Date: Mon Jan  4 03:43:14 est 1993
From: "John Covici" <covici@ccs.covici.com>
Message-Id: <2b47f8b5.ccs@ccs.covici.com>
Reply-To: "John Covici" <covici@ccs.covici.com>
Organization: Covici Computer Systems
To: uunet!css.itd.umich.edu!pauls@uunet.UU.NET
Subject: Unauthorized Biography of George Bush: Part 18
Status: O


CHAPTER 13 

CHAIRMAN GEORGE IN WATERGATE 


Why should Bush be so
distraught over the release to the
press of the transcript of the
notorious White House meeting of June
23, 1972? As we have seen, there is
plenty of evidence that the final fall
of Nixon was just the denouement that
Bush wanted. The answer is that Bush
was upset about the fabulous ``smoking
gun'' tape because his friend
Mosbacher, his business partner Bill
Liedtke, and himself were referred to
in the most sensitive passages. Yes, a
generation of Americans has grown up
recalling something about a ``smoking
gun'' tape, but not many now recall
that when Nixon referred to ``the
Texans,'' he meant George Bush. 
   The open secret of the ``smoking
gun'' tape is that it refers to Nixon's
desire to mobilize the CIA to halt the
FBI investigation of the Watergate
burglars on the grounds that money can
be traced from donors in Texas and
elsewhere to the coffers of the CREEP,
and thence to the pockets of Bernard
Barker and the other Cubans arrested.
The money referred to, of course, is
part of Bill Liedtke's $700,000
discussed above. A first crucial
passage of the ``smoking gun'' tape
goes as follows, with the first speaker
being Haldeman: 
   ``H: Now, on the
investigation, you know the Democratic
break-in thing, we're back in the
problem area because the FBI is not
under control, because [FBI chief] Gray
doesn't exactly know how to control it
and they have--their investigation is
leading into some productive areas
because they've been able to trace the
money--not through the money
itself--but through the bank
sources--the banker. And, and it goes
in some directions we don't want it to
go. Ah, also there have been some
things--like an informant came in off
the street to the FBI in Miami who was
a photographer or has a friend who was
a photographer who developed some films
through this guy Barker and the films
had pictures of Democratic National
Committee letterhead documents and
things. So it's things like that that
are filtering in. Mitchell came up with
yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very
carefully last night and concludes,
concurs now with Mitchell's
recommendation that the only way to
solve this, and we're set up
beautifully to do it, ah, in that and
that--the only network that paid any
attention to it last night was
NBC--they did a massive story on the
Cuban thing. 
   ``P: [Nixon] That's right. 
   ``H: That the way to handle this now
is for us to have [CIA Deputy Director
Vernon] Walters call Pat Gray and just
say `Stay the hell out of this--this
is ah, business here we don't want you
to go any further on it.' That's not an
unusal development, and ah, that would
take care of it. 
   ``P: What about Pat Gray--you mean
Pat Gray doesn't want to? 
   ``H: Pat does want to. He doesn't
know how to, and he doesn't have, he
doesn't have any basis for doing it.
Given this, he will then have the
basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and the
two of them--and Mark Felt wants to
cooperate because he's ambitious-- 
   ``P: Yeah 
   ``H: He'll call him in and say,
`We've got the signal from across the
river to put the hold on this.' And
that will fit rather well because the
FBI agents who are working the case, at
this point, feel that's what it is. 
   ``P: This is CIA? They've traced the
money? Who'd they trace it to? 
   ``H: Well they've traced it to a
name, but they haven't gotten to the
guy yet. 
   ``P: Would it be somebody here? 
   ``H: Ken Dahlberg. 
   ``P: Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg? 
   ``H: He gave $25,000 in Minnesota
and, ah, the check went directly to
this guy Barker. 
   ``P: It isn't from the committee
though, from Stans? 
   ``H: Yeah. It is. It's directly
traceable and there's some more through
some Texas people that went to the
Mexican bank which can also be traced
to the Mexican bank--they'll get their
names today. And (pause) 
   ``P: Well, I mean, there's no
way--I'm just thinking if they don't
cooperate, what do they say? That they
were approached by the Cubans. That's
what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans
too, that they-- 
   ``H: Well, if they will. But then
we're relying on more and more people
all the time. That's the problem, and
they'll stop if we could take this
other route. 
   ``P: All right. 
   ``H: And you seem to think the thing
to do is get them to stop? 
   ``P: Right, fine.''
   Kenneth Dahlberg was a front man
for Dwayne Andreas of Archer Daniels
Midland. Nixon wanted to protect
himself, of course, but there is no
doubt that he is talking about Liedtke,
Pennzoil, Robert Mosbacher--his
Bush-league Texas money-raising squad.
With that comment, Nixon had dug his
own grave with what was widely viewed
as a {prima facie} case of obstruction
of justice when this tape was released
on August 5. But Nixon and Haldeman had
a few other interesting things to say
to each other that day, several of
which evoke associations redolent of
