In this issue: * SECURITY COUNCIL REVISES MANDATE FOR UNOSOM; SUMMARY * THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT; SUMMARY * SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 897 ____________________________________________________________________ S O M A L I A N E W S U P D A T E ____________________________________________________________________ Vol 3, No 5 February 7, 1994. ISSN 1103-1999 ____________________________________________________________________ Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and fax. Questions can be directed to Bernhard.Helander@antro.uu.se or to fax number +46-18-151160. All SNU marked material is free to quote as long as the source is clearly stated. ____________________________________________________________________ SECURITY COUNCIL REVISES MANDATE FOR UNOSOM; SUMMARY (SNU/UNIC, Uppsala, February 7) - The Security Council this afternoon, February 4, revised the mandate for the continuation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and authorized a gradual force reduction to a level of up to 22,000. It reaffirmed that its action under Chapter VII of the Charter was in consideration of the exceptional circumstances in Somalia, in particular the absence of a government and the continued threat to peace and security. By its unanimous adoption of resolution 897 (1994) as orally revised, the Council approved the Secretary-General's recommendation that the Operation would assist the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", particularly in their cooperative disarmament and cease-fire efforts. The Council affirmed that those Agreements -- the General Agreement signed by the Somali parties on 8 January 1993 and the Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia signed on 27 March 1993 -- constitute the basis for the resolution of the problems in that country. In that context, it affirmed the importance of Somali establishment of representative district and regional councils, a transitional national council, as well as the re-establishment of a police force and judicial system. In its revised mandate, UNOSOM II will protect major ports, airports and essential infrastructure; provide humanitarian relief and assist in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system. It will help with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and assist in the political process. In addition, UNOSOM II will provide protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies as well as for non-governmental organizations which provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Expressing serious concern at reports of a rearming and troop build-up by Somali factions, the Council called upon all parties to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and respect all cease-fire arrangements and other commitments. It demanded that the parties refrain from acts of intimidation or violence against humanitarian or peace-keeping personnel. In authorizing the force reduction, the Council underlined the vital importance of providing UNOSOM II with the necessary material means and military assets to discharge its responsibilities and defend its personnel. It encouraged Member States to contribute on an urgent basis, troops, civilian personnel, equipment, financial and logistical support to the Operation. Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable institutions and reconstructing their country, the Council approved giving priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions of the country where security was being re-established. Resources will also be directed to local Somali institutions which are prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities as contained in the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa in 1993. The Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the League of Arab States, to consider establishing contacts with Somali parties to reach agreement on a timetable for the implementation of the "Addis Ababa Agreements". The objective would be to complete the process by March 1995 -- the date specified for the conclusion of the mission of UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General was further requested to report before 31 May, as soon as the situation warranted, on the conditions in Somalia and the implementation of the resolution. Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, China, Oman, United States, France, United Kingdom, Brazil, Russian Federation, New Zealand, Spain, Argentina, Czech Republic and Djibouti. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT; SUMMARY (SNU/UNIC, Uppsala February 7) - The Security Council meets this afternoon (February 4) to consider the situation in Somalia. It will take up a report of the Secretary-General (document (S/1994/12 of 6 January) reviewing the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the progress made by the Somali people towards national reconciliation. The report also contains updated options for UNOSOM II's future humanitarian, political and security strategies as requested by the Council in its resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November which extended the mandate of the Operation until 31 May 1994. By that text, the Council decided to review the mandate fundamentally by 1 February. While progress has been achieved, the Secretary-General states in that report that the mandate of UNOSOM II is far from being fully accomplished. The UNOSOM II's initial attempt to bring about general disarmament through coercive means had proven impracticable. Since the adoption of resolution 865 (1993), UNOSOM has sought to bring about disarmament through voluntary means. Unfortunately, the commitments made at Addis Ababa in January and March of 1993 on such issues as disarmament and the establishment of a Transitional National Council had not been honoured by all the Somali parties. The Secretary-General goes on to state he would consider the mandate as being completed only when the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 is fully implemented, culminating in the holding of general elections and the installation of a popularly elected Government. Success in fulfilling the mandate was predicated on a spirit of "cooperation, compromise and commitment on the part of the Somali people and the continued involvement of the international community". Further, The Secretary-General acknowledges unmistakeable signs of fatigue among the international community, as it continues to be called upon to extend considerable assistance to the operation in Somalia. At the Fourth Humanitarian Conference held at Addis Ababa in November/December 1993, representatives of the donor community made it clear that commitment of further resources was conditional on the Somalis doing their part in bringing about national reconciliation and establishing minimum levels of security. Assistance for reconstruction and development would be proportionate to the determination shown by the Somali people in resolving their differences. The fatigue surrounding the provision of troops and finances to UNOSOM II seemed unlikely to dissipate soon. The Secretary-General states that the international community must not abandon the people of Somalia as long as an overwhelming majority of them desire the presence of the United Nations. The main focus of UNOSOM II's activities in the period ahead would be on promoting Somali initiatives in the political, security and nation- building process. It would be used primarily to create a sustainable momentum in the task of political reconciliation, establishment of a Somali police and justice system and laying the foundation for an effective system of civil, financial and economic