BRITISH COUNTER INSURGENCY STRATEGY by Pat McGeown from-- An Camcheachta/The Starry Plough The Theoretical Magazine of the Irish Republican Movement Issue 1, Volume 1 ***************** In essence Britain's counter-insurgency strategy, which at present dates from the arrival of British forces, their generals and experts in 1969 to the present day, is best described as a political/military strategy coordinating governmental, judicial, economic, social and psychological agencies and dimensions, and aimed at containing, isolating and destroying identifiable resistance. There are some key high points of this strategy, easily identifiable, eg.reforms in 1969-70, the Curfew, Internment, Bloody Sunday, Ceasefire and Motorman in 1972, Sunningdale and the 1975 Truce, Ulsterization, Criminalization and Normalization, Atkins' Talks, Prior's Assembly, Hillsborough and today the Brooke talks. Each major move designed to have a particular effect, from the illusion of political moves towards peace, to inflicting costly defeats on the insurgent republicans. It would be impossible to chart all the plans and intentions for each, and it is not the intention of this paper to do so. However the more latter stages are of particular interest as their effects are still being played out. The final section of this paper will address the central level of current Brit counter-insurgency strategy, the Brooke talks, not in a predictive way but in an analytical overview. Let's remind ourselves of the five essential elements that compose the substance of British counter-insurgency strategy in Ireland, not only at the high points but on a day to day working basis: a. Identify the enemy and its reasons for existence. b. Co-ordinate the resources and personnel of all sections of the establishment against it. c. Contain the enemy and wear it down tactically. d. Isolate and frustrate it is every way, politically and militarily. e. Destroy it. This sectionalising of the process should not be taken as meaning that each is separate, or that one follows from the other in clear cut form as there is much overlapping. It is only used as a guide. While the 'counter-insurgency' expert starts by 'identifying', he is already 'co-ordinating' and so on, while he is 'containing and isolating' he is continually trying to identify new faces and approaches etc. They are continuous processes only finished when he has 'destroyed'. (a)...Identifying the enemy and it's reasons for existence.. When the British decided to commit armed troops onto the streets of the North in 1969, the situation was already one of open rebellion and their primary aim was to counter this and stabilize the situation through identifying those who were rebelling and their reasons for rebelling. Because there had been a history of armed nationalist opposition to British rule there was also the question of whether open spontaneous rebellion would turn into organized armed revolution and, if so, who would initiate that process. Or alternatively, could those leading the rebellion be bought off through reform and appeasement? (John Hume et.al.) In other words, right from the start their strategy had political and military dimensions. However, the initial problem that the British government faced was in finding a suitably coordinated and controlled body that could execute its will. Just who exactly was in charge and who ultimately would make decisions was a problem that would restrict the effectiveness of British counter-insurgency for many years. While all the arms of state control, British government, Stormont government, British army, RUC, and of course the unionist/Loyalist populace agreed on the defense of the state as it stood there were different opinions on what tactics should be employed. This is always a problem when putting theory into practice. What is easily planned and coordinated on paper seldom runs so smoothly when it comes to implementation by humans with different experiences and individual interests. The Labour government of the day appeared to veer on the side of appeasement of the rebellious nationalist population, buying them off with reform in an attempt to control them again. They actively encouraged the setting up of the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party, a Catholic middle class party set up around John Hume. emcelroy.) in an effort to take politics off the street, where the constitutional nationalists had little control, and back into the safe corridors of power in Westminster and Stormont (Northern Ireland's local parliament. emcelroy). Also, by giving the SDLP their patronage they effectively chose the nationalist leadership that they would deal with and they promoted them in the media and press. These are age-old tactics of counter-insurgents in the broadest sense. The Unionists saw the situation differently. They saw all disorder as resulting from IRA conspiracies. The way to put them down was by force and threat of force. The RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary), the armed militia that simply reflected and defended political unionism, supported this view. The British Army at this juncture appear to have been content to just fulfill the first role of counter-insurgency, identify your enemy and the possible causes of discontent. Meetings held between senior British army personnel and IRA leadership at local level were an integral part of this process and also had the primary effect of keeping things quiet without having to actually initiate major political reform that could destabilize unionism. The IRA had of course their own agenda. But again it was an old Brit psychological 'counter-insurgency' tactic 'making the opposition feel important, by structuring them into an institution of state' without