Received: from relay1.UU.NET by css.itd.umich.edu (5.67/2.2) id AA15084; Mon, 4 Jan 93 07:48:14 -0500 Received: from uunet.uu.net (via LOCALHOST.UU.NET) by relay1.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA10399; Mon, 4 Jan 93 07:48:11 -0500 Received: from ccs.UUCP by uunet.uu.net with UUCP/RMAIL (queueing-rmail) id 074748.2604; Mon, 4 Jan 1993 07:47:48 EST Received: by ccs.covici.com (UUPC/extended 1.11x); Mon, 04 Jan 1993 03:49:13 est Date: Mon Jan 4 03:49:02 est 1993 From: "John Covici" Message-Id: <2b47fa0b.ccs@ccs.covici.com> Reply-To: "John Covici" Organization: Covici Computer Systems To: uunet!css.itd.umich.edu!pauls@uunet.UU.NET Subject: Unauthorized Biography of George Bush: Part 31 Status: O X-Status: {XXIV: The End of History} {``If the Emperor Tiberius--George Bush--is elected, this country will become a fascist state in the first year he is in office, I guarantee it.'' --Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., April 15, 1988 campaign speech in Buffalo, N.Y.} George Bush's inaugural address of January 21, 1989, was on the whole an eminently colorless and forgettable oration. The speech was for the most part a rehash of the tired demagogy of Bush's election campaign, with the ritual references to ``a thousand points of light'' and the hollow pledge that when it came to the drug inundation which Bush had supposedly been fighting for most of the decade, ``This scourge will stop.'' Bush talked of ``stewardship'' being passed on from one generation to another. There was almost nothing about the state of the U.S. economy. Bush was preoccupied with the ``divisiveness'' left over from the Vietnam era, and this he pledged to end in favor of a return to bipartisan consensus between the President and the Congress, since ``the statute of limitations has been reached. This is a fact: The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered by a memory.'' There is good reason to believe that Bush was already contemplating the new round of foreign military adventures which were not long in coming. The characteristic note of Bush's remarks came at the outset, in the passages in which he celebrated the triumph of the American variant of the bureaucratic-authoritarian police state, based on usury, which chooses to characterize itself as ``freedom'': ``We know what works: Freedom works. We know what's right: Freedom is right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on Earth--through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state. @s1 After the inauguration ceremonies at the Capitol were completed, George and Barbara Bush descended Pennsylvania Avenue toward the White House in a triumphant progress, getting out of their limousine every block or two to walk among the crowds and savor the ovations. George Bush, imperial administrator and bureaucrat, had now reached the apex of his career, the last station of the {cursus honorum}: the chief magistracy. Bush now assumed leadership of a Washington bureaucracy that was increasingly focused on itself and its own aspirations, convinced of its own omnipotence and infallibility, of its own manifest destiny to dominate the world. It was a heady moment, full of the stuff of megalomaniac delusion. Imperial Washington was now aware of the increasing symptoms of collapse in the Soviet Empire. The feared adversary of four decades of cold war was collapsing. Germany and Japan were formidable economic powers, but they were led by a generation of politicians which had been well schooled in the necessity of following Anglo-Saxon orders. France had abandoned her traditional Gaullist policy of independence and sovereignty, and had returned to the {suivisme} of the old Fourth Republic under Bush's freemasonic brother Francois Mitterrand. Opposition to Washington's imperial designs might still come from leading states of the developing sector, from India, Brazil, Iraq and Malaysia, but the imperial administrators, puffed up with their xenophobic contempt for the former colonials, were confident that these states could be easily defeated, and that the Third World would meekly succumb to the installation of Anglo-American puppet regimes in the way that the Philippines and so many Latin American countries had during the 1980s. Bush assembled a team of his fellow Malthusian bureaucrats and administrators from among those officials who had staffed Republican administrations going back to 1969, the year that Nixon chose Kissinger for the National Security Council. Persons like Scowcroft, James Baker, Carla Hills, and Bush himself had, with few exceptions, been in or around the federal government and especially the executive branch for most of two decades. All the great issues of policy had been solved under Nixon, Ford and Reagan; the geopolitical situation was being brought under control; all that remained was to consolidate and perfect the total administration of the world according to the policies and procedures already established, while delivering mass consensus through the same methods that had just proven unbeatable in the presidential campaign. The Bush team was convinced of its own inherent superiority to the Mandarin Chinese, the Roman and Byzantine, the