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Box 2574 || || Olympia, Washington USA || || 98507-2574 || || Thank You, || || CWIS Staff || || || ||=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-|| ||\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/|| ()=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-() ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: This file has been created under the loving care of :: :: -= THE FOURTH WORLD DOCUMENTATION PROJECT =- :: :: A service provided by :: :: The Center For World Indigenous Studies :: :: :: :: THE FOURTH WORLD DOCUMENTATION PROJECT ARCHIVES :: :: http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/fwdp.html :: :: THE CENTER FOR WORLD INDIGENOUS STUDIES :: :: http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/cwisinfo.html :: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: DOCUMENT: ARIASPAX.TXT Indian Law Resource Center 601 E Street, Southeast, Washington, D.C., 20003 (202) 547-2800 REPORT ON THE NICARAGUAN INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE: A SEARCH FOR INDIAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE ARIAS PEACE PLAN April 4, 1988 The Indians of Nicaragua, after more than seven years of war, have entered into promising peace talks with the Sandinista government. These talks are completely separate from the "contra" peace talks. The negotiators from the Yatama Indian organization, led by Miskito leader Brooklyn Rivera, already have achieved an accord spelling out some basic Indian rights and establishing a truce during the pendency of the talks. A full ceasefire, autonomous self- government for the Indian region, and other issues will be addressed as the talks continue. This progress toward resolution of the Sandinista- Indian war has occurred within the Arias Peace Plan, the Esquipulas II Accord. Nicaraguan Indian leaders saw the August 1987 peace plan of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias as an opportunity to promote a new peace initiative of their own with the Sandinistas. Although the Arias Plan makes no mention of the Sandinista-Indian war, and no reference to Indian rights, the Indian leadership decided to explore the possibility of renewed Indian peace talks that would be separate from the political initiatives of the Nicaraguan Resistance (the "contras"), but within the framework and spirit of the Plan. The Indian leaders wanted an Indian peace initiative that would address the demands for Indian rights and Indian autonomy that have fueled the seven-year war in the Indian territory of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. The war between the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians and the Sandinista government has been widely recognized as separate and distinct from the contra-Sandinista war. The Indian war began in February 1981, before the contras were organized. The principal Indian demands -- for their rights to land, natural resources, self-determination, culture and religion -- have little in common with the demands of the contras. The Indians are not trying to seize power in Managua, and they fear that the contra leadership is as unwilling to recognize Indian rights as the Sandinistas have been. The Indian war has been fought by Indians, on Indian land, against military forces brought into the Indian territory by the Sandinistas. Those outside forces have occupied many Indian communities. Over the years, the Sandinistas tried to impose their political control on Indian communities, forcibly relocated and uprooted tens of thousands of Indians, destroyed scores of Indian villages, imprisoned hundreds of Indians, killed and "disappeared" many Indians who resisted, and committed many other human rights abuses. Yet the Indian fighters have survived against the superior firepower of the Sandinista military, and the Indian communities have continued to resist the government, despite the widespread suffering the war has caused. Both the Sandinista government and the Indians have good reasons to look for a way out of this war. THE FAILED INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE OF 1984-85 President Arias's insistence on political initiatives to resolve warfare in Central America was welcomed especially by the Nicaraguan Indian leadership. Most of the Indian leaders have long insisted that the political fight for Indian rights is more important than the military. One prominent leader, Brooklyn Rivera, undertook a political effort to make peace with the Sandinistas in late 1984, but that peace initiative foundered in May 1985, after four rounds of formal talks in Colombia and Mexico. Those earlier negotiations were the first peace talks between the Sandinistas and any of the armed resistance. They were strongly opposed by the contras (then called the FDN or UNO) and the United States. Those talks resulted in a preliminary accord reducing armed hostilities and expanding humanitarian assistance to Indian villagers, the Mexico City Accord of April 1985, But talks foundered when the Sandinistas refused to address the fundamental Indian rights issues and insisted on discussing only a cease-fire. That breakdown of the political process led to three more years of Sandinista- Indian warfare on the Atlantic Coast. INDIAN PLANS TO UTILIZE THE ARIAS PEACE PLAN When the Arias Plan was announced, Brooklyn