handing them any real power. This was to be used again with even greater effect in the 1975 IRA cease-fire period. The experience of 53 counter-insurgency campaigns between the end of World War 2 and January 1969 had taught British counter insurgency experts that there was an intermediate period between open street disorder and full scale warfare which could be used either to defuse the situation or to prepare for the next stage. As always 'containment' was a major cornerstone of their 'counter insurgency' strategy. With the election of the Conservative government to power in Britain in June 1970, and that party's close ties with unionism, the balance of 'security' or counter-insurgency strategy fell very much towards the aim of crushing opposition as opposed to buying it off. The second phase of counter insurgency strategy then began but not without its own problems. (b)...Coordinate all resources and personnel... A 'Joint Security Committee' had been established aimed at linking all the machinery of the state and its forces together into a powerful 'War Machine' capable of a coordinated and controlled politico/military response. However, those who sat on it had differing priorities or short-term objectives. The membership in early 1972 was the unionist Prime Minister, two unionist Cabinet ministers. the British Army GOC, the RUC Chief, and one British government representative. It's make-up demonstrates a heavy imbalance towards unionist phobias and paranoia. It was to cause much friction between Brit army counter insurgency experts and the Stormont administration and local forces. As British military 'counter insurgency' experts like Brigadier Frank Kitson began to arrive in the North carrying with them the experience of British counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus, that tension would increase. Kitson at this time was at Oxford University, writing the British Army's counter-insurgency' bible, "Low Intensity Operations". He was undoubtedly brought to the North in 1970 with the dual brief; to attempt to structure a 'counter insurgency' response and to gain experience of what was a relatively new 'counter-insurgency' situation. There were things that could be done in the far off obscure ends of the 'Empire', which could not be done under the watchful eye of the mass media, in a so-called liberal democratic society so close to Britian and Western Europe. The 'counter-insurgency' strategy for Ireland in the 70's would require a degree of sophistication and subtlety that the unionists were certainly showing themselves incapable of. It would have more to do with propaganda than physical show of strength. This is reflected in the Brit understanding that right from the start they needed to dictate how others saw the essence of the problem in the North. Their first propaganda victory was in getting acceptance for the explanation that the North's 'troubles' had sectarian roots and that British soldiers were the 'peace-keepers'. This is not to say that Kitson advocated a 'softly softly' approach, and his use of a curfew' on the Falls Road in his first days here adequately demonstrates this. Rather, what Kitson saw as important was that all the institutions of state be coordinated to provide a disciplined and controlled politico/military response. While the curfew was essentially the result of unionist political control of day to day 'security- counter insurgency' policy it also suited Kitson's purpose of showing the full extent of state power to intimidate those who may consider opposing it. State terror is an essential part of 'counter insurgency' strategy. Also inherent in the curfew situation was that it would draw the growing 'new IRA' of post '69 days out into an open battle with the Brit army allowing them to inflict casualties, and identify the new operational leaders and faces. In the former aim it was not successful in that only innocent civilians were killed while in the latter it was only marginally successful. The main disagreement between British Army 'counter- insurgency' experts and the unionist leaders and forces was on the timing of internment in 1971. Whilst there was no disagreement around the use of special laws to contain the insurgent threat Kitson et. al. disagreed with internment at this juncture because it had lacked the intelligence preparation that would allow it to seriously disrupt the IRA. Most of the intelligence relied on in the initial internment swoop was outdated, probably due to the fact that the RUC Special Branch tasked with putting the lists together had been generally isolated from the nationalist community since 1969. Furthermore the rapid growth of the IRA made it almost impossible to keep track of new talent and future leaders. It also said that because of fundamental disagreements between the Brits and everyone else on the 'Joint Security Committee' what little up to date intelligence that they possessed was not handed over to the RUC. But the lack of 'hard intelligence is given as Kitson's reason for opposing internment at that time. He devotes much of his book 'Low Intensity Operations' to intelligence gathering, categorizing, and the coordination of its operational use. Internment accelerated the whole process into a state of open warfare and near complete alienation of the whole nationalist community. For this reason, and the ensuing activities of the Brit forces in the months after 'Bloody Sunday' etc., it is now seen by 'counter insurgency' experts as one of the biggest and most costly mistakes of the Brit campaign. Certainly in terms of intelligence gathering and 'counter insurgency' strategy the lesson learned was that the alienation of a community from the state means that little intelligence will flow from that