CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS - 1986 FACTION FIGHT DOCUMENTS [IS Canada, 1986] MOTION AGAINST PERMANENT FACTIONALISM Democratic centralism is based upon the principle of "freedom of discussion and unity in action" once a decision has been taken in a socialist organization. Members of a revolutionary socialist group have the right to organize into factions to present their views to the organization as a whole. This requires, however that any factional grouping present its views for discussion and debate in open forums of the organization. For the past fifteen months in Toronto, we have had a situation of unprincipled permanent factionalism by a minority which has organized according to a hidden agenda and which has failed to openly declare its political basis and objectives. (See "Motion to Create Two Toronto Branches") The activity of this unprincipled minority has led the majority of the I.S to support the division of the Toronto Branch into two separate branches. We repudiate permanent factionalism as foreign to the norms of democratic centralism and will call for disciplinary action should unprincipled factionalism continue. [August 1986] MOTION TO CREATE TWO TORONTO I.S. BRANCHES Preamble: Fifteen months ago, the IS formally resolved a brief faction fight with the adoption at the May, 1985 Organizing Committee meeting of a section from the document "The Way Ahead". It was believed at the time that there was enough basis of political agreement throughout the organization on the basic perspective contained in "The Way Ahead" to enable common work around a common perspective to heal the divisions which especially plagued the Toronto branch. It is now clear, and has been for some time, that the factional divisions in Toronto have not disappeared. The last fifteen months have seen a persistent pattern of argument in Toronto over issues such as day school proposals, proposals for public meetings on South Africa, educational proposals, coverage in the newspaper (most notably over the recent events in the Philippines), approach to solidarity work around strikes, and, most significantly, over the proposal for a six person slate for Toronto branch coordinators. In principle, of course, such debate can and should be a healthy process by which arguments and disagreements are formulated, debate ensues, and the organization or branch arrives democratically at a majority position, which all comrades agree loyally to implement. Such a process is at the core of our concept of democratic centralism. But debate in the Toronto branch has not been conducted according to these norms. On the contrary, debate has been unprincipled and factional in character. Unprincipled because the main political arguments have not been aired openly in the branch meetings -- but instead in private discussions where unaccountable charges tend to be the order of the day; and factional because virtually all arguments are conducted in terms of pre-established sides or groupings which overwhelmingly reflect the factional line of division of 18 months ago. We are, in other words, in a situation of permanent factionalism in Toronto in which there is an ongoing attempt to create and exaggerate political differences in order to justify factionalism, in which the central branch is unable to give a decisive lead to the national organization. Eighteen months of permanent factionalism have demonstrated that the two groupings in Toronto are, at present, incapable of collaborating in a common branch. While the organization's other main branches, Ottawa and Montreal, have managed to grow and develop, the Toronto branch is slightly smaller now than it was 15 months ago, and the internal atmosphere has rarely been worse. It is time now to make a decisive break with the legacy of permanent factionalism which, in thelong [sic] run, threatens to break up the whole of the organization. Since genuine attempts at a political resolution to these divisions have failed, there is no alternative -- short of a split or expulsions -- but to impose an organizational solution. Therefore be it resolved: 1. That the present Toronto branch be divided into two branches to be known as "Toronto Central" and "Toronto East" 2. That the membership of Toronto Central consist of the present branch coordinating team (Mark, Michelle, Sandra and David M.) and their political supporters, while the membership of Toronto East consist of the defeated slate from the May coordinators election (Cindy, Alain, Abbie, Paul, Nancy and John) and their political supporters: 3. That the idefitication [sic] of political supporters of each grouping shall be made on the basis of a declaration by branch members; no member may belong to both branches; 4. That the division into two branches shall persist for a period of at least 12 months; 5. That the division of the branch is to go into effect immediately; 6. That the "Toronto Central" branch is to function as the national centre and to responsible for editing and producing Socialist Worker, maintaining "Socialist Worker Books", sustaining all national financial accounts, and organizing all national meetings and speaking tours; 7. That only the "Toronto Central" branch shall continue to use the IS office for branch meetings; while "Toronto East" can use office facilities for the production of leaflets and so on by agreement with the coordinators of the "Toronto Central" branch; 8. That the geographic lineof [sic] division between the two branches be Sherbourne St., the area east comprising the area for street sales workplace sales and strike interventions of "Toronto East", the area west comprising the area for "Toronto Central"; 9. That both branches shall have the right to participate in city-wide rallies and demonstrations (e.g. Labour Day, International Women's Day) and that coordinators of both branches shall discuss details beforehand of any such areas of joint intervention; 10. That present areas of work be divided between the two branches on the following basis: Ontario Coalition for Abortion Clinics and the Chubb strike be assigned to "Toronto East", while York University and the University of Toronto be assigned to "Toronto Central"> That "Toronto East" be allowed to continue its workplace sale at 4900 Yonge St. despite the fact that this location is west of Sherbourne St. These assignments reflect the already existing divisions in these areas of work. Neither branch is to intervene in an area assigned to the other branch; 11. That any disputes or conflicts over areas of work are to be submitted to the Steering Committee, the Organizing Committee or the National Convention for resolution; 12. That both branches shall agree not to "raid" the contacts of the other branch in an effort to recruit them from the periphery of one branch to that of another. Any cases of contract raiding shall be met disciplinary action by the steering committee, OC or national convention. 13. That any individual member in either branch may apply for membership in the other branch. Acceptance of their membership requires a majority vote of branch members. OPEN LETTER TO THE CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS [Sept. 1986] Dear Comrades: We are taking the very unusual step of writing this letter because we are dismayed by recent developments inside the Canadian International Socialists. The manner in which the Organizing Committee decided on 3 August to split the Toronto branch in our view threatens the very existence of the IS. It is only this urgent danger which has led us to intervene. We believe that the revolutionary marxist tradition which is our common inheritance as members of the same international tendency, and to which the SWP has made some contribution, makes it our duty to warn against the path now taken by the majority. We discussed the factional situation in some depth with David McNally, Brian MacDougall, and Abbie Bakan when they visited Britain in July. One issue considered was the proposal to split the Toronto branch, presented to us by David as a means of relieving some tensions, and reducing factional polarization. While not at that stage opposing the proposal, we argued that it could not be a solution, and that it involved various dangers. We made it clear that in our view the source of the divisions in the Toronto branch lay not in political differences but in personal factors exacerbated by widespread confusion over perspectives. We stressed to David, Brian, and Abbie the importance of mutual tolerance in a small revolutionary group, and we urged them to start from what they had in common, namely the Marxist tradition, and not the petty matters which divided them. At no stage during our lengthy and friendly conversation with him did David state or imply anything which suggested that he dissented from this broad assessment. He explicitly agreed with us that disciplinary measures against the minority were