Reply-To: "Paul Johnston" From: "Paul Johnston" To: "Labor Research and Action Project" Subject: Johnston/Against the Work Stoppage: A New Strike for a New Labor Movement Date: Tue, 6 Oct 1998 12:39:51 -0700 boundary="----=_NextPart_000_008A_01BDF126.6987CA40" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_008A_01BDF126.6987CA40 charset="iso-8859-1" Against the Work Stoppage: A New Strike for a New Labor Movement by Paul Johnston =20 With last year's UPS strike by the Teamsters and this year's GM strike = by the United Auto Workers, the labor movement in the U.S. may at last = have turned a very important corner. Finally, two decades after a = series of disasterous setbacks made strikes taboo in union circles, we = may be recovering our most important weapon.=20 =20 It's about time, because without the capacity to strike and win, labor = movement revival is impossible. Like any social movement, the labor = movement only exists through collective action, and the strike is our = form of collective action. =20 But a new danger looms as we pick up the picket signs. The new danger = is that after all the efforts our unions are making to unlearn the old = ways of business unionism, when we turn to the strike we'll do it the = old way. After all, a strike is a strike is a strike... isn't it? No = way.=20 =20 Another term for the strike as we know it is the work stoppage. The = work stoppage was shaped in conditions that prevailed in the 1950s and = 1960s. Unlike, for example, the two-day general strike led by public = workers in Puerto Rico in June to protest the sale of the public = telephone company to GTE, the work stoppage is not a political = mobilization. It's a withdrawal of labor power, a bargaining tool for = business unionism. By cutting profits, it aims to force an economic = decision favorable to workers. And typically-- though union officials = don't like to be quoted on this-- the pain of the extended strike is = also often intended to force workers to moderate their expectations and = settle for less. The work stoppage IS the most common form of the strike in the U.S., and = it certainly is our common notion of what a strike is and can be. But = in fact the simple withholding of labor only delivers power where we = have cornered our labor market, or where we somehow enjoy an advantage = that protects us from competition. And in the public sector it's rarely = EVER an effective source of power, since public employers aren't = capitalists and don't lose profit when we strike, and since public = employers learned a long time ago how to turn public anger over the = disruption of public services against "those greedy public workers." = By the late 1970s in the public sector and by the early 1980s in the = private sector, employers in both sectors had learned how to use strikes = as weapons against unions, and routinely sought to manipulate unions = into striking. Small wonder, then, that when someone shouts "strike" in = a crowded union hall so many of us run for the exit. So now we are in a situation, public sector and private, less similar to = that faced by our fathers thirty or forty years ago, and more similar to = that faced by workers in most of the rest of the world. The simple = withholding of labor power is not enough, especially when a company with = an eye on long-term strategy calculates its ability to take a strike for = a year or more to break the union and allow it to re-open at lower cost = and with a freer hand, and ESPECIALLY where an employer is able and = inclined to disinvest in higher-wage areas and move production = elsewhere. Does that mean we don't strike? No! But it does mean that we should = study when we win and when we lose and learn the lessons. The main = lesson to be learned is that a whole new world of possibilities for = union power opens up when we stop seeing the strike as an "off button"-- = put down your tools, walk out, stand in front of the worksite, keep = people from crossing the lines-- and start seeing it as an "on button." = =20 After all, suddenly in a strike situation the union has dozens or = hundreds or even thousands of full-time folks on the payroll, so to = speak... What kind of creative and effective organization and tactics = can we put together with that many folks? What are our adversary's = points of vulnerability, and how can we hit them? Who are our potential = allies, what are THEIR issues, and how can we use mutual support and = common concerns to bring them into the fray? How can we use this = suddenly huge "strikeforce" to escalate, to spread the strike, to = organize the unorganized and/or to accomplish other kinds of = objectives-- in our community or in the political process as well as in = our industry-- that leave us stronger than we were before the strike? =20 This is what the United Farm Workers did in the grape strike of the = 1960s. And although both unionists and scholars are used to seeing the = UFW as some kind of strange deviant case, different from the rest of the = labor movement, it seems more and more sensible to seem the old UFW as a = pioneer. The Justice for Janitors campaigns, labor-community = coalitions, immigrant worker organizing, and corporate campaigns-- all = pioneered by the UFW-- were at one time on the fringes of the old labor = movement, but are now in the middle of the new labor movement. =20 =20 But unless we shake our taken-for-granted notion of the strike as work = stoppage, the dead hand of the past will hold us back from learning such = lessons. This could easily lead to more PATCO-style debacles. And so = today's strike revival could wind up reinforcing our fear of collective = action, instead of opening the doors to a new labor movement.=20 =20 And here's an even greater obstacle to unleashing the potential power of = the new strike: our unions are used to being run by just a few people. = The staff is used to it, and the members are used to it. This is = understandable when only a few folk are actively involved. The problem = comes when suddenly we have a "staff"-- a strikeforce-- of dozens, = hundreds, thousands. We don't know how to open things up. But when we = DO open up, the payoff is tremendous: not only in organizational = capacity and strike power, but also in the long-term internal life of = the union. =20 =20 When we open up our minds to the new strike, and when we open up our = unions in the new strike situation, then maybe we'll learn (to = paraphrase Peter Sellers) to stop worrying and love the strike again. (Paul Johnston is a strike groupie, who works for the Central Coast = Citizenship Project) johnston@cruzio.com ------=_NextPart_000_008A_01BDF126.6987CA40 charset="iso-8859-1"
Against the Work Stoppage:
A New Strike for a New Labor=20 Movement
by = Paul=20 Johnston
 
With last year's UPS strike by the Teamsters and = this year's=20 GM strike by the United Auto Workers, the labor movement in the U.S. may = at last=20 have turned a very important corner.  Finally, two decades after a = series=20 of disasterous setbacks made strikes taboo in union circles, we may be=20 recovering our most important weapon.
 