community. (c)...Contain the Enemy: Wear it down tactically... By 1972 nationalist Ireland was almost completely alienated from the British and it was recognized that--as opposed to 'containing' the situation, and allowing it to evolve towards a climate in which a political settlement could be initiated to isolate the 'insurgents'--another cornerstone of 'counter insurgency' strategy, the opposite was happening. Even with the mass internment arrests the IRA had no shortage or recruits and apparently unlimited support and sympathy within the nationalist community, while the possible 'appeasement nationalists' the SDLP had been forced almost completely out of the system through which reform could be initiated. There was a serious imbalance in the politio/military strategy towards the military solution. Through the suspension of Stormont, the institution of direct British government rule and the short-lived IRA truce the British initiated a new political climate which would allow them to rebalance their strategy towards bringing in the reformers (SDLP) and 'isolating' the revolutionaries (IRA). Or at least ensure that the situation didn't deteriorate further, beyond an 'acceptable level of violence.' The climax of this phase of Brit 'counter insurgency' strategy would be the attempted political settlement, and subsequent failure, of Sunningdale in 1974. Meanwhile the day to day 'counter insurgency' tactics to 'contain' the IRA politically and militarily would evolve along the basic lines laid out by Kitson. Psychological warfare, use of special laws and powers, harmonization of all the institutions involved in the battle. As a second arm of this process daily life was to be made 'reasonably uncomfortable' (Kitson's terms) for the nationalist population in the ghettos and villages where the IRA support was strong--to wear them down. This meant at least increased searches and harassment and at worst, sectarian murder carried out by 'pseudo gangs' (Kitson's appropriate categorization of the UDA/UVF and Brit army/agent squads; MRF etc) The methods and the theories were simple. Use loyalist death squads and 'special forces', with their almost racist hatred of nationalists to kill and often gruesomely mutilate generally innocent nationalists. Then keep pumping out the propaganda line that if the IRA weren't fighting there would be no killings. It was and remains ultimate 'state terrorism." As for Special laws and powers they were progressively introduced; the Emergency Provisions Act, (a refined version of the Special Powers Act),--reforms are often little more than refined versions of repressive methods--the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the introduction of juryless Diplock courts. A further important tactic in use during this phase, and with lasting effects, was the use of Brit 'counter-insurgency' operatives in the 26 Counties to attempt to isolate Republicans and allow more pro-Brit elements in the government to have their way. The planting of bombs in Dublin on the eve of a parliamentary debate on special legislation was an example. The whole concept of psychological warfare was something that Kitson pioneered and later went on to teach to all British officers during training as 'psych-ops'. The full extent of 'psych-ops' is infinite and revolutionary, in other words it is continually updated. However, we do know the basic principles--'discredit, demoralize, and intimidate'--some examples of their practical use have been made public in the revelations of ex-British army personnel and agents. It ranges from the most basic black propaganda to murder. Kitson accepted the Mao analysis of what makes guerrillas/insurgents tick, when he wrote, "It is in men's minds that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided.' Following on this psychological state of the collective and individual insurgent's mind becomes a target. As indeed does the hearts and minds of the people who support and shelter them. One technique that became very much a fixation with the Kitsonian 'counter insurgency' strategists and is still in use today was the attempt to create a 'split' in Republican ranks. The 'hawks' and 'doves' stories that continue to appear are an important part of this process. As are the 'going political' stories and their sensationalist 'touts and traitors' line. A brief look at the background of the type of publications and journalists who produce such drivel should demonstrate to anyone where their sympathies lie. A former Brit member of the 'black propaganda unit; Colin Wallace, had much to say about these types of stories and what their aim was. While there are many other examples of how the technique worked in the early years, the best years for a practical study of the battle of hearts and minds is post 1976, when the processes of Normalization, Ulsterization and Criminalization were introduced. (d) ...Isolate and frustrate the enemy in every politically and militarily... The further development and refinement of Brit 'counter insurgency' strategy began in 1975. In 1976 a strategy paper 'The Way Ahead' was produced after consultation between political and military 'counter insurgency' strategists. It laid out a process that would become known as the three pronged strategy of 'Ulsterization, Criminalization and Normalization'. Although in effect the preparation and initiation of this strategy had already begun in 1975. For a range of tactical reasons, the British administration had decided to enter into talks with the IRA in late 1974, early 1975. Not least amongst those reasons was that a 'breathing space' would give them time to prepare the ground for their new policies. They believed that after an initial cooling off period the 'new RUC' could be made, if not more acceptable to nationalists, then at least more apt when linked with the UDR at military type patrolling and containment in nationalist areas.