The Zaslavskayan Conception of Soviet Economic History Critique of Tatyana Zaslavskaya's The Second Socialist Revolution, Indiana Univ Press, 1990 Paul Southworth Copyright 1991 by Paul Southworth, all rights reserved. Distribution in unmodified form is unrestricted. I. INTRODUCTION A. Zaslavskaya's Socialism Among Soviet economic and social theorists, the merits of a Marxist ideological basis for government policy are seldom questioned. A theory acceptable as a policy basis for party consideration must conform to basic Marxist principles, or the likelihood of its enactment is virtually nil. In effect, the theorist must pay lip service to the party by creating a theory that is Marxist in form. This, however, cannot prepare the student of Soviet policy for the plethora of widely variant and highly contradictory theories, all of which are, of course, "Marxist." Zaslavskaya uses several tests for determining progress down the "socialist" road. The first is based on the standard of living for the population. This test is concluded with a direct comparison of the standard of living of the Soviet Union with that of the Western powers.(1) The second test for "socialism" is the ability for individuals to own and operate commercial enterprises free (or relatively so) from state control.(2) The third major test is the degree of economic versus administrative management. The greater the degree of economic management, the greater the progress toward socialism.(3) Finally, the degree of democratization and the level of individual social and political freedoms is also a test for "socialist" progress. The popularity of the theories of Tatyana Zaslavskaya with portions of government and the population in the Soviet Union stems from her ability to render into the form of Marxism a theory for the systematic conversion of the Soviet economy from state capitalist(4) to market capitalist basis. Such a convenient blend of socialism and capitalism is, in the end, "having your Marxism and eating it, too." While she relates a class analysis of historical and current party function and structure after Stalin, her failure to respond to such an analysis with a method for returning power to the workers of the Soviet Union betrays her intentions. She summarizes Khruschev's policies as "a clumsy and inconsistent attempt at returning the country to the road of socialist construction" and those of Brezhnev as "degeneration of socialism."(5) It is apparent that the primary policy aim of Zaslavskaya's theory is to consistently and carefully continue the reforms that were begun with Khruschev and subsequently stifled under Brezhnev. Conveniently, Zaslavskaya provides readers with a summary definition of her conception of the "essential features and goals of socialism."(6) In several ways her summary offers liberalized versions of Marxist definitions of socialism which are explored below. Ultimately Zaslavskaya's "socialism" allows capitalist enterprise to continue on many levels. By use of the tests she has set up, Zaslavskaya cultivates a myopic perception of the effects of conversion to a market-based economy. B. Indicators of Capitalism As Zaslavskaya has used several measures of socialist progress, the following measures(7) of the presence or progress of capitalism will be applied to the policy examples raised in the text: 1. a social group that does not engage in production controls the means of production ;(8) 2. the controllers of the means of production control political power through the state; 3. profit potential determines what and how much to produce; 4. The labor of workers serves the controllers of the means of production who appropriate value created in production. While these measures are not entirely inclusive, the simultaneous presence of several of these indicators will be sufficient to indicate the presence of a degree of capitalist production relations.(9) A social trait (in this case, the capitalist mode of production) may be measured "by a series of indicators, or signs, that bear a probabilistic relationship to it. This means that the indicators do not necessarily appear each and every time the trait is manifesting itself."(10) Since there is great variation in the degree to which production relations are socialist or capitalist within Soviet society (and may possess only one or two of the indicators), general economic and social trends are more important in determining the direction Soviet society is going than a reductive categorization of the current status. Such a categorization would further require an evaluation of which of the features of capitalist production relations are more important and to what degree--an ultimately vulgar pursuit which would not contribute to a meaningful analysis. It is, similarly, not of value to attempt to make concrete comparisons with structures and institutions of Western countries since the form of capitalism in the Soviet Union will not resemble those found in the West, although the four indicators above will permit some comparison in broad terms. II. KHRUSCHEV'S SOCIALISM A. Economic Implications 1. Migration and Unemployment Through the decade of his rulership, Khruschev authorized the issuance of passports to the rural population to permit movement within the Soviet Union.(11) Zaslavskaya takes great notice of the improved civil rights and return of displaced nations to their original homelands, permitting the society to become "more normal."