THE EXECUTIVE
by John Paul Harmon


Based on "The Prince" by Nicolo Machiavelli in 1515 A.D., as translated by W. K. Marriott
Copyright -- 1995 -- John Paul Harmon -- All rights reserved

INTRODUCTION

This is an evil book.

Before the reader begins, it must be perfectly clear; this is not a good book.  There is no other way to describe a work proclaiming a philosophy so utterly utilitarian as Machiavelli's.  Here you will find no love; in its place, power and manipulation.  Here you will find no faith, no hope; only deceit and the whims of Fate.

In "The Prince" you learn that lust for power, scorn for truth, and rationalization for the vilest of evils have been around for centuries.  In "The Executive" you will see they live with us still. 

Why write an updated version of this malignancy?  Nicolo Machiavelli wrote the original as a guide for a young heir to a forgotten throne in 16th century Italy.  It is actually an epistle to one person in particular, never meant for a broad audience.  This version has been prepared as the equivalent guide for modern young executives, working hard to make their mark in the information age economy of a new millennium.  Broadly published, and with a different hope.

Since Machiavelli's time, much in western culture has changed, sometimes for the better, but recently for the worse.  We find ourselves in a time of radical utilitarianism, tempered only by the fading memory of a broadly held faith in the loving God.  The only philosophers a modern young executive is likely to actually listen to will give passionate, forceful expositions on topics such as "Communication, Connectivity and Power" and "Powerful Meetings".  These are the business gurus who travel around the world spreading messages of avarice and greed, well reasoned and well presented.  Many of their lessons are contained here, in this book.

Converting a medieval text on medieval government into a modern text on running a corporation was a lot easier than I had hoped it would be.  After experimenting with a paraphrased version, I have in the end retained most of the stiff formality of Machiavelli's original work as an artistic tool.  A paraphrase was simply too comfortable and made the ideas seem too familiar.  It left many of the subtler lessons difficult to catch.  I want my post modern reader to be uncomfortable enough with the text to be alert.  Pseudonyms for modern corporations replaced the names of ancient kingdoms which they vaguely resembled in terms of reach and influence, and anecdotes were tailored slightly.  A student of Machiavelli will quickly notice how similar the anecdotal story lines are to those in "The Prince", while a student of modern corporate history will likewise observe how commonplace most of the illustrative stories would be in the pages of an American business journal.  Further, the latter student would also see that most of the lessons drawn from the anecdotes would also be commonplace.

And therein lies my hope.  For other lessons, still easily recognizable as evil even in the twilight of our times, are to be found in this book as well.  Truth mixes freely with deceit, and is difficult for the unwary to pry apart.  It is the juxtaposition of today's commonly held assertions with those still beyond the pale that should jolt many readers into a reassessment of what they are taking in as advice on the pursuit of excellence.  Maybe the whole idea that personal power is the medium of successful business practice is corrupting, and needs to be disposed of.

Again.

John Paul Harmon
Albany, Oregon
1995 A.D.


CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF CORPORATIONS THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED


ALL COMPANIES, all syndicates, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either associations or corporations.

Corporations are either hereditary, in which the family has been long established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Loetec to James Manui, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary company of the executive who has acquired them, as was Apollus to that of the Chairman of Hewitt Cardpic.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under an executive, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the efforts of the executive himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.


CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY CORPORATIONS

I WILL leave out all discussion on associations of employee-owners, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to corporations. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such corporations are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary companies, and those long accustomed to the family of their executive, than new ones.  It is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for an executive of average powers to maintain himself in his company, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive fiscal challenge.  If he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in America, for example, the CEO of Gamma Airlines, who could not have withstood the take over attempts of TUA in '92, nor those of Lozengo in '92, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the hereditary executive has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his employees will be naturally well disposed towards him.  In the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.


CHAPTER III

CONCERNING MIXED CORPORATIONS

BUT the difficulties occur in a new corporation. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a company which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new corporations.  Men change their overlords willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to sabotage him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new executive to burden those who have submitted to him with his bureaucracy and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that corporation, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in staffing, yet in entering an organization one always needs the goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Guesser, Chairman of IPM, quickly took over Loetec, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed Manui's own forces; because those who had sold the stock to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new executive. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious organizations a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the executive, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause IPM to lose Loetec the first time it was enough for the CEO Manui to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to entice the whole world to bid against him, and that his minions should be defeated.

Nevertheless Loetec was taken from IPM both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the President of IPM.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient company by him who acquires them, are either of the same corporate culture, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government.  To hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family and favored subordinates of the executive who was ruling them because the two groups of employees, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly together.  This has been seen in Aptivac, Personal Digital Devices, Silverado Computers, and California Hard Drives, which have been bound to IPM for so long a time.  Although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family and friends of their former leader is extinguished; the other, that neither their rules nor their financial targets are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old corporation.

But when companies are acquired in a company differing in customs, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of Vice President of Cony in Willamette Pictures, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that company, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the company is not pillaged by your officials; the employees are satisfied by prompt recourse to the executive; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attempt to take over that company from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the executive resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send trusted upper management to one or two places, which may be as keys to that company, for it necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of mid level managers and accountants.  An executive does not spend much on expatriate vice presidents, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the locals from whom he takes responsibilities and employment to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these expatriates are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, in being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining low level management & technical staff in subsidiaries one spends much more, having to consume on the staff all income from the company, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole company is injured; through the shifting of the staff up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own turf, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a subsidiary is useful.

Again, the executive who holds a company differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of a coalition of other powerful companies in his market, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no competitor as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there.  It will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already.  Indel was brought into the personal computer market by IPM; and in every other market where he obtained a footing the President of Indel was brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful competitor enters a market, all the smaller companies are drawn in, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to these subject companies he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the standard which he has established there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the market. And he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.

The employees of Indel, in the markets which they annexed, observed closely these measures; they maintained friendly relations with the minor syndicates, without increasing their strength; they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign companies to gain authority. The personal computer market appears to me sufficient for an example.  IPM and later Conpiq were kept friendly by them, the enterprises of Arizona Electric was humbled, Modosola was driven out to the fringe; yet the merits of the Conpiq and IPM never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of the President of Conpiq ever induce the board of Indel to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of IPM make them agree that it should retain any directorship over the company. Because Indel did in these instances what all prudent executives ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of company, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them. there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, Indel, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Modosola and Arizona Electric in the personal computer market so as not to have to do it in the built in controller market. They could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time - "Let us enjoy the benefits of the time" - but rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

But let us turn to IPM and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of Wantsom II (and not of Guesser) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession of the mainframe market for the longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a company composed of divers elements.