Ottoman, the Austrian, the Prussian, the Soviet, and to all other bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that had ever existed on the planet. Pride goeth ever before a fall. The imperial functionaries of the Bush team had chosen to ignore certain gross facts, most importantly the demonstrable bankruptcy and insolvency of their own leading institutions of finance, credit and government. Their ability to command production and otherwise to act upon the material world was in sharp decline. How long would the American population remain in its state of stupefied passivity in the face of deteriorating standards of living that were now falling more rapidly than at any time in the last 20 years? And now, the speculative orgy of the 1980s would have to be paid for. Even their advantage over the crumbling Soviet empire was ultimately only a marginal, relative, and temporary one, due primarily to a faster rate of collapse on the Soviet side; but the day of reckoning for the Anglo-Americans was coming, too. This was the triumphalism that pervaded the opening weeks of the Bush administration. Bush gave more press conferences during the transition period than Reagan had given during most of his second term; he reveled in the accoutrements of his new office, and gave the White House press corps all the photo opportunities and interviews they wanted, to butter them up and get them in his pocket. These fatuous delusions of grandeur were duly projected upon the plane of the philosophy of history by an official of the Bush administration, Francis Fukuyama, the deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, the old haunt of Harrimanites like Paul Nitze and George Kennan. In the winter of 1989, during Bush's first hundred days in office, Fukuyama delivered a lecture to the Olin Foundation which was later published in {The National Interest} quarterly under the title of ``The End of History?''@s2 Imperial administrator Fukuyama had studied under the reactionary elitist Allan Bloom, and was conversant with the French neo-Enlightenment semiotic (or semi-idiotic) school of Derrida, Foucault and Roland Barthes, whose ``zero degree of writing'' Fukuyama may have been striving to attain. Above all, Fukuyama was a follower of Hegel in the interpretation of the French postwar neo-Hegelian Alexandre Kojeve. Fukuyama qualifies as the official ideologue of the Bush regime. His starting point is the ``unabashed victory of economic and social liberalism,'' meaning by that the economic and political system reaching its maturity under Bush--what the State Department usually calls ``democracy.'' ``The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.... The triumph of the Western political idea is complete. Its rivals have been routed.... Political theory, at least the part concerned with defining the good polity, is finished. The Western idea of governance has prevailed.... What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.'' According to Fukuyama, communism as an alternative system had been thoroughly discredited in the U.S.S.R., China, and the other communist countries. Since there are no other visible models contending for the right to shape the future, he concludes that the modern American state is the ``final, rational form of society and state.'' There are of course large areas of the world where governments and forms of society prevail which diverge radically from Fukuyama's Western model, but he answers this objection by explaining that backward, still historic parts of the world exist and will continue to exist for some time. It is just that they will never be able to present their forms of society as a credible model or alternative to ``liberalism.'' Since Fukuyama presumably knew something of what was in the Bush administration pipeline, he carefully kept the door open for new wars and military conflicts, especially among historical states, or between historical and post-historical powers. Both Panama and Iraq would, according to Fukuyama's typology, fall into the latter category. Thus, in the view of the early Bush administration, the planet would come to be dominated more and more by the ``universal homogenous state,'' a mixture of ``liberal democracy in the political sphere combined with easy access to VCRs and stereos in the economic.'' The arid banality of that definition is matched by Fukuyama's dazzling tribute to ``the spectacular abundance of advanced liberal economies and the infinitely diverse consumer culture.'' Fukuyama, it turns out, is a resident of the privileged enclave for imperial functionaries that is northeast Virginia, and so has little understanding of the scope of U.S. domestic poverty and immiseration: For Fukuyama, writing at a moment when American class divisions were more pronounced than at any time in human memory, ``the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisaged by Marx.'' As a purveyor of official doctrine for the Bush regime, Fukuyama is bound to ignore 20 years of increasing poverty and declining standards of living for all Americans which have caused an even greater retrogression for the minority population. It is not far from the End of History to Bush's later