In this issue: * MELES' FOUR-POINT PLAN * UNOSOM'S U-TURN IN SOMALILAND * CORRECTION: "No 23" ____________________________________________________________________ S O M A L I A N E W S U P D A T E ____________________________________________________________________ Vol 2, No 32 November 1, 1993. ISSN 1103-1999 ____________________________________________________________________ Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and fax. Questions can be directed to Bernhard.Helander@antro.uu.se or to fax number +46-18-151160. All SNU marked material is free to quote as long as the source is clearly stated. ____________________________________________________________________ MELES' FOUR-POINT PLAN (SNU, Addis Ababa, November 1) - The day after President Meles Zenawi met Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Addis Ababa, he wrote to the President of the UN Security Council, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, outlining a four-point plan for the resumption of the national reconciliation process in Somalia. The letter, dated October 24 1993, seems to be appealing over the heads of the UN Secretary General and the "briefcase Admiral" Howe, after meetings with the two UN officials had earlier failed to produce agreement. The diplomatic jets continue to land at Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa: yesterday, the US Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley, arrived in town for a meeting with President Meles. Although he refused to speak to journalists, before or after the meeting, the BBC reported US military sources as admitting a "philosophical shift" in US policy on Somalia. The US - regional axis threatens to emasculate Howe and Boutros-Ghali, who have no alternative proposal to offer at present. Somalia News Update is pleased to be able to reproduce the four-point plan in full: Proposal For Keeping the Momentum in Somalia: Steps that Need to be Taken by the Security Council As a Matter of Urgency While there has been a dramatic change for the better in the situation in Mogadishu as a result of the recent change in approach, it is also obvious that these gains are very fragile. No one can count on their durability unless steps are taken as speedily as possible so that we may be able to build on the limited gains already made. Time is of the essence in Somalia and in this regard it would be of tremendous help if the Security Council were to take a decision incorporating the following ideas as a matter of urgency: 1. On the Need to Establish An Independent Commission or a Fact Finding Mission It is my considered view that the major impetus for resuming the process of national reconciliation in Somalia would be the setting up of a Commission or a Fact Finding mission charged with the task of investigating the events leading to and surrounding the incident of 5 June, 1993, in Mogadishu and with submitting its report and recommendation thereon to the Security council. I feel it would be useful if the Security Council were to appoint the Chairman and the other members of the Commission from among jurists, intellectuals and credible and prominent personalities from Africa and from other regions of the world. It is my personal view that eminent personalties such as Mr. Jimmy Carter, former President of the United States, could play an important and key role in the setting up and in the work of such a Commission. The establishment of a Commission is extremely urgent because the initial hurdle we all face in ensuring the resumption of the national reconciliation process in Somalia in which all major actors would participate can be removed only by such a measure. This can also assist in formalizing the present de facto ceasefire in Mogadishu and in making it durable, as well as in solving the question of prisoners under UN custody. In short, the setting up of the Independent Commission or Fact Finding Mission is so closely linked to the initiation of the process of the national reconciliation process that delay in its being set up would also mean delay in the starting of the talks among the Somali factions on the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement and on national reconciliation. 2. On the Reaffirmation By the Security Council of the Responsibility of Somalis to Solve their Own Problems by Themselves It would be helpful if the Security Council were to reiterate that the role of UNOSOM is to assist Somalis to resolve their problems. Such a reiteration would serve to calm the fears of many Somalis with regard to the role of the UN and would encourage UNOSOM to assist rather than stifle, or appear to stifle, Somali initiatives that are in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 3. The Need for a More Explicit Endorsement By the Security Council of the Addis Ababa Agreement The Addis Ababa Agreement has been accepted by all Somali groups and it has also been the basis for the political activities of UNOSOM. However, while UNOSOM has tried to implement the Addis Ababa Agreement, the fact that it has not been obliged to do so by any Security Council resolution has created an unfortunate ambivalence on the part of some who are managing affairs in Somalia on behalf of UNOSOM. It would therefore be helpful if the Security Council were to endorse the Addis Ababa Agreement as a basis for the peaceful resolution of the problems in Somalia. 4. On Partnership Between the UN and the OAU Countries of the Sub-Region It has now been fully recognized that an African solution must be found to the problems of Somalia. It is my conviction that it is now time for this concept to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution or be endorsed by the Security Council. In this context, it would be extremely helpful if UNOSOM were to be explicitly directed to carry out its mandate in partnership with the OAU and the countries of the sub- region especially with regard to seeking and implementing a political solution to Somalia's problems. UNOSOM'S U-TURN IN SOMALILAND (SNU, Mogadishu, November 1) - The recommendation that Somaliland be "dismantled" became the final piece of "expert" advice offered by UNOSOM's zonal director in Bosaaso, John McAteer. His contract hs not been renewed and UNOSOM have, since President Egal ordered all UNOSOM officers to leave Somaliland in September, reconsidered its Somaliland policy. Egal's government is no longer referred to as the "community leaders of the Northwest" but is instead described as "Egal's administration" in official documents. UNOSOM officer's in Hargeysa recently confirmed that Egal was right "in principle" when he claimed that out of the 200 millions US Dollars that Somalland had been promised for this fiscal year only 20 millions had actually been received. CORRECTION: "No 23" By misstake SNU's October 25 issue was labelled No 23. As several observant readers have pointed out the correct number should be 30. ____________________________________________________________________ SNU is an entirely independent newsletter devoted to critical analysis of the political and humanitarian developments in Somalia and Somaliland. SNU is edited and published by Dr. Bernhard Helander, Uppsala University, Sweden. SNU is produced with support from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden. ____________________________________________________________________