undesirable, and argued that splitting the branch was an alternative to such measures. He has obviously changed his mind. The enormously detailed, 13-point resolution passed at the OC is clearly a disciplinary measure, as was stated by the movers. It places the minority, now in the Toronto East branch, on markedly unfavourable terms compared with the majority in Toronto Central. Moveover, its terms are such as almost to guarantee that this is only the first in a series of disciplinary measures whose likely outcome will be the expulsion of the minority. Take, for instance, clause 12 of the resolution, which not only forbids the branches 'raiding' each other's contacts, but states: "Any case of contact raiding shall be met with disciplinary action by the steering committee, OC or national convention." The idea of 'contact raiding' is itself an absurdity, since it implies that the two branches are in competition with each other, so that one's gain is the other's loss. Is this really how two units of a revolutionary organization should relate to one another? Any contact made by a branch is a gain to the group as a whole, not the property of the branch concerned. Clause 12 shows how deeply a factional mentality has penetrated the minds of the OC resolution's drafters. It also virtually guarantees that there will be occasions for further disciplinary measures against the minority, since "contact raiding" is such a vague concept, into which almost anything can be made to fit. For example, a member of the East branch could be disciplined for talking to someone to whom a member of the Central branch had already sold a paper on the same march. The OC resolution is not, therefore, as it claims, an alternative to, but rather a step towards "a split or expulsions." Were there any doubts on that score the arguments used to justify it, and the atmosphere in which it was passed would remove them. (Our information on the OC meeting itself comes from the only independent observer present, Ahmed Shawki of the International Socialist Organization, who shares our deep concern about developments in Canada. We very much regret that David McNally did not use the opportunity of his brief visit to Britain in late August to discuss recent developments with us.) This is most evident in David McNally's speech introducing the resolution. He made it clear that splitting the branch was "a punitive measure", and declared that "the situation looks pretty grim for the minority". Moreover, he proclaimed himself "a polarizer", who had been "centrally involved in refactionalizing the situation." Many of the contributions which followed were even worse, with remarks like "You are being kicked the fuck out", comparisons of the minority with the Spartacists, and Brian MacDougall openly warning that "further measures" might be necessary. We find it difficult to think of any meeting in the history of our own organization, which has had many bitter faction fights, which was conducted in such an atmosphere. We are not afraid of vigorous arguments, nor of polarization, but only as part of political clarification which unites, and raises the level of the organization. Yet what is the issue at stake here? Essentially that the Toronto minority has been engaged in "unprincipled and factional" behaviour. Now we hold no particular brief for the minority. When Abbie was in Britain, we were very critical of some actions of the minority, notably the decision to run a slate for the Toronto branch co-ordinators in May. Perhaps partly as a result of our arguments, Abbie subsequently conceded both at a Toronto branch meeting and at the OC that the "slate motion had helped to refactionalize the situation." But her self-criticism, far from being welcomed as a conciliatory gesture, was seized on by the majority as the main charge against the minority. This refusal to allow the minority room in which to retreat leaves us in no doubt that factionalism is endemic on both sides of the argument in Canada. David contended that "the norms of democratic centralism have been systematically violated" by the minority, and that "democratic centralism is very, very important even for very small groups cut off from the corrective influence of the class." He gave the instance of the Bolsheviks in 1907-10, when the defeat of the 1905 revolution and the consequent collapse of the workers' meant that the political differences between Lenin and Bogdanov could not be put to the test of the class struggle. Lenin was forced to resort to organizational measure, using the rather dubious device of an extended meeting of the editorial board of "Proletary" to expel the Bogdanovists. One of the important qualities of a revolutionary is a sense of proportion. To draw an analogy between the Bolsheviks in 1909 and the IS in 1986 is to show a grievous lack of this sense. The Bolsheviks had just been through a revolution in which the first soviets were formed, and in which they had organized an unsuccessful insurrection. As a result of the revolution, the Bolsheviks had grown to a mass party, numbering 46,173 members in 1907. Lenin's struggle against Bogdanov was part of the painful, but necessary retreat from tactics appropriate to revolutionary situation, of the process of adjustment to a downturn so deep that the Bolsheviks numbered only a few hundred in 1910. Bogdanov was a substantial figure in the revolutionary movement, whose philosophical writings had an enormous influence then and later, and who had a major following among the Bolsheviks themselves. His differences with lenin were political, concerning the whole question of revolutionary strategy and tactics, of whether, for example, revolutionaries should as a matter of principle boycott bourgeois elections. No analogy exists between this situation and that of IS Canada. The Bolsheviks at their weakest were far more important than a group which can barely muster forty members at a national summer school. Above all, there are no political differences of principle involved. Lenin expelled Bogdanov because he was an ultra-left. But no-one has seriously argued that the Toronto minority have deviated from revolutionary Marxism to a comparable extent. Moreover, the "norms of democratic centralism" are not timeless principles whose application does not vary according to time, place, and situation. As we wrote in a letter to the Australian IS whose arguments we gather have been misused in Canada, "the need for democratic centralism arises from the need for a revolutionary party which seeks to win workers to Marxism on the basis of its practical involvement in the class struggle. Democratic centralism is the mechanism through which the party draws in the experience of the workers' battles in which it intervenes, reflects on and seeks to generalize from this experience, and applies the lessons arrived at in further interventions in the class struggle. "Democratic centralism is thus only fully realized by a revolutionary party with deep roots in the working class which allow it to engage in agitation around immediate issues of class struggle. This none of the organizations in the IS Tendency, the British SWP included, is generally able to do. We mostly engage in different sorts of propaganda, general and concrete. moreover, it would be pretentious and harmful for groups the size of IS Australia [or Canada] to have top-heavy "Leninist" organizational structures. "Nevertheless, any revolutionary organization needs to have a mechanism to appraise work done, determine priorities, and allocate resources. There must be democratic procedures for hammering out the tasks of the organization. These proceedings are beside the point unless: (1) they involve genuine discussion of what is to be done - which permanent factions preclude; (2) they terminate in decisions that are binding on all. While these principles are essential to the functioning of any revolutionary organization, even their application requires considerable tact and sensitivity. As comrades in Canada know all too well, it is very hard to be a member of a small propaganda circle like the IS. The gap between our ideas - workers' power, international socialism - and the harsh reality of capitalist 'normality' is so vast. The kind of leadership required for such a group requires a strong emphasis on political clarity, on the ideas of the Marxist tradition, combined with considerable patience with and tolerance of the quirks, weaknesses, even "deviations" of the members. What we have instead in Canada at present is the appropriation of the revolutionary tradition to justify organizational measures which can only seriously damage, if not destroy the group. Certainly to demand, as did one speaker at the OC, of the minority that they say "I repudiate, I renounce" their past crimes has nothing to do with the "norms of democratic centralism" in any circumstances, and is more reminiscent of Stalin's show-trials. The