(12) This was followed by a high net migration of rural populations (especially youth) into urban areas, where wages were higher. She characterizes the migrants as willing to accept "literally any work and any accommodation," which was concurrently reflected in the "change in the ratio of the population producing agricultural output to that buying it."(13) This opens the debate on Soviet unemployment vs. underemployment. In Khruschev's time, unemployment was officially denied by the government, and Western scholars typically argue the existence of underemployment. The dual nature of employment statistics in the Soviet Union was explained by the CIA: "...unemployment in the USSR relates not to a high rate of joblessness in the labor force as a whole, but rather to the existence of pockets of unemployment that have developed in recent years, largely because of the failure of existing institutions to match workers and jobs efficiently...."(14) In this sense it was fairly easy to overlook the level of unemployment caused by the migration to the urban areas, since there were many jobs available and unfilled in the rural areas, and probably more in the urban areas that lacked suitably trained workers. Hence when one compares joblessness with available jobs, it is easy to underestimate the extent of the problem, since there is simultaneously a surplus and a shortage of jobs. In this sense, Zaslavskaya's "more normal" society is a society developing a complex unemployment problem. Some who would disprove the existence of capitalism in the Soviet Union use the proof that labor power does not have commodity status due to the fact that there is no reserve army of labor (unemployment) to force the price of labor power down through competition between workers.(15) Even so, the existence of "pockets of unemployment" make it possible for competition between workers to exist in limited scale in the urban areas--all who would migrate to the urban areas must compete for available positions. Furthermore, while unemployment and wage-slavery may conclusively indicate the presence of capitalism, the converse is not necessarily true. Many Western countries (notably Japan and Germany) have historically been able to sustain high growth and low unemployment, which is explained by a third variable, economic imperialism. Therefore while high unemployment is a good indicator of capitalist production relations, low unemployment is an inadequate indicator of socialist progress. 2. Material Incentives and Economic Management Systems Somehow Zaslavskaya has resurrected the argument that workers' alienation from the products of their labor will be ameliorated by the introduction of profit-based material production incentives and economic management system.(16) This position implies that if the material reward for production is increased, that workers will feel greater compulsion to produce more and higher quality goods, and enterprises will be induced to operate profitably for the greater good. This argument is anti-Marxist. Marx identified worker alienation as a function of the capitalist mode of production in his description of "Estranged Labour," where, under capitalist production relations, "the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object [emphasis in original]."(17) This is due to the disparity between the value of the labor power for which the worker is compensated and the actual value of the worker's labor embodied in the product--the worker may not understand how the surplus value was appropriated, but the contradiction is manifested in the effect on the worker. The capitalist aspect of material incentives and economic management systems are explored below. Moreover, profit-based material incentives provide the motivation to produce goods which are profitable to produce, while there are many goods that are highly necessary without being profitable to produce. This is most apparent with basic living needs. Profitability is contingent on high exchange value, while needs of society are best served by keeping the exchange value of human necessities low. Empirically, the result of the profit-based material incentives has contributed to the shortages of critical products in the USSR. Likewise in the West, high growth and starvation can easily coexist. a. Material Incentives Zaslavskaya indicates the great effectiveness of material incentives on agricultural production. Cited are figures on growth in agricultural production, however, these do not relate the fact that agricultural production up to 1953 had also been continuously rising. By the end of Stalin's rule most of the major livestock production figures were at or near pre-collectivization levels, without resorting to the use (and additional expense) of material incentives.(18) More importantly, the material incentives of the Khruschev era are in direct contradiction with the socialist system of production based on need, not profit. Here it is necessary to make an important distinction between pre- and post- central planning incentives. By the early 1960s, Khruschev had abolished many of the central planning authorities which were responsible for dictating production guidelines and quotas.