slogans of the New World Order and the imperial Pax Universalis. It is ironic but lawful that Bush should have chosen a neo-Hegelian as apologist for his regime. Hegel was the arch-obscurantist, philosophical dictator, and saboteur of the natural sciences; he was the ideologue of Metternich's Holy Alliance system of police states in the post-1815 oligarchic restoration in Europe imposed by the Congress of Vienna. When we mention Metternich, we have at once brought Bush's old patron Kissinger into play, since Metternich is well known as his ego ideal. Hegel deified the bureaucratic-authoritarian state machinery of which he was a part as the final embodiment of rationality in human affairs, beyond which it was impossible to go. Hegel told intellectuals to be reconciled with the world they found around them, and pronounced philosophy incapable of producing ideas for the reform of the world. The Bush regime thus took shape as a bureaucratic-authoritarian stewardship of the financial interests of Wall Street and the City of London. Many saw in the Bush team the patrician financiers of the Nelson Rockefeller administration that never was. The groups in society which were to be served were so narrowly restricted that the Bush administration often looked like a government that had totally separated itself from the underlying society and had constituted itself to govern in the interests of the bureaucracy itself. Since Bush was irrevocably committed to carrying forward the policies that had been consolidated and institutionalized during the previous eight years, the regime became more and more rigid and inflexible. Active opposition, or even the dislocations occasioned by administration policies were therefore dealt with by the repressive means of the police state. The Bush regime could not govern, but it could indict, and the Discrediting Committee was always ready to vilify. Some observers spoke of a new form of Bonapartism {sui generis,} but the most accurate description for the Bush combination was the ``administrative fascism'' coined by political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche, who was thrown in jail just seven days after the Bush inauguration. The Bush Cabinet Bush's cabinet reflected several sets of optimizing criteria: The best way to attain a top cabinet post was to belong to a family that had been allied with the Bush-Walker clan over a period of at least half a century, and to have served as a functionary or fundraiser for the Bush campaign. This applied to Secretary of State James Baker III, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher, and Bush's White House counsel and top political adviser, C. Boyden Gray. A second royal road to high office was to have been an officer of Kissinger Associates, the international consulting firm set up by Bush's lifelong patron, Henry Kissinger. In this category we find Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the former chief of the Kiss. Ass. Washington office, and Lawrence Eagleburger, the dissipated wreck who was named to the number two post in the State Department, Undersecretary of State. Eagleburger had been the president of Kissinger Associates. The ambassadorial (or proconsul) list was also rife with Kissingerian pedigrees: a prominent one was John Negroponte, Bush's ambassador to Mexico. Overlapping with this last group were the veterans of the 1974-77 Ford administration. National Security Council Director Brent Scowcroft, for example, was simply returning to the job that he had held under Ford as Kissinger's alter ego inside the White House. Dick Cheney, who eventually became secretary of defense, had been Ford's White House chief of staff. Cheney had been executive assistant to the director of Nixon's Office of Economic Opportunity way back in 1969. In 1971, he had joined Nixon's White House staff as Don Rumsfeld's deputy. >From 1971 to 1973, Cheney was at the Cost of Living Council, working as an enforcer for the infamous Phase II wage freeze in Nixon's ``Economic Stabilization Program.'' The charming Carla Hills, who became Bush's trade representative, had been Ford's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. William Seidman and James Baker (and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, a Reagan holdover who was the chairman of Ford's Council of Economic Advisers) had also been in the picture under Gerry Ford. Bush also extended largesse to those who had assisted him in the election campaign just concluded. At the top of this list was Governor John Sununu of New Hampshire, who would have qualified as the modern Nostradamus for his exact prediction of Bush's 9 percent margin of victory over Dole in the New Hampshire primary--unless he had helped to arrange it with vote fraud. Another way to carry off a top plum in the Bush regime was to have participated in the coverup of the Iran-Contra scandal. The leading role in that coverup had been assumed by Reagan's own blue ribbon commission of notables, the Tower Commission, which carried out the White House's own in-house review of what had allegedly gone wrong, and had scapegoated Don Regan for a series of misdeeds that actually belonged at the doorstep of George