Health Care Reform Demystified* By James O'Connor 1. The American health care industry is expanding at least twice the rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the past two decades, the industry has created one-sixth of all new jobs and at present accounts for about one- seventh of GDP. Almost $1 trillion is spent on health care each year. While no one knows exactly what combination of reasons explains the relentless march of the health care dollar, improvements in the quality of care are one key factor -- a fact that anyone over 40 or 50 years of age will confirm from personal experience. Medical science has advanced; medical personnel are better trained; hospitals are safer; heart attack and stroke victims stay alive longer because of bypass operations, new drugs, and other technological advances; diagnostic techniques and medical technology have improved, as has the management of chronic illness; and there is a host of new and improved products and services such as contact lenses, dental procedures, wheelchairs, and physical therapies. Another reason for the expansion of the health care industry is that incomes of doctors and other medical personnel, hospital equipment and drug manufacturers, and other sectors of the industry have increased faster than average income, partly due to better quality health care products and services. A third reason is that more people get sick more often, suffer more accidents, workplace hazards, and environmental illness, and are victimized by more violence, and more people who do get sick, injured, etc., get more and better medical treatment.1 The health care industry also may have become more economically inefficient over the past 20 years or so (although very recent trends point in the opposite direction). The problem with the American health care system is that fewer workers and their families and others have health insurance, and more people have more limited coverage or larger deductibles, hence do not have equal or full access to the wider range of better technologies and treatments available to those with comprehensive coverage. Fewer employees have health coverage paid for entirely by their employers. Full payment for family member coverage by employers has also fallen. While the "haves" enjoy more access to better health care, the "have nots" have less access to health care generally and primary and preventative care in particular. Over one-third of Mexican-Americans under age 65 lack health insurance, the highest percentage of any ethnic group.2 The leading causes of death of African-American women between 15 and 50 years of age are breast and cervical cancer, mainly for want of early detection. Blacks also have a proportionately fewer heart bypasses despite the fact that heart disease is the main killer of African-Americans. The American health care system is thus two-tiered (or multi-tiered) and is increasingly regarded by more people as hugely inequitable.3 Medical progress, which has given the U.S. the reputation of having the best, if one of the least equitably distributed, health care in the developed world, would not have been possible without massive subsidies to the health care industry. The government picks up the bill for those 65 years of age and older as well as millions of public employees and their dependents, and over one-half of all people living in poverty.4 Publicly-financed health care costs have risen faster than privately-funded costs because Medicaid eligibility has been expanded and the utilization of services by Medicaid and Medicare recipients has increased (despite the fact that fewer doctors accept Medicaid patients and more Medicare patients have to pay doctors an out-of-pocket premium to get treatment). Americans with good private insurance (for example, Fortune 500 workers) subsidize those without insurance (called "cost-shifting"). Young workers, professionals, and the self-employed with insurance indirectly subsidize the elderly, working poor, and plain poor, and the healthy gift the sick and injured. The fact that health care spending is rising so fast because of subsidized improvements in the quality of care and increases in the quantity of care and incomes of health care providers, while fewer workers and other Americans have good health care insurance or none at all, suggests that there is not one, but two, health care "crises" in the U.S. The first might be called a crisis of political legitimation. The present system is widely regarded as increasingly unfair and inefficient, particularly so given that the U.S. is the only major country without universal coverage, hence has to play "catch-up" with its industrial rivals. The system is financially so chaotic and organizationally so Byzantine, and so many people have no or poor insurance coverage (while 220 million Americans have health insurance, over 200 million are without full coverage), that a sitting President and the Congress have been seriously considering universal, comprehensive health care insurance (as well as a number of competing reform bills that would paper over the cracks in the system without seriously addressing the problems of inefficiency and equity). However, universal comprehensive coverage -- either the Clinton "package" or its rival, the single payer plan, or legislation that would combine elements from both with those of competing plans -- would be incredibly expensive without a fundamental reorganization of the industry's financing and