From: xcruz@webtv.net (Robert Chavez)
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 1998 15:46:50 -0600 (MDT)
To: Labor-Rap@csf.colorado.edu
Cc: xcruz@webtv.net
Subject: WW II--Imported Agricultural Labor
Message-ID: <8938-35C23B4A-134@mailtod-122.bryant.webtv.net>
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Sender: owner-frontera-l@nmsu.edu From: lplascen@mail.la.utexas.edu
(Luis F.B. Plascencia)                             Date: Fri, Jul
31, 1998, 11:40am (MDT+1) To: cxhaha@mail.wm.edu
Cc: frontera-l@nmsu.edu                Subject: WW II-- Imported
Agicultural Labor 
                                                              Dear
Professor Hahamovitch: 
I agree with your overall assessment of the role of imported
agricultural labor. I am sure you are probably aware of the background
to the Caribbean and Mexican programs, however, not all the readers of
your e-mail message may be as clear about the two programs and their
relationship. Consequently it may be useful to clarify some historical
points regarding the WW II programs: 
a) The agreement with former British West Indies colonies (Haiti and
Jamaica in particular) to import "temporary" agricultural labor
**predated** the Mexican program. This so called "temporary" program,
unlike the Mexican one, never ended; it has continued from 1942 to the
present. We now know it as the H-2A program. While the total number of
H-2A workers has decreased from a peak of about 13,000 to 7,000. The
single biggest user over the entire 50+ years has been the U.S. Sugar
Corporation and other smaller sugar companies in Florida - including a
company owned by a Cuban family that left Cuba after 1959; 
b) To argue that the "growers" (and perhaps the U.S. government) are the
bad guys is to simplify the complexity of the issue. The Jamaica
government has been deeply entrenched in promoting, regulating and
fostering the continuation of the H2-A program; after all there are
middle-person fees for the Jamaican government and the money brought
back by the returning workers is a major part of the country's sources
of income. The fact that significant numbers of workers are severely
injured as cane cutters is accepted by the Jamaican government as a
minor question. In addition, it plays an important role in preventing
the participation of workers who are black listed by the sugar
companies; 
c) During the 50+ years of the H2-A program, the U.S. federal agencies
involved in the program have at times adhered to the same political
views, but not always. The DOL has at time held back on granting
permission and questioned the need for H2-A workers. During the Carter
administration, for example, DOL opposed granting permission to H-2A
workers in certain crop (but not in others) but then faced court
injunctions that prohibited their denial of permits; although DOL
finally was able to overcome the court limitations, by the time it
achieved this the harvest was already over and thus the issue became
moot; 
d) The Mexican agreement (which later became known as the Bracero
Program, 1942-1964), was actually **modeled on** the British West Indies
program (not the other way around as it is usually thought of and
written about); 
e) The Mexican government played a key role in initiating the U.S-Mexico
program; after all, they saw the potential dollar remittances (as a
footnote it should be noted that during this time Mexico pushed strongly
for the implementation of "employer sanctions" against employers who
hired undocumented workers (a policy not adopted until 1986 under IRCA;
I interpret Mexico's push for employer sanctions as a strategy to allow
a high degree of monopolization for the Mexican government); 
f) The Mexican government used the program for its own internal
political aims. Since it controlled which areas of Mexico were going to
participate in the Bracero Program, it chose to use the program to
neutralize and eliminate areas of opposition to the PRI. Thus it was not
an accident that areas such as Jalisco and Michoacan (which were strong
bases for Cristeros and other opposition groups) were given the "golden
opportunity" to send workers to the U.S. Consequently, it was able to
heavily disrupt the recruitment base for opposition groups; and
sucessfully eliminated the opposition. If the Bracero Program was to be
implemented today, it would not surprise me that Zedillo would give the
"opportunity" to Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero to export workers to the
U.S.; the program of course would get some revamped name alluding to
"economic development," "rural revitalization" or the like. This should
help to understand why immigrants from Jalisco and Michoacan are so
prominent in California and other states, and in cities such as Chicago.
Some of the literature assumes that it was proximity to the U.S. that
drove persons from Michoacan and Jalisco to California and other
locations. While this may have a small piece of truth, it does not
explain why then are the majority of immigrants from Mexican border
states; 
g) The Mexican Bacero program was largely made up of agricultural
workers; however, not all Baceros worked in agriculture, some worked in
railroads; thus, not all Braceros were ag workers.