Bush. The members of that board were former GOP Senator John Tower of Texas, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, and former Sen. Edmund Muskie, who had been secretary of state for Carter after the resignation of Cyrus Vance. Scowcroft, who shows up under many headings, was ensconced at the NSC. Bush's original candidate for secretary of defense was John Tower, who had been the point man of the 1986-87 coverup of Iran-Contra during the months before the congressional investigating committees formally got into the act. Tower's nomination was rejected by the Senate after he was accused of being drunken and promiscuous by Paul Weyrich, a Buckleyite activist, and others. Some observers thought that the Tower nomination had been deliberately torpedoed by Bush's own discrediting committee so as to avoid the presence of a top cabinet officer with the ability to blackmail Bush. Perhaps Tower had overplayed his hand. In any case, Dick Cheney, a Wyoming congressman with strong intelligence community connections, was speedily nominated and confirmed after Tower had been shot down. Another Iran-Contra veteran in line to get a reward was Bush's former national security adviser, Don Gregg, who had served Bush since at least the time of the 1976 Koreagate scandal. Gregg, as we have seen, was more than willing to commit the most maladroit and blatant perjury in order to save his boss from the wolves (see Chapter 17). Later, when William Webster retired as director of the CIA, there were persistent rumors that the hyperthyroid Bush had originally demanded that Don Gregg be nominated to take his place. According to these reports, it required all the energy of Bush's handlers to convince the President that Gregg was too dirty to pass confirmation; Bush relented, but then announced to his dismayed and exhausted staff that his second and non-negotiable choice for Langley was Robert Gates, the former CIA Deputy Director who had been working as Scowcroft's number two at the National Security Council. As it turned out, the Bush Democrats in the Senate proved more than willing to approve Gates. The Dismal Hundred Days Bush's first 100 days in office fulfilled Fukuyama's prophecy that the End of History would be ``a very sad time.'' If ``post-history'' meant that very little was accomplished, Bush filled the bill. Three weeks after his inauguration, Bush addressed a joint session of the Congress on certain changes that he had proposed in Reagan's last budget. The litany was hollow and predictable: Bush wanted to be the Education President, but was willing to spend less than a billion dollars of new money in order to do it. He froze the U.S. military budget, and announced a review of the previous policy toward the Soviet Union. This last point meant that Bush wanted to wait to see how fast the Soviets would in fact collapse before he would even discuss trade normalization, which had been the perspective held out to Moscow by Reagan and others. Bush said he wanted to join with Drug Czar William Bennett in ``leading the charge'' in the war on drugs. Bush also wanted to be the Environmental President. This was a far more serious aspiration. Shortly after the election, Bush had attended the gala centennial awards dinner of the very oligarchical National Geographic Society, for many years a personal fiefdom of the feudal-minded Grosvenor family. Bush promised the audience that night that there was ``one issue my administration is going to address, and I'm talking about the environment.'' Bush confided that he had been coordinating his plans with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and that he had agreed with her on the necessity for ``international cooperation'' on green issues. ``We will support you,'' intoned Gilbert Grosvenor, a fellow Yale alumnus, ``... Planet Earth is at risk.''@s6 In order to be the Environmental President, Bush was willing to propose a disastrous Clean Air Act that would drain the economy of hundreds of billions of dollars over time in the name of fighting acid rain. Bush's first hundred days coincided with the notable phenomenon of the ``greening'' of Margaret Thatcher, who had previously denounced environmentalists as ``the enemy within,'' and fellow travelers of the British Labour Party and the loonie left. Thatcher's resident ideologue, Nicholas Ridley, had referred to the green movement in Britain as ``pseudo-Marxists.'' But in the early months of 1989, allegedly under the guidance of Sir Crispin Tickell, the British ambassador to the United Nations, Thatcher embraced the orthodoxy that the erosion of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect and acid rain--every one of them a pseudo-scientific hoax--were indeed at the top of the list of the urgent problems of the human species. Thatcher's acceptance of the green orthodoxy permitted the swift establishment of a total environmentalist-Malthusian consensus in the European Community, the Group of 7 and other key international forums. Characteristically, Bush followed Thatcher's lead, as he would on so many other issues. During the first 100 days, Bush called for the elimination of all chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by