IPM Chairman Wantsom II was brought into the peer to peer network market by the ambition of the Novella leaders, who desired to obtain half the company of WorkPerfect by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the Chairman, because, wishing to get a foothold in the American PC LAN market, and having no friends there- seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Phillippe- he was forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The Chairman, however, having acquired WorkPerfect, regained at once the authority which Phillippe had lost: Bortec yielded; the employees of Tectonix became his friends; the Chief Executive of Mantua, the CEO of Intuiqen, my lady of Autocap, the Directors of Fantec, of Printron, of CPM, of Centronitics, the management of Psoft, of Lexsoft, of Poluroit, of Seagrade- everybody made advances to him to become his friend.  Then could the board of Novella realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two businesses with WorkPerfect, had made the Chairman master of two-thirds of the American network market.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the Chairman could have maintained his position in America had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of Millisoft, some of Novella, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Loetec than he did the contrary by assisting Will Portals to occupy the operating system market. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized Millisoft by adding many end users to his captive market, thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Osborn, and to prevent his becoming the master of portable computers, he was himself forced to come into that market.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized Millisoft, and deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have Clarisoft, divides it with the Chairman of Asian Pear, and where he was the prime arbiter of the American PC market he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that company and the malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the enterprise his own pensioner as Chairman, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Guesser, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if IPM could have taken Clarisoft with her own resources she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it.  And if the partition which she made with Novella in WorkPerfect was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in the lucrative American market for office networking, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Wantsom II made these five errors: he destroyed the minor syndicates, he increased the strength of one of the greater corporations in America, he brought in a new competitor, he did not settle in the company, he did not send subsidiaries. Which errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from Novella; because, had he not aggrandized Millisoft, nor brought many nimble PC competitors into the market place, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them.  But, having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on WorkPerfect, to which Novella would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take WorkPerfect from IPM in order to give it to Novella, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.

And if any one should say: Chairman Wantsom II yielded the operating system market to Will Portals and the educational market to Asian Pear to avoid a price war, I answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the Chairman had given to the Millisoft Chairman that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the control of OS-22, to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of executives, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus Chairman Wantsom II lost WorkPerfect by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of companies and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at San Jose with Allens, when Will Portals took over the operating system market, and Vice President Allens observed to me that Novella's board did not understand war.  I replied to him that the IPM employees did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed Millisoft to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of Millisoft and of Asian Pear in America has been caused by IPM, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power.


CHAPTER IV

WHY THE ENTERPRISE OF CHEVLOLET, CONQUERED BY STONE,  DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF STONE AT HIS DEATH

CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired company, some might wonder how, seeing that the great Albert Stone became the master of the automotive market in a few years, and died whilst it was yet scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the corporations of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways: either by an executive, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the enterprise as ministers by his favour and permission; or by an executive and entrepreneurs, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the executive. Such entrepreneurs have companies and their own employees, who recognize them as directors and hold them in natural affection. Those companies that are governed by an executive and his servants hold their executive in more consideration, because in all the company there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a bureaucrat and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.

The examples of these two management structures in our time are Burner Broadcasting and IPM. The entire monarchy of Burner Broadcasting, until it was overmatched by the evil Time-Warren conglomerate, was governed by one director, the others were his servants; and, dividing his enterprise into business units, he sent there different administrators, and shifted and changed them as he chose. But the Chairman of IPM is placed in the midst of an ancient body of directors, acknowledged by their own employees, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the Chairman take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these companies will recognize great difficulties in seizing the company of Burner Broadcasting, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it; thus I would predict Time-Warren will have little trouble controlling their conquest. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the enterprise of Burner Broadcasting were that the usurper could not be called in by the executives of the enterprise, nor could he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the director had around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondsmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, when the CEO of Time-Warren considered a hostile takeover for Burner Broadcasting he had to bear in mind that he would find it united, and he would have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others.  Thus, he focused on corrupting and conquering Red Burner himself.  There being nothing to fear but the family of the executive after the fact, and, once these are exterminated, there will remain no one to fear, the others having no credit with the Burner employees.  As the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of IPM, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some entrepreneur of the enterprise, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the company and render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the executive, because the directors that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that company is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the management structure of John Chevlolet, you will find it similar to the enterprise of Burner Broadcasting, and therefore it was only necessary for Albert Stone, first to overthrow him in the stock market, and then to take the company from him. After which victory, Chevlolet being killed, the company remained secure to Albert Stone, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed the market securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in it except those they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity companies constituted like that of IPM.  Hence arose those frequent rebellions against Indel in Asian Pear, IPM, and the personal computer market, owing to the many silicon foundries there were in these companies, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, Indel always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and Indel then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the company, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former director being exterminated, none other than Indel were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which Albert Stone held his empire in the automobile market, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Ialokkoa and many more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject company.


 CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CORPORATIONS WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

WHENEVER those companies which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live within their own corporate culture, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a management structure, being created by the executive, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a division accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.

There are, for example, Sparkan and Indel.  Sparkan held workstation and server companies, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they lost them.  Indel, in order to hold its controller, ASIC, and ROM business, dismantled them, and did not lose their markets. They wished to hold the personal computer market as Sparkan held its computer market, making it free, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle and re-engineer many divisions in the company, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a division accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watch-word of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget.  And what ever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed but at every chance they immediately rally to them.

But when divisions or companies are accustomed to live under an executive, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old executive, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to rebel, and an executive can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in associations there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.


CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW CORPORATIONS WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS AND ABILITY

LET no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new corporations as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of executive and of company; because men and women, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. The wise ought always to follow the paths beaten by the great, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if the ability of the wise does not equal that of the great, at least they will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new corporations, where there is a new executive, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the company. Now, as the fact of becoming an executive from a private station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the executive, having no other company, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be leaders, I say that Moses, Henry, Gordon Less, Delv, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Henry and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mold into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of bondage. It was necessary that Less should not remain in academia, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become Chairman of Indel and founder of Silicon Valley. It was necessary that Henry should find the US auto market  discontented with the offerings of Newmobile and affiliates, and the Newmobile staff soft and effeminate through their long dominance. Delv could not have shown his ability had he not found the personal computer market locked in the hands of a rigid distribution channel. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their company was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become executives, like these men, acquire a corporation with difficulty, but they maintain it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their management and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attempt to take over they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the executive is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use appeals or can they use coercion? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never accomplish anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Henry, Delv, and Less had been without coercive elements at their disposal they could not have enforced their visions for long- as happened in our time to Adam Osborn, who was ruined with his new order of things immediately.  The multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is Seymour of Cray. This man rose from a private station to be Executive of Craycomp, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the future Craycomp staff, being oppressed inside Cybertek, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their executive. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but an enterprise to be a Chairman. This man abolished the old bureaucracy, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own network of associates, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.


CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW CORPORATIONS WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

THOSE who solely by good fortune become executives from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some company is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in the personal computer business, in the divisions of IPM and Hewitt Cardpic, where executives were made by Chairmen, in order that subservient VP's might hold the divisions both for their security and their glory, as were those vice presidents who, by the corruption of their engineers, from being middle managers came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them- two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

Companies that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and relations with other companies fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become executives are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid before they became executives, they must lay afterwards.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be an executive by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are James Manui and Wantsom II. Manui, by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be CEO of Loetec, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Wantsom II acquired his company during the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the companies which the subterfuge and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the CEO be considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power.  I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new executive than the example of his actions.  If his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Wantsom I, Chairman of IPM, in wishing to aggrandize the CEO, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any division that was not a division of IPM.  If he was willing to put forward the product of his minor ally, Millisoft's DOS, he knew that the CEO of Loetec and Novella would not consent, because Genoa Xnics and CPM were already under the protection of Novella. Besides this, he saw the legal authority of America, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Millisoft Chairman, namely, the SEC and the FTC and their following. It was prudent for him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the syndicates, so as to make himself securely master of part of their companies. This was easy for him to do, because he found Novella, moved by other reasons, inclined to entice IPM employees into working for Loetec; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of a powerful subordinate, VP Cannavo. Therefore the VP left IPM for Loetec with the assistance of Novella and the consent of Wantsom I. He was no sooner in Loetec than the Millisoft Chairman had engineers from him for the attempt on the operating system market, which yielded to him on the reputation of the VP. The CEO of Millisoft, therefore, having acquired the operating system market and beaten the FTC, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of IPM.  That is to say, he feared that the forces of the SEC, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the Chairman of IPM might also do the same. Of the FTC he had a warning when, after taking out Osborn, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attempt to take over. And as to Cannavo, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the mainframe services market, attacked applications software, and the former VP made him desist from that undertaking; hence the CEO decided to depend no more upon the aggressiveness and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the FTC and SEC parties owned by Indel, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the CEO. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the FTC, having scattered the adherents of the SEC. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the FTC, perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of Millisoft's CEO was ruin to them, called a meeting at Monterey, in California. From this sprung the rebellion of honest SEC employees and the tumults in the operating system market, with endless dangers to the CEO, all of which he overcame with the help of the IPM employees. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the IPM employees or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Mr. Palance [FTC]- whom the CEO did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses- the FTC were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at San Jose. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the CEO had laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the operating system market and the SEC; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

When the CEO of Millisoft took over the operating system market he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their employees than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the market was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Mr. Ramiro d'Orco, a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the CEO considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the company, under a most excellent president, wherein all divisions had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practiced, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretense he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on Fishermen's Wharf with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the CEO, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider IPM, for he knew that the Chairman, his father, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with IPM in the expedition which she was making towards Clarisoft against the Asian Pear employees who were fighting back in the PC operating system market. It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Wantsom I lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future the CEO of IPM had to fear, in the first place, that in the future the Chairman of Millisoft might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which Wantsom I had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by exterminating the families of those directors whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Millisoft Chairman. Secondly, by winning to himself all the gentlemen of Indel, so as to be able to curb the Millisoft Chairman with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college faculties more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Millisoft Chairman should realize it that he could by his own measures resist the first shock when the confrontation came. Of these four things, at the death of Wantsom I, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed directors as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the Indel gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Hewitt Cardpic, for he already possessed Aston-Bate and Psoft, and QNS was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study IPM (for the IPM employees were already driven out of Clarisoft by the Asian Pear employees, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down upon QNS. After this, Pexarr and Oldgen yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of Tectonix; and the employees of Tectonix would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Wantsom I died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Wantsom I's career died five years after he began. He left the CEO with the main frame operating system market alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile minions, and sick unto death. Yet there were in the CEO such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those minions on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were good, for the personal computer operating system market awaited him for more than a month. In Indel, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the FBI, the BATF, and the FTC might come to Indel, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Chairman of Millisoft him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of Wantsom I, everything would have been easy to him. On the day that Paul Callen was ejected from Millisoft, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

When all the actions of Wantsom II are recalled, I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and far-reaching vision, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Wantsom I and his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his new corporation, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the engineers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal bureaucracy and to create new, to maintain friendship with directors and executives in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the ejection of Callen, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Millisoft Chairman to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Millisoft Chairman; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any entrepreneur whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became Chairman. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were Will Portals, the SEC, San Giorgio, and Cannova. Any one of the others, on becoming Millisoft Chairman, would have had to fear him, OS-22 and the Asian Pear employees excepted; the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, IPM having relations with him. Therefore, above everything, the CEO ought to have created an Asian Pear employee Millisoft Chairman, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to pushed OS-22 harder on Will Portals. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the CEO erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.


CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A CORPORATION BY WICKEDNESS

ALTHOUGH an executive may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more copiously treated when I discuss associations. These methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends in the corporation, or when by the favour of his fellow-employees a private person becomes the executive of his company. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples- one ancient, the other modern- and without entering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow them.

Mike Abbaei, the New Yorker, became Chairman of Univec not only from a private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of an assembly line worker, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose through its ranks to be CIO of Univec.  Being established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself executive and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose with Hamilcar, the Oregonian, who, with his minions, was fighting for share in the emerging supercomputer market. One morning he assembled the people and staff of Univec, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the association, and at a given signal the engineers killed all the managers and the richest of the people; these dead, he seized and held the executive of that company without any civil commotion. And although he was twice routed by IPM, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his company, but leaving part of his men for its defense, with the others he attacked the mainframe market, and in a short time raised the siege of Univec. IPM, reduced to extreme necessity, was compelled to come to terms with Abbaei, and, leaving supercomputers to him, had to be content with the possession of the mainframe market.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, but step by step in the information technology profession, which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-employees, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Abbaei in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or to genius.

In our times, during the rule of Wantsom I, John Fogarty, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his maternal uncle, Barney Oliverotto, and in the early days of his youth sent to fight under Paul Vitalis, that, being trained under his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military profession. After Paul died, he fought under his brother Peter, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of some employees of Oliverotto, to whom the slavery of their company was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitalis Corporation minions, to seize Oliverotto's division from Hewitt-Cardpic. So he wrote to Barney Oliverotto that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his division, and in some measure to look into his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the employees should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred men, his friends and retainers; and he entreated Barney to arrange that he should be received honourably by the employees of Oliverotto, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Barney himself, who had brought him up.

Barney, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and he caused him to be honourably received by his division, and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Fogarty gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Barney Oliverotto and his staff. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished, Fogarty artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Wantsom I and his son, and of their enterprises, to which discourse Barney and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Barney and the rest of the employees went in after him. No sooner were they seated than engineers issued from secret places and slaughtered Barney and the rest. After these murders Fogarty placed his men in strategic locations around the site and besieged the personnel staff in their cubicles, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and to make an employee leveraged buyout, of which he made himself the executive. He killed all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened himself with new corporate guidelines, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the corporation, not only was he secure in the division of Barney Oliverotto, but he had become formidable to all his competitors and allies. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that of Abbaei if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Wantsom II, who took him with the FTC and Vitalis Corporation minions, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with Peter, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Abbaei, and his like, after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his company, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own employees; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the company, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this follows from severities being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the employees. The badly employed are those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practice the first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Abbaei did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a company, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his employees, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, an executive ought to manage by wandering around so that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.


