societies who conquered old core areas, and in many other cases peripheral societies simply overran and destroyed core areas. My typology of world-systems is admittedly somewhat arbitrary and I had difficulty deciding in which box to put particular cases. This interacted with the attempt to make generalizations about world-systems in some instances. I have not been able to give much consideration to the operation of processes such as the development of underdevelopment because there are few studies of these in the ancient world-systems. Much work remains to be done at the theoretical, conceptual and empirical levels. Modes of production Despite the problems with some of Polanyi's empirical claims, his distinctions between reciprocal, redistributive and market modes of integration continue to be helpful in understanding the nature of different world-systems. The term "redistributive" is somewhat unfortunate, however. It was suggested by the activities of chiefdoms, and fails to capture the mobilizational activities and politically-based exploitation that we find in states and empires. I prefer the term "tributary modes of production" as used by Amin (1980) and Wolf (1982). Wolf makes the useful point that the important distinction between feudalism and the Asiatic mode of production is that one is relatively decentralized (in which the immediate lord is the primary political authority that extracts surplus product from direct producers) and the other involves various types of centralized regimes that coordinate surplus appropriation from one or another form of politically coerced labor. Most precapitalist world-systems contained both types and the same area may change from one to the other over time. There are however, important differences between forms of the tributary mode of production in addition to the degree of centralization. The nature of the relationship between monarch and local powerholders is certainly important. Some authors stress personal fealty, as embodied in the institutions of vassalage and fief, as an important defining characteristic of feudalism. Perry Anderson (1974a) uses this more specific definition, and thus finds feudalism only in medieval Europe and Japan, which supports his notion that feudalism is fertile ground for capitalism. But other authors (Levinson and Schurmann, 1969: 34-40; Coulborn, 1956), using the same definition, find personal fealty in Chou China, Seljuq Iran and sixteenth-century Russia and other places and times as well. Personal fealty, however, is an inherently unstable basis for a territorial state, as it must be recreated in every generation. Thus it either is replaced by a centralized bureaucracy or by a more contractual relationship between monarach and a hereditary class of landed aristocrats. Amin (1980: 69) refers to feudalism as an "incomplete" mode of production, implying that is a kind of transitional period between the non- state "communal" formations and the more centralized tributary mode of production. While I agree that feudalism should not really be understood as a mode of production, my reasoning is somewhat different. We find social, political and economic institutions similar to European feudalism both in transition to empire formation and after empires have devolved. In the European case it is true, as Anderson (1974a) has shown, that feudalism was a synthesis of Germanic and other tribal institutions with Roman institutions--epecially the villa, which became the manor. But it was the process of political and economic devolution which created infeudation in much of Europe--the manor emerged as a mini-state and a subsistent mini- economy when a collapsing political economy forced peasants into serfdom to a feudal lord who could provide land and military protection. This was the first serfdom. The second serfdom was really a process of class formation and state formation in areas which had not been much affected by the Roman empire, but which were coming under the economic and political-military influence of the new European core area. Different forms of class relations also alter the character of tributary modes of production. Slavery is more important in some systems; tenantry, serfdom or freeholders in others. Many Marxists have contended that a mode of production based on slavery is a stage of development. Empirically we have found different forms of slavery, and different degrees of dependence on slave production in almost all types of world-systems. Rather than a stage, or a unitary mode of production, slavery is only one institutional form of coerced labor in tributary and peripheral capitalist modes of production. In its chattel version it is more compatible with the commodification of labor-power than serfdom, tenantry or corve'e, and thus we find it in relatively commercialized systems such as Greece, Rome, the Arab subsystem and peripheral areas of the capitalist world-economy. The distinction between Western private property and Eastern absolutism is false. There has been a lot of centralized absolutism in the West and a lot of private property in the East. More egalitarian states, usually in semi-peripheral, less developed but developing areas, have played an important role as marcher states and as spreaders of commerce in all state-based world-systems. The Greeks didn't invent democracy. The most democratic societies don't have states or classes. And among the class/state societies there were many, especially in Mesopotamia, but also the Phoenecians, in which elected kings and councils of