the end of the century, thus accepting the position assumed by the European Community as a result of Mrs. Thatcher's turning green. Bush told the National Academy of Sciences that new ``scientific advancements'' had permitted the identification of a serious threat to the ozone layer; Bush stressed the need to ``reduce CFCs that deplete our precious upper atmospheric resources.'' A treaty had been signed in Montreal in 1987 that called for cutting the production of CFCs by one half within a ten-year period. ``But recent studies indicate that this 50 percent reduction may not be enough,'' Bush now opined. Senator Albert Gore, Jr. of Tennessee was calling for complete elimination of CFCs within five years. Here a pattern emerged that was to be repeated frequently during the Bush years: Bush would make sweeping concessions to the environmentalist Luddites, but would then be denounced by them for measures that were insufficiently radical. This would be the case when Bush's Clean Air Bill was going through the Congress during the summer of 1990. After Bush's appearance before the Congress with his revised budget, the new regime exploited the honeymoon to seal a sweetheart contract with the rubber-stamp congressional Democrats, who under no circumstances could be confused with an opposition. The de facto one-party state was alive and well, personified by milquetoast Senator George Mitchell of Maine, the Democrats' majority leader. The collusion between Bush and the Democratic leadership involved new sleight of hand in order to meet the deficit-reduction targets stipulated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law. This involved mobilizing more than $100 billion from surpluses in the Social Security, highway and other special trust funds which had not previously been counted. The Democrats also went along with a $28 billion package of asset sales, financing tricks, and unspecified new revenues. They also bought Bush's rosy economic forecast of higher economic growth and lower interest rates. Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, accepting his pathetic rubber-stamp role, commented only that ``much sterner measures will be required in the future.'' Since the Democrats were incapable of proposing an economic recovery program in order to deal with the depression, they were condemned to give Bush what he wanted. This particular swindle would come back to haunt all concerned, but not before the spectacular budget debacle of October 1990. In the spring of 1990, according to an estimate by Sid Taylor of the National Taxpayers' Union, the total potential liabilities of the federal government exceeded $14 trillion. At that point, the official national debt totaled $2.8 trillion, but this estimate included the commitments of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, and other agencies. Bush's inability to pull his regime together for a serious round of domestic austerity was not appreciated by the crowd at the Bank for International Settlements in Geneva. Evelyn Rothschild's London {Economist} summed up the international banking view of George's temporizing on this score with its headline, ``Bush Bumbles.'' A few weeks into the new administration, it was the collapse of the FSLIC, studiously ignored by the waning Reagan administration, that reached critical mass. On February 6, 1989, Bush announced measures that his image-mongers billed as the most sweeping and significant piece of financial legislation since the creation of the Federal Reserve Board on the eve of World War I. This was the savings and loan bailout, a new orgy in the monetization of debt and a giant step toward the consolidation of a neo-fascist corporate state. At the heart of Bush's policy was his refusal to acknowledge the existence of an economic crisis of colossal proportions, which had among its symptoms the gathering collapse of the real estate market after the stock market crash of October 1987. The sequence of a stock market panic, followed by a real estate and banking crisis, closely followed the sequence of the Great Depression of the 1930s. But Bush violently rejected the existence of such a crisis, and was grimly determined to push on with more of the same. This meant that the federal government would simply take control of the savings banks, the majority of which were bankrupt or imminently bankrupt. The depositors might get their money, but the result would be the debasement of the currency and a deepening depression all around. In the process, the U.S. government would become one of the main owners of real estate, buildings, and the worthless junk bonds that had been spewed out by Bush's friend Henry Kravis and his partner Michael Milken during the heady days of the boom. The federal government would create a new world of bonded debt to pay for the savings banks that would be seized. When Bush announced his bailout that February, he stated that $40 billion had already been poured into the S&L sinkhole, and that he proposed to issue an additional $50 billion in new bonds through a financing corporation, a subsidiary of the new Resolution Trust Corporation. By August 1989, when Bush's legislation had been passed, the