In this issue: * COMMENTARY: THE RISE AND FALL OF A SRSG ____________________________________________________________________ S O M A L I A N E W S U P D A T E ____________________________________________________________________ Vol 3, No 15 May 18, 1994. ISSN 1103-1999 ____________________________________________________________________ Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and fax. Questions can be directed to Bernhard.Helander@antro.uu.se or to fax number +46-18-151160. All SNU marked material is free to quote as long as the source is clearly stated. ____________________________________________________________________ COMMENTARY: THE RISE AND FALL OF A SRSG (SNU, Uppsala, May 18) - Chances are that Lansane Kouyate, the special representative of the UN's secretary-general to Somalia, will find that Somalia has costed him his job. Eagerly awaiting the moment when he could go back to take up the post as under secretary-general for political affairs as the successor to James Jonah, he accepted to first assume the role as UNOSOM's number one man. Having served closely under the two previous SRSGs he was an obvious choice and he was actually appointed already last year, when the Americans all of a sudden decided to throw in their own man - Admiral Howe. With Howe departed - some would say deported - after his blatant failure to comprehend that in Somalia you cannot pursue personal vendettas unless you are thoroughly equipped to handle the consequences (whether the equipment existed or not is currently the subject for hearings organized by the Senate's Armed Service Committee), it was not easy to find a successor. UNOSOM II is not an attractive position among the suitable UN bureaucrats. The credibility of the organization has been shrinking to the extent that UN branch agencies like the WHO now openly contradict UNOSOM press releases in their own press releases. But Kouyate was there and he took that job too. Now versions differ. Some have it that there is absolutely no relation between Kouyate's two recent appointments; he will leave Mogadishu for New York on May 30, come whatever may. Others hold that the appointment for the New York office is somewhat conditional and ultimately dependent on his ability to handle the Somalia business. All agree, however, that it would look awkward for the new under- secretary-general to come back to the security council's discussion about Somali on May 31 without being able to show any kind of solid improvement. According to recent press leaks, the Americans made their willi-nilly support for ground-troops to Rwanda, dependant on progress being made in Somalia. Unless the May 31 deadline for an agreement is beaten, there is a good likelihood that the mandate for UNOSOM will not be prolonged beyond July 15. Kouyate himself is well aware of at least the pressure to demonstrate progress to the security council. Since March the SRSG has done little else besides pursuing every possible avenue to forge a political agreement among the "political leaders" (a UNOSOM euphemism for the leaders of the 15 militias). Since the beginning of March, Kouyuate has been shuttling back and forth between the capitals on the Horn plus Cairo and New York to find a fresh angle to Somalia's problems that would enable Aideed to return from his self- imposed exile in Nairobi with preserved dignity and willing to put phrases of peace and reconciliation into action. The problem is that in his attempt to please all involved parties, including regional powers with hegemonic aspirations, Kouyuate has found himself dealing with crooks and tied up by contradictory promises. In the end the current developments may put into jeopardy whatever futile chances that once may have existed for a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Somalia - and it is already a threatening his position in New York. It all began in mid-March with the attempt to get two camps of militias known as SNA and SSA to sign an agreement in Nairobi that essentially boiled down to that they pledged to stand by the agreement that Kouyate had them sign a year ago in Addis Ababa. It was only after that Kouyate stopped paying their hotel bills (running at $150,000 per day) that the signatures were produced. The agreement stipulated that a two-step process would be initiated: A planning meeting in Mogadishu on April 15 to work out the details for a reconciliation conference in Mogadishu on May 15. Back in Somalia there were few tangible signs of this "peace process". Tensions were mounting in and around the airport and the Hawaadle clan who had held it prior to the arrival of the UNITAF command in December 1992 now wanted it back when the American and other Western forces pulled out. Although the Hawaadle militias were loosely allied with Aideed's USC/SNA movement, Aideed's Habar Gedir clan did not accept the Hawaadle road blocks that they put up along the access road to the airport. Fighting erupted and the planning meeting was relocated to Nairobi. Then, as fighting continued it was rescheduled for April 25. The fighting spread to the southern port of Merka and it was clear that major conflict between the militias of Habar Gedir and Hawaadle was arising. In some of the worst combat that Mogadishu had seen since the UN stopped the hunt for Aideed in October last year, the Hawaadle were defeated and withdrew to their strong-hold in the Hiraan region. The planning meeting, meanwhile, had to be postponed for until May 10. However, as so often before, Somali political realities took little notice of the course that UNOSOM tried to follow. Back in Hiraan region, the Hawaadle cleared out all Habar Gedir militias from the regional capital Beled Weyn. Then they went north and overrun the town of Mataban, then they captured the town of Gurael - both places held a substantial Habar Gedir population. If this had been the only problem the planned meetings could probably have been held. After all, large-scale