Bush. 
   Shortly after the excerpts
provided above, Nixon himself sums up
why the CIA ought to have its own
interest in putting a lid on the
Watergate affair: 
   ``P: Of course, this Hunt
.. will uncover a lot of things. You
open that scab there's a hell of a lot
of things and we just feel that it
would be very detrimental to have this
thing go any further. This involves
these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of
hanky-panky that we have nothing to do
with ourselves. Well what the hell, did
Mitchell know about this? 
   ``H: I think so. I don't think he
knew the details, but I think he knew. 
   ``P: He didn't know how it was going
to be handled through--with Dahlberg
and the Texans and so forth? Well who
was the asshole that did? Is it Liddy?
Is that the fellow? He must be a little
nuts!'' 
   Shortly after this, the
conversation turned to Bus Mosbacher,
who was resigning as the chief of
protocol. Nixon joked that while
Mosbacher was escorting the visiting
dignitaries, bachelor Henry Kissinger
always ended up escorting Mosbacher's
wife. But before too long Nixon was
back to the CIA again: 
   ``P: When you get in--when you get
in (unintelligible) people, say, ``Look
the whole problem is that this will
open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs
thing and the President just feels that
ah, without going into the
details--don't, don't lie to them to
the extent to say there is no
involvement, but just say this is a
comedy of errors, without getting into
it, the President believes that it is
going to open the whole Bay of Pigs
thing up again. And, ah, because these
people are plugging for
(unintelligible) and that they should
call the FBI in and (unintelligible)
don't go any further into this case
period! (inaudible) our cause.'' 
   It would also appear that Nixon's
references to Howard Hunt and the Bay
of Pigs are an oblique allusion to the
Kennedy assassination, about which
Nixon may have known more than he has
ever told. Later the same day Haldeman
reported back to Nixon about his
meeting with Walters: 
   ``H: Well, it was kind of
interesting. Walters made the point and
I didn't mention Hunt. I just said that
the thing was leading into directions
that were going to create potential
problems because they were exploring
leads that led back into areas that
would be harmful to the CIA and harmful
to the government (unintelligible)
didn't have anything to do
(unintelligible).''
   Later, Haldeman returned to this
same theme: 
   ``H: Gray called Helms and
said I think we've run right into the
middle of a CIA covert operation. 
   ``P: Gray said that? 
   ``H: Yeah. And (unintelligible) said
nothing we've done at this point and ah
(unintellibible) says well it sure
looks to me like it is (unintelligible)
and ah, that was the end of that
conversation (unintelligible) the
problem is it tracks back to the Bay of
Pigs and it tracks back to some other
the leads run out to people who had no
involvement in this, except by
contracts and connection, but it gets
to areas that are liable to be raised?
The whole problem (unintelligible)
Hunt. So at that point he kind of got
the picture. He said, he said we'll be
very happy to be helpful
(unintelligible) handle anything you
want. I would like to know the reason
for being helpful, and I made it clear
to him he wasn't going to get explicit
(unintelligible) generality, and he
said fine. And Walters
(unintelligible), Walters is going to
make a call to Gray. That's the way we
put it and that's the way it was left. 
   ``P: How does that work though, how
they've got to (unintelligible)
somebody from the Miami bank. 
   ``H: (Unintelligible) The point John
makes--the Bureau is going on this
because they don't know what they are
uncovering (unintelligible) continue to
pursue it. They don't need to because
they already have their case as far as
the charges against these men
(unintelligible) One thing Helms did
raise. He said. Gray--he asked Gray why
they thought they had run into a CIA
thing and Gray said because of the
amount of money involved, a lot of
dough (unintelligible) and ah
(unintelligible) 
   ``P: (Unintelligible) 
   ``H: Well, I think they will. If it
runs (unintelligible) what the hell, who
knows (unintelligible) contributed CIA. 
   ``H: Ya, it's money CIA gets money
(unintelligible) I mean their money
moves in a lot of different ways,
too.''@s5@s7
   Nixon's train of associations
takes him from the Pennzoil-Liedtke
Mosbacher-Bush slush fund operation to
Howard Hunt and the Bay of Pigs and ``a
lot of hanky-panky'' and then back to
Bus Mosbacher, Robert's elder brother.
Later on, Haldeman stresses that the
FBI, discovering a large money
laundering operation between Pennzoil
and Bill Liedtke in Houston, Mexico
City, Maurice Stans and the CREEP in
Washington, and some CIA Miami station
Cubans, simply concluded that this was
all a CIA covert operation. 
   As Haldeman himself later summed
it up: ``If the Mexican bank
connection was actually a CIA operation
all along, unknown to Nixon; and Nixon
was destroyed for asking the FBI to
stop investigating the bank because it
might uncover a CIA operation (which
the Helms memo seems to indicate it
actually was after all) the multiple
layers of deception by the CIA are
astounding.''@s5@s8
 