majority will no doubt protest that they have been goaded into this behaviour by the factionalism of the minority. We do not dispute that the minority have acted factionally. We agree that permanent factions are a paralysing, debilitating evil in a revolutionary organization. But the truth is that factionalism is endemic on all sides - that apolitical gossip, innuendo, insults and manoeuvering are rife throughout the organization, not simply within the Toronto branch, but also between the two factions there and the other main branches in Ottawa and montreal. To treat the Toronto minority as responsible for the factionalism is to confuse a symptom with the disease. Attacking the Toronto minority has become a substitute for analyzing the underlying causes of the crisis which has now afflicted the IS for nearly two years. But in the absence of such an analysis there is no reason to believe that the crisis will not continue, even if, as seems all too likely, the minority is expelled. David McNally began to probe the roots of the crisis in his document "The Way Ahead", approved as defining the group's perspective by the May 1985 OC. He identified the fundamental problem as the IS's failure fully to recognize and to adapt to the downturn in the class struggle which developed in 1976-7 soon after the group was formed. Even when the IS began to face up to the downturn in 1979-80, and lay much more stress on general Marxist propaganda, David argued, "in practice...we specialized in propaganda...and treated our active interventions as a duty which contributed little if anything to building the group today. Rather than seeking to combine our education and activity...as closely as possible, we operated with an approach that artificially separated them. And this artificial separation of education and activity permeated all our work. Education increasingly became an end in itself ( what "holds us together" in the downturn ). Our interventions drifted aimlessly - sometimes with exaggerated expectations, sometimes with no expectations...To the degree that we had perspectives, they were not worked out in branch meetings, at the OC and in the convention. Instead, they were arrived at in private, informal and unaccountable discussions between a handful of comrades...Moreover, leadership itself became top-down and educational in character - the job of leadership being to "teach" members the politics." (p.8) But if David's analysis was cogent, his proposed remedies were disastrously mistaken. It was through the paper that he sought to overcome the separation of education and activity. "Our paper strives to connect socialist theory, politics, analysis and proposals to the real-life struggles of workers today. The paper is our tool for bringing about - even if in the most modest of ways - what Rosa Luxemburg called "the fusion of sciences and the workers", the fusion of Marxist theory and working-class experience. The paper is thus a lifeline in which the current flows both ways: from the working class to the socialist organization (in the form of the experiences of working-class struggle ), and from the socialist organization to the working-class ( in the form of our analysis, arguments and proposals for working-class struggles ). ( pp.10-11 ) This conception of the paper implied, David argued a re-orientation of the group. "In order to organize our active relationship to the working class...., the paper must be the centre around which we organize all of our work in the IS. That requires that we feed our experience of working-class struggle back into the organization (starting with the branch meetings ), that we discuss, debate and analyse that experience, that we amp out perspectives on our interventions and the approach we will carry in Workers' Action, and that we return to the branch meeting to evaluate the use of the paper in our interventions. Discussion of the paper - our workplace and street sales, our strike interventions, our interventions in demonstrations and coalitions, and out coverage in all areas - must be the core of all our branch meetings." ( p. 11 ) This perspective seemed to us completely mistaken, and we argued strongly against it at the international meeting of IS groups in July 1985. In the first place, David was proposing a paper of the upturn in conditions of downturn. ( See C. Harman, "The Revolutionary Paper", IS 2:24 [1984]. ) The kind of paper he described is appropriate to a situation where workers are on the offensive and generalizing from their experience of struggle. In a situation of downturn, where struggles are fragmented and defensive, where the best one can hope for are bureaucratic mass strikes like Operation Solidarity or the British miners' strike, the conclusions that worker draw from their experience are likely to be demoralized and reactionary ones. Thus the miners' defeat has vastly strengthened the position of right-wing social democracy in Britain. It is therefore dangerous nonsense to argue, as David did, that "especially in a downturn, it is critical to grasp every bit of experience of struggle and to discuss in a detailed and a critical manner" ( p. 7, emphasis added ). The appropriate paper for a downturn is one in which the main emphasis is upon political analysis and explanation, providing both members of the organization and their contacts with the overall perspective on the basis of which they can make sense of the setbacks suffered by the workers' movement, and also recognize the possibilities of renewed class struggle in the future. Instead, for a period in mid-1985 Workers' Action became little more than a strike sheet. Fortunately, renamed Socialist Worker, it shifted back to much greater emphasis on politics last autumn. Nevertheless, the same mistaken perspective remained in place. it was re-affirmed at January's convention ( see D. McNally, "The task is to Build a Socialist Organization", SW February 1986 ). In particular, the idea that "discussion of the paper ... must be the core of all our branch meetings" went unchallenged, even though it is gravely mistaken. Even in a period of upturn the focus of branch meetings should be political discussion, though then it would be closely related to immediate struggles. The emphasis on Marxist ideas should be even greater in a period of downturn, when the socialist political analysis we offer at our meetings provides those attracted to our ideas with the generalization which they are denied in the outside world. To devote one branch meeting a month to detailed discussion of the latest issue of SW, as the Ottowa [sic] branch does, is a recipe for internalization and navel-gazing, especially, since the discussion appears to focus heavily on matters of style, and layout rather than on the political content of the paper ( see "Ottowa Branch Report - January 1986 IS Convention", pp. 17-19, 25-6 ). Indeed, the perspective is one guaranteed to institutionalize factional nit-picking and the kind of obsession with organizational minutae displayed by the Ottowa report, which devotes no less than 36 pages to a branch whose size varied over the year between 11 and 15 members! We believe that the IS has yet to think through the implications of the downturn for its practice. The devaluation of the group's propagandism of the early 1980s which both sides in Toronto now tend to go in for seems to us one-sided. General Marxist propaganda is the anchor of a revolutionary group in a period of downturn, when its audience is likely to be primarily individuals, often students, seeking political explanations, rather than rank-and-file workers generalizing from their experience of struggle. We certainly learned things from the IS through our members' visits to Canada which have proved helpful in Britain. The source of what David calls the IS's "artificial separation of education and activity" lies to some degree in a failure to recognize the importance of concrete propaganda, that is, of relating general Marxist ideas to specific issues and struggles. In general, the conditions of downturn and our own puny size make it difficult for us to engage in agitation, advancing demands and proposals which can take the struggle forward. but we can still reach a wider audience by connecting our overall analysis of the world to crises which may be pushing some section into activity of some kind. it is important to grasp this because downturns are not flat and empty, but often lead to volcanic eruptions, to bureaucratic mass strikes. A number of groups in the IS tradition have gone through the experience of having to adapt temporarily to such episodes of struggle - IS Canada during Operation Solidarity in 1982, the SWP during the 1984-5 miners' strike, IS Denmark during the Easter 1985 strikes, OSE during the strikes against Papandreou's austerity policies. Even less dramatic incidents can create new openings, as the wave of campus unrest over South