estimated cost of the S&L bailout had increased to $164 billion over a period of ten years, with $20 billion of that scheduled to be spent by the end of September 1989. Within a few months, Bush was forced to increase his estimates once again. ``It's a whale of a mess, and we'll see where we go,'' Bush told a group of newspaper editorial writers at the White House in mid-December. ``We've had this one refinancing. I am told that that might not be enough.'' By this time, academic experts were suggesting that the bailout might exceed the administration's $164 billion by as much as $100 billion more. Every new estimate was swiftly overtaken by the ghastly spectacle of a real estate market in free fall, with no bottom in sight. The growing public awareness of this situation, compounded by the ongoing bankruptcy of the commercial banking system as well, would lead in July 1990 to a very ugly public relations crisis for the Bush regime around the role of the President's son Neil Bush, in the insolvency of the Silverado Savings and Loan of Denver, Colorado. One of the obvious reasons for Bush's enthusiastic choice of war in the Persian Gulf was the need to get Neil Bush off the front page. But even the Gulf war bought no respite in the collapse of the real estate markets and the chain-reaction bankruptcies of the savings banks: By the summer of 1991, federal regulators were seizing S&Ls at the rate of just under one every business day, and the estimates of the total price tag of the bailout had ballooned to over $500 billion, with every certainty that this figure would also be surpassed.@s7 The carnage among the S&Ls did not prevent Bush from seeking an increase in the U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund, the main agency of a world austerity that claims upwards of 50 million human lives each year as the needless victims of its Malthusian conditionalities. The members of the IMF had been debating an increase in the funds each member must pay into the IMF (which has been bankrupt for years as a matter of reality), with Managing Director Michel Camdessus proposing a 100 percent increase, and Britain and Saudi Arabia arguing for a much smaller 25 percent hike. Bush attempted to mediate and resolve the dispute with a proposal for a 35 percent increase, equal to an $8 billion additional payment by the U.S. This sum was equal to more than three times the yearly expenditure for the highly successful Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, savagely cut during Bush's first year, which attempted to provide a high-protein and balanced food supplement to mothers and their offspring.@s8 As the depression deepened, Bush had only one idea: to reduce the capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 15 percent. This was a proposal for a direct public subsidy to the vulture legions of Kravis, Liedtke, Pickens, Milken, Brady, Mosbacher, and the rest of Bush's apostles of greed. The Bushmen estimated that a capital gains tax reduction in this magnitude would cost the Treasury some $25 billion in lost receipts over six years, a crass underestimate. These funds, argued the Bushmen, would then be invested in high-tech plant and equipment, creating new jobs and new production. In reality, the funds would have flowed into bigger and better leveraged buyouts, which were still being attempted after the crash of the junk bond market with the failure of the United Airlines buyout in October 1989. But Bush had no serious interest in, or even awareness of, commodity production. His policies had now brought the country to the brink of a financial panic in which 75 percent of the current prices of all stocks, bonds, debentures, mortgages, and other financial paper would be wiped out. If there was a constant note in Bush's first year in office, it was a callously flaunted contempt for the misery of the American people. During the spring of 1989, the Congress passed a bill that would have raised the minimum wage in interstate commerce from $3.55 per hour to $4.55 per hour by a series of increments over three years. This legislation would even have permitted a subminimum wage that could be paid to certain newly hired workers over a 60-day training period. Bush vetoed this measure because the $4.55 minimum wage was 30 cents an hour higher than he wanted, and because he demanded a subminimum wage for all new employees for the first six months on the job, regardless of their previous experience or training. On June 14, 1989, the House of Representatives failed to override this veto, by a margin of 37 votes. (Later, Bush signed legislation to raise the minimum wage to $4.25 per hour over two years, with a subminimum training wage applicable only to teenagers and only during the first 90 days of the teenagers' employment, with the possibility of a second 90-day training wage stint if they moved on to a different employer.)