lineage heads played important parts in the formulation and implementation of policy. The weak monarchs and democratic polities of the Greek poleis were important because they emerged on the semi-periphery of a world-system which was dominated by older absolutist empires and which contained the preconditions for the further extension of market exchange. That Athens opted for empire, and that the Hellenization of the Eurasian world-system was carried out by a monarchy that was semi- peripheral within the Greek subsystem, shows important continuity with the processes observed in the earlier epochs of the Eurasian world-system. This is not to demean the amazing cultural achievements of the Greeks, but simply to point out that these were largely epigenetic, building on the material inherited from the East and nurtured on the fertile soil of a semi-peripheral area which was experiencing state-formation on the edge of a weakening core empire. Transformations What about transformations of systemic logic? The major transformations of modes of production, or social systemic logic have been: 1. the neolithic horticultural revolution 2. primary class and state formation 3. empire-building based on tribute-gathering 4. the dominance of commodity production and capitalist accumulation. To these let us add a potential transformation, that from the capitalist to the socialist mode of production. All five of these involved long lasting processes in which economic productivity increases and institutions evolve, but they also are brought into being by particular historical actors making decisions and inventing solutions to unique situations. Transformations 2, 3 and 4 were dependent on various forms of class and intersocietal conflict during the periods of their first emergence, but these activities and their consequences were only possible because of the cumulative and incremental changes which had occurred over previous long periods of time. The time framework for major changes became shorter however. The neolithic "revolution" which led to specialization in agriculture, the necessary basis of state formation, occurred over several millenia. The development of irrigation and other techniques which further increased productivity took a shorter time. And the machine age came recently and quickly once capitalist relations of production and market incentives provided a heightened stimulus to technological innovation. The material basis for social evolution sped up, and with it the emergence of cultural forms and social institutions which were complementary with the new techniques. Another generalization which is suggested by our survey of ancient world-systems is that social innovations and new modes of production tend to emerge first in semi-peripheral areas. These areas can utilize earlier developments as a basis for innovation but are not committed to those structural and institutional aspects of older core areas which are obstacles to the full implementation of innovations. The relatively more egalitarian political systems and class structures of some semi-peripheries, usually due to their recent transition from kin-based reciprocal societies, and their sometimes more decentralized political systems, provide fertile ground for a solidary community which can develop innovations, or devote itself to the energetic pursuit of conquest or wealth. We may see a functional analogy to these processes in the pattern of successful hegemonic core states within the European subsystem and the global capitalist world-economy. The Dutch, English and U.S. hegemones were all former semi-peripheries with relatively egalitarian and politically decentralized states. Nation-building is a more powerful force behind upward mobility under these conditions, as it was for the Akkadians, the Chou, the Greeks and numerous others. The generalizations which we can make from comparing the above system transformations are, unfortunately, not of much use to us, although they may provide interesting leads. Like the hypothesis of ecological succession or Parson's theory of differentiation and integration, the insight that innovations and new centers are formed in semi-peripheries does not tell us what to do about our own world-system. For one thing the kinds of organiza- tion necessary to make a particular transformation differ greatly across the transformations listed above. Perhaps Marx was right to spend so much time on the capitalist system, for that is our problem. The semi- periphery idea may be helpful in locating weak links and agents of change, but beyond that we must deal with the historical particularities of capitalism and the organizational nature of socialism. We also must deal with a situation peculiar to our own age; the species-threatening existence of nuclear weapons. Here the processes of previous transformations are also suggestive, but as in medicine, it is the particular patient we want to save, and sweeping generalizations about system types may be only part of the information we need. Our world-system What are the implications of the above analysis for the prospects of transforming our own contemporary world-system into a more humane and peaceful world society? The notion that there has been no such thing as "progress," or that progress is only an ideology (Nisbet, 1980) is, I think, mistaken. I agree with Marx that capitalism represents an advance over previous modes of production because it revolutionizes the technology of material production and provides the basis for a more democratic and collectively