Rivera and the other Indian leaders did not respond by joining ranks with the contras. Instead, the Indian leaders developed their OWN plan to assert their OWN rights and interests. First, they had extensive meetings for several weeks with Indian refugees, Indian fighters and other Indians in exile. Through these meetings, they arrived at a broad-based decision to launch a new effort to enter into talks with the Nicaraguan government within the framework of the Arias Plan. Then they released a public statement in early September endorsing that broader peace effort and calling for international attention to the rights and needs of the Indian peoples of Nicaragua. Through press statements and meetings with public officials, the Indians emphasized that their war was not about the East-West conflict. They resolved to stop the manipulation of their people by forces of the left and the right. They informed government officials and the general public that the Indian war would not be ended unless the Indian rights issues were settled by agreement with legitimate Nicaraguan Indian leaders. The Central American presidents who signed the Arias Plan were reluctant to address the Nicaraguan Indian issue. Because each Central American country fails to guarantee Indian rights within its own borders, none had clean hands to accuse the Sandinistas on this point. Nevertheless, progress was soon made through the diplomatic initiative of Rivera and the other Indian leaders, and the Indian peace initiative soon got the support of President Arias. SANDINISTA-INDIAN PEACE TALKS ALMOST BEGIN IN OCTOBER 1987 In September and October, there were serious talks between Brooklyn Rivera and the Sandinista government. These talks were conducted through intermediaries. Rev. Andy Shogreen, head of the Nicaraguan Moravian Church was the most important intermediary. Nobel prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel served as mediator for a time in October, and a Mennonite mediator, John Paul Lederach, also played an important role. Senator Edward Kennedy provided valuable assistance from Washington. On the Sandinista side, the principal official was Tomas Borge, the Sandinsita commander and Interior Minister who is responsible for Atlantic Coast affairs. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto was also involved. President Arias and his foreign minister met with Brooklyn Rivera in October, and President Arias publicly commended the Indian peace effort. Privately, the Costa Rican government helped in many ways to move the Indian peace process forward, communicating regularly with Rivera and the Nicaraguan government. A preliminary agreement was made to begin the new Sandinista-Indian talks in Nicaragua in late October. Despite the opposition of Honduran officials, United States officials, and the Nicaraguan Resistance, a ten-member Indian negotiation commission, headed by Rivera, assembled in San Jose in preparation for the trip to Nicaragua. This delegation included representatives from all sectors of the Nicaraguan Indian organization, Yatama. Yatama had been established at a general assembly of Nicaraguan Indians in June, 1987 to replace and unify the Nicaraguan Indian organizations known as Misurasata, Kisan and Misura. Brooklyn Rivera is one of the Yatama directors. On the eve of the talks, the Sandinista Directorate met in Managua and decided that the Indian commission must submit to the government's amnesty program before it could return to Nicaragua. This amnesty precondition was unacceptable to all the Indian leaders, because it required an act of surrender and submission by the Indians. The government, through Miguel D'Escoto, had earlier informed Rivera and Senator Kennedy that it would not insist on this amnesty as a precondition to talks in Nicaragua with the Indians. The government's change of position on this critical point killed the October talks. DESPITE NEW OBSTACLES, EFFORTS CONTINUE TO FIND A FRAMEWORK FOR TALKS In late October and early November most of the Indian negotiation commission members returned to Honduras, where they were subjected to economic and political pressures by United States and Honduran officials for trying to negotiate "unilaterally" with the Sandinistas. These officials had demanded that there be no Sandinista-Indian talks without prior approval of the contras. Brooklyn Rivera tried to return to Honduras, but he was singled out for special treatment because of his key leadership role. He was barred from entering the country. Despite repeated pleas to the U.S. State Department and the Honduran government to permit Rivera's access to his people in Honduras. He has been barred from that country since October. Rivera's inability to meet freely with Indian leaders, Indian fighters, and over 20,000 Indian refugees in Honduras has greatly complicated the peace process. Armstrong Wiggins, a Miskito leader who works at the Indian Law Resource Center in Washington, D.C., learned in December that he too had been barred from Honduras for the same reason as Rivera. Upon his arrival at the airport in Tegucigalpa, he was summarily deported from the country, without explanation and without permission even to make a telephone call. Indirect talks between Brooklyn Rivera and Sandinista officials continued after the October breakdown. President Daniel Ortega and other members of the