Africa did for the ISO is spring 1985, or the Hawke government's attacks on living standards may do for IS Australia. To build a revolutionary organization in the present downturn requires as its basis a political routine of street sales, weekly discussion meetings, and student work designed to win individuals on the basis of general Marxist propaganda when the kind of opportunity just described presents itself. We believe that the IS has yet systematically to address the question of building in the downturn. Support for this diagnosis is provided by the Ottowa branch report to the August OC, which concludes: "The branch has begun to feel that over the last year, and particularly since January, we have failed to approach our activities primarily as opportunities to make propaganda. thus our interventions have tended to focus on the technicalities of the given strike or coalition, while not arguing enough politics to justify the effort expended and while letting activities such as public meetings, study groups, etc slide somewhat." ( p. 3 ) To remedy this situation a number of proposals are made: regular study groups, public meetings every eight weeks, bi-weekly streets rather than "low workplace and union meeting sales", regular branch discussions on concrete political issues. This self-criticism and its proposed remedies represent a real shift away from the mistaken "Way Ahead" perspective. The tragedy is that rather than their providing the stimulus for a discussion on how to reorient the group, they were lost amid the factional hubbub of the resolution on Toronto, of which the Ottowa comrades appear, if anything, to be more vehement supporters than the Toronto majority itself. The assault on the Toronto minority amounts to making the letter a scapegoat for the drift and crisis which the IS has suffered in recent years. The minority are not the source of the group's problems. These arise, as we have argued, from a failure to think through the implications of the downturn. In the absence of such an analysis and consequent re-orientation the IS in 1984 was fertile ground for factionalism. The occasion was provided by the disintegration of the core of the national leadership, due to the personal antagonisms which developed between David and Abbie, which unleashed both associated conflicts in Toronto, and accumulated resentments of the old leadership in other branches. it is the combination of the lack of a clear perspective, and a welter of petty, personal conflicts, not any political differences, which underlies the factionalism. Nor did the may 1985 OC which supposedly ended the "first" faction fight represent any real resolution. In the first place, the perspective agreed there, embodied in "The Way Ahead", did not, as we have argued, offer correct guidance on how to build the group. Secondly, that OC meeting very much reflected the dominance of a bloc of the Toronto majority with the leaderships of the Montreal and Ottowa branches, united by little more than a common hostility to Abbie and her supporters. We warned at the 1985 international meeting that such a bloc, lacking any clear and principled political basis, was not a stable entity. The resumption of factional hostilities, which began with the dispute over the editorship of SW at the convention, reflected the inevitable disintegration of this unprincipled bloc rather than any crime committed by the Toronto minority. How then, can the crisis be resolved? The majority at the August OC appeared to think that the solution lies in the surgical removal of the minority first from the Toronto branch, but ultimately from the organization. This is an extremely short-sighted and irresponsible attitude to take. In the first place, a group of eighty cannot afford to lose any members, especially ones who are, for all their mistakes, serious, committed, and active revolutionaries such as those in the minority. Secondly, a split always costs more than those actually expelled. Other become demoralized by the arguments, and by the shrunken size of the group, and leave as well. Let us give an example from our own experience. In 1975 we expelled a substantial number of members in Birmingham. We were right to do so: a major political difference had arisen leading to serious breaches of discipline on their part. Moreover, the disagreement reflected pressures from the outside, since many of those expelled were engineering workers who were being pulled rightwards by the onset of the downturn. Nevertheless, our Birmingham district was severely damaged by the split, to the extent that, even today, from being one of our strongest big-city organizations in the early 1970s, it is now one of our weakest. Splits and expulsions, even when unavoidable, exact a very high price. Thirdly, what guarantee is there that getting rid of the Toronto minority will be the end of the matter? The IS went through a succession of splits in the late 1970s during its last period of crisis. If the minority in Toronto are expelled on an arbitrary and factional basis, why stop there? There are growing tensions between the Toronto majority and Ottowa on the one hand, and the Montreal branch on the other. And once Montreal has been "sorted out", what there to stop the victors from fighting over what will by then be very meagre spoils? Those who live by the sword perish by the sword. The IS is in a fragile enough state as it is: the fact that barely half the membership attended the August summer school/OC is not a good augury. The outcome of the succession of expulsions to which the present path taken by the majority is leading could be a mere rump, unable to produce a monthly paper or even to pretend to be a national organization. It is because we are desperately concerned to avoid such a disastrous outcome that we have written this letter. Nothing of substance divides the members of the IS. Indeed they have far more in common - namely the revolutionary socialist tradition. Re-uniting the organization requires recognizing this, and seeing also that building a revolutionary group involves enormous resources of patience and tolerance, and a sense of proportion. All these qualities are sadly lacking in IS Canada at present, but there is no reason why its members, who we know are deeply committed to the group and to the ideas it embodies, should not be able to recover them. We appeal: 1) to all members to step back from their present factional alignments; 2) to supporters of the majority to abjure the use of disciplinary measures against the minority; 3) to supporters of the Toronto minority to abjure the kind of factional nitpicking which helped to provoke the present crisis; 4) to all members to use the discussion period leading up to the national convention to hammer out a perspective that can build the group. This letter is intended as a contribution to the process of political clarification essential to re-uniting the group. There is still time to save the IS. Yours fraternally Tony Cliff and Alex Callinicos for the Central Committee of the Socialist Workers' Party ( Britain ) Draft Steering Committee Coppy [sic] to Branches 25 September 1986 Crisis in the IS - First Contribution from Montreal. It is indeed an exceptional situation for the SWP Central Committee to intervene in our organisation with its open letter. We welcome the letter as a fair description of the state of the organisation, and, more importantly, as a framework for at least beginning the much needed debate inside our group. In May David McNally came to Montreal (with Paula and Kogan) to present his view of the crisis in Toronto. He first stressed that there had been a considrable increase in the level of activity in TO around SW sales, demonstrations and strike visits. It was agreed that it was work of this kind that gave any prospect of healing the branch. No diffferences of political substance were identified between the two sides in TO. The logic of David attacking the minority with disciplinary measures was seen to inevitably escalte into a national fight (as Montreal would come to the support of the minority and Ottawa the majority and so on...). Such a fight would have many casualties, since it would be started on poison not political clarity. In this context, creating two branches was discussed as a possible alternative to an unprincipled national fight (some members in Montreal liked the idea, others opposed it). Possibly the two sides might begin to calm down if they didn't have to see each other every week. such a move implied the political failure of David to unify the branch around the work of building the IS, not a disciplinary action against the minority. David, Paula and Kogan agreed that there were excellent comrades in the minority and that the minority pulled their weight in paper sales, attendance at meetings, demos, and pickets. It was also state many times by them that Montreal was a healthy branch. To us in Montreal