rational form of society. On the other hand, our contemporary world-system is not the best of all possible worlds. Exploitation, oppression and warfare are endemic and systematically reproduced. It may be that exploitation and oppression are relatively less onerous, at least in the twentieth century, than they were in earlier world-systems, but warfare has gotten worse. The proportion of national populations killed in "industrial" wars has risen geometrically (Galtung, 1980). Rapid technological advancement, so fruitful in the area of material production, has, in the realm of military hardware, produced a species-threatening horror. Whether or not we can attribute the deadly rise of industrial warfare to capitalism, as McNeill (1982) contends, the fact is that the "normal" operation of capitalist uneven development, periodic economic and political crises, and a cycle of world war constitutes, in combination with nuclear weapons, a certain death sentence for our planet. This problem supercedes all others in importance, but its solution cannot be separated from the processes by which capitalism produces not only technology and growth, but also uneven development and underdevelopment. Briefly and crudely, we must transform our world-economy into a world-empire. World state formation is the only institutional mechanism which can, in the long run, prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The question becomes one of the means by which world state formation can occur. Our analysis of historical world-systems does not provide happy implications for this problem. In all cases empire formation occurred through conquest, usually by an upwardly mobile semi-peripheral state. Instances of confederation, a far more palatable form of state-formation, were rare, only occurring in non-core regions subjected to external threat, and they were usually unstable. Some Chinese dynasties, as Lattimore (1940) pointed out, were formed after long periods of warfare and disorder, when a consensus formed around one central state which could provide order. Unfortunately such a long-term period of disorder would probably be fatal in the modern context, although it is possible that a near-catastrophe, in which some large portion of the world's population was annihilated, might create the poliitical will among the survivors to sustain an effective monopoly of nuclear violence. This last scenario, however, is not one which can be the basis of political action. If it happens, those of you who survive will make the best of it. In the meantime the only sane and rational path is to promote peaceful cooperation and contractual limitations of arms buildup among potentially conflictive powers and also to promote the institution-building of international organizations which can move toward the provision of collective security. A somewhat more encouraging indication is suggested by the circumscription hypothesis which was an important aspect of primary state formation. Recall that regions in which escape was difficullt were more likely to develop states. The Earth is such a "region." Flight to external arenas is no longer possible, except in the imagination. New, last and final frontiers are inspirational images, but the fact is that the crew of spaceship Earth must learn to survive together. This may be an important condition for the emergence of a global political system which can regulate conflict. The record of such attempts as have been made is not very encouraging but we can not afford to be discouraged. Even a smattering of progress, which may be undone in periods of growing strain, is likely to provide a basis for further integration at a later date. We can, in fact see a spiraling pattern of progress from the Concert of Europe through the League of Nations to the United Nations. To turn to a somewhat less depressing but related topic, what does our study of world-systems and modes of production imply about a possible transition to socialism, a more democratic and collectively rational mode of production? As we have seen, capitalism emerged first in peripheral and semi-peripheral areas, or at least it was in these areas that capitalists first obtained state power. But it was not until capitalism came to control core states that we can speak of the domination of the capitalist mode of production in a world-system. The capitalist semi-peripheral states were ambivalent, tending to return to imperial tribute-taking to consolidate their successes or as a last effort at survival. Capitalist states had a hard time in world-systems dominated by the tributary modes of production, and it was only after a long period in which market relations within and between states and empires had grown in importance, that core states became able to sustain a stable commitment to accumulation through commodity production for the world market. I have elsewhere argued against a simple domino theory which predicts that world socialism will emerge from the simple accretion of socialist parties coming to power in separate states (Chase-Dunn, 1982c). But it would be a mistake to represent such achievements as inconsequential. The point to make is that these may be difficult to sustain in a world-system which is dominated by capitalism, and it is the growth of international and transnational forms of socialism which will allow this new mode of production to eventually become dominant. Seen in a long run comparative perspective, the struggle for socialism within core states, though currently in the doldrums, is crucial for