   Moves for Impeachment

   Later, on Nixon's last Monday,
Bush joined White House Counsel J. Fred
Buzhardt and Dean Burch on a visit to
Congressman Rhodes, and showed him the
transcript of the smoking gun tape.
``This means that there's just no
chance in the world that he's not going
to be impeached,'' said Rhodes. ``In
fact, there's no chance in the world
that I won't vote to impeach him.''
Bush must have heaved a sigh of relief,
since this is what he had wanted Rhodes
to tell Nixon to get him to quit.
``Rhodes later let it be known that he
was offended that Bush had been briefed
before he was,'' but of course, Bush
was a top official of the Nixon White
House.@s5@s9 
   But Nixon still refused to quit,
raising the prospect of a trial before
the Senate that could be damaging to
many besides Nixon. The next day,
Tuesday, August 6, 1974, saw the last
meeting of the Nixon cabinet, with
Chairman George in attendance. Nixon's
opening statement was: ``I would like
to discuss the most important issue
confronting this nation, and
confronting us internationally
too--inflation.'' Nixon then argued
adamantly for some minutes that he had
examined the course of events over the
recent past and that he had ``not found
an impeachable offense, and therefore
resignation is not an acceptable
course.'' Vice President Ford predicted
that there would be certain impeachment
by the House, but that the outcome in
the Senate could not be predicted. Ford
then said he was an interested party on
the resignation issue and would make no
further comment. 
   Nixon then wanted to talk about
the budget again, and about an upcoming
summit conference on the economy.
Attorney General Saxbe interrupted him.
``Mr. President, I don't think we ought
to have a summit conference. We ought
to make sure you have the ability to
govern.'' Nixon quietly assured Saxbe
that he had the ability to govern. Then
Chairman George piped up, in support of
Saxbe. The President's ability to
govern was impaired, said George.
Watergate had to be brought to an end
expeditiously, Bush argued. From his
vantage point at Nixon's right elbow,
Kissinger could see that Bush was
advancing toward the conclusion that
Nixon had to resign. ``It was cruel.
And it was necessary,'' thought
Kissinger. ``More than enough had been
said,'' was the Secretary of State's
impression. Kissinger was seeking to
avoid backing Nixon into a corner where
he would become more stubborn and more
resistant to the idea of resignation,
making that dreaded Senate trial more
likely. And this was the likely
consequence of Bush's line of argument. 
   ``Mr. President, can't we just
wait a week or two and see what
happens?'' asked Saxbe. Bush started to
support Saxbe again, but now Nixon was
getting more angry. Nixon glared at
Bush and Saxbe, the open advocates of
his resignation. ``No,'' he snapped.
``This is too important to wait.'' 
   Now the senior cabinet officer
decided he had to take the floor to
avoid a total confrontation that would
leave Nixon besieged but still holding
the Oval Office. Kissinger's guttural
accents were heard in the cabinet room:
``We are not here to offer excuses for
what we cannot do. We are here to do
the nation's business. This is a very
difficult time for our country. Our
duty is to show confidence. It is
essential that we show it is not safe
for any country to take a run at us.
For the sake of foreign policy we must
act with assurance and total unity. If
we can do that, we can vindicate the
structure of peace.'' The main purpose
of this pompous tirade had been to
bring the meeting to a rapid end, and
it worked. ``There was a moment of
embarrassed silence around the table,''
recalls Nixon, and after a few more
remarks on the economy, the meeting
broke up. 
   Kissinger stayed behind with Nixon
to urge him to resign, which Nixon now
said he felt compelled to do. Bush
sought out Al Haig to ponder how Nixon
might be forced out. ``What are we
going to do?'' asked Bush. Haig told
Bush to calm down, explaining: ``We get
him up to the mountaintop, then he
comes down again, then we get him up
again.''@s6@s0 Kissinger walked back to
his office in the West Wing and met
Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the NSC director.
Kissinger told Scowcroft that ``there
was precious little support'' for the
President. Kissinger, no mean hypocrite
in his own right, thought that Saxbe
had been ``weak-livered.'' Bush and
Saxbe had both been petty and
insensitive, Kissinger thought. He
compared Bush and Saxbe and the rest to
a seventeenth-century royal court with
the courtiers scurrying about,
concerned with themselves rather than
with their country. 
   During this cabinet meeting, Bush
was already carrying a letter to Nixon
that would soon become the unkindest
cut of all for Chairman George's
wretched patron. This letter was
delivered to Nixon on August 7. It read
as follows: 

   Dear Mr. President, 
   It is my considered judgment that
you should now resign. I expect in your
lonely embattled position this would
seem to you as an act of disloyalty
from one you have supported and helped
in so many ways. My own view is that I
would now ill serve a President whose
massive accomplishments I will always
respect and whose family I love, if I
did not now give you my judgment. Until
this moment resignation has been no
answer at all, but given the impact of
the latest development, and it will be
a lasting one, I now firmly feel
resignation is best for the country,
best for this President. I believe this
view is held by most Republican leaders
across the country. This letter is much
more difficult because of the gratitude
I will always have for you. If you do
leave office history will properly
record your achievements with a lasting
respect.@s6@s1

