Mon, 10 Oct 1994 17:33:04 -0700 for <socgrad@UCSD.EDU>
Date: Mon, 10 Oct 1994 17:32:57 -0700 (PDT)
From: Robert Duniway <duniway@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: Rational Choice theories
To: Alan <DAVIDSON@UConnVM.UConn.Edu>


On Mon, 10 Oct 1994, Alan wrote:

>      One piece that is missing is it matters very much, especially in terms
> of one's assumptions of the human agent and the contexts they act within
> and upon, where preferences come from.  If preferences are strictly norm-driven
> then, one's options for action are relatively strictly proscribed, both with
> respect to observers in a particular context as well as actors themselves.
> I, however, preferences are purposively left multifarious, then, much more
> room is allowed for, and much more attention is paid to people's actions.
> 

Couldn't you have a multifarious but equally determined assumption about
where preferences come from (E.g. - preferences are produced by a 
combination of physiological and expreriential factors, both of which 
follow regular and predictable patterns)?  It is a mistake to think that
this is some sort of free will versus determinism conflict when in fact
it is simply a debate over whether a particular specification of the 
origin of preferences in adequate.  All rational choice theorists care
about is that preferences exists, and that they are consistent enough within
a particular domain that specification of preferences yields a useful
model of individual behavior.  Unfortunately, RCT has been ideologically
associated with competitive individualism.  There is nothing irrational
about normative preferences.  Preferences are necessary for rational 
evaluation of alternatives, and as long as they make such rational 
evaluation possible they are adequate foundations for RCT.

Bob Duniway					University of Washington