(The UDR, Ulster Defense Regiment, was a regular British army unit drawn from Northern Ireland. Overwhelmingly Protestant, it has served as a revolving door between the British Army and Loyalist paramilitary death squads such as the UDA-Ulster Defense Association and the UDF-Ulster Defense Force. UDR personnel have been constantly implicated in turning over weapons and intelligence files on suspected Republicans to the UDA/UDF. The UDR was also involved in numerous offenses against the civilian population in Nationalist areas. In an attempt to defuse criticism agaist the UDR, it was merged into another regular British Army unit, the Irish Rangers, but this has not resulted in any lessening of human rights violations. facilitator note). This would have the primary effect of reducing the level of mainstream British army commitment in the North, thereby reducing any pressure at home over casualties. Then, years later the real effects of this could be seen when it was disclosed that the RUC/UDR had responsibility for patrolling 80 percent of the territory in the Six Counties. The British Army's task had been reduced to just four 'hard green areas', West Belfast, Derry, South Armagh and part of the Fermanagh/Tyrone border. Also, by using a 'police force' as the frontline defense against insurgency it may be possible to de-politicize the situation and portray it as something less than a war, a battle between 'police and criminal gangs'. And a reduction in the level of actual British troops could be portrayed as part of this cosmetic exercise. The implications at home and abroad for Republican insurgents were not initially clear but they would become so in the days ahead. Central to the whole process was the 'psych-ops' tactic and the primary aim was to isolate and frustrate Republicans. ...Ulsterization... To effect Ulsterization, the RUC had to be restructured and remolded in the image of a professional, non-sectarian police force. That this is still being attempted 15 years later says a lot. To this end the leadership of the force was placed under a 'non-sectarian' English cop Kenneth Newman. Major publicity and propaganda offensives were launched through a generally compliant press and media, and the process of taking people on the streets was 'professionalized.' They were now 'impartial, normal policemen' keeping 'law and order' in a society divided on 'religious' lines, until such times as the politicians could come up with an 'internal political solution.' Proof of this was their arrest and conviction of such Loyalist killers as the 'Shankill Butchers'. The role of Britain would effectively be wiped clean. In effect, it was an attempt to totally internalize the problem and hopefully distract international opinion away from Britain's real position as part of the problem. The struggle, which in the early 1970's. had come to be seen as essentially a 'national liberation war' against the Brits, was re-defined as one of communities divided on 'fundamentalist religious' divisions because the basis of politics in the democratic sense is an element of compromise. By portraying this situation, Britain could get off the hook but continue to control. Defining what problems are is an important part of 'counter- insurgency' strategy, because not only does it dictate how people see each side of the conflict, but it also sets the agenda on which a 'solution' will be based. Psychology would play a central part in the process. In part, it has been a successful policy in that over the last 15 years the level of British troop commitment has been reduced, and the British analysis of the problem is generally the accepted one internationally. ...Normalization... If Ulsterization was in essence a military strategy with political and psychological dimensions, Normalization was essentially the political, social and economic prong. Its central plank was to convince people that normality or peace was returning and that there was no need for war. The 'terrorists' were the only ones who didn't want peace. If they could turn the nationalist community against the insurgents, or make them think they had turned them, they could isolate the insurgent. Thousands of millions of pounds were pumped in during this period to give the impression of growing prosperity and fairness. New housing went up wholesale particularly in nationalist areas. Estates (housing projects in American parlance. facilitator note.) were specifically designed by 'counter insurgency' specialists, so that they could be easily sealed off in the event of an incident. Factories and industry appeared to be booming, again with particular direction towards nationalist areas. Leisure centers (community centers) grew up out of nowhere. Everywhere things appeared to be getting better. "If only the terrorists would stop all could be rosy"..."and anyway, the terrorists were being defeated"..."They were less effective than they had been, the arrest and conviction rates were up and the nationalist community were informing on them". These were all common propaganda lines of the day and statistics were produced to back up their image. The opportunist use by Brit propaganda units of an incident involving IRA volunteers when three children were killed and the subsequent 'gut-reaction' peace movement, to give the impression that the nationalist community were rejecting the IRA is another example of the tactic of psychological warfare in action. This period also saw the increased and more refined co- ordination of all sections of state control, (control in the ideological sense as much as physical). Business leaders met