Sandinista Directorate took a more active role for the Nicaraguan government, but Tomas Borge continued to be the chief Sandinista official in these indirect discussions. PRESIDENT ARIAS GIVES FIRM BACKING TO THE INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE The early January 1988 summit meeting of the Central American Presidents under the Arias plan was used to formally bring the Indian peace initiative forward once again. President Arias met with Rivera during that summit and personally introduced him to the other presidents. Daniel Ortega and Rivera met privately in San Jose and made final plans to begin direct negotiations in late January. President Ortega assured Rivera and President Arias that the amnesty precondition had been dropped and that the Yatama Indian delegation could meet and travel inside Nicaragua without any precondition. The Costa Rican government agreed to send its ambassador with the Indian delegation to serve as an observer and guarantor of the delegation's security. FORMAL SANDINISTA-INDIAN PEACE TALKS BEGIN IN MANAGUA On January 23, a Yatama Indian negotiation commission of nine members, headed by Brooklyn Rivera, flew from Costa Rica to Managua. Members of the commission included Marcos Hopington, Samuel Mercado, Modesto Watson, Walter Ortiz, Jenelee Hodgson, Herta Downs de Masanto, Julian Smith and Armstrong Wiggins. They were accompanied by the Costa Rican ambassador to Nicaragua. Also with them were Jim Anaya, an attorney with the National Indian Youth Project who was asked by Senator Edward Kennedy to be his personal representative, and three other advisors to the Yatama commission: Dr. Bernard Nietschmann, attorney Glenn Morris, and attorney Steven Tullberg of the Indian Law Resource Center. The talks in Managua began with serious difficulties. Tomas Borge at first insisted on meeting at his Interior Ministry office, contrary to an understanding on the part of the Indian leaders that the meetings would take place in a neutral setting. After several hours of tense discussions, during which Borge threatened to summarily expel the entire commission from the country, an agreed-upon meeting place was found, and all subsequent talks took place at the Moravian Church or at the hotel where the delegation stayed. Borge also objected to the presence of North American advisors and observers. (Sandinista officials had called three of them CIA agents when the 1984-85 Indian peace talks broke down.) The dispute about advisors was not resolved for more than a day. After first threatening to expel all four North Americans, Borge agreed that two of them could stay. Then he completely reversed his initial position and agreed that all four could stay. Other points of contention arose during the first few days of talks. Borge insisted that the Yatama commission denounce the bill for aid to the contras that was pending in the U.S. Congress. He said the Yatama commission's planned trip to visit the Indian communities on the Atlantic Coast would be canceled unless they first denounced the contras publicly. Rivera refused to submit to any such preconditions, and they were eventually withdrawn after extensive discussions. The government also tried to downgrade the talks by presenting Mirna Cunningham, an Atlantic Coast Sandinista official, as the head of the government negotiating team. The Indians refused to negotiate if she was head of the government's delegation, insisting that the government comply with its agreement to have talks at the highest level. Rivera told Borge that the Indian conflict had to be resolved between the Sandinista leadership and the Indian leadership, that it could not be resolved through talks among Atlantic Coast peoples. Borge returned to the negotiating table. Another dispute involved Borge's declaration that the Yatama commission would be denied permission to visit the Atlantic Coast unless it first signed a ceasefire agreement. The Indians refused, but they agreed that no offensive or provocative military actions should take place by either side during the talks. They agreed to promote a truce during the talks and to put a formal ceasefire on the negotiation agenda. By the fourth day in Managua, more calm and productive talks began. It appeared that the government was finally willing to discuss the fundamental Indian rights issues that it had previously avoided. The parties agreed to establish a Conciliation Commission, comprised primarily of religious leaders from the Moravian Church and CEPAD, that would actively participate in the talks. The Yatama delegation submitted a written proposal for a preliminary accord, and the government agreed to respond to it after the Indian commission returned from its trip to the Atlantic Coast. THE YATAMA NEGOTIATION COMMISSION VISIT TO THE ATLANTIC COAST A short trip was planned to the Atlantic Coast Indian region. By Sandinista military plane the Yatama commission, advisors and Costa Rican representative flew to Puerto Cabezas, the main town in the northern coastal region. Today Puerto Cabezas reportedly is the base for some 2000 MINT troops. The nearby military base at Kamla holds over 4000 EPS troops. The Sandinista military presence is overwhelming; uniformed troops and military vehicles are everywhere, giving this small town the appearance of military base. The atmosphere was very tense. The Yatama