CHAPTER IX  

CONCERNING A CIVIL CORPORATION

BUT coming to the other point- where a leading citizen becomes the executive of his company, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow employees- this may be called a civil corporation: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a corporation is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of upper management. Because in all divisions these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by upper management, and upper management wish to rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in divisions one of three results, either a corporation, self-government, or anarchy.

A corporation is created either by the people or by upper management, accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for upper management, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and they make him an executive, so that under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist upper management, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him an executive so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of upper management maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy upper management, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of upper management, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that an executive can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from upper management he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that an executive may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile peers he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the executive is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do well without the same peers, being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that upper management ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and an executive ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes an executive through the favour of the little people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the workers, becomes an executive by the favour of upper management, ought, above everything, to seek to win the workers over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus the workers quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the corporation by their favours; and the executive can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for an executive to have the workers friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis, Executive of Sparkan, sustained an attempt to take over all of the personal computer market, by a highly successful and aggressive Indel, and against them he defended his company and his market niche; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient if the workers had been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 'He who builds on the workers, builds on the mud,' for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the workers will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by governments; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gerard in Indel and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Tectonix. But granted an executive who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged- such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.

These corporations are liable to danger when they are passing from the associative to the hierarchical management structure, for such executives either rule personally or through subordinates. In the latter case their management structure is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those employees who are relied on to carry out the executive's instructions, and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the management structure with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the executive has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the employees and workers, accustomed to make decisions in committee, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such an executive cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when employees had need of the company, because then every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the company has need of its employees, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise executive ought to adopt such a course that his employees will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the company and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.


CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL CORPORATIONS OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these corporations: that is, whether an executive has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of personnel resources or funding, raise a sufficient barrier to market entry, and to join battle against any one who comes to take markets from them.  I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the market, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind tariff walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such executives to provision and fortify their businesses, and not on any account to defend the company. And whoever shall fortify his business well, and shall have managed the other concerns of his employees in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his business well fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The divisions of Zeroz are decentralized, they own few assets, and they yield obedience to the CEO of Zeroz when it suits them, nor do they fear this or any other economic power they may have near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks a hostile take over bid would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper "poison pills" and high levels of employee ownership, they make vigorous use of the courts to press their claims, and they always keep in public deposit enough reserves to operate for a year.  Beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the company, they always have the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of the division, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also support powerful politicians with large donations, and moreover have many ordinances spun to uphold them.

Therefore, an executive who has a strong division, and has not made himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attempt a take over he will only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that affairs of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep a business a whole year in the market without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the people have stocks outside the division, and see their value fall, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their executive; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous executive will overcome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his employees that the downturn will not be for long, at another time fear losing out on a coming peak because of the volatility of the market, then preserving himself adroitly from those employees who seem to him to be too bold.  Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once break up and ruin the company at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready for the defense; and, therefore, so much the less ought the executive to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their executive, he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have been mortgaged and their stocks devalued in his defense. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it wilt not be difficult for a wise executive to keep the minds of his employees steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them.


CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING COMPUTER OPERATING SYSTEMS

IT ONLY remains now to speak of the operating system market, touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ordinances of faith and expectation, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the corporations may be held no matter how their executives behave and live. These executives alone have companies and do not defend them, they have employees and do not rule them; and their divisions, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the employees, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such corporations only are secure and happy. But being upheld by customers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that Millisoft has attained such greatness in end user applications, seeing that from Wantsom I backwards the computer market potentates (not only those who have been called visionaries in the mainframe days, but every entrepreneur and director, though the smallest in the centralized computer business) have valued the end user applications very slightly- yet now a Chairman of IPM trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from America's operating system market, and to ruin Novella- although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Phillippe, Chairman of Bortec, invaded the programming language market, it was under the dominion of the Millisoft Chairman, Novella, the CEO of Loetec, and the Employees of Tectonix. These potentates had two principal anxieties: the one, that no new competitor should enter this market; the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about whom there was the most anxiety were the Millisoft Chairman and Novella. To restrain Novella the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the defense of Intuiqen; and to keep down the Millisoft Chairman they made use of the captive agencies of Indel, who, being divided into two factions, FTC and SEC, had always a pretext for disorder.  And although there might arise sometimes courage in the Millisoft Chairman, yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a Millisoft Executive is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a Millisoft Executive, he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one executive should almost destroy the SEC, another would arise hostile to the FTC, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the FTC.  Thus the end user applications of the Millisoft Chairman are little esteemed in America, yet dominate the market.

Will Portals, who of all the CEO's that have ever been showed how a Millisoft Chairman with both money and arms was able to prevail, and through the instrumentality of the CEO Wantsom II, and by reason of the entry of the IPM employees, he brought about all those things which I have discussed above in the actions of the CEO.  And although his intention was not to aggrandize Millisoft, but the CEO position he held, nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of Millisoft, which, after his passing over the hill into his 30's and the ruin of the Bortec CEO, became the heir to all his labours.  Portals found that he had made Millisoft strong, possessing all the operating system market, the entrepreneurs of Indel reduced to impotence, and, through the chastisements Portals, the factions wiped out; he also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practiced before Portal's time. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen Millisoft and not any private person. He kept also the FTC and SEC factions within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one, the greatness of Millisoft, with which he terrified them; and the other, not allowing them to have their own leaders, who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their leaders they do not remain quiet for long, because leaders foster the factions in Indel and out of it, and the entrepreneurs are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of executives arise disorders and tumults among the entrepreneurs. For these reasons the Millisoft Chairman Leo found his position most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made it great technically, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.


CHAPTER XII

HOW MANY KINDS OF BUREAUCRACY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES

HAVING discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such corporations as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offense and defense which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for an executive to have his foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundations of all companies, new as well as old or composite, are sound organizational structure, clear policy and strong bureaucracy; and as there cannot be good structure where the company's bureaucracy is precarious, it follows that where there is a powerful bureaucracy they have good structure. I shall leave the particulars of structure and policy out of the discussion and shall speak of the  bureaucracy.

I say, therefore, that the bureaucracy with which an executive defends his company is either his own, or they are temps, overhead, or mixed. Temps and overhead are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his company based on this kind of bureaucracy, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither internalized the corporate culture nor have they loyalty to their fellow employee, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for internally one is robbed by them, and in externally by the competition. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the market than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your engineers whilst you are not in a serious, make or break competitive position, but the time comes to demonstrate their mettle they take themselves off or punch the time clock; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of American industry has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on temps, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the competitors came they showed what they were. Thus it was that Dick Slashburn, Executive Vice President of Hewitt Cardpic's Hardcopy group, was allowed to seize America's printer market; and he who told us that the competitive printer manufacturer's sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of executives, it is the executives who have also suffered the penalty.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of temporary bureaucrats. The mercenary industrial captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skillful, you are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is hired will act in the same way, whether temporary or not, I reply that when bureaucratic forms have to be resorted to, either by an executive or an association, then the executive ought to go in person and perform the duty of coach; the association has to send its employees, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by policy so that he does not leave the position. And experience has shown executives and associations, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and temps doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring an association, armed with its own bureaucracy, under the sway of one of its employees than it is to bring one armed with foreign bureaucracy. Indel and Sparkan stood for many ages full time staffed and free. The Switzers are completely bureaucratic and quite free.