@s9 This was the same George Bush who had proposed $164 billion for bankrupt S&Ls, and $8 billion for the International Monetary Fund, all without batting an eye. This is also the George Bush who, customarily during holiday periods, joins his millionaire crony William Stamps (``Auschwitz'') Farish III at his Lazy F Ranch near Beeville, Texas, for the two men's traditional holiday quail hunt. This is the same William Stamps Farish III whose grandfather, the president of Standard Oil of New Jersey, had financed Heinrich Himmler. William Stamps Farish III's investment bank in Houston, W.S. Farish & Co., had at one time managed the blind trust into which Bush had placed his personal investment portfolio. Farish was rich enough to vaunt five addresses: Beeville, Texas; Lane's End Farm in the Versailles, Kentucky bluegrass; Florida, and two others. Farish's hobby for the past several decades has been the creation of his own top-flight farm for the raising of thoroughbred horses, the 3,000-acre Lazy F Ranch, with its ten horse barns and four sumptuous residences. Over the years, Farish has saddled winners in the 1972 Preakness and the 1987 Belmont Stakes, and bred 80 stakes winners over the past decade. Farish, who is married to Sarah Sharp, the daughter of a Du Pont heiress, had worked with Bush as an aide during the 1964 Senate campaign. Farish III is rich enough to extend his largesse even to Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom, probably the richest individual in the world. The queen regularly visits Farish's horse farm, traveling by Royal Air Force jetliner to the Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky, accompanied by mares which Her Majesty wishes to breed with Farish's million-dollar prize stallions. Farish magnanimously waives the usual stud fees for the queen, resulting in an estimated savings to Her Majesty of some $800,000. Smear, Scandal and Sanctions For George Bush, the exercise of power has always been inseparable from the use of smear, scandal, and the final sanctions of police-state methods against political rivals and other branches of government. A classic example was the Koreagate scandal of 1976, unleashed with the help of Bush's long-time retainer, Don Gregg. It will be recalled that Koreagate included the toppling of Democratic Speaker of the House Carl Albert of Oklahoma, who quietly retired from the House at the end of 1976. That was in the year when Bush had returned from Beijing to Langley. Was it merely coincidence that, in the first year of Bush's tenure in the White House, not just the Democratic Speaker of the House, but also the House Majority Whip, were driven from office? The campaign against Speaker of the House Jim Wright was spearheaded by Georgia Republican Congressman Newt Gingrich, a typical ``wedge issue'' ideologue of the GOP's Southern Strategy. Gingrich's campaign against Wright could never have succeeded without systematic support from the news media, who regularly trumpeted his charges and lent him a wholly undeserved importance. Gingrich's pretext was a story about the financing of a small book in which Wright had collected some of his old speeches, which Gingrich claimed had been sold to lobbyists in such a way as to constitute an unreported gift in violation of the House rules. One of Gingrich's first steps when he launched the assault on Wright during 1988 was to send letters to Bush and to Assistant Attorney General William Weld, whose family investment bank, White Weld, had purchased Uncle Herbie Walker's G.H. Walker & Co. brokerage when Bush's favorite uncle was ready to retire. Newt Gingrich wrote: ``May I suggest, the next time the news media asks about corruption in the White House, you ask them about corruption in the Speaker's office?'' A similar letter went out from the ``Conservative Campaign Fund'' to all GOP House candidates with the message: ``We write to encourage you to make ... House Speaker Jim Wright a major issue in your campaign.''@s1@s1 Bush placed himself in the vanguard of this campaign. When Bush, in the midst of his presidential campaign, was asked by reporters about the investigation of Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese (no friend of Bush) concerning his dealings with the Wedtech Corporation, he replied: ``You talk about Ed Meese. How about talking about what Common Cause raised against the Speaker the other day? Are they going to go for an independent counsel so the nation will have this full investigation? Why don't people call out for that? I will right now. I think they ought to.''@s1@s2 Reagan followed Bush's lead in calling for Wright to be investigated. In January-February 1989, the House took under consideration a pay increase for members. Both Reagan and Bush had endorsed such a pay increase, but Lee Atwater, now installed at the Republican National Committee, launched a series of mailings and public statements to make the pay increase into a new wedge issue. It was a brilliant success, with the help of a few old Prescott Bush strings pulled on key talk show hosts across the country. Bush accomplished the coup of thoroughly destabilizing the Congress at the outset of his tenure. Jim Wright was hounded out of office and into retirement a few months later, followed by Tony Coelho, the Democratic Whip. What remained was the meek Tom Foley, a pliable rubber stamp, and Richard Gephardt, who briefly got in trouble with Bush during 1989, but who found his way to a deal with Bush that allowed him to rubber-stamp