it was clear that punitive action against the minority should not, and we assumed would not, be taken. Their visit ended in an air of good faith. David said he would phone to continue these fruitful talks before going to the International meeting in Britain (he didn't). (Incidentally, the April OC had asked David to send copies to branches of the report he was going to give to the International meeting, but he didn't. When challenged in August, he promised to do so but still hasn't.) There was surprise and extreme anger therefore in August when heard reports of the OC and received copies the two main resolutions. We were not informed before the OC that anything of this kind was going to be raised at all. In fact we received no proper political preparation for the OC at all, just the flyer for the Summer School. In contrast, comrades in the Ottawa branch were consulted some three weeks before, and invited down to prepare the resolutions. (By the way, some people seem to want to draw significance out of the absence of montreal comrades at the OC. Several comrades had made it clear in April that they could not attend an early August OC. Near the day it looked as if we could get a car load of 5 down, but when the car couldn't go the others could not rake together the train fares.) Everything positive that we had discussed with Dave in may was gone by the August OC. Gone was the recognition that in fact there had been improvements in Toronto through increased activity, paper sales etc. by the body of good comrades on both sides of the TO branch. The two branch proposal was no longer a means of creating space for the two sides to build without some of the poison. It had become a Frankenstein to punish the minority for all our sins and by an implication exhonerate [sic] the existing IS leadership around David. Gone also, we discovered pretty quickly after the OC, was the idea of Montreal as a healthy branch doing good work. (It is after all the only Branch in Canada to have grown during the past 18 months of crisis -from 8 to 17- which doesn't make us necessarily correct but does give us the right to be considered genuine). It became clear that we were next for the boot. This became in a sense the last straw. We have had many longstanding [sic] disagreements with David and the "centre". Now, out of intensified political disagreement , (and basic self-defence), it was decided, by especially those comrades who had experience of conventions, OCs etc, to formally go into opposition. On 14 August Joe Herbertson resigned from the OC Steering Committee. On the phone David accepted this as he had now come to the conclusion that David, Bryan and Sandra were in political opposition to Joe. We wrote on 27 August of our intention to oppose the August OC decisions (or more to the point the political thinking behind them), and to attempt a serious pre-Convention debate to get a more honest accounting of our problems and set out some new perspectives. Since we clearly do not have the sympathy of the dominant leadership in the IS (eg. the current steering committe [sic] members, who in turn have had a comfortable numerical majority at teh [sic] Convention and the two Ocs this year) we see the need to fight as a principled, temporary faction. We promised an initial letter early in September. This was delayed because of the healthy demands on our time (see Oct SW), and also because as we talked things through it became clear to us that things were even worse than we thought. Now much of what we would have had to deal with in our initial letter has been covered by the SWP Central Committee's Open letter. We welcome the intervention of the SWP, and accept the broad framework of their letter as the starting point of debate. Below we state 7 basic themes we take as central to the SWP letter, and then expand on each of them. This remains an initial letter, which will need to be followed up with specific documents on the various aspects appropriate for developing a solid perspective by Convention (namely, branch building, work in the colleges, contacts with workers, campaigns and coalitions, Socialist Worker etc etc.). 1. The crisis threatens the very existence of the IS. The seriousness of our problems is highlighted by the fact that the present alignments, based as they are on an unhappy blend of politics and personalism, represent roughly a potential 50:50 division in the group. If things continue unchecked, leave alone possible expulsions, the organization could well fall apart or split in two. 2. A serious debate in the organization, leading up to Convention next January is essential. This will inevitably be sharp and often heated. In so far as it leads to clarification, and a new set of perspectives that allow us to build, we may be able to limit the casualties. In the past we have tended to fudge. In a desire for unity we did not debate clearly why David's "Building in the Downturn" document for the 1985 February convention (signed by 18 IS comrades) was wrong, nor did we honestly deal with why it was necessary for Abbie to stand down as National Secretary in May. Therefore, some of the political problems associated with David's original document, or the legacy of Abbie's method of organising, could raise their heads at a later date in different contexts, thereby limiting our progress in developing some good perspectives and practices for building the group. Underneath the personalism identified in the SWP letter is a history of problems that need to be dealt with, although not in an inward looking fashion. We must not be afraid of polarisation if it begins to create some political clarity. part of developing new perspectives is some very honest accounting of how we've been conducting ourselves this past year or so. Nor will it be enough to bemoan the poison between certain members in Ottawa and Montreal. We have to find the political causes, and resolve them. 3. What has passed as political debate has often been a welter of petty, personal conflicts. Apart from Dave and Abbie, the two sides in TO include a number of people whose personal relationships broke up in bitterness. No doubt this provided fuel for personalism and poison. However, why has it persisted for so long? The answer is that this sort of personal factionalism has political roots, and will not disappear by self-restraint and a cold shower. We have in fact inherited a legacy of running the group, established by Dave and Abbie, that puts sustaining personal control high on the priorities. Many people with talent and energy have been demoralized or driven out of the group if they were seen as some challenge to the "leadership". This situation was perpetuated by a system of patronage in the branches. Disagreements over activity would be resolved in terms of who had control of the branch, not what was the perspective for building that particular branch. The legacy is that we are terribly underdeveloped. We simply do not have a wide layer of independent thinking, confident branch builders that would form the cadre of our organisation. This has very seriously damaged our ability to debate our problems. Perhaps the most striking remaining product of this legacy is Bryan McDougal [sic], whose desire for top-down control, rigid moralism and his instinctive reliance on "punishment" (of others) as a means of dealing with disagreements, forced the Ottawa comrades to take the very unusual steps of barring him from any role of leadership and influence in the branch in 1984. Despite his claimed "rehabilitation", it is clear from his dealings in the national style of leadership is still a real problem. There is nothing controversial in this as an account of history. Dave, Abbie and Bryan have all admitted it on various occasions since then. Dave describes the situation of his leadership quite well in the passage quoted by the SWP(p9). But that passage would even more accurately describe the present situation. things have not improved in these respects; if anything the situation is worse. Take as one example the way Dave has responded to political criticisms to his editorship of the paper. In December, 1985, the Montreal branch had a number of pre-Convention discussions on the paper (see the document written up at that time, Appendix 1). Informally Dave admitted that he would welcome a change in role, a replenishing of his political batteries etc. However he was worried that no-one had the capability to take over yet. John Bell then agreed to have a go, if he had the help and support of the comrades in TO. By the eve of the January 1986 Convention Dave argued a different line, namely that any challenge to his editorship would be exploited by Abbie and reopen the past faction fight. In addition it became obvious to us that John's editorship would be sabotaged even were he to be elected. Therefore John decided not to stand in the elections for editor. (Incidently we agreed under