(19) Prior to this time, economic incentives to Soviet industry had been derived from production achieved in relation to fulfillment of planned targets(20) which were based on the social need for the goods in question. However, after the destruction of the central planning authorities, the incentives were entirely based on the profitability of the operation. V S Nemchinov(21) explains the new incentive system: "The enterprise must possess a fund for material incentive, the size of which must depend on the actual level of profitability."(22) An additional adverse effect of profit-based production incentives is that the money fetishism of capitalism is maintained. Instead of seeking to improve production for its social value (and giving priority to producing goods of primary social importance) they encourage producers to worship the money/incentive and seek to obtain the incentive over primary social goals. When this is combined with entrepreneurial independence, a situation arises where the non-profitable (but necessary) goods are not produced in sufficient quantities or at appropriate prices, depending on the degree of price fixing. The current crisis in food availability in the Soviet Union is one example of this. b. Economic Management Systems and Growth The capitalist nature of economic accounting and management of industry needs little clarification in relation to the indicators of capitalist production relations. Zaslavskaya's analysis mirrors that of her predecessors in the Khruschev administration. She relates that "the new leadership adopted a policy of systematically introducing economic accounting...."(23) which resulted in high economic growth. Beyond the obvious point that profit-based production is by definition capitalist in nature, it is important to observe that Zaslavskaya is only concerned with the spoils of this policy in terms of the direct effect on the standard of living. Since her logic establishes the progress of socialism on the basis of the improvement of living standards, this represents "proof" of Khruschev's socialist intentions. The absurdity of this argument is immediately apparent when one considers that capitalist production relations have historically been a highly effective method of making rapid leaps in economic growth.(24) Improvement of living standards by increased economic growth in no way indicates socialist progress--it is entirely ambiguous. This fact exposes the weakness of Zaslavskaya's indicators of socialist progress which rely on ends justifying means. 3. Production of Consumer Goods It is interesting to note that Zaslavskaya equates television sets with consumer "needs."(25) Naturally CD players, programmable coffee makers, electrically adjustable beds and Lincoln Continentals are "needs" as well. By this standard the "needs" of a society are endless and there is no difference between a VCR and food or clothing. Once again the analysis is fundamentally non-Marxist. The implication that these "needs" spurred greater production is also a distortion. In reality, the high demand for these goods (and hence their high profitability) resulted in application of high levels of government incentive (since the incentives were based on profitability). This example only further demonstrates the level of money-worship and commodity fetishism present in the Soviet Union at the time of Khruschev, as well as the production of goods based on profit rather than actual need. Luxury goods can play a part in contributing to the standard of living, but they should not be equated to basic survival necessities. B. Social Reform as Indicator of Socialist Progress While the process of democratization and "free speech"(26) is not in doubt, the connection of democratization in the presence of capitalist production relations with socialist progress is entirely spurious. If "free speech" is a measure of socialism, then the majority of the Western powers also qualify. The absurdity of "free speech" in the Soviet Union is equal to that in the West. Workers are free to participate in government, except that they are caught in the endless cycle of selling their labor power, while those who control the means of production have the time and resources to make their influence felt. Ultimately, while the process of democratization played a beneficial role, democratization with capitalist production relations is fundamentally meaningless. In the Soviet Union, this process is further compounded by the fact that those in the party leadership have wealth (since they economically benefit by their party position) while at the same time those with wealth are those who have the ability to be in the party leadership. This is a vicious circle that can only be broken by reclaiming the wealth and influence that the party bureaucracy has appropriated--simply "democratizing" society will not alter it. The effect of Brezhnev's policies after the Kosygin Reform of 1965 has only closed this cycle more tightly. III. BREZHNEV'S STAGNATION A. The Kosygin Reform The Kosygin Reform(27) at the beginning of Brezhnev's rule was not of any particular significance in terms of policy change from that of the majority of Khruschev's policies. It is useful as an analytical tool, since it officialized and articulated the goals of the administration in a more concise manner. As is examined below, the "reversal" of the goals of the Kosygin Reform on which Zaslavskaya puts so much importance is, in reality, a change of only one fundamental portion of the path toward capitalism--the role of the state in the management process. The overall direction is the same, and to a certain degree, Marxist-Leninist predictions of the direction that capitalism will ultimately travel are easily applied here. B. "Stagnation" To the extent that Khruschev's policies are mirrored in the Kosygin Reform (albeit in a refined manner), and that Zaslavskaya equates these policies with socialism, Brezhnev's move is indeed a "degeneration of socialism." However, viewed from the vantage point that the Khruschevian reforms were a regression to the capitalist road, Brezhnev's actions do not alter the course--they are simply a refinement. 