administration at the local, regional and central levels. He expresses the belief that without the continued stabilizing presence of an adequate United Nations force, there would be an early resumption of civil strife and an unravelling of all that had been achieved. What could be achieved would depend on the willingness of Member States to see the Somalia operation to its successful conclusion. According to the Secretary-General, it was extremely doubtful whether the required level of resources would be available to UNOSOM II after 31 March. The military strength of UNOSOM II would be down to 19,700 by the end of March from 25,945 on 1 January. Those figures are based on the projected withdrawals of a number of troop contingents. Although a large number of Member States have been approached in seeking contributions to the Operation's military component, not a single positive response has been received, the Secretary-General states. He suggests that prudence would indicate that the level of UNOSOM II would not be much more than 19,700 and could be even less. The unpaid assessed contributions of $100 million had also adversely affected the willingness of Member States to maintain or increase their contributions or to send new contingents. The Secretary-General restates and expands upon the three security options relating to the mandate of UNOSOM II, which had originally been part of his report of 12 November 1993 (document S/26738). The first option is a continuation of the current mandate with the addition of an extra brigade. That mandate would call for disarmament, coercive if necessary, as well as a defence capability against attacks on UNOSOM II personnel. General disarmament is perceived as a necessary precondition for the establishment of a secure environment for national reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Indicating a preference for the first option, the Secretary-General states his belief that only a comprehensive mandate would make it possible for UNOSOM II to create a secure environment and help the Somali people towards national reconciliation and institution-building. He concludes, however, that due to the question of availability of resources, the first option would in all probability have to be excluded. The second option put forth in the current report would call for voluntary disarmament and the deployment of about 16,000 troops to protect ports, convoys and refugees. Under that option, UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. He expresses uncertainty that UNOSOM II would have adequate resources or that Somali leaders would have advanced far enough in the process of national reconciliation to be able to undertake all the activities envisaged even under the second option. That uncertainty was based mainly on the continued negative attitude of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) towards UNOSOM II, reports of an arms build-up by all the Somali factions and the revival of inter- clan fighting and increased banditry. In spite of the uncertainties, the Secretary-General does recommend the second option to the Council. Under the second option, the report continues, UNOSOM II would retain some capability to defend its personnel, in the event of renewed inter-clan fighting. It would also protect the important ports, airports and infrastructure of Somalia; keep open the main supply routes to and from Mogadishu; pursue the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial systems; and help with the repatriation of refugees. The Operation would continue its efforts to provide emergency relief supplies. Regarding rehabilitation and development, the donor community has made it clear that aid would only go to secure regions with the necessary functioning Somali institutions. The UNOSOM II would focus its activities on facilitating programmes in those regions of the country. It would also assist in the political process according to the wishes of the Somali people. If the troop strength of 16,000 or the necessary financial resources are not available on 31 March, the Secretary-General states, he will bring it to the attention of the Council along with a possible modification of the mandate. The cooperation of the Somali parties would determine the success of the modified second option. How each party perceived UNOSOM II's capability to discharge its functions effectively would affect their individual course of action in the process of national reconciliation. In addition, if the Transitional National Council were to be established by the Somalis and subsequently able to function effectively, it could have a bearing on the mandate. In such a case, the Council would also be notified. The third option, reiterated by the Secretary-General, calls for the deployment of only 5,000 troops, which would keep control over important ports and airports, particularly in Mogadishu. It would continue assistance in the delivery of humanitarian aid and in the training of a Somali police force. This option would presuppose local cooperation with UNOSOM II. The financial requirement for the third option would also be substantially less. The Secretary-General states that the political mandate of the Operation entails a two-track approach: reconciliation among the national factions and promoting district and regional councils at the grass-roots level. The deep divisions between the two main factional alliances -- the Group of 12 and the SNA -- as well as the SNA's continued rejection of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II continued to impede political progress. Despite warnings from the international community that failure to achieve progress at the December 1993 meeting in Addis Ababa could drive away foreign assistance, the representatives of the two major alliances failed to agree on a structure for face-to-face talks between faction chairmen. They also could not agree on whether the United Nations should play any role in the national reconciliation process or on the status of district and regional councils. The SNA has refused to participate in the creation of district councils. The March 1993 Addis Ababa agreement had called for progress in the establishment of the Transnational National Council. All the participants in the December 1993 political meetings, with the exception of the United Somali Congress (USC)/SNA faction, had expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of the Transitional National Council. Once formed, that Council could begin to address the many issues which go beyond the UNOSOM II mandate. Regarding UNOSOM II's Humanitarian Division, the Secretary- General points out the significant step taken by the participants at the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia. In the process of handing the responsibility for recovery of the country to the Somalis, representatives from the regions, political movements and the international donor community agreed on a regionally based strategy for resource mobilization and development of programmes. The strategy being followed by the Humanitarian Division was based on the principles agreed upon at the meeting which include: the unconditionality of essential emergency assistance; the provision of rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance only where stability and security exist; involvement of Somalis in all stages of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes; ensuring the sustainability of all programmes; ensuring that all programmes enhance the operation of the private sector; and support of donor community for rehabilitation priorities. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 897 "The Security Council, "Recalling its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, "Reaffirming the decision taken in resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993 to continue UNOSOM II up to 31 May 1994, "Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 6 January 1994 (S/1994/12), "Stressing the importance the Council attaches to the Somali parties fulfilling in good faith all obligations and agreements to which they commit themselves, and affirming once again that the General Agreement signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 1993 and the Addis Ababa Agreement of the First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia signed on 27 March 1993 ("The Addis Ababa Agreements") constitute the basis for the resolution of the problems in Somalia, "Bearing in mind respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable national political institutions and for reconstructing their country, "Expressing serious concern at reports that Somali factions are rearming and that a troop build-up is taking place in some regions of Somalia, "Condemning the continued incidents in Somalia of fighting and banditry and in particular condemning violence and armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts, "Emphasizing the crucial importance of disarmament by all parties in achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia, "Paying tribute to the peace-keepers and humanitarian personnel of several countries killed or injured while serving in Somalia and, in this context, re-emphasizing the importance the Council attaches to the safety and security of United Nations and other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief and peace-keeping throughout Somalia, "Affirming the importance of establishing, by the Somali people, of representative district and regional councils and of a transitional national council, as well as the importance of a re- established police force and a judicial system for the restoration of public order throughout Somalia, "Welcoming the efforts made at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference at Addis Ababa and reaffirming the commitment of the international community to assist the Somali people to attain political reconciliation and reconstruction, "Welcoming also political contacts and consultations between representatives of various parties in Somalia with a view to finding solutions to outstanding matters and disputes among them and promoting the process of political reconciliation, "Commending and supporting the ongoing diplomatic efforts being made by international and regional organizations and Member States, in particular those in the region, to assist United Nations efforts to persuade Somali parties to reach a political settlement, "Keeping in mind the objective that UNOSOM II complete its mission by March 1995, "Reaffirming that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security and having regard to the exceptional circumstances, including in particular absence of a government in Somalia, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, "1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/1994/12); "2. Approves the Secretary-General's recommendation for the continuation of UNOSOM II, as set out in particular in paragraph 57 of his report, with a revised mandate for the following: "(a) Encouraging and assisting the Somali parties in implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements", in particular in their cooperative efforts to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease- fire; "(b) Protecting major ports and airports and essential infrastructure and safeguarding the lines of communications vital to the provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance; "(c) Continuing its efforts to provide humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country; "(d) Assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system; "(e) Helping with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; "(f) Assisting also in the ongoing political process in Somalia, which should culminate in the installation of a democratically elected government; "(g) Providing protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, as well as of non- governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance; "3. Authorizes the gradual reduction of UNOSOM II to a force level of up to 22,000, and necessary support elements, such force level to be reviewed at the next renewal of the mandate; "4. Underlines, in this context, the vital importance of placing at the disposal of UNOSOM II the necessary material means and military assets required to enable it to discharge its responsibilities in an effective manner as well as effectively to defend its personnel in case of armed attack; "5. Approves also giving priority to redirecting international reconstruction resources to those regions where security is being re- established and to local Somali institutions which are prepared to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities in accordance with the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa as set forth in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Secretary-General's report; "6. Underlines the importance that the Council attaches to demining and requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements to ensure the start of demining operations as soon as possible wherever conditions permit; "7. Calls upon all parties in Somalia to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and respect the cease-fire arrangements and other commitments entered into by them; "8. Demands that all Somali parties refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work in Somalia; "9. Reaffirms the obligations of States to implement fully the embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992); "10. Commends the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the personnel of UNOSOM II for their efforts in improving the conditions of the Somali people and in encouraging the process of political reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; "11. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have contributed troops or provided logistical or other assistance to UNOSOM II or have offered to do so, and encourages those who are in a position to do so to contribute on an urgent basis, troops, civilian personnel, equipment, financial and logistical support so as to enhance UNOSOM II's capability to carry out its mandate; "12. Expresses also its appreciation to those States which have contributed humanitarian assistance or have supported the Somali Justice Programmes and encourages further such contributions on an urgent basis; "13. Requests the Secretary-General to consider, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States, establishing contacts with the Somali parties with the view to arriving at an agreed timetable for implementing the "Addis Ababa Agreements" including the objective of completing the process by March 1995; "14. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit to it, as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case in good time before 31 May 1994, a report on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of this resolution; "15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter." ____________________________________________________________________ SNU is an entirely independent newsletter devoted to critical analysis of the political and humanitarian developments in Somalia and Somaliland. SNU is edited and published by Dr. Bernhard Helander, Uppsala University, Sweden. SNU is produced with support from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden. ____________________________________________________________________