delivery systems, an unlikely prospect.5 The second crisis may be termed a crisis of capital accumulation. The same financially and organizationally sick health care system has multiplied the costs of labor, and the costs of social consumption and social expenses (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid, respectively) even more so.6 The system is regarded in business circles as "too costly" given that the U.S. is the only major country that is presently restructuring its economic and social policy to favor exports over production for the domestic market, hence is playing catch-up not only in terms of political legitimation but also on the "competitiveness" front. In 1993, according to one survey, the average health insurance per worker paid by employers was about $3,800, an eight percent increase from 1992 (which, however, was less than the annual growth of employer health costs in the preceding five years). (The Department of Labor puts the growth of health benefit costs at a significantly lower rate.) In 1992, medical and medical-related benefits constituted over 25 percent of total benefits (and 10 percent of total payroll) paid out to employees by American business. Also, Federal government deficits have soared in large part because of increases in Medicare and Medicaid spending. The Clinton reform package and the single payer plan (as well as the patchwork plan that Congress is likely to finally pass into law) seek to solve both the legitimation and accumulation crises in a single stroke, which most Republicans and many Democrats regard as flatly impossible. Some observers believe that the solution to the legitimation crisis is more health care spending, better care, and a massive redistribution of facilities to oppressed minorities and the poor, and to preventative and family medicine and community clinics. The solution to the accumulation crisis is less (and even less equitably distributed) health care spending, and worse care. As social policy, health care reform would raise costs and spending; as economic policy, reform would lower costs and spending.7 2. The crisis of accumulation is especially acute today given the new conditions of world capital or the "new global economy." While Europe and Japan stagnate or suffer recession, the U.S. economy is changing from a Keynesian or Fordist economy which at one time maintained a rough balance between domestic production and consumption to an export-driven economy similar to Japan's since the mid-1970s and to those of many European countries.8 Exports in relation to GDP have grown from five percent in the 1970s to eleven percent today. The fundamental aim of the Clinton administration's economic policy team is to accelerate this shift from domestic to foreign markets -- in George Bush's words, to make the country an "export super-power." In a speech last December, Export-Import Bank Chair and CEO, Kenneth Brody, emphasized that the U.S. "would seek economic growth through exports." "The U.S. government," he said, "will act like a trading company and create an export mentality through the country." Trade Representative Mickey Kantor and Commerce Secretary Ron Brown reiterate that their job is to "aggressively expand exports." In the new global economy, "the economy, stupid!" translates into "exports, stupid!" Export-driven economies have to compete with the whole world. They are obsessed with cutting labor, energy, and raw material costs, improving product quality, and developing new products for the world market. Far from being guided by the mythical invisible hand of the "free market," export-led economies are driven by the strategies of huge transnational corporations and by neo-mercantilist governmental "industrial policy" and state and private financial policies that promote exports at the expense of production for domestic markets. The U.S. economy is no exception to this rule. The powers of the Federal government (and numerous State and local governments) are increasingly deployed to expand foreign sales of goods and services that depend on overseas markets for healthy profits. These include high tech equipment, business and financial services, foods and raw materials, artifacts of pop culture, upscale armaments, and large-scale passenger aircraft, to name the more important products, which also consist of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals in which U.S. companies presently control over one-half the world market. The Clinton administration has given every sign that its economic policy aims to first and foremost to help business to cut costs -- despite the fact that, according to Laura Tyson, head of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, the country already has achieved the lowest unit labor costs of all major industrial countries. The U.S. also remains the world leader in science, R&D, and new product development. Irrespective of low unit costs, as the country depends more on exports to deliver it from recessions and propel economic booms, American business will be forced to continue to revolutionize technology and the export product mix, develop more complex patterns of worldwide sourcing, and intensify labor to maintain and improve its competition position.9 The significance of these changes, which have created a kind of "hyper-capitalist" world, is plain to see. Even after twenty years of stagnating or lower real wages, speed-up, and longer hours of work, unemployment, and economic sacrifice, American