   The next day, August 8, 1974,
Nixon delivered his resignation to
Henry Kissinger. Kissinger could now
look forward to exercising the powers
of the presidency at least until
January 1977, and perhaps well beyond. 
   For a final evaluation of Bush in
Watergate, we may refer to a sketch of
his role during those times provided by
Bush's friend Maurice Stans, the
finance director of the CREEP. This is
how Stans sizes up Bush as a Watergate
player: ``George Bush, former
member of Congress and former
Ambassador to the United Nations. Bush,
who proved he was one of the bravest
men in Washington in agreeing to head
the Republican National Committee
during the 1973-74 phase of Watergate,
kept the party organization together
and its morale high, despite massive
difficulties of press criticism and
growing public disaffection with the
administration. Totally without
information as to what had gone on in
Watergate behind the scenes, he was
unable to respond knowledgeably to
questions and because of that unjustly
became the personal target of
continuing sarcasm and cynicism from
the media.''@ s6@s2
   But there are many indications
that Bush was in reality someone who,
while taking part in the fray, actually
helped to steer Watergate toward the
strategic outcome desired by the
dominant financier faction, the one
associated with Brown Brothers Harriman
and with London. As with so much in the
life of this personage, much of Bush's
real role in Watergate remains to be
unearthed. To borrow a phrase from
James McCord's defense of his boss,
Richard Helms, we must see to it that
``every tree in the forest will fall.'' 

Notes for Chapter 13
 

   57.
 For the ``smoking gun''
transcript of June 23, 1972, see
{Washington Post,} Aug. 6, 1974.
 
   58.
 H.R. Haldeman, {The Ends of
Power} (New York: Times Books, 1978),
p. 64.
 
   59.
 Bernstein and Woodward, {The
Final Days,} p. 374.
 
   60.
 Available accounts of
Nixon's last cabinet meeting are
fragmentary, but see: {The Memoirs
of Richard Nixon,} p. 1066;
{The Final Days,} pp. 386-89;
Theodore H. White, {Breach of
Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon}
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1975),
p. 24; Henry Kissinger, {Years of
Upheaval} (Boston: Little, Brown,
1982), pp. 1202-3; J. Anthony Lukas,
{Nightmare: The Underside of the
Nixon Years} (New York: Viking
Press, 1976), pp. 558-59.
 
   61.
 The ostensible full text of
this letter is found in Nicholas King,
{George Bush: A Biography} (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1980), p. 87.
 