with Generals and RUC chiefs, NIO (Northern Ireland Office, the official British government department charged with administering Northern Ireland. facilitator) officials met with church leaders at a local level, and with press and media people on a regular basis to ensure that their line and explanations were carried. While within the state forces, the fight against insurgents became more refined. Targeting of individual Republicans as opposed to the community became the order of the day. The policy of normalization is an ongoing one so it would be wrong to attempt to judge its real success or failure yet. But what is clear, is that primarily the reason that it has not brought the Brits the success they planned for is because of their inability to get an internal political settlement. Without that the facade of normality doesn't hold up internally or internationally. ...Criminalization... This was to become the most controversial and least secure part of the 'counter-insurgency' strategy. It began with the announcement in 1975 that no one arrested after March 1976 would be entitled to political status in the prisons, but its scope went far wider that prison policy. The Brit propaganda line through which they hoped to influence 'hearts and minds' here and abroad was that things were returning to normal; those who continued to resist were going against the better interests of the community, therefore they should be treated as common criminals. As it was essentially a 'law and order problem', the way to deal with them was investigation, arrest, conviction, and sentencing to a normal prison with no privileges under the due process of law. And anyway, they were 'Mafia-like led by Godfathers only interested in personal gain.' What the psychologically oriented propaganda line hid was special laws, special 'no-jury' courts, presided over by unionist judges who happily accepted co-ordination into the war machine, and ignored torture and ill-treatment as a way of getting convictions which are usually the result of community cooperation in a normal society. Over 80 percent of people convicted in this period were imprisoned on the basis of 'self-incriminating' statements signed under physical pressure and threat in purpose-built interrogation centres. The onus of proof of guilt, normal principle of law, was shifted so that the accused had to prove they were innocent. Essentially, in Kitson's own words, the law became "...just another weapon in the government's arsenal..." which "...becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public." Resistance to criminalization, particularly within the prisons, and ultimately with the hunger strike deaths of 1981 effectively limited the success of this policy. However, it did play an important role in 'counter insurgency' strategy during the late '70's. While the policies of Ulsterization, Normalization and Criminalization didn't succeed in either isolating or wearing down Republican resistance they provide much of the foundations on which current Brit 'counter insurgency' strategy in based and they continue in so far as what is happening today is their extension. (e)...Destroy the Enemy...(?) This last section asks the question...how effective is Brit counter insurgency strategy today considering its practical evolution and its theoretical background. Has it the potential to counter Republican insurgency to the point of breaking it? Present Brit counter insurgency strategy centers around the Hillsborough Treaty, aimed at nationalists and the Brooke talks aimed at unionists. It is based on a 'balancing act', an attempt to balance all anti-revolutionary forces in Ireland, be they British oriented, or 'constitutional nationalist', in a unified structure of sorts which can then be coordinated into the British counter insurgency forces and used to isolate and crush Republican opposition. The Hillsborough Treaty was the start of this process. And it's worth remembering it is a 'revolutionary process.' That is, the plans have not been laid out, just the principles, so that adjustments can be made. The common principle of all involved is to destroy Republican resistance and the potential revolutionary alternative that it may offer to the Irish people. It has an Irish dimension only in so far that 26 County politicians now see it in their interests to that the force of revolution be crushed before they threaten their power and privilege. In this, they have become effective open allies of the Brits and turned their backs completely on national liberation for their own personal interests. The Hillsborough strategy had to undergo changes because of loyalist misunderstanding and intransigence. The Brooks talks are about balancing Hillsborough's illusion of an Irish dimension, and stabilizing unionists through the demand for the amendment of dropping Articles 2 and 3 (articles in the Irish constitution that refuse to recognize partition, and which consider that, in theory, Irish law extends thru all of Ireland.) But in essence the process begun at Hillsborough in 1985 will remain, although its mutual slope and title may change. It marked the first total co-ordination of all counter revolutionary forces in Ireland and Britain. Like all phases of 'counter insurgency' strategy already used it will be evolved and refined in the days ahead and it is important to remember this when dealing with counter insurgency/revolutionary strategy. It mirrors revolutionary strategy in that it too has to be progressive. Albeit only in so far that it brings about limited reforms as those who hold power attempt to hold onto it. The prize that is being played for is who holds power. It can't be static. Because in the main, the Hillsborough process is the current Brit counter