workers can expect little respite or rest in the global economy of the late 1990s. This fact will all but guarantee that occupational health and safety conditions will deteriorate, environmental and stress diseases will rise, and other illnesses, accidents, and forms of violence associated with hard economic times and growing morbid forms of social life will multiply.10 3. One key to "seeking economic growth through exports" is to reduce the cost of wages -- the size, quality, and cost of producing the average consumption basket. Since health care is the second largest component of the consumption basket (housing is the first) and since health care spending has grown faster than any other major component (including housing), employers have been trying to reduce the costs of health care for their employees in a number of different ways. Perhaps the most important is the shift from traditional fee-for-service to managed health care plans, which enroll eight times as many people today compared with a decade or so ago. Ninety million Americans (most wage and salary workers and their dependents) are now enrolled in managed care plans which cost employers significantly less money than fee-for-service.11 Managed care plans such as California's Health Net do not give employers or insurance companies direct control of the labor of doctors and other health care personnel, but they do give them enormous indirect power over doctor fees, types of services offered, utilization rates, and so on -- the more so since the health insurance industry is becoming dominated by five giant companies, which themselves are purchasing true health maintenance organizations (HMOs, which put doctors on salary) at a rapid rate.12 In many States, for example, Blue Cross and Blue Shield have reduced payments to doctors and hospitals. Increased "efficiency" has also resulted in U.S. hospitals having lower admission rates for acute care patients and shorter lengths of stay than hospitals in other industrial countries. Employers have also reduced benefits for Medicare eligible retirees and little more than one-half offer benefits for employees who retire before they reach 65 years of age. Last but not least, more employers, particular small businesses, have cancelled health insurance for their workers altogether (more than two-thirds of uninsured workers are employed by businesses with less than 100 workers). Despite business's attempt to economize in these and other ways, health care spending has continued to expand much faster than GDP. A consensus thus has emerged within the political and economic classes that the system is in "crisis" and that "health care reform" is badly needed -- all the more so given that the U.S. is poised to exploit what business regards as the booming markets of Asia and Latin America, hence needs to create economic conditions at home favorable to American exports of goods and services. At the same time, the establishment has to try to legitimate any reform by restoring and expanding "access" to health care providers -- a contradictory undertaking, as has been noted. 4. The holy trinity of the Clinton administration's reform package (as well as the single payer plan) is "cost containment, access, and quality" (with "choice" thrown in for good measure). These goals or principles add up to "more of the same or better for less," a politician's promise if there ever was one (a fact made clear during Congressional debates on competing plans in the early spring, when everyone denounced everyone else's plans as "unfair," "inefficient," or pies in the sky). The key term for the Clinton administration and "New Democrats" is "cost containment." Last December, Robert Rubin, Chair of Clinton's National Economic Council, said that "health care is the President's most important economic initiative" (italic added). In March, according to Senator Phil Graham, "health care system [costs] represent a major competitive disadvantage of the United States." Other politicians have linked health care reform with American "competitiveness" in the world market. Their aim, first and foremost, is to reduce the cost of wages of employed workers, future workers (children and youth), and retired workers. Clinton's reformers have proposed an armory of policy weaponry to reduce costs, and Congressional sponsors of rival plans, chairs of various Committees and Sub-Committees seeking consensus, and individual members with their own axes to grind have followed suit. By April Fool's Day, the result was a health care reform jig saw puzzle without a picture on the cover of the box. Clinton's original proposal for health care "alliances" (compulsory health insurance purchasing cooperatives) went down in smoke in March. This despite the fact that large purchasing cooperatives are one way to make sure that insurers practice "community rating," or underwrite high risk populations. (The single payer plan would, in effect, prohibit competition among insurers to cover the healthy while abandoning the sick.) Clinton's concept of "managed competition" has been attacked from the right and the left -- even though its cost-conscious supporters argue that it would force insurers to compete for alliance business. (The single payer plan would largely eliminate private insurers from the health care industry.) There is an agreement between Clinton's people and single payer supporters that limits on insurance premiums or price controls and/or global health care budgets are