representatives walked from the airport through the town and held a meeting at the Moravian church. Despite the failure of the government to inform the community of their arrival, the Indian leaders soon were warmly received by crowds of people in the streets. Meetings were held through the night with Indian religious and civic leaders and with family and friends. The Yatama leaders conspicuously refused to meet with the local Sandinista officials in their offices. A rally was planned for the baseball stadium the following morning, before the scheduled noon departure. The baseball stadium rally began late the following morning. Local Sandinista officials had tried to dissuade the people from coming. They refused to broadcast information about the rally on the government-controlled radio, and they set up check points on nearby roads at which they turned back villagers from outlying communities who began walking to town once word of Brooklyn Rivera's arrival reached them. The Sandinista effort to undercut the demonstration of local support for Rivera failed. On extremely short notice, about two thousand people came to the stadium and enthusiastically showed their support for Rivera. Shortly after he began speaking to the crowd, a gang of about 20 individuals began to chant pro-Sandinista slogans in Spanish. (Rivera was speaking in Miskito.) They then moved out of the bleachers and continued their disruption, almost provoking a violent confrontation with supporters of Rivera and Yatama. When it became clear that they were not effective in their protest and that the people were not joining with them, they left, and Rivera continued to speak. With their applause and cheers the crowd demonstrated overwhelming support. When Rivera condemned local Sandinista officials for interfering with the peace initiative because "they feared having their candy taken out of their mouths" (that is, the loss of their privileges), the crowd erupted into loud cheers. He repeatedly called for "peace with justice" for Indians and Creoles of the Atlantic Coast. The group that tried to disrupt the rally was organized and led by Sandinista officials, including Interior Ministry employees, at least one of whom was posing as a news reporter. The group was a small "turba" (also known as "turba divina"), an organized mob used frequently against opponents of the Sandinistas. They became more violent at a later stage in the talks. Jose "Chepe" Gonzalez, the FSLN representative and most powerful Sandinista official in the region, spoke after Rivera finished. The crowd was unresponsive to his Sandinista slogans. When Gonzalez asked everyone to stand for a moment of silence in honor of "the heroes and martyrs" of Slilma Lila, an Atlantic Coast Indian community where an armed clash had occurred only days before, the people remained seated. After the rally, Rivera and the Yatama delegates were joined by throngs of supporters who followed them through the town. As the Yatama delegation prepared to depart for Bluefields, they were greeted by many friends and family, some of whom had just arrived after walking many hours to see them. The Yatama commission continued its trip to Bluefields where the atmosphere was very different. Bluefields has not been militarized like Puerto Cabezas, and the Sandinista officials there were very cordial to the Yatama delegation. A public meeting was held at the Moravian Church gymnasium, with presentations in Miskito and English, and there were no disruptions. Several local officials went out of their way to give a warm reception to the Yatama leaders. Private meetings were held during the night. The Yatama leaders were relaxed and optimistic when they prepared to travel by boat to Rama Key, home of the Rama Indians, the following day. They saw that they had broad popular support in the southern coastal region, just as in the northern. The trip to Rama Key was pleasant and positive. Rivera met with the Ramas in their church and explained the peace initiative. (This is the same church that was bombed by the Sandinista air force in the summer of 1984 when Rama fighters took control of Rama Key for several days.) Then the Rama leader in the Yatama delegation, Walter Ortiz, met privately with the Rama community. There was clear Rama support for the peace initiative. Rama villagers complained about being "molested" by non-Indian contras operating in the area and urged the return of the Yatama leaders once their personal security could be guaranteed. The Yatama commission returned to Managua after a friendly private reception at the home of Lumberto Campbell, the head Sandinista official in Bluefields. A PRELIMINARY ACCORD BETWEEN THE YATAMA INDIAN LEADERS AND THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT Negotiations resumed in Managua on the evening of February 1, two days before a scheduled contra aid vote in the U.S. Congress. Talks between Brooklyn Rivera and Tomas Borge lasted throughout the night and were resumed the following afternoon, after only a few hours of sleep in the morning. The result was a remarkable preliminary accord that is viewed by the Indian leaders as a breakthrough overcoming the impasse that had killed the 1984-85 peace talks. Included in the accord, signed by Rivera and Borge and released to the public on February 2, is an agreement on basic principles of Indian autonomy and territorial and natural resource rights. The parties agreed to refrain from offensive or provocative military actions during the pendency of the talks, and they agreed to meet again by March 1. A formal cease-fire would be on the agenda for that next round of talks. Yatama would enjoy full civil and political freedoms inside Nicaragua once a cease-fire was in operation. Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Norway and Sweden were invited to participate in the peace process as official witnesses. The government also agreed to respond to a lengthy autonomy proposal that was submitted by Yatama in the form of a draft treaty of peace. The autonomy proposal of Yatama goes far beyond the autonomy statute enacted by the government in 1987. Yatama insists that the autonomy arrangement between the Indians and Managua be based on a bilateral agreement. The Yatama treaty proposal would guarantee Indian self-government and control over resources within a demarcated Indian territory to be known as Yapti Tasba (Miskito for "Motherland"). Although the parties still had much to negotiate, there was good feeling on both sides when the first round of talks ended. After a joint press conference, the Yatama leaders returned to San Jose, Costa Rica. MORE OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME IN HONDURAS While the Yatama delegation headed by Brooklyn Rivera was in Nicaragua, the press reported that Wycliffe Diego and Steadman Fagoth, Yatama leaders in Honduras, had denounced the Indian peace initiative. It was later learned that United States and Honduran military officials had demanded the publication of such a denunciation. They continued to insist that Yatama unify with and accept direction from the contras. In fact, there was continuing broad support for the peace initiative among the Indian leaders, fighters and refugees in Honduras. Before undertaking his trip inside Nicaragua, Rivera had met privately with Diego and Fagoth, and they had given their quiet support to his negotiation effort. Opponents of an independent Indian resistance and independent Indian peace initiative, particularly CIA and Honduran military officials, intensified their pressures on the Nicaraguan Indians in Honduras. They called for a "mini- assembly" of Indian leaders on the Atlantic Coast of Honduras. They planned to orchestrate this assembly to achieve two ends. First, they wanted Brooklyn Rivera and his associates in the peace effort expelled from Yatama. Second, they wanted Yatama to unify with the Nicaraguan Resistance. Needless to say, Rivera and all members of the Yatama negotiation commission were barred from coming to Honduras for this assembly. The mini-assembly was held in the Honduran Atlantic Coast community of Tapamlaya, February 26-29. Some 300 Indians were present. Wycliffe Diego, under pressure from U.S. and Honduran officials, demanded that Rivera be denounced by the assembly, and urged unification with the Nicaraguan Resistance. (It was rumored that Diego planned to assume a position on the directorate of the Nicaraguan Resistance.) But Steadman Fagoth refused to support Diego, and he publicly reminded Diego of their private meeting at which they supported Rivera's peace talks inside Nicaragua. Supporters of Rivera, who carried with them copies of the preliminary accord, presented a statement to the assembly that Rivera had prepared. Individuals who had been in Nicaragua when Rivera and the Yatama commission visited in late January gave the assembly a full report. Participants in the assembly demanded that U.S. officials clarify their objectives in calling the assembly, and insisted they would not take orders from United States officials. When Osorno Coleman (Comandante Blas), commander of the Yatama military forces, under pressure from the U.S. Embassy threatened to unify the military command with the contras against the wishes of the Yatama political leaders, the assembly participants threatened to remove him from the Yatama leadership. Azucena Ferrey, a member of the directorate of the Nicaraguan Resistance, was brought to address the assembly and urge unification. Participants demanded clarification of the Nicaraguan Resistance's position on the Yatama autonomy proposal and on Rivera's peace initiative. To the dismay of the assembly, she failed to provide answers to their questions and was quickly taken away by helicopter. (The Nicaraguan Resistance has not yet addressed the Indian autonomy issue.) The end result was that the mini-assembly endorsed Brooklyn Rivera's peace initiative and refused to unify with the contras. This result was infuriating to the United States and Honduran officials who had organized the assembly. Upon returning to Tegucigalpa, they demanded that all supporters of Rivera be denied financial support and be refused permission even to visit the Yatama office. They threaten to expel from Honduras those leaders who refuse to comply with their demands. In early March, they drafted a communique for publication in the Honduran newspaper EL TIEMPO. They insisted that Wycliffe Diego and three other Yatama leaders sign it. That communique announced the expulsion of Rivera from Yatama, for revealing Indian military positions to the Sandinistas and for being a "sell out" and "communist." The same communique also expelled Steadman Fagoth, for human rights violations. In an