Bush's ``fast track'' formula for the free trade zone with Mexico, which effectively killed any hope of resistance to that measure. The fall of Jim Wright was a decisive step in the domestication of the Congress by the Bush regime. Bush was also able to rely on an extensive swamp of ``Bush Democrats'' who would support his proposals under virtually all circumstances. The basis of this phenomenon was the obvious fact that the national leadership of the Democratic Party had long been a gang of Harrimanites. The Brown Brothers Harriman grip on the Democratic Party had been represented by W. Averell Harriman until his death, and after that was carried on by his widow, Pamela Churchill Harriman, the former wife of Sir Winston Churchill's alcoholic son, Randolph. The very extensive Meyer Lansky/Anti-Defamation League networks among the Democrats were oriented toward cooperation with Bush, sometimes directly, and sometimes through the orchestration of gang vs. countergang charades for the manipulation of public opinion. A special source of Bush strength among southern Democrats is the cooperation between Skull and Bones and southern jurisdiction freemasons in the tradition of the infamous Albert Pike. These southern jurisdiction freemasonic networks have been most obviously decisive in the Senate, where a group of southern Democratic senators has routinely joined with Bush to block overrides of Bush's many vetoes, or to provide a pro-Bush majority on key votes like the Gulf war resolution. Bush's style in the Oval Office was described during this period as ``extremely secretive.'' Many members of Bush's staff felt that the President had his own long-term plans, but refused to discuss them with his own top White House personnel. During Bush's first year, the White House was described as ``a tomb,'' without the usual dense barrage of leaks, counter-leaks, trial balloons, and signals which government insiders customarily employ to influence public debate on policy matters. Bush is said to employ a ``need to know'' approach even with his closest White House collaborators, keeping each one of them in the dark about what the others are doing. Aides have complained of their inability to keep up with Bush's phone calls when he goes into his famous ``speed-dialing mode,'' in which he can contact dozens of politicians, bankers or world leaders within a couple of hours. Unauthorized passages of information from one office to another inside the White House constitute leaks in Bush's opinion, and he has been at pains to suppress them. When information was given to the press about a planned meeting with Gorbachov, Bush threatened his top-level advisers: ``If we cannot maintain proper secrecy with this group, we will cut the circle down.'' Bush routinely humiliates and mortifies his subordinates. This recalls his style in dealing with the numerous hapless servants and domestics who populated his patrician youth; it may also have been reinforced by the characteristic style of Henry Kissinger. If advisers or staff dare to manifest disagreement, the typical Bush retort is a whining ``If you're so damned smart, why are you doing what you're doing and I'm the President of the United States?''@s1@s3 In one sense, Bush's style reflects his desire to seem ``absolute and autocratic'' in the tradition of the Romanov czars and other Byzantine rulers. He refuses to be advised or dissuaded on many issues, relying on his enraged, hyperthyroid intuitions. More profoundly, Bush's ``absolute and autocratic'' act is a cover for the fact that many of his initiatives, ideas and policies came from outside of the U.S. government, since they originated in the rarefied ether of those international finance circles where names like Harriman, Kravis, and Gammell are the coin of the realm. Indeed, many of Bush's policies come from outside of the United States altogether, deriving from the oligarchical financial circles of the City of London. The classic case is the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. When the documents on the Bush administration are finally thrown open to the public, it is a safe bet that some top British financiers and Foreign Office types will be found to have combined remarkable access and power with a non-existent public profile. Notes for Chapter XXIV 1. {Washington Post,} Jan. 21, 1991. 2. For Fukuyama's ``End of History,'' see {The National Interest,} Summer 1989, and Henry Allen, ``The End. Or Is It?'' {Washington Post,} Sept. 27, 1989. 6. ``Bush's Earthly Pursuits,'' {Washington Post,} Nov. 18, 1988. 7. See the transcript of Bush's statement and news conference, {Washington Post,} Feb. 7, 1989; ``With Signs and Ceremony, S&L Bailout Begins,'' {Washington Post,} Aug. 10, 1989; and ``Bush: S&Ls May Need More Help,'' {Washington Post,} Dec. 12, 1989. 8. ``Bush Backs Increase in IMF Funds,'' {Washington Post,} Nov. 23, 1989. 9. See House Democratic Study Group, Special Report No. 101-45, ``Legislation Vetoed by the President,'' p. 83. 11. John M. Barry, {The Ambition and the Power} (New York: Viking Press, 1989) pp. 621-22. 12. {Ibid.} 13. ``Bush: The Secret Presidency,'' {Newsweek,} Jan. 1, 1990. ---- John Covici covici@ccs.covici.com