Marx's Method in Capital: A Reexamination, edited by Fred Moseley. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993. 233 pages. --James Lawler Philosophy Department SUNY at Buffalo phijiml@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu phijiml@ubvms.bitnet As he was preparing his first manuscript leading to Capital, published as the Grundrisse, Marx (1983, 249) wrote to Engels that he had just "completely demolished the theory of profit as hitherto propounded. What was of great use to me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic ..." Unfortunately Marx did not adequately spell out the nature of this dialectical method, which he said Hegel both created and mystified at the same time. To help rectify this inadequacy, the authors of this volume exchanged views on the nature of the dialectical method during a conference in June 1991. Papers given then have since been revised in the light of that discussion, with cross references to each others' positions interspersed in the text. Fred Moseley's introduction outlines the main points of agreement and disagreement on topics such as the nature of Marx's method and the extent to which it coincides with Hegel's, the significance of Marx's starting with the analysis of the commodity, the validity of Marx's early argument in Chapter one for the labor theory of value, the relation between value and money, the relation between the first and third volume of Capital, with special application to the "transformation problem". There are also criticisms of alternative economic theories, primarily the neo- Ricardian theory of Sraffa and Marxist followers such as Sweezy, criticized extensively by Fred Moseley ("Marx's Logical Method and the `Transformation Problem'") and Guglielmo Carchedi ("Marx's Logic of Inquiry and Price Formation") in chapters seven and eight. In the preceding chapter, Martha Campbell ("Marx's Concept of Economic Relations and the Method of Capital") closely examines Marx's criticisms of the classical economics of J.S. Mill and the neo-classical theory of Adolph Wagner. While the first five chapters offer a more concentrated focus on the nature of Marx's methodology, these final "applied" chapters also develop their arguments from the high level of general methodology. To consider here only the most fundamental question posed by this volume, what exactly is dialectical method? Tony Smith ("Marx's Capital and Hegelian Dialectical Logic") argues that it is neither more nor less than Hegel's own method as seen in the social scientific context of his Philosophy of Right. In partial disagreement with Marx, Smith doesn't see much need to demystify Hegel, at least on the plane of methodology. Hegel does not construct logical castles in the air, but bases his investigation on the appropriation of empirical material. The transition from one category to another, as in the passage from "property" to "contract", is the intellectual representation of a definite social process. Logical development is not the result of a mysterious power inherent in the concepts, but the mental recapitulation of the social practice in which individuals who possess property will tend to engage in contractual relations with one another. As a form of social life, property relations involve a "necessary structural tendency" for social agents to engage in the logically subsequent social form of contractual relations. But this is precisely how Marx understands the transition from, say, the elementary form of commodity exchange to its expanded and general forms, and from there to money. E.g., from the standpoint of the exchange of commodities at a relatively simple or abstract level, social agents who operate within such conditions will necessarily tend to single out one commodity to serve as a general measure of value. Smith distinguishes his position from that of Christopher Arthur ("Hegel's Logic and Marx's Capital") who thinks that Hegel does indeed have an idealistic conception of the evolution of concepts as superhuman, automatically developing forms. But it is this very fact that makes Hegelian dialectics suitable for understanding the logic of Capital. For capitalism is an alienated social power that unfolds its moments or categories in the "self-moving" way that is mirrored in Hegelian logic. The exchange of commodities involves a "material abstraction" in which the concrete particularities of use-values become mere bearers of exchange values. The forms of value unfold in capitalism in the same unearthly way that categories evolve in Hegel's Logic. The impulse to move from the starting point, the most elementary form, to more concrete forms is, Arthur adds, the insufficiency of the simple form to express the complex conditions of its existence. The starting point is an element in a totality, rather than an axiom or an empirical given on which all else depends. Unlike Smith, who sees the motivation for development to come from within the given form, Arthur sees the development to come from outside the particular element underconsideration, because of its conditioned character. Only the totality is unconditioned self-movement. Patrick Murray ("The Necessity of Money: How Hegel Helped Marx Surpass Ricardo's Theory of Value") also links Marx's appreciation of Hegel with alienation, as expressed in Hegel's "logic of essence" (the second part of Hegel's Logic) according to which one thing must express itself in something else. Following the traditional conception of essence, however, Ricardo merely reduces exchange values to the underlying essence, labor. He does not explain how that essence dialectically expresses itself in something else, in forms that are seemingly in contradiction to that essence. Repeating an idea elaborated by Smith, Murray argues that Marx exploits the potentialities of Hegel's "logic of the concept" (the third part of Hegel's Logic) to provide a socialist alternative to the alienation, as expressed in the logic of essence, inherent in capitalist relations. Geert Reuten ("The Difficult Labor of a Theory of Social Value: Metaphors and Systematic Dialectics at the Beginning of Marx's Capital") believes that Marx sometimes deviates from a systematic development of categories, as in his derivation of labor as the "substance" of exchange value through analysis rather than through dialectical development. Perhaps for this reason, Arthur attempts a dialectical account that avoids this part of Marx's work altogether, introducing the category of labor dialectically only as the solution to the problem of the origin of capitalist profit. Paul Mattick, Jr. ("Marx's Dialectic") outlines Marx's double method of analysis and synthesis of empirical data, which he holds to differ significantly from Hegel's a priori or idealistic logic of concepts. Mattick interestingly develops the critique of Ricardo advanced by Murray to argue that Marx begins Capital with the starting point of classical political economy, not with some independent "social form". Marx then critically replaces this starting point with one that is adequate to the analysis of capitalism. Thus, the Ricardian derivation of labor as the essence of value is taken to be part of a critique of political economy, rather than an authentic starting point for the understanding of capitalism. Mattick converges here with the arguments of Murray and Arthur, as well as Reuten, who sharply criticizes the Ricardian "labor embodied" theory of value. But for Mattick, Marx's dialectical method is a critique of ideology, rather than a method of theory construction (Smith) or an expression of capitalistic alienation (Arthur). Major specialists here come to grips with each other while inspiring the reader to turn to their larger works. Unlike many collections only loosely connected by a general theme, there is here a serious effort, not just by the editor, but by the authors themselves, to focus their discussion and to confront their differences and similarities so as to offer the reader a truly collective effort. REFERENCE Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. Collected Works, Vol. 40. New York: International Publishers, 1983, 249.