In this issue: US TROOPS AND THEN WHAT...? GLIMPSES FROM THE ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE ____________________________________________________________________ S O M A L I A N E W S U P D A T E ____________________________________________________________________ No 42 December 10, 1992. ISSN 1103-1999 ____________________________________________________________________ Somalia News Update is published irregularly via electronic mail and fax. Questions can be directed to antbh@strix.udac.uu.se or to fax number +46-18-151160. All material is free to quote as long as the source is stated. ____________________________________________________________________ Note to fax-subscribers: Unfortunately the delivery time for the facsimile edition has increased. As this issue "goes into press" the previous two issues have not yet been sent out by the fax gateway that handles the distribution.It is said to be due to an over-heated use of SUNET's fax gateway. I would like to encourage all fax-subcribers to explore their possibilities of receiving instead the e-mail edition B. H. US TROOPS AND THEN WHAT...? (SNU, Uppsala, Dec 10) The deployment of the first 1 800 US troops went exceptionally well. So far they have met little or no resistance and they have had some success in collecting guns from the population. Mogadishu is reported to be exceptionally calm. The sporadic gunfire that most people had grewn so accustomed to during the past two years, is hardly heard anymore. From a military point of view the operation "Restore Hope" has been extremely simple. It is tempting to say "embarrassingly simple" when keeping in mind that so many people, so long have appealed to the UN for a massive international military solution. With the advantage of hindsight we no know that it took only 1 800 troops to restore some sort of order in Mogadishu, and that not a single round needed to be fired. Today, there have been some shooting as a truck tried to get through a road block without being searched. French soldiers opened fire and there are reports of some casualties. Nevertheless, the dangers of "Restore Hope" do no not lie in establishing control over the port and and airports in the Mogadishu area. Resistance may be expected as the US troops advance towards the interior. However, although the size of the forces of the various factions and their armament that the forces will encounter may look impressive on paper, few seem to claim that this will really constitute a serious problem for the Marines. The real problems are political. There is an immanent danger that the foreign intervention will create an opportunity for the factional leaders to present themselves and to become established as the legitimate leaders of the Somali people - without giving the Somali people much say in the matter! Already Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aydiid have been "summoned to the American embassy", according to a telegram. Any kind of solution worked out for the future of Somalia must undobtedly to some extent come to involve these and other factional leaders. However, a genuine peace process cannot by-pass the traditional leadership such as clan elders, intellectuals, religious leaders, influential persons of both sexes, not to mention all the Somalis in exile. In the worst possible scenario, some of the factional leaders will reach a quick agreement with the Americans. They will be allowed to set the agenda for peace talks and sign fancy documents. Large scale disarmanent will be carried out but the core of the factional armies will withdraw to Ethiopia. Once things have settled - it is reasonable to expect that within six to eight weeks - the Americans can start to pull out. With the foreign troops out, some new peace conferences will be held but disagreements will emerge. Sporadic fighting will begin among groups that are by then based in Ethiopia and soon that unrest will spread into the south of Somalia again. The consolidation of the power of the factional leaders will be accomponanied by the massive input of Western development aid assistance. This will provide these leaders with new resources to distribute among their followers and it will effectively block all attempts towards democratic development. Somalia will to some extent see a revival of the economy of late 80's during which foreign developement assistance accounted for 57% of the GNP. The difference will be that Somalia will have not one dictator as in the days of Siyad Barre, but several "regional dictators" subsiding off development corruption and basing their power on their control of foreign funds. Already some signs of this process are visible. US administration officials are reported to have said that the warlords no more are to be described by that term, "regional leaders" is the euphemism they have come up with. Another sign is the coclusion of the recently concluded Addis Ababa conference that the targets for input of aid should be "determined at the local level in accordance with the prevailing leadership structure in each area". (See next article) GLIMPSES FROM THE ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE Copyright Inter Press Service 1992, all rights reserved. (New york, Dec 8 (IPS) -- As U.S. Marines prepare to land in Mogadishu to begin 'Operation Restore Hope', the United Nations is trying to encourage Somalis to search for a long-term political solution to the crisis in their country. A U.N. spokesperson confirmed monday that Ismat Kittani, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's special representative in Somalia, was "in touch with all factions on a regular basis". This meant that the two rival warlords in the East African nation, Farrah Aidid and Ali Mahdi, who did not attend a coordination meeting on Somalia in Addis Ababa, were being kept informed of U.N. efforts to forge a political understanding between Somali leaders. Jan Eliasson, U.N. under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs who addressed the meeting Dec. 5 (see SNU 40, Dec 4), said it was important for the conference "to lay the foundation for a future for Somalia beyond emergency relief". The conference was attended by 400 participants from donor countries, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and U.N. relief bodies. A quarter of the participants were community, political and ngo leaders from Somalia. Two areas thought to be crucial for reconstruction was health and agriculture. Several Somali doctors and specialists working in refugee camps in neighbouring countries were being asked to return to Mogadishu to help start the medical services there. The conference focussed on measures to intensify the United Nations' 100-day programme of accelerated relief and recovery assistance to Somalia. Launched two months ago, the programme was disrupted when rival warlords broke ceasefire agreements and attacked U.N. food shipments. Eliasson admitted that the 100-day programme was so far only a "partial success". but even in its limited operation, the programme "may directly and indirectly have saved the lives of perhaps as many as one million people". An important conclusion of the conference was that the new targets of the 100-day programme would be "determined at the local level in accordance with the prevailing leadership structure in each area". There has been considerable criticism from human rights activists that the way relief supplies were delivered by some Western agencies actually contributed to the general lawlessness in Somalia. This was because some relief agencies ignored local community leaders and made separate deals with armed groups or "technicals" as they are known in Somalia. Among the conclusions of the conference were those relating to the role and activities of what it called the "humanitarian protection forces" or the U.S. troops under the U.N.-authorised intervention. Without specifying the circumstances, the conference said the humanitarian protections forces "should remain until such time as their mission has been accomplished". And hinting at a broader role for the U.S.-led forces, the participants "strongly recommended" that while they were there, the troops should become involved in "the rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure" of the country. Although the conference did not refer specifically to disarming the irregular forces, it said the "reduction of arms, particularly of the 'technicals' and other heavy weaponry, was fundamental" in restoring law and order. So far, the precise task of the U.S.-led force has been defined by the U.N. security council resolution and the top leadership of the U.S. defence department as one which will ensure "a secure environment" for the delivery of relief supplies to the starving Somalis. If the two biggest warlords cooperate with the U.S-led force, as they have already indicated they will, a "secure environment" for the delivery of relief supplies may well be created for the asking. But the conference participants in Addis Ababa expect the "humanitarian protection forces" to do more than just that. They want the armed gangs disarmed and demobilised, and the humanitarian protection force to help in the reconstruction of Somali society. _________________________________________________________________ Posted by Bernhard Helander in Uppsala, Sweden.