needed (these are rejected out of hand by most Republicans and many Democrats). Community rating, limits on insurance premiums or price controls, and global budgets would all reduce the cost of wages (hence of capital). The former would end "cost shifting," which means that big employers and others which offer good coverage would no longer have to pay a higher premium for their workers' insurance in order to indirectly subsidize the uninsured and underinsured. Price controls would simply mandate lower insurance premiums (hence incomes of health care providers). Since most uninsured and underinsured workers labor for small business, community rating and price controls would shift health care costs from big to small capital, that is, from companies that export a relatively large share of their output to those which do not. Universal coverage per se would permit workers who don't change jobs because they are afraid of losing health insurance coverage to become more mobile and also give welfare recipients who don't want to lose Medicaid eligibility more incentives to seek work. The Clinton and single payer plans, therefore, would make the labor market more flexible or resilient. Also, as Labor Secretary Reich explained in March, the Clinton plan would also improve labor-management relations by "taking health benefits off the bargaining table." That this would be no small comfort to management is suggested by an anonymous union official who was quoted on C-SPAN late last year as saying that "health care reform achieves for the corporations what they couldn't and can't win at the bargaining table." The Clinton plan, single payer, and provisions of one or two rival plans would de-emphasize specialty medicine and strengthen primary care and preventative medicine. This would lower the costs of wages of future workers. Clinton would make sharp reductions in Medicare and Medicaid spending (the latter from its present annual growth rate of 20 percent to four percent by the turn of the century). This would cut the costs of health services of ex-workers and the poor. Other elements of the health care system that Clinton's experts (and those of rival plans) do not regard as cost-effective would be restructured or tinkered with. Whether Congress will support any or most of these particular measures, and how effective they would be in containing costs, is anybody's guess. The health care industry is so huge and the economic stakes for the "special interests" are so great that every important lobby and health care association in the country has entered the struggle for and against this or that aspect of Clinton's plan. Media campaigns generated an incredible volume of misinformation; members of Congress introduced new "compromise" bills every month or so; the Clinton team quickly shifted from the political offensive to the defensive. The First Lady and her husband concocted a complex and unwieldy package designed to please practically everyone. It appears that, in the last analysis, it will please no one. Thus, Congress is likely, finally, to produce "an emaciated...plan that will do more for the lobbies than those who need care."13 One safe conclusion is that to the degree the Clinton (or any) plan's cost containment features work, the result will be an increase in the average rate of profit on capital as a whole,14 and the availability of more money capital to private business directly and also indirectly through lower budget deficits and long-term interest rates, hence an improvement in the U.S.'s ability to compete in the world market. Industries that export a sizable share of their output will particularly benefit from lower labor costs and interest rates, first, because they are under more competitive pressure than industries that have the domestic market to themselves, and, second, because export-led industries are growing faster, hence have a greater need for capital, than other industries. 5. "Cost containment" without "improved access" would be quickly rejected by most Americans and members of Congress. The legitimacy of Clinton's government and the Democratic Congress rests in some large part on whether most voters regard health care reform as "fair." Unfortunately for both Clinton and single payer advocates, "most voters" include the millions of workers who are presently happy with their insurance coverage -- not just those without insurance or with limited coverage. Clinton (and the single payers) have thus taken the bold step of modeling a benefits package on the lines of elite Fortune 500 company plans. This would result in greater total health care spending and also more spending "per unit" of health care. In short, the Clinton package -- universal, comprehensive coverage via employer-mandated health insurance -- is quasi-New Deal legislation the likes of which haven't been seen since the booming 1960s (the single payer plan is pure New Deal legislation). Both the Clinton and the single payer plans would address the health care needs of over 38 million Americans who have no insurance, most of whom are among the 39 percent of workers employed by small business who are presently uninsured (a disproportionate number of whom are oppressed minorities and the working poor). Clinton would also expand coverage for workers and their families who are presently insured: 53 million more people for prescription drugs; 121 million more for dental care; 139 million for vision care; and 153 million for mental illness and