   62.
 Maurice H. Stans, {The Terrors
of Justice: The Untold Side of
Watergate} (New York: Everest, 1978),
p. 66.
 

insert chapter subhead here

Chapter 14 

1974: Bush Attempts the Vice-Presidency 

   Those who betray their benefactors
are seldom highly regarded. In Dante's
{Divine Comedy,} traitors to
benefactors and to the established
authorities are consigned to the ninth
circle of the Inferno, where their
souls are suspended, like insects in
amber, in the frozen River Cocytus.
This is the Giudecca, where the three
arch-traitors--Judas Iscariot, Brutus
and Cassius--are chewed for all
eternity in the three mouths of
Lucifer. The crimes of Nixon were
monstrous, especially in Vietnam and in
the India-Pakistan war, but in these
Bush had been an enthusiastic
participant. Now Bush's dagger, among
others, had found its target; Nixon was
gone. In the depths of his Inferno,
Dante relates the story of Frate
Alberigo to illustrate the belief that
in cases of the most heinous treachery,
the soul of the offender plunges at
once into hell, leaving the body to
live out its physical existence under
the control of a demon. Perhaps the
story of old Frate Alberigo will
illuminate us as we follow the further
career of George Bush. 
   As Nixon left the White House for
his home in San Clemente, California,
in the early afternoon of August 9,
1974, Chairman George was already
plotting how to scale still further up
the dizzy heights of state. Ford was
now President, and the vice presidency
was vacant. According to the 25th
Amendment, it was now up to Ford to
designate a Vice President who would
then require a majority vote of both
houses of Congress to be confirmed.
Seeing a golden opportunity to seize an
office that he had long regarded as the
final stepping stone to his ultimate
goal of the White House, Bush
immediately mobilized his extensive
Brown Brothers, Harriman/Skull and
Bones network, including as many
Zionist lobby auxiliaries as he could
muster. 
   One of the first steps was to set
up a boiler shop operation in a suite
of rooms at the Statler Hilton Hotel in
Washington. Here Richard L. Herman, the
Nebraska GOP national committeeman, and
two assistants began churning out a
cascade of calls to Republicans and
others around the country, urging,
threatening, cajoling, calling in
chits, promising future favors if
Chairman George were to become Vice
President George.@s1 
   There were other, formidable
candidates, but none was so aggressive
as Chairman George. Nelson Rockefeller,
who had resigned as governor of New
York some months before to devote more
time to his own consuming ambition and
to his Commission on Critical Choices,
was in many ways the front runner. But
Nelson was the incarnation of the
Eastern Liberal Establishment
internationalists against whom
Goldwater had campaigned so hard in
1964. His support was considerable, but
he had more active opposition than any
other candidate. This meant that Ford
had to hesitate in choosing Nelson
because of what the blowback might mean
for a probable Ford candidacy in 1976. 
   The conservative Republicans all
regarded Goldwater as their sentimental
favorite, but they also knew that Ford
would be reluctant to select him
because of a different set of
implications for 1976. Beyond
Rockefeller and Goldwater, each a
leader of a wing of the party, the
names multiplied: Senator Howard Baker,
Elliot Richardson, Governor William
Scranton, Melvin Laird, Senator Bill
Brock, Governor Dan Evans, Donald
Rumsfeld and many others. Bush knew
that if he could get Goldwater to show
him some support, the Goldwater
conservatives could be motivated to
make their influence felt for Bush, and
this might conceivably put him over the
top. 
   First, Chairman George had to put
on the mask of conciliation and
moderation. As Nixon was preparing his
departure speech, Bush lost no time in
meeting with Ford, now less than 24
hours away from being sworn in as
President. Bush told the press that
Ford had ``said he'd be pleased if I
stayed on'' at the RNC, but had to
concede that Ford had given no
indication as to his choice for the
Vice President. Bush's network in the
House of Representatives was now fully
mobilized, with ``a showing of
significant support in the House and
among GOP officials'' for Bush on the
day before Nixon left town. Bush also
put out a statement from the RNC,
saying, ``The battle is over. Now is
the time for kindness.... Let us all try
now to restore to our society a climate
of civility.'' But despite the
hypocritical kinder and gentler
rhetoric, Chairman George's struggle
for power was just beginning.@s2 
   Melvin Laird soon came out for
Rockefeller, and there were sentimental
displays for Goldwater in many
quarters. With Bush's network in full
gear, he was beginning to attract
favorable mention from the columnists.
Evans and Novak on August 11 claimed
that ``as the new President was sworn
in, Rockefeller had become a
considerably less likely prospect than
either Senator Howard Baker of
Tennessee or George Bush, the
gregarious patrician and transplanted
Texan who heads the Republican National
Committee.'' 
   On August 10, Ford announced that
he would poll Republicans at all levels
across the country. Some expressed
their preferences directly to the White
House, but the Republican National
Committee members had to report their
choices through Chairman George. Many
of them, fearing the price they might
have to pay for le@agse majeste@aa,
indicated Bush as their first choice.
This matter was the subject of a
complaint by Tom Evans of the RNC, who
talked to the press and also wrote
letters to the Ford White House, as we
will see. 
   By August 14, the {Washington
Post} was reporting a ``full scale
campaign'' on behalf of Bush, with an
``impressive array of support'' against
Rockefeller. Bush's campaign manager
and chief boiler room operator, Richard
L. Herman of Nebraska, summed up his
talking points: Bush, said Herman, ``is
the only one in the race with no
opposition. He may not be the first
choice in all cases, but he's not lower
than second with anyone.'' Herman said