Of ancient temps, for example, there was Xylogtec, which was oppressed by their mercenary engineers after the first market share war with Indel, although Xylogtec had their own employees for mid level management. After the death of Estaban, Philips was made chief engineer by the management of Thebetec, and after achieving a stunning market victory he took away their liberty.

CEO Mason being dead, the Milakrontec board enlisted James Manui against Novella, and he, having overcome the competition in east Asia, allied himself with them to crush Milakrontec, his employer. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Chairperson Johanna of Clarisoft, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the bureaucracy of the Chairman of Aragontec, in order to save her enterprise. And if Novella and employees of Tectonix formerly extended their dominions by these bureaucracy, and yet their captains did not make themselves executives, but have defended them, I reply that the Employees of Tectonix in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was John Acuto, and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the employees of Tectonix would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the staff always against him, so they watched each other. Francis turned his ambition to WorkPerfect; Bradley against Millisoft and Clarisoft. But let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The employees of Tectonix appointed as their captain Paul Vitalis, a most prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken QNS, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the employees of Tectonix to keep in with him, for if he became technical contributor for their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. Novella, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they competed using their own men, when with educated managers and proletariat they did very well. This was before they turned to enterprises in the office computer network market, but when they began to fight for market share they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of EBS. And in the beginning of their expansion in computer networks, through not having much territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under Cargrave, they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the CEO of Loetec under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the competition, they feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bart Bergamo, Robert Frankenburger, Carl Pitt, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened afterwards in the Word Processor market, where in one fight they lost that which in eight years they had acquired with so much trouble to the engineers of Millisoft. Because from such bureaucracy conquests come but slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

And as with these examples I have reached EBS, which has been ruled for many years by temps, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the internal empires of corporate information systems (IS) have recently come to be repudiated in America, that the Millisoft Chairman has acquired more end user applications (such as word processing), and that EBS has been absorbed by GN and then divided up into more divisions, for the reason that many of their greater customers subverted bureaucracy out from under their IS managers, who, formerly favoured as emperors, were oppressing them, whilst Millisoft was favouring them so as to gain authority in end user applications: in many others their employees became executives. From this it came to pass that America fell partly into the hands of Millisoft and of associations, and, Millisoft consisting of hackers and the employees unaccustomed to bureaucracy, both commenced to enlist competitors.  The first who gave renown to this bureaucracy was Pournelle, a native of the operating system market. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Kawasaki and Seymour, who in their time were the arbiters of American computing. After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the bureaucracies of American computer companies and corporate computing departments; and the end of all their valour has been, that those companies have been overrun by Wantsom II, robbed by Guesser, ravaged by Phillippe, and insulted by the cadre of Hewitt Cardpic. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of the graduate engineers so that they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many engineers, and a few computer scientists did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ engineering fellows, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand engineers, there were not to be found two thousand graduate engineers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their engineers, not crushing the competition, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attempt a take over markets under cover or by surprise; they did not surround the competitors either with barriers to entry or massive ad campaigns, nor did they campaign during holidays. All these things were permitted by their management rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought the American computer systems departments to slavery and contempt, under the thumb of Millisoft, IPM, and Hewitt Cardpic.


CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING PARTNERS, MIXED BUREAUCRACY, AND ONE'S OWN

INTERNAL PARTNERS, which are the other useless arm, are employed when an executive is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Millisoft Chairman Portals in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Intuiqen, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to partners, and stipulated with Sculler, Chairman of Asian Pear, for his assistance with men and technology. These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to leave this recent one of Millisoft Chairman Portals, the peril of which cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Intuiqen, threw himself entirely into the hands of the competitor. But his good fortune brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because, having partners routed by the courts, it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his partners, he having conquered by other means than theirs; his own software became a serious contender in the money management software market.

The Employees of Tectonix, being entirely without technology, allied themselves with ten thousand IPM employees to take QNS, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their troubles.

The President of Ferd Motors, to oppose Japanese small import erosion of his automobile market, sent ten thousand German cars into the American small car market, the manufacturers of which, on the war being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of the small car market to the imports.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these techniques, for they are much more hazardous than temporary employees, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; but with temporary employees, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in temporary employees dastardy is most dangerous; in partners, valour. The wise executive, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the prowess of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Wantsom II and his actions. This CEO entered the operating system market with partners, taking there only IPM his engineers, and with them he captured almost all of the mainframe market; but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him cost effective, he turned to temporary employees and partnerships, and enlisted the FTC and Vitalis Corporation minions; whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed them and returned to his own men. And the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation of the CEO, when he had the FTC and Vitalis Corporation minions, and when he relied on his own engineers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond  recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave out Seymour of Cray, he being one of those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the executive staff by the Craycomp technical staff, soon found out that a mercenary bureaucracy was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards developed new computers with his own engineers and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.

Phillippe of Bortec, having by good fortune and valour liberated the spreadsheet market from Loetec, recognized the necessity of being armed with computer scientists of his own, and he established in his enterprise ordinances concerning scientists and engineers. Afterwards his disciple, Chairman Guesser, began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that enterprise; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own technology, for he has destroyed the EE's altogether; and his scientists he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to work along with the temps from the Switzers, it does not appear that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the IPM employees do not come off well against others. The minions of the IPM employees have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which technical knowledge together are much better than temporary employees alone or partners alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example proves it, IPM would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Phillippe had been enlarged or maintained.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a corporation cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Indel Empire should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting of the NEG engineers; because from that time the vigour of the Indel Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no corporation is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one's own forces  are those which are composed either of employees, staff, or dependents; all others are temporary employees or partners. And the way to take ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philippe and many associations and executives have armed and organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.


CHAPTER XIV

THAT WHICH CONCERNS AN EXECUTIVE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

AN EXECUTIVE ought to have no higher aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, before war and its rules and discipline; for this is an art so near to that exercised solely by him who controls a corporate empire, and there is so much power in the knowledge of it that it not only upholds those who are born executives, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when peoples have thought more of ease than of the stimulus of competition they have lost their companies. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a company is to be master of the art. James Manui, through being martial, from a private person became CEO of Loetec; and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of competition, from dukes of society became private persons. 

Among other evils which being unarmed (i.e., unprepared for the rigors of market competition) brings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which an executive ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well together. And therefore an executive who does not understand the art of war and how it applies to corporate competition, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by his workers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, a general ought above all things to keep his men well organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his company, and is better able to undertake its defense; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one company one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the executive that lacks the skill to see the terrain on which he competes lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead minions, to array the battle, to besiege competitors to advantage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in the company with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and company his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he could deal with.  So too, the executive can practice incessantly scenarios in his mind and with his staff, preparing for the vagaries of the economy and competitive situation.