substance abuse programs. Clinton's experts once believed that universal coverage would not only be politically acceptable (always a dubious premise) but also economically rational in the long-run. The idea is that a healthy work force, secure in the knowledge that medical care of high quality is available to all workers when and where they need it, would have a positive effect on labor productivity hence help the country compete better in the new global economy -- a questionable proposition given that universal and comprehensive coverage would cost a lot more money than the present health care system (unless, of course, effective price controls and global budgets are in place and enforced). The administration's reform package would require all employers to purchase health insurance for their workers and pay 80 percent of the insurance premium (up to a certain percentage of total payroll). (Single payer proposes a new payroll tax.) Small and medium-size employers have strongly opposed this scheme on the grounds that even with managed competition and alliances, unit labor costs would rise, not fall. Eighty-five percent of the members of the National Federation of Small Business polled late last year stated that they would cut wages or lay workers off if the Clinton plan became law. Some have predicted that employer-mandated insurance would also slow down the rate of formation of new small business. The attempt to place new cost burdens on small and middle business is one of the main contradictions of Clinton's proposal. It demonstrates just how beholden the President is to big business and the four or five insurance giants with the financial clout necessary to bargain effectively with Clinton's alliances. Despite his pledge to subsidize small business that could not absorb increased costs, it is probable that any employer- mandated system would eliminate many inefficient companies, prevent other businesses from starting up, lower money wages in the most competitive sectors of the economy, or lead to a deterioration of working conditions. Small businesses that survive would have to become more competitive, which is precisely the result that Clinton doubtless wishes to achieve. A policy dressed up as an exercise in political legitimation also looks suspiciously like a spur to increased economic efficiency and capital accumulation in the economy as a whole. 6. No one has satisfactorily explained how expanded and less costly health care will be paid for without a decline in the quality of services -- "quality" being the third leg of Clinton's and single payer's reform triad. Some argue that managed care would improve quality on the grounds that these systems make fewer mistakes in diagnostic work and treatment ("mistakes cost money," said one Clinton defender; presumably, they also cause pain and travail). At present, doctors who belong to some managed care organizations make more money the fewer referrals they make to specialists or other providers. Managed competition would intensify the labor of many medical personnel and also limit their incomes, which would lead many to work less or retire early (as did some Blue Cross doctors in Tennessee when Medicaid payments were cut). Improved and more equitable access would increase quality defined in global terms, but cost containment would have the opposite effect, except in so far as family and preventative medicine receive a much larger share of the health care dollar -- a political long shot. To the degree that specialty medicine and a lower rate of growth of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry are discouraged by cost containment schemes, new drugs and diagnostic, surgical, and other technologies which health planners do not regard as "cost effective" would be scarcer. Then there is the whole problem of the increase in illness and disease and accidents accompanying the further intensification of labor, and more virulent forms of social and environmental morbidity, that can be expected as the U.S. becomes a more hyper-competitive super-power. It is often said that the American health care system is grossly inefficient because the U.S. spends a higher proportion of its GDP for health care without obtaining significantly different morbidity rate than the country's main industrial rivals. This line of argument presupposes that the production of illness, disease, accidents, and so on in other countries is similar to that in the U.S. The facts seem to be, however, that American individualism and hyper-capitalism, labor mobility, workplace stress, racism and crime, environmental pollution, and morbid forms of social life generally produce more illness and injury than in other countries. The U.S. spends relatively more on health care with roughly the same results partly because the overall production of bad health is higher -- a fact obscured by simple comparisons between how much we spend and, for example, how long Americans live. This will become even more the case when Clinton and his successors are finished redefining the American economy as little more than a part -- albeit the largest part -- of global capitalism as a whole. The intensification of labor, growth of part-time and temporary work, home work, and so on will result in more injuries and spending on physical therapy, pain killers, and the like. The most common surgical procedure today is said to be to correct carpal tunnel syndrome, a workplace disorder. The demand for drugs such as Prozac will