accompanying editorial, EL TIEMPO informed its readers about the obvious political manipulation by the United States behind this communique. It is clear to all serious observers that the expulsions from Yatama were a sham and that Brooklyn Rivera's leadership and peace initiative is firmly supported by the vast majority of Nicaraguan Indians in Honduras. By barring legitimate Indian leaders from Honduras, and by exerting extreme political and economic pressure on Indian leaders who are in Honduras, United States and Honduran military officials have created serious but not insurmountable obstacles to the Indian peace initiative. Fortunately, the manipulations and threats are increasingly transparent and ineffective, and broad Indian support for the peace initiative continues to be demonstrated in Honduras as well as in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. THE SECOND ROUND OF SANDINISTA-INDIAN PEACE TALKS, MARCH 1988 In compliance with the preliminary accord, a Yatama delegation returned to Managua for a second round of talks on March 1. At first there was a dispute about a Canadian Indian lawyer, Clem Chartier, whom Rivera had invited to accompany his delegation. Chartier, former head of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, had accompanied Rivera in a clandestine trip deep inside the Atlantic Coast region in January 1986. He had angered the Sandinistas and had been called a CIA agent after reporting on the terrible conditions he had witnessed in Indian villages and the bombing by the Sandinista air force at the Miskito village of Layasiksa that almost killed him. Tomas Borge initially refused to permit Chartier into the country, but he relented, and Chartier traveled with the Yatama commission throughout its three-week stay inside Nicaragua. Several days of talks in Managua were followed by extensive travel in the Atlantic Coast region. In the talks, the government raised many objections to the Yatama treaty proposal, some based on legal and constitutional arguments and others purely political. The negotiations were serious and in apparent good faith. The Yatama delegation presented another brief, written proposal in the hope of making progress towards a comprehensive agreement. The government agreed to respond to it after the delegation returned from the Atlantic Coast. THE MARCH 1988 YATAMA VISIT TO ATLANTIC COAST COMMUNITIES The Yatama commission, the Conciliation Commission and the advisors had a very remarkable trip to the Atlantic Coast region. They traveled first to Bluefields, because Tomas Borge said it was too dangerous to fly immediately to Puerto Cabezas. He would not explain the nature of that danger. From Bluefields they traveled north by boat to the Pearl Lagoon villages and as far as Karawala (Sandy Bay Sharon) on the Rio Grande. They then returned to Bluefields, flew to Puerto Cabezas, and went by land to Yulo and to the Rio Coco border with Honduras, visiting Indian civilians and fighters in several border villages. Returning to Puerto Cabezas, they traveled by boat to Haulover and other central coastal villages, as far as Prinsapolka, the town where the Sandinista-Indian war began in 1981. They visited twenty Atlantic Coast communities. At each stop they received an outpouring of support. There was virtually unanimous backing for them in the Miskito and Creole villages, among both civilians and fighters. EVIDENCE OF SANDINISTA ABUSES IN INDIAN COMMUNITIES In two villages, the Yatama delegation found first hand evidence of serious breaches of the truce that had been agreed upon in the preliminary accord of February 2. In a small Miskito community near Karawala (Sandy Bay Sharon), the villagers told of an incident on February 7 when Sandinista officials waylaid two young Indian fighters who were picking coconuts nearby. One of them, "Junior", was shot and mutilated. His eyes were gouged out and his ears cut off by a Sandinista official known as "Melward" who was still stationed at Karawala when the Yatama visitors arrived. The other Indian fighter had been arrested and imprisoned in Bluefields. The villagers told Rivera and the others of this incident in a meeting at their church. Rivera, the Conciliation Commission members, and Dr. Nietschmann told the official who was accused of the killing that they would demand a complete investigation after they left. Several days after the Yatama delegation left the area, Melward was reportedly shot and badly injured in an ambush. This incident was later cited as a reason for arresting Dr. Nietschmann and removing him from the Atlantic Coast region. When Rivera returned to Bluefields from Karawala he was assured by Sandinista prison officials that the imprisoned fighter would be promptly released. In the Miskito village of Kum, along the Rio Coco, the villagers told of another apparent violation of the truce. Sandinista soldiers had reportedly entered the village, surrounded the house where an Indian fighter was staying, and killed him with machine gun fire. Other complaints included harassment by Sandinista officials and severe restrictions on subsistence hunting and fishing. In coastal villages actively patrolled by Sandinista forces, people complained about a serious shortage of food. The Sandinista forces had militarily occupied fishing keys and were prohibiting regular fishing and lobster gathering. In the