Received: from jhuml1.hcf.jhu.edu (jhuml1.hcf.jhu.edu [128.220.2.86]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.7.6/8.7.3/CNS-4.0p) with ESMTP id SAA11711 for ; Wed, 25 Jun 1997 18:53:18 -0600 (MDT) Received: from jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu by jhmail.hcf.jhu.edu (PMDF V5.0-7 #13870) id <01IKI4J607NK95N0B3@jhmail.hcf.jhu.edu> for socgrad@csf.colorado.edu; Wed, 25 Jun 1997 20:52:42 -0400 (EDT) Received: from jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu by jhmail.hcf.jhu.edu (PMDF V5.0-7 #13870) id <01IKI4J1BZMI95MSKJ@jhmail.hcf.jhu.edu> for socgrad@csf.colorado.edu; Wed, 25 Jun 1997 20:52:24 -0400 (EDT) Received: from jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu id <762-4>; Wed, 25 Jun 1997 20:52:21 -0400 Date: Wed, 25 Jun 1997 20:52:20 -0400 From: Thomas F Brown Subject: Re: tracking again To: socgrad@csf.colorado.edu Message-id: <97Jun25.205221edt.762-4@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT References: <97Jun25.145411edt.2555-8@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu> >i'm being picky here, but this is interesting. >so people's attitudes regarding the regime structure are considered a >component of tracking until they (the respondent/the reported attitude) >mentions unfairness -- and then the attitudes (the data) are >conceptually thrown into the category of "outcome?" Well, you're conflating the conceptual structure with the measurement protocol. I haven't addressed how we're going to measure this stuff. It is very tricky because of the overlap you describe. Another confounding factor would be social influences that affect both an individual's choice of discipline and also affect how people think disciplines should be organized according to demographic characteristics. It could get messy. It might be impractical. But the only attitudes we need to know for this bivariate conceptual design are what people think about who should go into which specialty. >consider this: >in order for an individual to have an attitude at all regarding the >regime structure, one must have experienced it in some way -- which >would really make all attitudes about the regime stucture "outcomes" to >some extent, would it not? Yeah, that is exactly what I said--there is likely a reciprocal influence between distributive outcomes and people's attitudes about how outcomes should be distributed. >why is it that you would value one's subjective attitudes when it comes >to describing the regime structure, but would not equally value one's >subjective attitudes regarding the fairness or unfairness of the regime >structure? In the first one, we would be surveying causal elements. We have to assume the hegemonic discourse is in their collective head, and if we want to get at it, we have to ask them. I doubt if they'd tell the truth. This is a fantasy design. I think it's impractical. My intent was to conceptualize the relationship between a hegemonic tracking discourse and the distribution of specialties by demographic characteristics. What I wanted to demonstrate was that if we infer tracking attitudes from the outcomes, we are defining the outcome in terms of the input-- a tautology. As long as we are defining the hegemonic discourse as a factor, then I don't see any way around measuring subjective tracking attitudes and assuming that those attitudes determine how people are tracked. Whether or not we can actually measure those attitudes reliably is another question entirely. In the second one, it's irrelevant who thinks they've been discriminated against. We're looking at the relationship between the hegemonic discourse and the actual distributive outcome. >of course, you can conceptualize any way you want to (and i know you >recognized the overlap in your post), but i'm not convinced that these >two things are so different, even with your conceptual differentiation. They are conceptually different. One is a "should"--people should go into specialties according to their demographic characteristics. The other one is a "shouldn't"--I should not have been subjected to tracking pressure. Separating them out in the measurement model would be tricky. Let's not confuse measurement problems with conceptual problems. >if you are allowing the measurement of attitudes in this analysis, why >disallow attitudes of unfairness? to me, this borders on conceptually >screening the data. Of course it's conceptually screening the data! That's what theory does-- it tells us which phenomena are important to the story and which are not. I'm discriminating between endogenous and exogenous factors. The aggregate pattern of attitudes that describe a hegemonic discourse constitute one factor. The distribution of people across specialties is the other. Causal direction is unknown, probably reciprocal. Attitudes of unfairness are not included in my bivariate design. How do you think they should fit in? Do you think they cause tracking? I think they represent either a consequence of tracking or else they are some exogenous frustration that is being sublimated into a subjective experience of being tracked. I do not think they cause either the hegemonic discourse or tracking, therefore they are not included in the conceptual model. They might constitute resistance to the hegemonic discourse.