eventual transformation. Contemporary involvement in electoral politics, coalition-formation and reformist movements represents a realistic adjustment to the current period and also fits well with the implications of a macro-historical analysis which shows that a new mode of production builds by accretion in the interstices of an old one. But, as some political analysts have pointed out, the continuation and worsening of the current world economic crisis will undoubtedly spur broad populist, anti-state movements eventually. Socialists should be prepared to provide direction and leadership to these, lest they be harnessed by reactionaries or neo-fascists. A period of social polarization is quite likely, and this, in the context of the potential nuclear holocaust, is a frightening prospect. Nevertheless we should remember that building ties of cooperation and friendship amongst peoples, forms of democratic and collectively rational (i.e. planned) economic organization and exchange, and efforts toward a more balanced form of global development are important long run means for eliminating the roller coaster processes of capitalist development, and the threat of systemically produced warfare. An important contrast between the transition to capitalism and the potential transition to socialism is due to differences in the logic of the two modes of production. Capitalism can exist and thrive as a subsystem in the interstices of another mode of production, as it did for many centuries, gradually creating the institutional basis for its own eventual dominance. Its individualist and partial rationality thrives in a competitive and conflictive setting. Socialism, on the other hand, is a holistic mode of production in which the whole arena of interaction needs to be organized on a collectively rational and democratic basis in which reciprocity and politically articulated redistribution play an important role. People have struggled against market forces which would convert them into commodities. The guilds, labor unions, cooperatives, the socialist parties, the welfare states, the socialist states and the movements for national liberation in peripheral areas are all social movements which have attempted to resist commodification and exploitation. But these have been largely subverted by the growing scale and grander institutionalization of the capitalist world market. Even the largest socialist states find themselves influenced not only by the military threats of the capitalist core states, but also by the opportunities of the world market of high technology and profitable commodity production. The partial rationalities of state capitalism and state socialism do not in themselves help build cooperation at the world level. Rather, they create a world in which somewhat collectivized subunits compete with one another militarily and through commodity production. This does not mean that attempts by socialist parties to take state power in the periphery and semiperiphery should cease, or that socialists in core states should stop trying to organize more humane, just and democratic institutions. But it does imply that these alone will not be enough. Socialism must be organized as well at the level which has been attained by the capitalist mode of production, and that is the world level. That is why transnational and international socialist forms of exchange and political organizations are crucial. Socialist modes of integration and exchange involve democratic planning which organizes reciprocity and politically determined forms of redistribution which can place limits on the operation of uneven development and unequal exchange. Some of these ends can also be achieved by socialist markets. The Soviet tendency to try to convert all exchanges into redistributive exchange is excessive. Markets are good institutions for providing some goods and services, and need not be subsumed by an all-encompassing state as long as certain functions, such as collective security and planning for basic infrastructural development, are socialized. Galtung's (1980) vision of a multicentric, multilevel world economy, which emphasizes self-reliance at various levels where feasible, but allows for centralization of some functions, is perhaps the right formula. A multicultural and multicentric world can allow peoples and civilizations to cultivate their own forms, while at the same time providing security and a more balanced and ecologically sane type of economic development. The Yugoslav model would probably be ideal if it were carried out more generally, and therefore was not overwhelmed by the operation of a powerfully- commodified and more developed world context. This is another reason why core areas are crucial for world socialism. I am optimistic about the prospects for world socialism if we can survive the current crisis without bringing on a nuclear holocaust. World state formation, international and transnational socialist organization and forms of exchange are, thus, my prescriptions for political action. Perhaps the further analysis of ancient world-systems and earlier system transformation will help us to survive and to build the institutions of a more peaceful and just world. We have made great advances in the natural and biological sciences which have transformed us from servants of the gods to kings of the jungle. The social sciences can help us to come of age, to understand our own collective nature, and to appreciate the terrible and beautiful experiment with intelliigent life of which we are a part.