he was ``assisting'' a broader
organization on the Hill and of course
at the RNC itself that was mobilized
for Bush. Bush ``can do more to help
the Republican Party than anyone else
and is totally acceptable throughout
the country,'' blathered Herman. Bush
was ``obviously aware of what we're
doing,'' said Herman. 
   Support for Goldwater was apt to
turn into support for Bush at any time,
so Bush was gaining mightily, running
second to Rocky alone. Taking note of
the situation, even Bush's old allies
at the {Washington Post} had to
register some qualms. In an editorial
published on August 15, 1974 on the
subject of ``The Vice Presidency,''
{Post} commentators quoted the
ubiquitous Richard Herman on Bush's
qualifications. The {Post} found that
Bush's ``background and abilities would
appear to qualify him for the
vice-presidency in just about all
respects, except for the one that seems
to us to really matter: What is
conspicuously lacking is any compelling
or demonstrable evidence that he is
qualified to be President.'' 
   But despite these darts, Chairman
George continued to surge ahead. The
big break came when Barry Goldwater,
speaking in Columbia, South Carolina,
told a Republican fundraiser that he
had a ``gut feeling'' that Ford was
going to select Bush for the vice
presidency. On August 15, a source
close to Ford told David Broder and Lou
Cannon that Bush now had the ``inside
track'' for the vice-presidency.
Rockefeller's spokesman Hugh Morrow
retorted that ``we're not running a
boiler shop or calling anyone or doing
anything,'' unlike the strong-arm Bush
team.@s3 
   Inside the Ford White House,
responses to Ford's solicitaton were
coming in. Among the top White House
counselors, Bush got the support of
Kenneth Rush, who had almost become
Nixon's Secretary of State and who
asserted that Bush ``would have a
broader appeal to all segments of the
political spectrum than any other
qualified choice.'' Dean Burch wrote a
memo to Ford pointing out that among
the prominent candidates, ``only a few
have a post-1980 political future.''
``My own choice,'' Burch told Ford,
``would be a Vice President with a long
term political future--a potential
candidate, at least, for the Presidency
in his own right.'' In Burch's
conclusion, ``Still operating on this
assumption, my personal choice is
George Bush.''@s4. 
   The cabinet showed more sentiment
for Rockefeller. Rogers Morton of the
Interior, Weinberger of HEW, James Lynn
of HUD, Frederick Dent of Commerce, and
Attorney General Saxbe were all for
Rocky. Earl Butz of Agriculture was for
Goldwater, and James R. Schlesinger of
Defense was for Elliot Richardson. No
written opinion by Henry Kissinger
appears extant at the Ford Library. 
   Then the White House staff was
polled. Pat Buchanan advised Ford to
avoid all the younger men, including
Bush, and told the president that
Rockefeller would ``regrettably'' have
to be his choice. John McLaughlin also
told Ford to go for Rocky, although he
mentioned that Bush ``would also be a
fine vice president.''@s5 Richard A.
Moore was for Bush based on his
economic credentials, asserting that
Bush's ``father and gradfather were
both highly respected investment
bankers in New York.'' In the White
House staff, Bush won out over
Rockefeller and Scranton. Among
personal friends of Ford, Bush won out
over Rocky by a four to three margin. 
   Among Republican governors, there
was significant resistance to Bush.
Former Pennsylvania Governor William
Scranton, who had been considered of
presidential caliber, wrote to Ford
aide Phillip Buchen of Bush: ``Quite
frankly, in my experience with him his
one drawback is a limitation of his
administrative ability.''@s6 
   Among the Republican Senators,
Bush had intense competition, but the
Prescott Bush network proved it could
hold its own. Howard Baker put Bush
second, while Henry Bellmon and Dewey
Bartlett sent in a joint letter in
support of Bush. Bob Dole put Chairman
George last among his list of
preferences, commenting that the choice
of Bush would be widely regarded as
``totally partisan.'' Pete Dominici put
Bush as his first choice, but also
conceded that he would be seen as a
partisan pick. Roth of Delaware had
Bush in third place after John J.
Williams and Rocky. Hugh Scott of
Pennsylvania wanted Rocky or Goldwater,
but put Bush in third place. James
Pearson of Kansas had Bush as first
choice. Jesse Helms mentioned Bush, but
in fifth place after Goldwater, Harry
Byrd, Reagan and James Buckley.@s7 In
the final tally, Rocky edged out Bush
with 14 choices to Bush's 12, followed
by Goldwater with 11. 
   Bush was stronger in the House,
where many members had served side by
side with their old friend Rubbers.
Bush was the first choice of Bill
Archer of Texas (who had inherited
Bush's old district, and who praised
Bush for having ``led the fight in
Congress for disclosure and reform''),
Skip Bafalis of Florida, William G.
Bray of Indiana, Dan Brotzman of
Colorado, Joe Broyhill of Virginia,
John Buchanan of Alabama, Charles
Chamberlain of Michigan, Donald Clancy
of Ohio, Del Dawson of California, and
Thad Cochran of Mississippi. William
Armstrong of Colorado struck a
discordant note by urging Ford to pick
``a person who has extensive experience
in {elected} public office.'' William
S. Cohen of Maine found that Bush did
``not have quite the range of
experience of Richardson or
Rockefeller.'' James Collins favored Bush
``as a Texan.'' Glenn Davis of
Wisconsin, Derwinksi of Illinois (a
long-term ally who eventually rose to
the Bush cabinet after having served
with Bush at the U.N. mission in New
York), Sam Devine of Ohio, and Pierre
S. Du Pont IV of Delaware--all for
Bush. William Dickinson of Alabama
found Bush ``physically attractive''
with ``no political scars I am aware
of'' and ``personally very popular.''
But then came John J. Duncan of
Tennessee, who told Ford that he could
not ``support any of the fifteen or so
mentioned in the news media.'' 
   Marvin Esch of Michigan was for
Bush, as was Peter Frelinghuysen of New
Jersey. Edwin D. Eshelman told Ford to