rise, as depression costs employers an estimated $23.8 billion annually in lower productivity and lost work time.15 Morbid forms of social life will multiply, with all attendant bad effects on personal and community safety and health. For these and other reasons, the demand for health care will probably rise at least as fast as the supply is restructured or increased. As we have noted, the rise in health care spending has been largely due to better quality services and an increase in the number of people receiving these services. (Waste, fraud, inefficiency, and "inappropriate services" are definitely problems, but if they are the primary culprits, there is no obvious way of eliminating them, short of planned medicine.) This means that inflation in health care spending is more apparent than real. Costs and prices are higher in some significant part because the product is better and more people use the product. We have also noted that health care spending has risen because it has been delinked from worker income (as conservative critics of Clinton's plan constantly harp on). Most who are sick, injured, disabled, chronically ill, or otherwise in need receive upscale treatment because they (and the health care industry) are subsidized by the rest of society. It is precisely this system of subsidies that Clinton's reform package seeks to rationalize. Employers pay for health insurance partly by passing costs forward to consumers in the form of higher prices, thus inhibiting exports, or backward as lower wages, hindering recruitment of top workers and technicians. The government pays for Medicare and Medicaid and health insurance for public employees by raising taxes and borrowing money, which keep savings lower and long-term interest rates higher than they would otherwise be. Since the majority of consumers are workers and since most individual income taxes are collected at the base rate -- that is, from working people -- wage and salary earners as a whole pay for the health care of private and public sector workers and the elderly and poor. In other words, health care subsidies to those in need largely come from "consumers" (workers in the supermarket and shopping mall) and "taxpayers" (workers in their roles as citizens). The present health care system thus amounts to a redistribution of income within the wage and salaried classes. It is as if the working class as a whole "decided" by ballot that good and improving health care services are more important than new cars and expensive vacations. Workers in their roles of consumers and taxpayers, in effect, want those in need -- oppressed minorities and the poor excepted to date -- to get the best health care possible. This sensibility is behind the popular support for those parts of the Clinton plan that would insure the uninsured and subsidize drugs and nursing home care for the aged. It is also why millions of people with good health insurance oppose Clinton's agenda to further redistribute income within the wage and salaried classes in order to increase access to equal care for minorities and the poor. The Clinton package (and the single payer plan) thus, in effect, seek an even more equal distribution of income within the wage and salary earning classes, broadly defined. 7. The problem for American capitalism is not that the present health care system works so poorly but that it works so well -- for those with good health insurance and access to the technological wonders of modern medicine. Most health care consumers, the vast majority wage and salary earners and their dependents, don't have to pay anything approaching full price for medical care.16 Hence they choose the best insurance plan available and see doctors, physical therapists, and other providers who insured workers believe will go out of their way to give them the best care, for example, make available the best technology and latest drugs. The effect is to drive up the cost of wages in the economy as a whole, at a time when American capital is trying to become even leaner and meaner. The position of the political right is that if health care insurance were individually-based (rather than employer-mandated) consumers would purchase less and cheaper insurance, simply out of economic necessity. In a purely market-driven system, the costs of health insurance would not fall on employers, the cost of wages would be lower, and U.S. exports would be more competitive.17 The right also believes that an individually-based system would provide incentives to the health care industry to become more efficient -- as consumers shop around for the best cheap plan (as many shoppers seek out the best cheap housing or clothing). The right has tried in the past without success to get its brand of health care reform into law. There is no reason to believe that "conservatives" will have better luck this time around. Liberals and the left have no chance of passing their single payer system. Nor can the original Clinton plan, as originally constructed, win anything like a majority in Congress. In late March, Congressional Democrat Pete Stark's compromise proposal seemed to have the best prospects.18 Clinton himself said at a press conference on March 24th that he would not veto the Stark plan, assuming Congress enacted it (a highly dubious proposition given the opposition of Congressional centrists and right wingers). In the final analysis, as with all consequential Federal domestic policy, neither capital nor labor, right