It's about time, because without the capacity to = strike and=20 win, labor movement revival is impossible.  Like any social = movement, the=20 labor movement only exists through collective action, and the strike is = our form=20 of collective action.
 
But a new danger looms as we pick up the picket = signs. =20 The new danger is that after all the efforts our unions are making to = unlearn=20 the old ways of business unionism, when we turn to the strike we'll do = it the=20 old way.  After all, a strike is a strike is a strike... isn't = it?  No=20 way.
 
Another term for the strike as we know it is the = work=20 stoppage.  The work stoppage was shaped in conditions that = prevailed in the=20 1950s and 1960s.  Unlike, for example, the two-day general strike = led by=20 public workers in Puerto Rico in June to protest the sale of the public=20 telephone company to GTE, the work stoppage is not a political=20 mobilization.  It's a withdrawal of labor power, a bargaining tool = for=20 business unionism.  By cutting profits, it aims to force an = economic=20 decision favorable to workers.  And typically-- though union = officials=20 don't like to be quoted on this-- the pain of the extended strike is = also often=20 intended to force workers to moderate their expectations and settle for=20 less.

The work stoppage IS the most common form of the = strike in=20 the U.S., and it certainly is our common notion of what a strike is and = can=20 be.  But in fact the simple withholding of labor only delivers = power where=20 we have cornered our labor market, or where we somehow enjoy an = advantage that=20 protects us from competition.  And in the public sector it's rarely = EVER an=20 effective source of power, since public employers aren't capitalists and = don't=20 lose profit when we strike, and since public employers learned a long = time ago=20 how to turn public anger over the disruption of public services against=20 "those greedy public workers."   By the=20 late 1970s in the public sector and by the early 1980s in the private = sector,=20 employers in both sectors had learned how to use strikes as weapons = against=20 unions, and routinely sought to manipulate unions into striking.  = Small=20 wonder, then, that when someone shouts "strike" in a crowded = union=20 hall so many of us run for the exit.

So now we are in a = situation, public=20 sector and private, less similar to that faced by our fathers thirty or = forty=20 years ago, and more similar to that faced by workers in most of the rest = of the=20 world.  The simple withholding of labor power is not enough, = especially=20 when a company with an eye on long-term strategy calculates its ability = to take=20 a strike for a year or more to break the union and allow it to re-open = at lower=20 cost and with a freer hand, and ESPECIALLY where an employer is able and = inclined to disinvest in higher-wage areas and move production=20 elsewhere.

Does that mean we don't strike?  No!  But it = does=20 mean that we should study when we win and when we lose and learn the=20 lessons.  The main lesson to be learned is that a whole new world = of=20 possibilities for union power opens up when we stop seeing the strike as = an=20 "off button"-- put down your tools, walk out, stand in front = of the=20 worksite, keep people from crossing the lines-- and start seeing it as = an=20 "on button." 
 
After all, suddenly in a strike situation the union = has dozens=20 or hundreds or even thousands of full-time folks on the payroll, so to=20 speak...  What kind of creative and effective organization and = tactics can=20 we put together with that many folks?  What are our adversary's = points of=20 vulnerability, and how can we hit them?  Who are our potential = allies, what=20 are THEIR issues, and how can we use mutual support and common concerns = to bring=20 them into the fray?   How can we use this suddenly huge=20 "strikeforce" to escalate, to spread the strike, to organize = the=20 unorganized and/or to accomplish other kinds of objectives-- in our = community or=20 in the political process as well as in our industry--  that leave = us=20 stronger than we were before the strike?
 
This is what the United Farm Workers did in the = grape strike=20 of the 1960s.  And although both unionists and scholars are used to = seeing=20 the UFW as some kind of strange deviant case, different from the rest of = the=20 labor movement, it seems more and more sensible to seem the old UFW as a = pioneer.  The Justice for Janitors campaigns, labor-community = coalitions,=20 immigrant worker organizing, and corporate campaigns-- all pioneered by = the=20 UFW-- were at one time on the fringes of the old labor movement, but are = now in=20 the middle of the new labor movement. 
 
But unless we shake our taken-for-granted notion of = the strike=20 as work stoppage, the dead hand of the past will hold us back from = learning such=20 lessons.   This could easily lead to more PATCO-style = debacles. =20 And so today's strike revival could wind up reinforcing our fear of = collective=20 action, instead of opening the doors to a new labor movement. =
 
And here's an even greater obstacle = to unleashing=20 the potential power of the new strike: our unions are used to being run = by just=20 a few people.  The staff is used to it, and the members are used to = it.  This is understandable when only a few folk are actively=20 involved.  The problem comes when suddenly we have a = "staff"-- a=20 strikeforce-- of dozens, hundreds, thousands.  We don't know how to = open=20 things up.  But when we DO open up, the payoff is tremendous: not = only in=20 organizational capacity and strike power, but also in the long-term = internal=20 life of the union. 
 
When we open up our minds to the new = strike, and=20 when we open up our unions in the new strike situation, then maybe we'll = learn=20 (to paraphrase Peter Sellers) to stop worrying and love the strike=20 again.

(Paul Johnston is a strike groupie, who works = for the=20 Central Coast Citizenship Project)
johnston@cruzio.com
<= /DIV> ------=_NextPart_000_008A_01BDF126.6987CA40--