pressure from David to withdraw the document on SW from the Convention, not wanting to reopen the old faction fight and conceding that the document had arrived in TO only a few days before Convention. This was a political mistake, and in retrospect an example of what the SWP open letter refers to as the unprincipled block against Abbie. in the event it was obvious that Dave had wildly exaggerated the possibility of Abbie making any significant impact on the Convention. Even in terms of personalism the argument was a storm in a teacup. What was really the case is that Dave can not tolerate personal criticism. Dave later, on many occasions, argued that the lesson from this sordid affair must be to argue on political principles out in the open, with documents released sufficiently in advance for comrades to digest them. We agreed. However, was Dave's handling of the run up to the August OC any the better?) In January Dave reported to us in Montreal on the phone that he would probably stand down as editor within four months. He subsequently added 4 loyalists to the Ed board, and reported in montreal after our day School that he would now stay on. In a new change of tack he now argued that our criticisms were inward looking, and not political. (Take a look at the infamous, withdrawn, SW document to see whether we were guilty of such a crime. We would certainly not claim it to be a perfect document, certainly now that so much additional water has passed under the bridge.) By August Nancy and John from the minority were off the ED Board and a criterion for pasting up the paper even became subject to a loyalty pledge to David and the majority coordinating team (see August 13 point resolution.) We have come full circle. Dave has resisted a serious debate about the political content of the paper. instead of giving a political lead, shaping the paper, solliciting [sic] articles and making the paper begin to make what the SWP letter calls concrete propaganda, he has instead responded by protecting his personal control. To raise these matters is not to revert to personalism, but to begin to recognise that there are some very unhealthy and unaccountable methods of giving leadership and direction in our organisation. We have to break with the petty personalism that has plagued the IS. To make any progress comrades are going to have to break with some almost instinctive responses to line up on the basis of personal loyalties. But to have this debate, and still have Dave and Bryan in effective control would be to fudge one of the more prickly problems and resort to damaging sentamentalism [sic]. The personalism and poison has part of its political roots in the personal desire for control by some of our leading comrades. For those who have followed the situation in the ISO in the States, who could argue that it has not been valuable to create space for new people to take over the reigns and remove Cal and Barbara Winslow from leadership? As the SWP letter highlights, all this has been made very much worse by the absense [sic] of perspectives for seriously building the IS; but it has also been a block to developing fresh perspectives. As we have tried in practice to begin to develop a practice for qualitative and quantitative growth in Montreal the process of generalising our lessons to the rest of the group has been slowed because of this unhealthy internal atmosphere. The very same comrades will say in almost one breath that we are going good work but we are wreckers! it is not personalism in a small group to see that certain individuals are important (in both a positive and negative sense). So the question of who we elect to responsible positions in the IS at Convention for the coming year (editor, sec, steering committee, tres., branch coordinators etc) is part of resolving our crisis. As long as we remember, of course, that it will all be bullshit if we don't have a good open debate on perspectives running up to the Convention. 4. There is no perspective for building the IS (the group has stagnated for many years. in practice we are trying to develop a set of perspectives in Montreal, and we certainly have convinced ourselves at least, that significant growth is possible. Since the 1985 May OC and the "Way Forward" the branch has gone from 7 to 17) 5. the Toronto East Branch must be given complete backing to operate on the same terms as the TO Central branch. The August OC resolutions must be thrown out. (Whether we maintain 2 TO branches is a tactical question that should be looked at again only once there is some measure of political clarity.) 6. the perspectives for Socialist Worker have to be changed to be based around concrete propaganda. We attach a copy of the Socialist Worker document prepared for last January's convention, but withdrawn under pressure from David. it is by no means adequate, and much water has passed under the bridge since then making the election of a new editor this year essential. We will write up a SW document to contribute to the present debate. This will cover the editorial aspects, and how we use it in the branches) 7. the interpretation of democratic centralism on display in August must be rejected It is a sick joke that the disciplinary measures against the East TO comrades were justified in the name of democratic centralism. Our internal regime is unhealthy, debate is quickly taken personal offence to, we don't know how to make decisions, our most elementary organisation is a mess etc. And there certainly hasn't been any lead given from the centre. TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS October 9, 1986 We welcome the open letter from the SWP as a positive contribution to the current debate in the Canadian IS. We accept the spirit and the central direction of the letter, despite serious reservations about several aspects of the SWP's interpretation of recent events. Most importantly, we agree that an immediate change of course is required to shift the terms of debate onto a political basis. We are putting toward the following statement as a step in that direction. 1. We will recommend at the next Organizing Committee meeting the immediate withdrawal of all punitive aspects of the motions on permanent factionalism and the creation of two Toronto branches passed at the August OC meeting. 2. We agree that all sides in the IS, including the Toronto majority and Ottawa have participated in a process of apolitical factionalism. All sides have treated organizational solutions and changes in personnel as a necessary precondition to principled political debate about how to build the IS in the current period. This has produced a series of factional battles in which genuine political differences have been obscured, making it impossible to clarify any political differences that may exist. Political debate about any differences that exist on how to build the organization should be the only basis for organizational changes. 3. The climate created by ongoing infighting has created a political vacuum at the center of the IS. Currently, there is no political strategy that has been articulated, accepted and consistently acted upon by a clear majority of the organization. Effective direction and leadership in a revolutionary organization must be based upon a strategy for building the group; a strategy designed only to beat other faction [sic] within the IS does not provide a basis for effective leadership or growth. 4. We call on all sections of the organization to immediately abandon all factional alignments based on organizational and personnel changes and to combat all tendencies to slander and gossip which have been generated by apolitical debate. 5. Since there is no accepted and adequate strategy for building the IS at present, a period of open and principled debate is essential. As a contribution to such a debate comrades in the Toronto Central and Ottawa branches promise to prepare discussion documents for the 1987 convention. 