Sun, 9 Oct 1994 03:47:34 -0700 for <socgrad@ucsd.edu>
From: lichter@nicco.sscnet.ucla.edu (Michael Lichter)
Date: Sun, 9 Oct 1994 03:46:14 +0000
To: Alan <DAVIDSON@UConnVM.UConn.Edu>
Subject: Re: Parsons
On Oct 8,  9:47pm, Alan <DAVIDSON@UConnVM.UConn.Edu> wrote:
>      The general agenda of Parsons was to develop a theory of society which
> would avoid both classical behaviorist conceptions of a social actor, and
> evolutionary notions of the inevitable progress of societies.  The former
> he borrowed from Mead and Freud, and the latter he borrowed from Durkheim,
> Weber, and Pareto.  To a certain extent, the consensus is he failed in this
> attempt b/c he ignored any notion of a rational human agent, and began
> inching toward evolutionary theory in his later works.

For me anyway, the name Parsons is synonomous with "functionalism" (or
"structural-functionalism", his term).  Parsons had an organicist model
of society, where every institution and every person has their place in
the overall social division of labor.  Shared norms and values
characterise society and help explain why we have social order and
cooperation as opposed to a Hobbesian state of war of all against all.

Although I'm not fan of Parsons and I have yet to learn anything useful
(to my work) that's come out of his work, I think the question of
Parsons' fall from grace is more of a sociology of knowledge (or
sociology of sociology) question, than a question of the (many)
weaknesses of his work.  My understanding is that the 60's generation
of sociologists despised Parsons and his work because of (a) his
virulent anti-Marx anti-Communist cold war liberal politics as
expressed in his actions, (b) the conservative implications of his
theories which apologized for social inequality as necessary and (more
or less) implictily favored social equilibrium and therefore the status
quo.  While many sociologists of Parsons' vintage disdained his use of
functional explanation and criticized his "oversocialized" conception
of social actors (tey felt tat hhhhis framework [sorry, my keyboard is
not working too well] left little room for individual volition),
Parsons lost his hegemony over sociological theory less by losing
credibility among his fans, and more by his supporters being replaced
by this new generation.

Alan is probably rigt about Parsons' later evolutionary bent hurting him,
I disagree about te "rational human agent".  If he means tat sociologists
eventually dismissed Parsons' work because it didn't include rational
actors a la rational choice teory, tat's clearly wrong -- rational choice
as never had tat big a following among sociologists.  On the oter and,
Alan probably means this criticism that Parsons' individuals are
"oversocialized".  Parsons certainly did not ignore human agency; the
agency vs. structure (ick) dialectic was a primary concern for him.

> Much of the friction that currently exists concerning rational choice theory
> among non-Marxists takes Parsons as a point of departure.

You're saying that non-Marxists (what's different about te Marxists on
this point?) use Parsons against RCT?  I tink that most treads of
sociological theory are in oppostion to RCT and its individualism.  Are
you (Alan) suggesting that tere's a sgnificant debate going on today
about RCT within sociology?

In any case, let me close with my favorite Parsons quote.  Thhhhis is
from "The Distribution of Power in American Society", a review of Mills'
THE POWER ELITE.

	Women qua women by and large do not have a position of power
	comparable to that of men; but this is not to say tat tey are
	unimportant -- otherwise ow can we account for the extent of our
	national preoccupations with questions of sexuality?  (Parsons
	1956; 133)

By the way, Mills' discussion of Parsons (dissection of his prose,
anyway) in THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION is must reading.

Michael