insurgency strategy directed against Republicans, we look at it more closely. It is worthwhile remembering the climate in which Hillsborough was conceived and initiated in. There had long been an acceptance amongst military strategists that the IRA could not be defeated militarily. In the period after the hunger strikes and with Sinn Fein's move to radical revolutionary politics and into the public electoral process and their apparent success there, it was felt by the nationalist 'constitutionalists' that unless the Brit government moved there was a danger that the situation would no longer be containable. The Brits saw an opener in the nationalist community in that if the SDLP could be brought in to a internal settlement then the nationalist community could be divided with a significant section siding with British interests. In such a situation it may be possible to mop up the IRA and, through isolating the political force of Sinn Fein, to render it impotent. It required the creating of a basic illusion to end deep nationalist alienation, and some very subtle management to increase the prestige of the SDLP and church (the main anti- revolutionary parties in the nationalist community) to do so. Funding of community based ACE schemes under church and SDLP patronage and the putting down of others and the careful management of international funding are ways of doing this. Hillsborough was all about providing the illusion of an Irish Dimension, whereby basic nationalist rights could be protected by the Dublin government in consultation with London and where it was possible that sometime in the future a United Ireland, the basic ideological target the supports Republicanism, could be negotiated. The practical implementation of this strategy, designed to split and recruit a section of the nationalist community, required a re-identification of who actually was the enemy., as some old enemies may now be allies, a re-look at coordination as there was now the extra dimension of cross-border co-operation, a limited open co-operation of the SDLP and church, and a refinement of containment and isolation in the light of the above. The full effectiveness of the Hillsborough process as a 'counter insurgency' strategy with the potential for destroying Republican resistance remains to be seen. However, one can already see the cracks appearing as the perfect theory is tested against day to day practical implementation. Also the obvious weakness in the Hillsborough/Brooke balancing act is precisely this. It is a balancing act in theory. Too much emphasis or weight to either side and it can tilt out of balance, causing fragmentation. Republicans attempt to influence this by making it difficult for 'constitutional' nationalists to go further into this alliance through conceding Articles 2 and 3, and completely surrendering to Brit/Loyalists. But the internal contradictions of the 'balancing act' are its biggest obstacle. Has it the potential for destroying the Republican Movement? There are two answers to this, a simple basic no, or a more complex analytical response. The basic Republican prediction is that it will fail to bring peace in the same way that other phases have failed simply because armed and political resistance are a 'response' to British rule and all the tinkering and illusion making in the world does not change that reality. Nor does it change the fact that to maintain British rule in the North the British have to rely on a 'divided community', not one necessarily divided on sectarian lines, but divided on the lines of power and privilege. Those who fall on the wrong side of the line, in the frustrating position of no power or privilege have only one means of asserting their voice, through political conflict and armed struggle. These of course will always be the people whoa re either less supportive of, or don't support British rule at all. Summary There may appear to be an over reliance on the directives of Kitson throughout this paper. It must be pointed out that Kitson is not the sole 'counter insurgency' brain behind 'counter insurgency' strategy. He is just one of many. Others whose material should be read are: Professor Paul Wilkinson, International Relations Studies, University of Aberdeen; De. Peter Jancke, Institute for the Study of Conflict; Col. Robin Evelegh, (retired Greenjacket); Maurice Tugwell and Edward Moxon-Browne, both writers for the Institute for the Study of Conflict and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Much of their writings and thoughts are contained in quarterly papers published by the above institutes and available through reference libraries. It is hoped that this paper will provide just an initial flavor of the taste of 'counter insurgency' strategy which has come a long way from when Robert Taber wrote in the "War of the Flea" in the late 60's that the '...counter insurgents could not match the insurgents tactics." Today they not only try to match but sometimes they succeed in being more progressive in their use of methods than the insurgents. Their apparent primary aim now in the North remains--to under cut support for the revolutionary by appearing, through psych-ops, illusions, structural realignment, (a reformed Stormont), to be capable of radical change without revolution, while making the revolutionary appear impotent and inconsistent through isolating and containing them. ********** A limited number of Republican publications, such as The Starry Plough, IRIS, Women in Struggle, The Captive Voice, and the latest Sinn Fein peace plan are available from: Eugene McElroy 265 Townsend St New Brunswick, NJ 08901 ******* Sinn Fein Education Department 44 Parnell Square Dublin 1, Ireland ****** Irish Northern Aid 4951 Broadway New York, NY 10030