villages along the central coastal area, where the Sandinista military has not been able to dislodge the Indian fighters, the people have ample food, but they lack coffee, flour and other staples previously acquired through commerce. (In the Corn Island area, the people trade lobsters for dollars and goods brought in small boats from Colombia and Jamaica. Unable to stop this trade, Sandinista officials also have begun purchasing Corn Island lobsters with dollars, and dollars are now the currency most used in daily commerce on that island.) Throughout the region, the people expressed hope that the Yatama leaders would soon be able to return, that the war would end, and that justice would be established in the communities. Even the Kisan Pro Peace group, former members of the armed Indian resistance who are now in Yulo, gave full support to the Yatama initiative. Yatama leaders were told that before they arrived in Yulo, Sandinista officials had visited and instructed the Kisan Pro Peace people to throw rocks and sticks at the Yatama leaders when they arrived. Instead, the Yatama leaders received a warm welcome and an offer of full support for their peace project. THE ARREST OF DR. BERNARD NIETSCHMANN When the Yatama delegation returned to Puerto Cabezas, near the end of its visit to the Atlantic Coast, armed Sandinista security officials suddenly appeared at the hotel where the delegation was staying and sought to arrest Dr. Bernard Nietschmann, a Yatama commission advisor. At the time of their arrival at the hotel, Dr. Nietschmann was not there, so security officials swept through the town looking for him. The Yatama leaders immediately began negotiations about this threatened arrest through the Conciliation Commission members who were with them. The Sandinista officials said they wanted to arrest Dr. Nietschmann and hold him in a "safe house". They accused him of provoking the shooting of the Sandinista official at Karawala. All available evidence suggests this was a pretext; the local Sandinista officials did not want him in town as a witness to coming events in Puerto Cabezas. Rivera was told that if Dr. Nietschmann did not leave at once, he and the entire delegation would be required to return immediately to Managua. The Yatama leaders agreed that Dr. Nietschmann would return to Managua, but they insisted that he be accompanied by a representative of CEPAD, the inter-denominational protestant relief agency that is part of the Conciliation Commission, and that he would return to the hotel where the delegation had stayed in Managua. The Sandinista security officials then confiscated Dr. Nietschmann's passport and sent him to Managua. The two highest ranking Sandinista officials from North Zelaya, Jose Gonzales and Salvador Perez, accompanied him and the CEPAD representative. After two days of further negotiations, Dr. Nietschmann's passport was returned to him. He was reunited with the Yatama delegation when they returned to Managua on March 14. THE RALLY OF SUNDAY, MARCH 13, AND "THE WAR OF ROCKS" As Brooklyn Rivera travelled through the Coast communities, he invited the public to a rally at the baseball stadium on in Puerto Cabezas on Sunday, March 13. Sandinista officials, including Mirna Cunningham, Cesar Pais, Hazel Lau, Salvador Perez and Jose Gonzales organized a week-long campaign to stop people from showing their support at that rally. On their radio broadcasts they instructed people not to come. They visited all of the neighborhoods of Puerto Cabezas in a vehicle with an attached loudspeaker and warned people that their food and medicine rations would be jeopardized if they attended the rally. They set up military checkpoints on roads outside of town to discourage villagers from coming. And these same Sandinista officials sent about 40 "turbas", another of their mobs, to throw rocks at the hotel where Rivera and the others were staying. The turbas chanted pro-Sandinista slogans as they menaced the delegation. Military and police officials stood by and offered no protection, obviously under orders not to intervene. Women who work in the market in the center of the town immediately responded by organizing about 1000 people who surrounded the hotel to protect the Yatama leaders and chased away the turbas. Rivera then walked to the center of town, surrounded by about 2000 of his supporters, showing that he was not intimidated. The Sunday rally was an historic event for the Miskito people. Some 8,000 to 10,000 people filled the stadium to overflowing. They had come to demonstrate their support, and feelings were very high. Rivera was completely surrounded by supporters as he spoke. About 20 minutes into his address, Sandinista military began firing cannon or mortar rounds nearby, and a Sandinista airplane began circling overhead. The crowd was not intimidated by this show of force, and the rally continued, interrupted only by the chants and threats of a small group of 80-100 turbas. Fearing bloodshed in the highly charged atmosphere, Rivera urged the crowd to be calm. He finished his presentation and received resounding support from the crowd. Then the turbas started attacking people with rocks, clubs and chains. The people responded by throwing back the rocks and by chasing after the turbas and beating them. Some of the turbas fled into government offices and were dragged out and beaten. Some