go for Bush ``if you want a moderate.''
The Bush brigade went on with Charles
Gubser of California, and Hammerschmidt
of Arkansas, still very close to Bush
today. John Heinz of Pennsylvania was
having none of Bush, but urged Ford to
take Rockefeller, Scranton or
Richardson, in that order. John
Erlenborn of Illinois was more than
captivated by Bush, writing Ford that
Bush ``is attractive personally--people
tend to like him on sight.'' Why, ``he
has almost no political enemies'' that
Erlenborn knew of. Bud Hillis of
Indiana, Andrew Hinshar of California,
Marjorie Holt--for Bush. Lawrence Hogan
of Maryland was so ``disturbed'' about
the prospect of Rockefeller that he was
for Bush, too. Hudnut of Indiana put
Bush as his second choice after
favorite son Gov. Otis Bowen because
Bush was ``fine, clean.'' 
   Jack Kemp of New York, now in the
Bush cabinet, was for Bush way back
then. Lagomarsino of California put
Bush third, Latta of Ohio put him
second only to Rocky. Trent Lott of
Mississippi, who has since moved up to
the Senate, told Ford that he needed
somebody ``young and clean'' and that
``perhaps George Bush fits that
position.'' Manuel Lujan of New Mexico,
who also made the Bush cabinet, was a
solid Bush rooter, as was Wiley Mayne
of Iowa. Pete McCloskey put Bush second
to Richardson, but ahead of Rocky. John
McCollister of Nebraska deluded himself
that Bush could be confirmed without
too much trouble: McCollister was for
Bush because ``I believe he could pass
the Judiciary Committee's stern test''
because ``he had no policy-making role
in the sad days now ended,'' but
perhaps Ford knew better on that one. 
   Clarence Miller of Ohio was for
Bush. Congressman Bob Michel, ever
climbing in the House GOP hierarchy,
had long-winded arguments for Bush.
Rocky, he thought, could ``help most''
over the remainder of Ford's term, but
Bush would be a trump card for 1976.
``George Bush would not command all the
immediate adulation simply because he
hasn't had as long a proven track
record in the business and industrial
community, but his credentials are
good,'' wrote Michel. ``He is young and
he would work day and night and he
would never attempt to `upstage the
boss.' Aside from projecting a
`straight arrow image,' he would be
acceptable to the more conservative
element in the party that would be
offended by the appointment of
Rockefeller.'' In addition, assured
Michel, Bush enjoyed support among
Democrats ``from quarters I would not
have believed possible, ... and they
are indeed influential Democrats....
Over and above this, we may be giving
one of our own a good opportunity to
follow on after a six-year Ford
administration,'' Michel concluded. 
   Donald Mitchell of New York was
for Bush because of his ``rich
background,'' which presumably meant
money. Ancher Nelson thought Bush had
``charisma,'' and he was for him. But
George O'Brien of Illinois was also
there with that bothersome request for
``someone who was elected and was
serving in a federal position.'' Stan
Parris of Alexandria, Virginia, a
faithful yes-man for Bush until his
defeat in 1990, was for Bush--of
course. Jerry Pettis of California was
for Bush. Bob Price of Texas urged Ford
to tap Bush, in part because of his
``excellent'' ties to the Senate, which
were ``due to his own efforts and the
friendships of his father.'' Albert
Quie of Minnesota had some support of
his own for the nod, but he talked
favorably about Bush, whom he also
found ``handsome.'' ``He has only one
handicap,'' thought Quie, ``and that
is, he lost an election for the
Senate.'' Make that two handicaps.
Score J. Kenneth Robinson of Virginia
for Bush, along with Philip Ruppe of
Michigan, who lauded Bush's ``human
warmth.'' Earl Ruth of northern
California and William Steigler of
Wisconsin for Bush. Steve Symms of
Idaho, later a Senator, wanted ``a
Goldwater man'' like Reagan, or
Williams of Delaware. But, Symms added,
``I would accept our National Chairman
Bush.'' Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan
confided to his former colleague Ford
that ``my personal recommendation is
George Bush.'' John H. Ware broke a
lance for Chairman George, and then
came the endorsement of G. William
Whitehurst of Virginia. According to
Whitehurst, Bush demonstrates ``those
special characteristics that qualify a
man for the highest office if fate so
designates.'' Bob Wilson of California
was for Bush, also considering the long
term perspectives; he liked Bush's
youthful enthusiasm and saw him as ``a
real leader for moderation.'' Larr Winn
of Kansas, Wendell Wyatt of Oregon,
Bill Young of Florida, Don Young of
Alaska, Roger Zion of Indiana--all
listed Bush as their prime choice. The
Republican House Steering Committee
went for Bush because of his ``general
acceptance.''@s8 
   When Ford's staff tabulated the
House results, Bush's combined total of
101 first, second and third choice
mentions put him in the lead, over
Rocky at 68 and Reagan at 23. Among all
the Republican elected and appointed
officials who had expressed an opinion,
Bush took first place with 255 points,
with Rockefeller second with 181,
Goldwater third with 83, Reagan with
52, followed by Richardson, Melvin
Laird and the rest. It was a surprise
to no one that Bush was the clear
winner among the Republican National
Committee respondents. But all in all
it was truly a monument to the Bush
network, achieved for a candidate with
no qualifications who had very much
participated in the sleaze of the Nixon
era. 
   The vox populi saw things slightly
differently. In the number of telegrams
received by the White House, Goldwater
was way ahead with 2,280 in his favor,
and only 102 against. Bush had 887 for
him and 92 against. Rocky had 544 in
favor, and a whopping 3,202 against.@s9 
   But even here, the Bush network
had been totally mobilized, with a very
large effort in the Dallas business
community, among black Republicans, and
by law firms with links to the Zionist
lobby. Ward Lay of Frito-Lay joined
with Herman W. Lay to support Bush. The
law firm of McKenzie and Baer of Dallas
assured Ford that Bush was ``Mr.
Clean.''      