But to exercise the intellect the executive should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Octavius, Scipio Henry. And whoever reads the life of Henry, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of Henry by Xenophon. A wise executive ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows.


CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY EXECUTIVES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

IT REMAINS now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for an executive towards employees and friends. And as I know that many have written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured associations and corporations which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for an executive wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning an executive, and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly executives for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a traditional term (because an avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one green, another caring not for the environment; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving; one politically correct, another not, and the like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in an executive to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which would lose him his company; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without which the company can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.


CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

COMMENCING then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say that it would be well to be reputed liberal, particularly when being discussed in the mass media. Nevertheless, liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that an executive thus inclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly burden his company, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him odious to his employees, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperiled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.

Therefore, an executive, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his company with debt; thus it comes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Millisoft Chairman Portals was assisted in establishing his company by a reputation for liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the Chairman of IPM; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary debt on his company, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present Chairman of Asian Pear would not have undertaken or succeeded in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. An executive, therefore, provided that he has not to under pay his employees, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Mr. Steve Works of Asian Pear established his empire by liberality, and many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are an executive in fact, or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and CEO Works was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent in the PC market; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his company. And if any one should reply: Many have been executives, and have done great things with minions, who have been considered very liberal, I reply: Either an executive spends that which is his own or his employees' or else that of the share holders. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the executive who uses his bureaucracy, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by engineers. And of that which is neither yours nor your employees' you can be a ready giver, as were Henry, Stone, and Wantsom I; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And an executive should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.


CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

COMING now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every executive ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Wantsom II was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the mainframe market, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful than the American government, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permit their workforce competitiveness to be destroyed through welfare. Therefore an executive, so long as he keeps his employees united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow bankruptcy or unemployment; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with an executive offend the individual only.

And of all executives, it is impossible for the new executive to avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing to new companies being full of dangers. Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new, saying:

"Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."

In English: "...against my will, my fate,
A throne unsettled, and an infant company,
Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,
And guard with these severities my shores."

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And that executive who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Nevertheless an executive ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the property of his employees and from their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when an executive is with his bureaucracy, and has under control a multitude of engineers, then it is quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his staff united or disposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that having led an enormous army, which was ethnically diverse, to fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect.  In this he demonstrated the only excellent means of managing diversity.  And shortsighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Works, that most excellent man, not of his own times but within the memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his staff rebelled in Asian Pear; this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance and liberality, which gave his engineers more licence than is consistent with corporate discipline. For this he was upbraided by the Board of Directors, and called the corrupter of the marketing bureaucracy. The Asian Pear II design staff was laid waste by a legate of Works, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone on the board, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Works; but, he being under the control of the board, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing according to that of the executive, a wise executive should establish himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.


CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH EXECUTIVES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

EVERY one admits how praiseworthy it is in an executive to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those executives who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for an executive to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to executives by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other leaders of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for an executive to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. An executive, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise director cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are often bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to an executive legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of executives; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence. Portals did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well understood this side of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for an executive to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, politically correct, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that an executive, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the company, or his position in the company, to act contrary to faith, friendship, humanity, religion, and what is desirable and politically correct. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.

For this reason an executive ought to take care that he never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named six qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful, etc. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than the last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the culture of the company to defend them, a culture shaded by your touch.  In the actions of all men, and especially of executives, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let an executive rise to the top by getting the credit for conquering and holding his market.  The means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on.

One executive of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and enterprise many a time.


CHAPTER XIX

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly under this generality, that the executive must consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his employees, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which an executive should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his employees let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That executive is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason an executive ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his employees, the other from without, on account of external syndicates. From the latter he is defended by being well prepared and having good partnerships, and if he is well prepared he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every take over attempt, as GBS did.

But concerning his employees, when affairs outside are disturbed he has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which an executive can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious remedies that an executive can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires against an executive always expects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the executive, to keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the executive there is the power of the corporation, the laws, the protection of friends and the company to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Ronald Belgrave, who was a steel executive in Birmingham (grandfather of the present Mr. Belgrave), having been murdered by the Cosa Nostra, who had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer John, who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and hanged all the Cosa Nostra they could identify. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the house of Belgrave enjoyed in those days in Birmingham; which was so great that, although none remained there after the his death who were able to rule the company, the people of his company, having information that there was one of the Belgrave family in Tectonix, who up to that time had been considered the son of an engineer, sent to Tectonix for him and gave him the control of their division, and it was lead by him until Messer John came in due course to the administration.

For this reason I consider that an executive ought to reckon conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered companies and wise executives have taken every care not to drive upper management to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most important objects a manager can have.

Among the best ordered and governed corporate kingdoms of our times is IPM, and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the Chairman; of these the first is the board and its authority, because he who founded the enterprise, knowing the ambition of the principal shareholders and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against upper management, he wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the Chairman; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to from upper management for favouring the people, and from the people for favouring upper management, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the Chairman. Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the Chairman and enterprise. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that executives ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that an executive ought to cherish upper management, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of the Indel Presidents that many of them would be an example contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by employees who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the Presidents, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those Presidents who succeeded to the corporate empire from Marcus Less the philosopher down to the great Gordon Less I; they were Marcus and his son Calvin, Peter, Jeremy, Steven and his son Anthony, Matthew, Hubert, Alexander, and the great Gordon Less I.

There is first to note that, whereas in other corporations the ambition of upper management and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with, the Indel Presidents had a third difficulty in having to put up with the cruelty and avarice of their MBA Wall Street stock brokers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many.  For it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to brokers and people; because most of the employees loved stability, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring executive, whilst the brokers loved the aggressive executive who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those Presidents were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the corporation, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the brokers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because, as executives cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those Presidents who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily to the market analysts than to the people; a course which turned out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the executive knew how to maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Peter, and Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the brokers or the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

But Peter was created emperor against the wishes of the brokers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Calvin, could not endure the honest life to which Peter wished to reduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said before, an executive wishing to keep his company is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to maintain yourself- it may be either the people or the brokers or upper management- you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the fourteen years he held the corporate empire no one was ever put to death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the bureaucracy conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Calvin, Steven, Anthony, and Gordon Less, you will find them all cruel and rapacious- men who, to satisfy their brokers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Steven, came to a bad end; but in Steven there was so much valour that, keeping the brokers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the brokers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a new executive, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for an executive to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of Indel CEO and President Jeremy, he persuaded the marketing bureaucracy, of which he was leader, that it would be right to go to corporate headquarters and avenge the dismissal of Peter, who had been removed by the praetorian brokers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the dais, he moved on Indel, and reached America before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Indel HQ, the board, through fear, elected him President and removed Jeremy, who promptly committed suicide, or so it was reported. After this there remained for Steven, who wished to make himself master of the whole corporate empire, two difficulties; one in the automobile market, where Niger had begun a similar move; the other in the telephony market where Shelley Moore was, who also aspired to the presidency. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to take over Niger and to deceive Moore. To the latter he wrote that, being elected CEO by the board, he was willing to share that dignity with her and sent her the title of Chief Operating Officer, or COO; and, moreover, that the board had made Moore his colleague; which things were accepted by Moore as true. But after Steven had conquered and killed Niger, and settled automotive department affairs, he returned to Indel HQ and complained to the board that Moore, little recognizing the benefits that she had received from him, had by treachery sought to destroy him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish her. Afterwards he sought her out in IPM, and took from her both post and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the bureaucracy.  It need not be wondered at that he, the new man, did well, because his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence.