nor left, will get what they want. Neither will big and small business, health insurers and physicians, nor workers with good insurance and those with no or poor insurance. When all the compromises are hammered out and deals are made, the Clinton government will have little more (if any) political legitimacy than it now enjoys and capital will still have to pay relatively high insurance premiums for worker health benefits. Unlike its main rivals, Japan and Germany, the U.S. political class is incapable of developing a socio-economic policy based on its perceived idea of the interests of capital as a whole. American individualism, interest group pluralism, and plain political and economic stupidity will sabotage any systematic effort to install good universal coverage or to reduce the cost of wages19 -- and the present political, social, and economic crisis of American capitalism will deepen. (April 1, 1994) * I am grateful to M. Edith Rasell, MD of the Economic Policy Institute for her criticisms of an earlier version of this article. 1A deep analysis of the rise of health care spending would focus on the economic and social causes of disease, illness, etc., and of the ways that they are treated, and the increasingly capitalistic structure of the health care industry. None of the reforms proposed in the late winter and spring of 1994 addressed the social causes of health, disease, and death, except in so far as personal behavior puts individuals at risk. But even smoking, bad diets, and lack of exercise have social, as well as individual, causes. The most radical reform proposal, the single payer bill, is largely silent on the production of health and disease, accidents, and the rest (although both the single payer and Clinton plans do call for some reallocation of resources in favor of preventative care). Single payer proponents seem to be concerned less with producing more health per se than with improving and equalizing access to health care by providing good comprehensive insurance coverage to everyone. 2According to a study by demographer David Hayes-Bautista, cited by Roberto Rodriguez and Patrisia Gonzales, Health Cares Big Losers, San Francisco Chronicle, March 31, 1994. 3Any health care reform worthy of the name, therefore, would massively reallocate diagnostic and other technologies, personnel, and other resources to the ghettos and barrios of American cities and towns, and to districts that are the homes of the working and non-working poor. 4The latter statistic is courtesy of Dr. Rasell, who also noted (communication, March 2, 1994) that Medicare rates are below the actual cost of services, which (in my opinion) means that government (i.e., taxpayer) subsidies to the elderly and poor are less than they would be if Medicare and Medicaid paid for full costs. 5Such a reorganization, for example, would result in greater subsidies from workers with good insurance packages to those without insurance as well as greater out-of-pocket expenditures by the former. According to Governor Mario Cuomo, the Clinton plan would force public workers in New York to join state health care alliances (giant purchasing cooperatives), which would almost certainly offer fewer benefits and require higher premiums that these workers presently receive and pay (New York Times, March 7, 1994). Thus, while workers and others presently without good health insurance politically support Clintons reforms (or the single payer plan), more public employees and others with good insurance do not. The problem of legitimation is thus displaced to those in the work force with health insurance that they are presently happy with, namely, most wage and salary earners. 6For definitions of social consumption and social expenses, see James OConnor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973), Chapters Five and Six. 7The alternative view of Dr. Pasell and others is that the inefficiency of the present health care system can be turned into a plus in the sense that financial and organizational rationalization would reduce the contradiction between the legitimation needs and accumulation imperatives to manageable proportions. For example, Dr. Pasell writes that up to one-third of medical tests and procedures may be unnecessary (Pasell, op. cit.). This argument may have much or little merit, depending on how one interprets unnecessary. In any case, its validity would seem to depend on evidence that inefficiencies have increased fast enough over time to explain most of the rise in total health care spending. There is no doubt that if doctors incomes were reduced, administrative waste eliminated, malpractice insurance reformed, duplication of facilities done away with, monopoly power in the health care sector broken up, and so on, and if thousands of non-profit community health care centers were heavily subsidized by the government, huge sums of money could be saved (exactly how much, no one can know). But these are big ifs given that the politics of the capitalist health care industry cannot be separated from its economics. The view presented here that quality improvements are arguably the key factor driving up health care spending presupposes the current politics and economics of the system. However, if all the inefficiencies you list were eliminated (which I regard as totally unrealistic given the nature of U.S. economy and society), I think I would change my tune (Communication to Dr. Pasell, March 15, 1994). 