of the turbas had guns, and almost all were from the Interior Ministry and local government offices. Miraculously, no one was killed in this melee. (There is an unconfirmed report that one of the turbas accidentally shot another turba.) Today, that Sunday disturbance is known on the Atlantic Coast as the "Guerra de Piedras", the War of Rocks. Among those injured by the turbas was John Paul Lederach, the Mennonite mediator, and a CEPAD worker who is also part of the Conciliation Commission. They had sought refuge in a CEPAD vehicle when the turbas attacked them. They were cut and bruised when the turbas smashed in all the windows, but they managed to escape with wounds requiring a few stitches. The leader of these attacks was the same "news reporter" who had been a leader of the turba disruption at the January stadium rally. A third member of the Conciliation Commission, Moravian pastor Jorge Fredericks, was also attacked and beaten by the turbas. An injury to one of his wrists required a cast. Many Miskitos were injured before the turbas were routed and order was restored. Prominent local government officials, including Mirna Cunningham's chief administrative aide, led the turba attacks. In all of the turmoil that day, the Sandinista military and police forces again refused to intervene to provide any protection against the turbas. RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN MANAGUA Brooklyn Rivera and the Yatama leaders returned to Managua the following day. Their trip had been successful beyond their hopes. They had found deep support for their leadership and for their peace initiative in almost every sector of the Atlantic Coast. Years of efforts by the Sandinistas to divide and conquer the Atlantic Coast peoples had obviously failed. The Yatama leaders would be negotiating from strength. It was clear that Tomas Borge and the Sandinista leadership were at a crossroads. On the one hand they could support the turbas and local Sandinistas who had attacked the Yatama leaders and violated the truce. They could accuse Rivera of inciting the people and could close ranks behind their cadre. This approach would likely result in termination of the peace talks and would require vigorous oppressive measures to reassert Sandinista control over the Atlantic Coast communities. Fortunately, Tomas Borge did not elect that option. Instead, he blamed the disturbances and abuses on local Sandinista officials and offered to accompany Rivera during his next trip to make sure that there are no more such troubles. This approach keeps the peace process on track, whether or not the actions of the local Sandinista officials had prior approval from Managua. The final talks in Managua dealt almost exclusively with Rivera's report and evaluation of the developments and grievances on the Atlantic Coast. There were no further negotiations of the substantive Indian rights issues, and the government apparently needed time to evaluate its next moves. Accordingly, no additional agreements were made, and the Yatama negotiation commission returned on March 16 to San Jose, Costa Rica, promising only to resume talks during the latter half of April, on a date to be agreed upon. Although Brooklyn Rivera and others from his delegation held a press conference and had additional meetings with the international press in Managua, there was virtually no coverage of these important events. International attention on Nicaragua has focused almost exclusively on developments pertaining to the contra-Sandinista war and the related East-West issues. MANIPULATION AND CONFUSION AT SAPOA The pressures applied against Indian leaders in Honduras resulted in more problems for the Yatama leadership after they left Nicaragua. Yatama military commander Osorno Coleman (Comandante Blas) appeared at the Sapoa cease-fire talks between the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Nicaraguan government. He signed the accord and gave the appearance that the Indian resistance was united with the contras. He reportedly had been sent to those talks by United States officials who threatened to cut off humanitarian aid to the Indian fighters if he refused. In fact, Colemen had no authority from his people to participate in those talks. Such authority had been denied at the Indian "mini-assembly" in late February where a proposal for unity with the contras was expressly rejected. This latest effort to manipulate and control the Indian resistance has created more confusion that will have to be overcome during the continuing negotiations between Yatama and the Nicaraguan government. CONCLUSION The Indians of Nicaragua, who were the first to go to war with the Sandinistas, have been quietly demonstrating that they may be the first to show the way to peace. They have already made remarkable progress, overcoming many obstacles. Hopefully, their efforts and their leadership will soon gain the broader attention and support they deserve. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- To have a current Center For World Indigenous Studies Publication Catalogue sent to you via e-mail, send a request to jburrows@halcyon.com http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/cwiscat.html Center For World Indigenous Studies P.O. Box 2574 Olympia, WA U.S.A. 98507-2574 FAX: 360-956-1087 OCR Provided by Caere Corporation's OmniPage Professional