6. We call on comrades in all branches, and in particular the Toronto East and Montreal branches, to contribute in writing to this debate. While it is important to clarify the roots of the current crisis, the upcoming debate must focus on the question of strategy for building the IS in the present period. --Brian McDougall and David McNally (endorsed by Ottawa branch) To the Steering Committee Circulate to Branches/Copies to all members 20 October, 1986 The Crisis in the IS: Initial Response from Montreal to the SWP Letter It is indeed an exceptional situation for the British SWP Central Committee to intervene in our organization. We welcome that intervention, having made very similar criticisms and observations for quite some time. The SWP letter can be a framework for at least beginning the much needed debate in the Canadian IS. However, the situation is in our opinions even worse than that put forward by the SWP- on two of its central themes: (i) personal factionalism and (ii) perspectives. (i) The SWP letter describes well the poisonous atmosphere in the IS, and puts it down to a consequence of us not having a correct perspective for growth. But the apolitical personalism in the group has political roots in that some leading members have cultivated it over many years as a means to maintain control of the organisation (In our opinion, David, Bryan and Abbie are the prime examples). It has become part of the political method. And this in turn has blocked putting good perspectives into practice. Thus we cannot simply shake off the legacy without a very serious examination of the way we conduct ourselves, and the method of leadership. Part of the coming perspectives debate has to be directed to challenging the thoroughly unhealthy internal regime of the IS. We need to develop a collective leadership in the branches based on consistent work. Our present system of "leadership" continues to be unacceptable and undemocratic, and does not encourage the development of comrades' political and organisational skills. The consequence is a very low level of political debate in the organisation, and a grossly under-developed cadre for an organization of our age. (ii) On the question of perspectives the SWP letter to some extent misses the mark by concentrating on "The Way Ahead" document in May 1985 by David McNally. This has never been particularly significant in practice. There is what is written, and there is what is done. So the "upturn in a downturn" problem identified by the SWP letter has rarely been in evidence. (A noted exception was the PSAC coverage in the winter, which in length and its propositions for activity would have been more appropriate had there been a prospect for an explosion of strike activity and a layer of militants that could challenge the beaurocrats [sic]. The result was very tedious SW coverage.) More typically, a central problem is that the paper is neither an "upturn" nor a "downtown" paper. We have long argued that the paper relies too heavily on essentially timeless statements of fundamental principle, that gives the paper its staleness. What is missing is a sense of connecting in to real questions of concern to socialists, and prospective socialists, in Canada in the middle 1980's. There is a strong tendency, politically encouraged by the Editor, to abstain from the real world. (To make the paper connect to the real world does not mean we can change that real world.) Our paper is a hit or miss mixture of some good individual articles in a sponge of abstract propaganda. The result is a paper with no sense of analysis of relevance to socialists in Canada today. Rather than an "upturn" or a "downturn" paper, ours could perhaps be called a "vacuum" paper with little sense of who we are writing for and why. But we are not really going to solve the problems of abstentionism in the paper (or in the language of the SWP letter, the inability to develop concrete propaganda), without looking at branch building and IS perspectives generally. As we in Montreal have discussed the crisis in the IS over the past few months, we have come to see that the complete confusion over perspectives is not because we haven't had a good perspective. Many good things have been written, and some good work has been done. In these cases there has been working to two different perspectives, which are pulling us in opposing directions. We believe that at heart there have been two basic responses to the downturn in the IS. To put it crudely, one is to give up, the other is to build around consistent work. The first type of response to the downturn was most clearly articulated in David and the 18's "Building in the Downturn" document at the 1985 Convention. In a desire for unity in 1985 we did not deal adequately with why that document was political suicide, and we have paid the price of that fudging. Many of the political problems of that perspective have raised their heads in different contexts ever since. (The letter from Tony Cliff and Lindsey German at that time should be re-read by everyone now.) We have to break consciously from those inevitable pressures on us to adapt to the downturn with passivity and abstract propaganda. That is pulling us in the ultimate direction of becoming an academic study circle. David, no matter how many perspectives has formulated on paper since then, has not in practice broken from that perspective. Coming to terms with the downturn is not to justify doing nothing, it is not a question of holding on waiting for the upturn. For those who like labels, this becomes a case of engaging in downturn determinism or perhaps more accurately, downturn miserablism. Understanding the downturn means finding a way to build in this extremely difficult environment for revolutionaries. The starting point of any perspective for building in the downturn is the notion of "back to basics". Firstly, that means emphasising the central core of our politics in our branch meetings and in the paper. In a downturn, it is very easy to lose sight of our ultimate objectives of workers' power, with a consequent collapse of self respect, and a loss of confidence in the groups [sic] relevance. We have to feel that what we are doing now, no matter how modest, is some meaningful contribution to building a revolutionary party in Canada that can play a decisive role in mass class struggles, and ultimately in smashing the state. Secondly, we have to make sure that our weekly meetings are a place for non-members to come and learn, and begin to get involved with our activities. The meetings must provide an atmosphere for the political development of members and contacts. The weekly branch meeting is absolutely central to building the IS. The numbers present at branch meetings, and particularly the numbers of non-members, are the best yardstick of our political health. If attendance is poor then you know you have a problem, either with the meetings themselves (people will not continue to come to metings [sic] if they do not learn things at them, and if they seem a waste of time ie. they must give some direction to the work of the branch in the coming week) or with your work. We will never make lasting gains from outside activity if our meetings are not good. (We will return in later documents to these questions) Thirdly, selling Socialist Worker is at the very heart of how we relate to the outside world. It is how we identify ourselves, and how we find people. Selling the paper will become a chore if there is not a confidence that it will help you find new people. In turn, you need to have confidence that any new person will find the meetings interesting and helpful, and that there is some meaningful activity for them to get involved in. (The question of the content of the paper is a separate question that we will address more fully in later documents) Fourthly, there has to be a serious attitude to organisational matters: coordinating, preparing for the meetings, following up on any new people, contacting people for meetings, getting to sales on time, getting things done once you've agreed to do them etc etc. It is quite important to create a sense of collective discipline, joint effort, and professionalism about our work. The criticism that there is no politics in Montreal is in itself a non-political argument, and is in part a reflection of a cavalier, and ultimately abstentionist, attitude to building an organisation. Only when you have the basics in place, can you really begin, slowly, to expand your horizons and lift the level of activity in the branch. Activity which has been labelled "mindless" has been quite modest. Problems arise when activtiy [sic] isn't directed to building the meetings, widening your circle of regular readers, increasing the numbers of contacts etc. Loose talk which sneer at "mindless activity" has been dangerous in the IS. We must build up the level of activity, and have branch leads who lead from the front, to raise the level of activity of the more passive members, not pander to passivity. In Montreal we have been trying to build on this perspective for a couple of years and slowly the benefits are beginning to become more apparant [sic]. If your feet are firmly on the ground, and you have a strong committment [sic] to the core of the politics, and you look after the basics of meetings, coordinating, and paper sales, then you can very dramatically increase the size of your general periphery. At any time of course special attention has to be given to the one or two people that are closest to joining . But is essential to build a larger periphery. There are people out there interested in socialist politics. You've got to get out there and find them. We will draw up a comprehensive branch report for the November OC because we have learnt so much (both positive and negative) from our activities around the campaign to stop South African shipments, from