Received: from localhost (gimenez@localhost) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.8.4/8.8.4/CNS-4.1p-nh) with SMTP id IAA25674; Thu, 11 Jun 1998 08:55:18 -0600 (MDT) Date: Thu, 11 Jun 1998 08:55:17 -0600 (MDT) From: Martha Gimenez To: "Marco A. Garcia" cc: PROGRESSIVE POPULATION NETWORK Subject: RE: Class and Mortality In-Reply-To: <000101bd94e2$b4e41c50$4ff154cc@mgarcia1.dyn.ml.org> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII On Wed, 10 Jun 1998, Marco A. Garcia wrote: > Martha, > > as far as I understand (in my limited biologist view of societal processes) > class structure can be an important determinant of fertility rates, > especially in developing countries. I fully agree, though I would say it is just as important in the developed countries. > > In Developed Country societies, childbearing constitutes a consumptive > activity, an economic liability. I suspect many factors contribute to this > situation; weak familiar kin and community networks, commoditized goods and > services, parents do not generally expect economic returns from their > children and the individualism of the capitalist culture that has resulted > in a materialist and rational attitude towards children. > > In Third World countries, which social security systems have been reduced to > nil as a result of economic adjustment measures, children are the only > source of support for the poor elder and disabled that are unable to > participate in the labor force. Also, in contrast to the norm in > middle-class Western cultures, Third World children start providing for the > family at very early ages. According to Caldwell (1982) by his 15th > birthday, a Javanese boy has repaid the entire investment his family made in > him. In Bangladesh, a son provides labor and income by the age of 6 and by > the age of 12 he contributes more that he consumes. While it is the case that as capitalism penetrates all social relations and populations become proletarianized the content of "rational" fertility behavior changes so that it is as "rational" to have several children in the LDCs as it is to have 2, 1 or none in the DCs, in both settings class location and location within the strata into which classes are fragmented continues to affect fertility decisions. If we focus our analysis on the individual or the household as decision making units, then it would seem that indeed children become consumer goods in the DCs while they are wanted as sources of labor and/or income in the LDCs. But in both cases it is, in the last instance, class location and the balance of power between classes which sets the boundaries within which "rational" fertility decisions are made. And when the balance of class power changes, people might find out the hard way that their "rational"decisions become, in retrospect, "irrational." This is why, even in countries with social security and welfare systems it is possible to find a substantial proportion of elderly in poverty and near poverty. > > Infant mortality is another important issue that has a clear correlation > with high fertility and class structure. The higher infant mortalities are > observed in the poorest countries, the same that have the higher fertility > rates. In the less developed regions, the average infant mortality rate is > 69 per 1,000 births. This is a sharp contrast with the 1.9 child deaths per > 1,000 births observed in Developed Countries. [Infant mortality statistics > account only for children that die during the first year, but many more > children die during later years due to lack of health care, nutrition and > other factors associated with poverty] While infant mortality rates have been declining in the DCs, there are significant differences that remain based on class, race and ethnicity. I haven't taught population courses for a while but when I did, I remember that while infant mortality in the U.S. was less than 10 per 1000, infant mortality in the inner cities and among Native Americans was double digit and comparable to the infant mortality in some Central American countries. > > Among poor women, childbearing also represents the only available means to > social and family empowerment. That might be the case - but it is also often the product of incest and sexual abuse. I remember reading a relatively recent study that pointed out that the fathers of the children of teen-age mothers were adults, often relatives or friends of the family. > > High fertility rates among the bottom of the class structure are not the > result of ignorance, apathy or lack of access to contraceptives, as is > usually depicted by white middle-class westerners. High fertility rates, are > in fact a rational, well-founded economic/survival strategy for the poor. I think that while that might be the case among some women, we cannot generalize. Fertility rates are irreducible to only one micro foundation, be it rational survival strategy, adherence to religious or social norms, sexual abuse, etc. I think empirical research can discover different microfoundations in different settings. I appreciate your observations - despite minor disagreements, i consider, like you, that it is impossible to understand variations in fertility and, for that matter in all population processes without investigating the effects of social class and the changing balance of power between classes. Martha E. Gimenez Department of Sociology Campus Box 327 University of Colorado at Boulder Boulder, Colorado 80309 Voice: 303-492-7080 Fax: 303-492-5105 ***************************** > > > Marco A. Garcia > Department of Marine Sciences, UNC-Chapel Hill > Phone: (919) 918-7713 > e-mail: mgarcia@marine.unc.edu > www: http://mgarcia1.dyn.ml.org >