8A simple model of an export-driven economy is that the rate of accumulation in the home country depends on the rate of growth of its export surpluses with other countries (i.e., import surpluses in other countries). The latter, in turn, depend on the rate of growth of credit money available to finance import surpluses. This includes the inflow of foreign capital. For example, the export- driven Japanese economy in the 1970s and 1980s depended on the rapid growth of consumer, business, and Federal government credit in the U.S., which ran large import surpluses during this period. These import surpluses were financed by a combination of Japanese loans and the rapid expansion of domestic credit. 9When the Japanese shifted from a more balanced economy to an export-led economy during the mid-and-late 1970s, labor was continuously intensified, despite low unit labor costs. 10Therefore, whatever health care reform Congress ultimately enacts, it is likely that the demand for health care services will rise faster than increases in their supply with the effect of raising prices in the industry and building up more pressure for price controls in the future. Inflation in the industry will be intensified to the degree that reforms give more people access to better care, given that the supply of doctors, diagnostic machinery, etc., is relatively inelastic. Price inflation will be mitigated by the fact that there is significant excess supply of hospital beds and equipment in the industry; however, excess supply is to some unknown degree a problem of inequitable or irrational distribution of health care capacity. 11According to Robert Winters, Chairman and CEO of Prudential Life Insurance Company, managed care plans cost employers $700 less per worker than fee-for-service plans in which individuals are completely free to choose (and change) doctors, get second opinions, and so on. I note that Dr. Pasell disagrees with this judgement. 12Only 15.5 million people are enrolled in true HMOs today. It needs to be added that definitions of what HMOs in fact are widely differ; e.g., The Group Health Association of America, a trade group for HMOs, claims to have enrolled 45 million people. The managed health plans that enroll 90 million Americans (noted above) are thus defined in much looser terms. 13Amitai Etzione, How to Transform Society: The Health Care Example, Tikkun, 8, 6, 1994, p. 14. The same note is sounded in Victor Fuchs The Future of Health Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Few if any observers have pointed out that a contradiction exists not only between universal, comprehensive coverage, on the one hand, and cost reduction, on the other (broadly speaking, between labor and capital), but also between individual capitals (e.g., drug manufacturers) and States (or regions) (e.g., New York) and capital as a whole. For example, expanding family medicine at the expense of New Yorks teaching hospitals would reduce employment in the hospital industry, negatively impacting New Yorks economy. The Clinton plan was designed to reduce the cost of wages (capital) as a whole. Hence, at the start of his reform campaign, he attacked those fractions of capital with a big stake in the health care industry which were reluctant to go along with his plan. This strategy backfired when special interests came out against his reforms. Subsequently, Clinton lowered the sound level of his anti-special interest rhetoric. 14Dr. Rasell argues that, since health care costs are paid by workers through lower wages, cost containment may have the effect of increasing wages. However, health insurance costs are also shifted to consumers (which is one reason why Clinton wants to reform the system, as higher consumer prices adversely affect exports). Some costs are also absorbed by business. Perhaps more importantly, with current loose labor markets and weak unions, it is unlikely that workers will benefit in the form of higher money wages if health insurance costs business less money. 15Milton Freudenheim, The Drug Makers are Listening to Prozac, New York Times, January 4, 1994. 16Another reason for this is the estimated $75 billion tax subsidy for employer- paid health care, which means that consumers have less incentive to choose cost-effective health plans. 17The right plays down the fact that employers shift much or most of the health insurance costs to consumers. The conservatives plan also contains its own contradictions. One is that because consumers would purchase poorer quality insurance, the rate of growth of innovation in the health care industry would slow down, which would adversely affect profits and exports. Another is that, as a salve to their conscience, the right would subsidize those too poor to buy insurance, thus undermining the formers philosophy of responsibility, perhaps even inadvertently opening the way for new demands for subsidized housing and so on. 18The bill reported out of Starks House health subcommittee in late March would provide a smaller benefits package, replace Clintons compulsory alliances with voluntary health purchasing cooperatives, and double the population covered by Medicare (low-wage workers and the poor). Costs would be controlled by a national limit on health care spending (as under Clintons plan) and also by Medicare, which would enforce controls on prices that it would pay for hospital and doctors fees and drugs. 19James OConnor, Accumulation Crisis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), Chapter Seven.