But his son Anthony was a most eminent man, and had very excellent qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and acceptable to the brokers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of fatigue, an avid runner, a vegeterian, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him to be beloved by the minions. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large number of the people of Indel and all those of the Alexandria Sales site. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his office building by a security guard. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by executives, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but an executive may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the service of the company. Anthony had not taken this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that security guard, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the leader's ruin.

But let us come to Calvin, to whom it should have been very easy to hold the corporate empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and brokers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing the brokers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity, often descending to the tavern to drink with the workers and engage in ribald humour, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the nobility of a CEO, he fell into contempt with the brokers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against and killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Gordon Less. He was a very militant man, and the minions, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Gordon Less to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and despised; the one, his having programmed in BASIC at a former job, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Indel HQ and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in Indel and elsewhere in the corporate empire, practiced many cruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity. First the microprocessor group rebelled, then the board of directors with all the people of Indel, and all America conspired against him, to which may be added his own bureaucracy: this latter, besieging his office and meeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss the brilliant Hubert, Matthew, or Jeremy, who, being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that executives in our times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their brokers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these executives have minions that are veterans in the governance and administration of organizations, as were the minions of the Indel Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the brokers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all executives, except Burner Broadcasting and the Soldan, to satisfy the broad group of employees rather than the brokers, because the people are now unionized and the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted Burner Broadcasting, who always keeps round him twelve VP's and fifteen thousand engineering fellows on which depend the security and strength of the enterprise, and it is necessary that, putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The enterprise of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of brokers, follows again that, without regard to the employees, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the company of the Soldan is unlike all other corporations, for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed corporation; because the sons of the old executive not the heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only board members. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new corporation, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the executive is new, the constitution of the company is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary director.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named Presidents, and it will be recognized also how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Peter and Alexander, being new executives, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the corporation; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Carl, Calvin, and Gordon Less to have imitated Steven, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore an executive, new to the corporation, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Steven, but he ought to take from Steven those parts which are necessary to found his company, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a company that may already be stable and firm.


CHAPTER XX

ARE DERIVATIVES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH EXECUTIVES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. SOME executives, so as to hold securely the company, have dis-empowered their employees; others have kept their divisions by factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their governments; some have built financial success not on the core business but on derivatives; some have refused long term debt and the leverage it makes possible.  And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those companies in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.

2. There never was a new executive who has dis-empowered his employees; rather when he has found them dis-empowered he has always prepared them, because, by doing so, those thoughts become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your employees become your adherents. And whereas all employees cannot be empowered, yet when those whom you do empower are benefited, the others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you dis-empower them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unprepared, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you or your market share against powerful enemies and distrusted employees. Therefore, as I have said, a new executive in a new corporation has always distributed empowerment. Histories are full of examples. But when an executive acquires a new company, which he adds as an organization to his old one, then it is necessary to dis-empower the men of that company, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all the prepared men in the company shall be your own engineers and brokers who in your old company were working near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistotec by factions and QNS by derivatives; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary suppliers so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when America was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided companies you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. Novella, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the union and professional factions in their tributary companies; and although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the employees, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout in the stock market, one party at once took courage and seized the company. Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the executive, because these factions will never be permitted in a vigorous corporation; such methods for enabling one the more easily to manage employees are only useful in times of peace, but if struggle comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt executives become great when they overcome the difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune, especially when she desires to make a new executive great, who has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise executive, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.  Or an engineer, in order to insure his climb, should trumpet the difficulty of a problem after he has a solution in mind, the better to appear brilliant when the problem is solved.

5. Executives, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted. Rudolph Weber, Executive of Oldgen, ruled his company more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual.  I will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of an executive's period of control have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the executive with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them.  Thus the executive always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn an executive, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new company or division, that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the executive to make friends of those men who were contented under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with executives, in order to hold their companies more securely, to build up credit and derivatives that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first take over attempt. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicholas Winkler in our times has been seen to divest himself of two derivatives in the London exchange so that he might keep his company; Carson, CEO of Urbinotec, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven, eliminated the foundations of all the derivatives in that company, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Belgrave returning to Birmingham came to a similar decision. Derivatives, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the executive who has more to fear from the people than from competitors ought to build on derivatives, for the employees can't understand them, but he who has more to fear from competitors than from the people ought to leave them alone. The derivatives of Loetec, built up by James Manui, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the company.  For this reason the best possible device for holding your company is- not to be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the derivatives, yet they will not save you if the workers hate you, for there will never be wanting competitors to assist a union that has bestirred itself up against you. It has not been seen in our times that derivatives have been of use to any executive, unless to the Countess of Forli, when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack upon Milanosoft and wait for assistance from Loetec, and thus recover her company; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the competitors could not assist the people. But derivatives were of little value to her afterwards when Millisoft attacked her market, and when the employees, her enemy, were allied with competitors. Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the derivatives.  All these things considered then, I shall praise him who builds up financial instruments as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.


CHAPTER XXI

HOW AN EXECUTIVE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

NOTHING makes an executive so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a fine example. We have in our time Dr. Blithely, the present Chairman of Asian Pear. He can almost be called a new executive, because he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant executive to be the foremost Chairman in Computerdom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked the home hardware market, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the entrepreneurs of Palo Alto occupied in thinking of the attack and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of Millisoft and of the employees to sustain his minions, and by that long competition to lay the foundation for the virtually military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, always using local law as a plea, so as to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with a pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his enterprise of those not politically correct; nor could there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed the peripherals market, he has finally attacked IPM; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against him.

Again, it much assists an executive to set unusual examples in internal affairs.  An executive ought, above all things, always to endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

An executive is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other.  This course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral, because if two of your powerful competitors in a market come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to compete strenuously.  In the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, resources ready, court his fate.