our work around the colleges, and from our attempts to develop some relations with individual workers. It has reinforced the central need to be strong on the basics. It has convinced us that the general level of activity in the IS should be raised, it has convinced us that it is possible to grow in the downturn, and it has convinced us that many of the current practices for work in coalitions, in the colleges etc in the IS have to be challenged. None of this is new. We have been arguing it for a long time. In fact the two basic responses to the downturn (pulling us one hand toward a passive, academic study circle or on the other hand towards a determined attitude to building an organisation of revolutionaries) are in evidence to varying degrees in all branches and even within individual comrades. That is why present alignments are not based on politics. There are political differences as we discussed above. But these do not correspond neatly to the present alignments in the IS. Therefore, the personal factionalism and the present alignments are a block to identifying and resolving them. To develop new perspectives will not mean plucking them out of thin air. It will mean examining our experiences in a very honest fashion, and identifying and decisively rejecting those abstentionist politics and rotten organisational practices which are pulling us towards destruction. And it will mean identifying and consciously reinforcing those practices that lead to an active outward looking approach from which we can build, starting with solid foundations of regular consistent work and gradually opening up new possibilities. Only then can we develop in practice an on-going dialogue in the group on how to combine activity and propaganda in the downturn. Then we can begin to share our experiences, and generalise from them. the present political situation has made that almost impossible. The consequences of failure to do this are extreme. As the SWP letter says, our continued existence is at stake. The present alignments, based as they are on an unhappy combination of politics and personalism, represent a potential 50:50 division in the group. If things go unchecked, leave alone expulsions, we could fall apart or split in two or three. If we do not resolve the political questions of perspectives and leadership, then many of the best comrades will fall away through demoralization, leaving a sectarian rump. If we do make a decisive turn, then the prospects are good. We have no serious competition on the Canadian left. A mass party can not grow numerically in a political downturn. A small party like the British SWP can grow in one and twos. But a tiny group which grows consistently in ones and twos can double and triple its membership, without the needs for a fundamental improvement in the levels of class struggle. Joe Herbertson Nelson Calder Ian Thompson To the Steering Committee Circulate to Branches/copies to all Members 21 October, 1986 Initial Montreal response to the letter from Bryan McDougal [sic] and David McNally, dated October 9, 1986. 1.We of course agree that the OC in November must drop all punitive measures against the Toronto East branch. 2.We agree that a period of open principled debate leading up to Convention is necessary. At the OC we should have presentations from each branch in order to establish the scope of agreement and disagreement, so we can identify the key questions of debate, but not necessarily resolve them. The OC can then agree on a structure for Convention that allows the debate to be clarified and resolved. The OC must set a date for Convention. 3.We agree that the political centre of the IS has completely failed, but the problems run deeper than just apolitical in- fighting. They are the result of poor political and organizational methods of our current leadership. That Bryan and David agree to lift the punitive measures, agree on the need for a period of open debate, and accept the collapse of the political centre in the IS represent undoubted steps forward. However, despite the 180 degree turn this letter makes, there are the obvious signs that nevertheless it shall be "business as usual". The letter is written with the assumption that Toronto Central and Ottawa will continue as one alignment, distinct from montreal and Toronto East. No attempt was made by Bryan or David to consult with Montreal, and presumably Toronto East, prior to writing their letter. The endorsement of the letter by Ottawa is reminiscent of the situation prior to the August OC where Ottawa was drawn into the practical preparations for the attack on the Toronto minority some weeks in advance, whereas Montreal received no honest indication of what was being planned. There is also an attempt in the letter to tar everyone with the same brush of apolitical factionalism, thereby ducking any responsibility - by those who have actually had control of the IS this past year or two - for the failure to unite the group around consistent work. In Dave and Bryan's letter, we are still not seeing a break with the method of innuendo. Where have we, or others, put personnel changes forward as a precondition for debate? We have not escaped the poison, but when have we resorted to apolitical factionalism, against the interests of building the group? We may well ask, why have annual elections at Convention at all, if to want different people in positions as a consequence of your political assessment is labelled "apolitical personnel changes". We have no "preconditions" of debate, but we do have opinions that we will argue and solutions that we will put forward in the course of the political debate around perspectives. Lets [sic] be quite clear and honest; we have political reasons for not wanting David and Bryan (or for that matter, Abbie) in the leadership of the IS for 1987. But we feel that it is not a precondition for debate, just part of the solution. The lofty appeal by Bryan and David for all sides to abandon their alignments based on organizational and personnel changes is in part an attempt by them to protect their current positions of control in the group. After all, no one in opposition to dave and Bryan have any positions that could be threatened by "personnel changes". Every single position of responsibility in the national organization is held by people who have been part of Bryan and David's alignment. It is essential that an open perspectives debate that is attempting to save the very existence of the IS does include an honest examination of the manner in which we operate, the unhealthy internal regime and the reasons for the failure of leadership. Room has to be created for fresh people to develop and take on responsibilities for the paper and the national centre. We have to learn how to debate, for our own survival. It is precisely principled debate that allows for serious differences to be aired without being accused of splitting, wrecking etc etc ad nauseum [sic]. For a year now, we have not wanted Dave to continue as editor. So what? Have we refused to sell the paper under his editorship? No, we have roughly doubled our sales this year. And during the year we have seen Bryan in operation (in matters going outside the borders of Ottawa) and we do not want him to continue as a Steering Committee member. So what? Have we stopped building the IS in this time? Of course not. We have roughly doubled the attendances at our meetings, and we have greatly increased the numbers of contacts and loose periphery. We make a somewhat different appeal to the comrades than made by Bryan and David. It is a grim fact that many have followed the twists and turns of David and Bryan with little evidence of political independence or principle. We ask comrades to break from the almost habitual, instinctive responses. Break with the mentality of the blocks. We are not asking you to now agree slavishly with us. Disagree, argue, by all means. But if we do not shake off the personalism, the suspicion, the rigid apolitical loyalties, then we will go down to ruin in exactly the way the SWP letter predicts. We have already been accused of being irresponsible for wanting changes in leadership without people in place now to take their place. This is to miss the point: serious damage is being done by the existing leadership - [w]e can not let that continue. Potentially there are many comrades in the two Toronto branches who could do a better job. In any case, we need to change the method of leadership, based on a spirit of collective work to get the perspectives carried through in practice. The pre-Convention and Convention debates will begin to identify those comrades who are breaking with the current political and organizational practices,and who genuinely want to build a revolutionary group in Canada today. It is such comrades who we shall vote into the positions of responsibility at the end of Convention. Joe Herbertson Nelson Calder Ian Thompson