fighting has never stopped UNOSOM in the past to hold simultaneous "peace conferences" in neighbouring capitals. The signing ceremony of last year's "reconciliation conference" in Addis Ababa had to be postponed due to fresh fighting in Kismayo between two of the signatories of the conference. A set of additional problems emerged in the current case. It proved first of all impossible for Aideed to go back to Somalia. His SNA alliance is extremely fragile and even within the different sub- clans of Habar Gedir there is opposition to his leadership. Basically, Aideed feared for his security if he was to go back to Mogadishu. The other block of allied militias, the SSA or "Group of Twelve" of Ali Mahdi loyals was no less conflict ridden. Within some of the Abgal sub-clans there was a long-standing discontent over their alliance with some of their former archenemies among the Daarood clans' militias, and some of the smaller clans within the alliance were upset with Ali Mahdi's failure to react against the Habar Gedir purge of Hawaadle in Mogadishu. In the midst of this turmoil, someone sneaks into UNOSOM's headquarters and walks off with nearly $ 4 millions in an humiliating theft that now eventually is being investigated by the Scotland Yard. It became clear that Kouyate needed some form of distraction and a substantial carrot to wave with if the scheduled meetings were going to come off ground. There has never been a better carrot for Somali unity than recourse to Pan-Somalism and the notion of "Greater Somalia". The only thing that all southern factions agree on is that the northern proclamation of its secession in May 1991 is wrong. A southern leader could not wish for a greater dignity than to come back as the person who reunified the Somali territory. An early draft for the Addis Ababa agreement actually contained the phrase "the territorial integrity of Somalia is sacred". It was omitted at the time but in subsequent security council resolutions, the secretary-general has inserted similar phrases. So, Kouyate dug up Abdirahman "Tuur", the first president of the independent Somaliland republic, in fact the person who declared its independence. He had been living in London since he failed to get reelected in May 1993. "Tuur" had also served as the chairman of the northern movement SNM until spring 1993 and Kouyate was assured by one of his advisors that this was still the case. In brief, Aideed and Kouyate held meetings with "Tuur" in Addis Ababa and eventually convinced him to renounce Somaliland's secession and declare that as from now, the SNM would take full part in the talks held among the southern factions. It will probably never be known precisely how Kouyate managed to obtain "Tuur's" cooperation, but a few days after the press conference a person closely allied with "Tuur" was intercepted by the Ethiopian authorities on the Addis airport carrying a very large sum of money. For a while it almost looked as if Kouyate had found a real successful formula as far as the south was concerned. Aideed could claim the credit for having "reunited" Somalia and that would ensure his smooth return to Mogadishu. Having sown the seeds of a renewed "Greater Somalia" fervour it was also very likely that inter- factional strife would diminish. Furthermore, the Egyptians, and most likely the secretary-general, would be pleased to se Somaliland vanish. However, "Tuur" turned out to be just another headache for Kouyate. Having barely announced "SNM's" participation in all future talks it turns out that he is not longer the chairman and when massive demonstrations against "Tuur" was held in nearly all the major cities of Somaliland even Kouyate and his advisers became aware that they had committed a fatal tactical error. To make things worse, "Tuur" started making demands by urging that the already postponed planning meeting should be rescheduled again. The date for the planning meeting had to be changed again. This time it became May 30 with the reconciliation conference tagged for "mid-June". If the leaders will be able to sign yet another agreement on that very date, there is still a chance for Lansane Kouyate to get back to the UN headquarters for the security council debate the next day. But there is a good chance they no agreement will emerge and even a better chance that the security council for once will look to deeds more than to words. Since the latest postponement, 5 Nepalese peace keepers have been shot dead and several wounded. One of the wounded was later kidnapped from the UN military field hospital were he was being treated. These are the meagre results of 18 months of UN brokered peace keeping. In the meantime, Somalis all over the Horn have continued to tend to their own affairs. In Somaliland the inter-clan field force was recently completed with the 37 remaining members of the Warsangeli clan joining it. In the south, the genuine clan leaders joined by the Hiraab-agreement in January have continued their activities to promote peace and reconciliation in a Somali way. When recently fighting broke out between the Degode and Ajuran clans in northern Kenya, the Imaam of Hiraab sent a representative to the area to soothe the feelings and initiate dialogue. Other representatives of the Imaam have travelled elsewhere to the Somali-inhabited territories to take part in dialogues meetings way beyond UNOSOM's control. The big question the security council will confront is whether not Somalia would be better off without UNOSOM. ____________________________________________________________________ SNU is an entirely independent newsletter devoted to critical analysis of the political and humanitarian developments in Somalia and Somaliland. SNU is edited and published by Dr. Bernhard Helander, Uppsala University, Sweden. SNU is produced with support from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden. ____________________________________________________________________