   Bad Blood

   The full court press applied by the
Bush machine also generated bad blood.
Rockefeller supporter Tom Evans, a
former RNC co-chair, wrote to Ford with
the observation that ``no one should
campaign for the position and I offer
these thoughts only because of an
active campaign that is being conducted
on George Bush's behalf which I do not
believe properly reflects Republican
opinion.'' Evans was more substantive
than most recommendations: ``Certainly
one of the major issues confronting our
country at this time is the economy and
the related problems of inflation,
unemployment, and high interest rates.
I respectfully suggest that you need
someone who can help substantively in
these areas. George is great at PR but
he is not as good in substantive
matters. This opinion can be confirmed
by individuals who held key positions
at the National Committee.'' Evans also
argued that Bush should have put
greater distance between the GOP and
Nixon sooner than he did.@s1@s0 
   So Nelson's networks were not
going to take the Bush strong-arm
approach lying down. Bush's most
obvious vulnerability was his close
relationship to Nixon, plus the fact
that he had been up to his neck in
Watergate. It was lawful that Bush's
ties to one of Nixon's slush funds came
back to haunt him. This was the
``Townhouse'' fund again, the one
managed by Jack A. Gleason and
California attorney Herbert W.
Kalmbach, Nixon's personal lawyer, who
had gained quite some personal
notoriety during the Watergate years.
These two had both pleaded guilty
earlier in 1974 to running an illegal
campaign fundraising operation. 
   On August 19, the eve of Ford's
expected announcement, the {Washington
Post} reported that unnamed White House
sources were telling {Newsweek}
magazine that Bush's vice-presidential
bid ``had slipped badly because of
alleged irregularities in the financing
of his 1970 Senate race in Texas.''
{Newsweek} quoted White House sources
that ``there was potential
embarrassment in reports that the Nixon
White House had funneled about $100,000
from a secret fund called the
``Townhouse Operation'' into Bush's
losing Senate campaign against Democrat
Lloyd Bentsen four years ago.''
{Newsweek} also added that $40,000 of
this money may not have been properly
reported under the election laws. 
   Bush's special treatment during
the 1970 campaign was a subject of
acute resentment, especially among
Senate Republicans Ford needed to keep
on board. Back in 1970, Senator Mark
Hatfield of Oregon had demanded to know
why John Tower had given Bush nearly
twice as much money as any other Senate
Republican. Senator Tower had tried to
deny favoritism, but Hatfield and
Edward Brooke of Massachusetts had not
been placated. Now there was the threat
that if Bush had to go through lengthy
confirmation hearings in the Congress,
the entire Townhouse affair might be
dredged up once again. According to
some accounts, there were as many as 18
Republican Senators who had gotten
money from Townhouse, but whose names
had not been divulged.@s1@s1 Any
attempt to force Bush through as Vice
President might lead to the fingering
of these Senators, and perhaps others,
mightily antagonizing those who had
figured they were getting off with a
whole coat. Ripping off the scabs of
Watergate wounds in this way conflicted
with Ford's ``healing time'' strategy,
which was designed to put a hermetic
lid on the festering mass of Watergate.
Bush was too dangerous to Ford. Bush
could not be chosen. 
   Because he was so redolent of
Nixonian sleaze, Bush's maximum
exertions for the vice-presidency were
a failure. Ford announced his choice of
Nelson Rockefeller on August 20, 1974.
It was nevertheless astounding that
Bush had come so close. He was defeated
for the moment, but he had established
a claim on the office of the
vice-presidency that he would not
relinquish. Despite his hollow,
arrogant ambition and total
incompetence for the office, he would
automatically be considered for the
vice-presidency in 1976 and then again
in 1980. For George Bush was an
aristocrat of senatorial rank, although
denied the Senate, and his conduct
betrayed the conviction that he was
owed not just a place at the public
trough, but the accolade of national
political office. 

Notes for Chapter 14
 
                                 
   1.
 {Washington Post,} Aug. 16,
1974.
 
   2.
 {Washington Post,} Aug. 9,
1974.
 
   3.
 {Washington Post,} Aug. 16,
1974.
 
   4.
 Gerald R. Ford Library, Robert
T. Hartman Files, Box 21.
 
5.
 Hartman Files, Box 19.
 
   6.
 Philip Buchen Files, Box 63.
 
   7.
 Hartman Files, Box 21.
 
   8.
 Hartman Files, Boxes 19 and 20.
 
   9.
 Hartman Files, Box 21.
 
   10.
 Hartman Files, Box 20.
 
   11.
 Walter Pincus and Bob
Woodward, ``Presidential Posts and
Dashed Hopes,'' {Washington Post,} Aug.
9, 1988.
 
----         John Covici
          covici@ccs.covici.com