The Chairman of Motosola went into the personal computer market, being sent for by Hewitt Picard and Asian Pear to drive out Indel. He sent envoys to Computec, who were friends of Indel, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand Indel urged them to take up marketing. This question came to be discussed in the boardroom of Computec, where the legate of Motosola urged them to stand neutral. To this the Indel legate answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your company not to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the recompense of the conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with actions in the marketplace. And irresolute executives, to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when an executive declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions in a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that an executive ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at his discretion, and executives ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any one. Novella joined with WorkPerfect against the CEO of Millisoft, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Employees of Tectonix when the Millisoft Chairman and Asian Pear sent minions to attack Adobsoft, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the executive ought to favour one of the parties.

Never let any corporate body imagine that it can choose perfectly safe courses.  Rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil.

An executive ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his employees to practice their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of corporate taxes; but the executive ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his division or company.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals, picnics, and spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every division is divided into guilds or into unions, he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.


CHAPTER XXII

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF EXECUTIVES

THE choice of servants is of no little importance to an executive, and they are good or not according to the discrimination of the executive. And the first opinion which one forms of an executive, and of his understanding, is by observing the women he has around him; and when they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.

There were none who knew Miss Valerie Bloom as the secretary of Rudolph Weber, Executive of Oldgen, who would not consider Rudolph to be a very clever man in having Valerie for his servant. Because there are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which appreciates what others comprehend; and a third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Rudolph was not in the first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good or bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable an executive to form an opinion of his servant there is one test which never falls; when you see the servant thinking more of her own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly her own profit in everything, such a woman will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to trust her; because she who has the company of another in her hands ought never to think of herself, but always of her executive, and never pay any attention to matters in which the executive is not concerned.

On the other to keep her servant honest the executive ought to study her, honouring her, enriching her, doing her kindnesses, sharing with her the honours and cares; and at the same time let her see that she cannot stand alone, so that many honours not make her desire more, many riches make her wish for more, and that many cares may make her dread changes. When, therefore, servants, and executives towards servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.


CHAPTER XXIII

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I DO NOT wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which executives are with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom the office is full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest.  If they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.

Therefore a wise executive ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his company, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councilors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example, from government. Stephan, the man of affairs to Clinton, the present President, speaking of his greatness, said:  "He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above; for the President is a secretive man- he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions."

An executive, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that an executive who conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that an executive who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well coached, but it would not be for long, because such a coach will in a short time take away his company from him.

But if an executive who is not experienced should take counsel from more than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite them. Each of the counselors will think of his own interests, and the executive will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the executive, and not the wisdom of the executive from good counsels.


CHAPTER XXIV

THE EXECUTIVES OF AMERICA THAT HAVE LOST THEIR COMPANIES

THE previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new executive to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in the company than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new executive are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood.  Men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defense for an executive if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory to him to have established a new corporation, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born an executive, shall lose his company by want of wisdom.

And if those entrepreneurs are considered who have lost their companies in America in our times, such as the Chairman of Clarisoft, the CEO of Loetec, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to resources from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure upper management. In the absence of these defects companies that have power enough to keep a strong presence in the stock market cannot be lost.

Philip of Gridtek Computers had not much market share or competitive advantage compared to the greatness of Indel, who attacked him.  Yet being an aggressive man who knew how to attract the people and secure upper management, he sustained the fight against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he lost the dominion of some niches, nevertheless he retained the enterprise.

Therefore, do not let our executives accuse fortune for the loss of their corporations after so many years' possession, but rather their own sloth.  In quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.


CHAPTER XXV

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

IT is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by the dance of atoms that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them.  Because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defenses and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defenses have not been raised to constrain her.

And if you will consider Zerox, which is the seat of many of these changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open company without barriers and without any defense. For if it had been defended by proper valour, as are Asian Pear, and IPM mainframes, imitation would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that an executive may be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the executive who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the zeitgeist. This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to, and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, and is ruined.  But had he changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed.

Millisoft Chairman Portals went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against WorkPerfect. Novella were not agreeable to it, nor was the Chairman of Asian Pear, and he had the enterprise still under discussion with the Chairman of IPM; nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Asian Pear and Novella stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover Clarisoft; on the other hand, he drew after him the Chairman of IPM, because that Chairman, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Millisoft Chairman his friend so as to humble Novella, found it impossible to refuse him engineers without manifestly offending him. Therefore Will with his impetuous action accomplished what no other CEO with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited for the Indel business to be firm until before he broke away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other CEO would have done, he would never have succeeded. Because the Chairman of IPM would have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.


CHAPTER XXVI

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE THE COMPUTER MARKET FROM THE BARBARIANS

HAVING carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new executive, and whether there were the elements that would give an opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this company, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new executive that I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the US auto market should be oppressed by the Newmobile so as to discover the greatness of the soul of Henry; and that the PC distribution system should be inefficient to illustrate the capabilities of Delv: then at the present time, in order to discover the virtue of the customer, it was necessary that PC software should be reduced to the extremity she is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the US auto market; without system stability, without order, herded, despoiled, over hyped, over priced; and to have endured every kind of embarrassment.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that American software, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of WorkPerfect, to the swindling and taxing of Millisoft and of Asian Pear, and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she refuses to entreat God to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies, yet wishes for it nonetheless. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in your illustrious house, with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by Millisoft of which it is now the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.

With us there is great justice, because that market take over is just which is necessary, and new programs are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named engineers have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in America, and in so many campaigns, it has always appeared as if business virtue were exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish new industry standards and new protocols when he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and admired, and in America there are not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the design center whilst it fails in marketing. Look attentively at the duels and the action in the trenches. But when it comes to minions the software companies do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there has been a truly superior software technology, it has always given a poor account of itself; as witness QS/2, Asian Pear's Version 7.0 OS, UNIX.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow those remarkable men who have redeemed their company, it is necessary before all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better engineers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their executive, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such, so that you can be defended against competitors.

And although NEG and Asian Pear CS staff may be considered very formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to overthrow them. For the Asian Pear employees cannot resist engineering fellows, and the Switzers are unable to match the prowess of EE's in creating flexible code quickly. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Asian Pear employees are unable to resist IPM engineering leadership, and the Switzers are overthrown by the speed and rapidity of any coder unshackled by conventionality. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it in the spreadsheet market, when the Asian Pear software engineers were confronted by Loetec code, which followed the same protocol as MSDOS versions of the software; when the Asian Pear employees, by innovation and brilliance, got in under the patents of the latter and stood out by virtue of the capabilities of their code, able to attack, while the Loetec program stood helpless, and, if the engineering fellows had not dashed up, all would have been over with for them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these companies, to invent a new tactic, which will resist engineering fellows and not be overwhelmed by EE's rapidity; this need not create a new order of software, but a variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new executive.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting the American software applications market at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with which he would be received in all those organizations which have suffered so much from these unreliable, over hyped programs (with what thirst for disk space!) with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What American would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are undertaken, let a reliable, efficient, truly useful software architecture be created, so that under its standard our native company may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:



Virtu contro al Furore
Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:
Che l'antico valore
Negli americi cuor non e ancor morto.

In English: "Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight;
For the old coder, valour is not dead,
Nor in th' American's breasts extinguished."