Message-Id: <3.0.32.19980731120005.007373c0@popact.org>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 1998 12:00:06 -0500
To: nicka@well.com
From: Richard Cincotta <cincotta@popact.org>
Subject: Re: how urgent, how strict
Cc: ppn@csf.colorado.edu
Mime-Version: 1.0
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Yours was a long and interesting email, Nick. I'm not sure that anyone has
gotten back to you -- but I'd like to give it a shot (using my own reading
of the literature and opinions, of course). 

>1. Quantitatively, what needs to be done in terms of social programs to 
>bring about voluntary ZPG?  (i.e. has anyone found that thus and such 
>investment in education for women results typically in thus and such 
>reduction in reproductive rates?)  

There's quite a bit of writing on this topic. For an easy-reading review, I
like the publication written by Laurie Mazur and put out by the Rockefellor
Foundation last year entitled "High Stakes."   It concludes (as I have)
that the programs that most affect fertility are those that promote girls'
education, promote women's participation in the workforce -- which seem to
stimulate a decline in desired family size -- and programs that promote
family planning, and maternal and child health.  Quality voluntary family
planning programs provide the means for families to meet their childbearing
goals, whether in terms of frequency or timing. Maternal and child health
programs reduce infant mortality, and help families escape a vicious
poverty circle that include poor health, poor childhood development, and
household insecurity.  
      There are, of course, other aspects of economic development, culture,
and livelihood that weigh upon childbearing -- but the three that I
mentioned are those that most development agencies focus upon.  Donor
agencies have yet to do a very substantive job to change the situation of
lagging girls' education in the developing world. 

You can get "High Stakes" from:
Rockefellor Foundation
420 5th Av.
New York, NY  10018  USA 
or
http://www.rockfound.org/frameset.html

Laurie Mazur, “High Stakes: The United States, Global Population and our
Common Future,”  (New York: Rockefellow Foundation, 1997).

>2. What is the dollar cost of #1 ?  Who can pay it?  How far over 
>present payments is it?  

A total packet of these costs were figured for the International Conference
on Population and Development in Cairo, 1994 (ICPD).  Including a
reproductive health component, which addresses sexually transmitted
diseases (including HIV/AIDS prevention), the total bill comes to US$17
billion per year for the world.  Presently, most developing countries pay
the lion's share of their family planning services through state programs
and private enterprise. Cairo calls for developed countries to contribute
one-third of the bill -- and they fall far short of that goal.
    PAI has a report coming out on this shortly -- I only have rough
figures. The developed country goal is $5.3 billion annually by year 2000.
They now contribute about $2 billion (less than 40%). Developing countries
need to contribute $11.3 billion by year 2000. They are now at about $8
billion, around 75%.
    US assistance to family planning programs is among the lowest
contribution for developed countries (figured as a percent of GDP basis),
though the US is still the biggest player (probably around 40 percent of
international funding) despite the large cutbacks from Congress.  One point
not well known by US citizens: US family planning does not contribute to
abortion services, and has been forbidden by law to make those
contributions since 1972. 

You can read our factsheets on funding at:  
http://www.popact.org/

I recommend the following review of Cairo: 
Lori S. Ashford, “New Perspectives on Population: Lessons from Cairo,”
Population Bulletin (Population Reference Bureau) 50, no. 1 (1995).

You can read about costs and donor assistance trends at: 
http://www.popact.org/programs/minidac.htm


>3. What is the realistic carrying capacity of the earth over the short 
>term (next century) and long term (geological) for humanity under each of 
>the constraints outlined above 1-3?  

I don't think anyone really has a clue (though they may believe they do). I
suppose it depends on what people expect life's qualities to be, for
themselves and for others, including other species.  
Read Joel Cohen's book: 
Joel E. Cohen, How many people can the Earth support? (New York: Norton,
1995).

>4. Which will really be more painful to humanity - a benign voluntary 
>program to eventually reach ZPG (followed perhaps by a drastic, violent, 
>chaotic reduction to a much lower carrying capacity) or a less benign, 
>perhaps mandatory program to reduce population which will eleiminate the 
>painful uncontrolled reduction?  If one doesn't perceive that we have yet 
>reached carrying capacity, a variant of the same question still applies - 
>whether implementation of a voluntary and benign program is justified 
>when the tradeoff is taken into account of postponement, perhaps 
>indefinitely, of goals of adequate standards of income for the poorer 
>nations.

Experience suggests that population "control" doesn't appear to work in the
long-run. Quality voluntary programs with lots of information and choice
are in high demand, however. 
      Coercive programs mandated by elites have led, eventually, to
substantial setbacks for voluntary programs that have succeeded them.
India is a prime example -- where there are good NGO and state-supported
programs, they must deal with the residual stigma of India's quota system,
and the incidents that occurred during "the Emergency".  
     China has, most recently, allowed coercive programs in some of its
provinces and localities.  Besides this being a morally reprehensive
approach to family health, most family planning professionals believe that
replacement fertility (total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman, on
average) would have been reached without coercion -- all of the more
rapidly developing countries in East Asia have achieved substantial
reductions in fertility (UN 1996 data: Thailand (TFR=1.9), Singapore (1.8),
Taiwan (TFR = 1.7, from a Taiwan survey), South Korea (1.6), Indonesia
(2.9), Hong Kong (1.3)). China is at TFR 1.9  .   I think there is a high
likelihood that China's coercive program could produce in-country backlash
long after it has ended. 
     Other findings suggest coercion was unnecessary.  About one-third of
China's reduction in fertility occurred as a result of delayed age of
marriage, and first childbirth. Demographers suggest that Chinese
minorities in Southeast Asia -- outside of China -- have generally
experienced the most rapid declines in desired family size and the quickest
to adopt modern contraceptive use. 

You can read about fertility changes in Southeast and East Asia at: 
                 http://www.popact.org/why_pop/tigers.htm


I hope this is helpful. There is more info on our web site -- though it is
being re-organized to make it more accessible.  
Regards,

Richard Cincotta


Richard P. Cincotta
Senior Research Assoc.
Population Action International
1120 19th St., NW
Suite 550
Washington, DC  20036
USA
(202)659-1833 x168
(202)293-1795 (fax)
cincotta@popact.org
http://www.populationaction.org/

Download "Economics & Rapid Change: the Influence of Population Growth" on
population, economics and institutions at:
http://www.populationaction.org/why_pop/wealth.htm