1. All Power to the Monopoly a. Party monopoly Zaslavskaya understood that the party had a vested interest in the maintenance of party power.(28) Her analysis fails to relate the material basis for this, however, which was that the promotion of entrepreneurial independence simultaneously promoted competition for the economic benefits of production. The party did not seek power for the sake of power itself, indeed, power without economic benefit is of no value, unless the Brezhnev administration was a party of idealists. No, the party sought to consolidate its monopoly on surplus appropriation. From a Marxist perspective, this was inevitable and the policies of Brezhnev were a logical extension of those initiated under Khruschev. If individuals were able to conduct business independent of the government's influence, then the economic benefit of that production would naturally go to that individual. Not only could this potentially reduce the benefit to the party, but the established party structure could be challenged by newcomers with economic influence. In this sense, it was entirely necessary for the party leadership to systematically eliminate economic independence. Zaslavskaya categorizes the reason for the reversal as "not in the economic, but in the socio-political sphere"(29) but fails to apply even her own analysis (actually borrowed from Marx) "that the social structure is formed above all by the system of economic relations."(30) In this sense it is incorrect to think of economic and social spheres as distinct and exclusive, since the social sphere is within the economic. b. Concentration of capital The party leadership sought to concentrate control of the means of production not only by exercising complete party rule over centralized economic planning, but also by concentrating individual enterprises to make them easier to manage centrally.(31) Indeed, this concentration was reflected in a continuous rise in the size and value of Soviet enterprises during the Brezhnev administration. Furthermore, this concentration was even more pronounced than in the Western countries, where there was a higher degree of competition.(32) Most indicative of the capitalist nature of this concentration is the precision with which the assessments of the Soviet economic theorists of the time fit with a Marxist analysis of concentration of capital. Marx on concentration arising from competition: "The battle of competition is fought by cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities, caeteris paribus(33), on the productiveness of labour, and this again on the scale of production. Therefore the larger capitals beat the smaller."(34) In comparison, Bland quotes N Y Drogichinsky: "Small enterprises are faced with difficulties. Since their economic stimulation funds are not big, they are not always able to build cultural and service establishments and houses and also to undertake measures for the development of production because the size of the funds does not allow them to do this in one or two years.... Economic stimulation funds can be better utilised in cases where they are set up by big enterprises...."(35) So concentration, both naturally occurring and hastened via encouragement by the state, resulted in solidification of the state monopoly on extraction of surplus value. c. The Reward of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie "What are classes in general? Classes are that which permits one section of society to appropriate the labor of another section."(36) The party leadership used a variety of methods to indirectly appropriate labor through the government monopoly. First, the profits of the enterprise, after dispensing a portion as incentive to the employees and management, are seized by the state. The party leadership gives itself a variety of privileges which give individual party leaders the "right" to a large portion of the profits. The system for bolstering a high salary with other unearned income often consists of special bonuses for accepting more than one party post and extra allowances for academic qualifications. Even the material incentives for production are not equitably distributed, with workers incentive being about 4% of their wage, while that of managerial staff constitutes 40%. Beyond the legal privileges that exist, embezzlement and abuses of power for economic gain constitute an expense of millions of roubles. "The higher one's position and the greater one's power, the more surplus value one gets."(37) d. Non-consumptive Uses of Appropriated Surplus Value It is erroneous to believe that the only misuse of surplus is through decadent bourgeois consumption. Vast amounts are used in other fashions to prop up the bureaucratic system, and significant amounts are squandered or wasted through intentional destruction of surplus commodities and planned obsolescence. It is useful to note that the amount directly consumed by the bourgeoisie is relatively insignificant in comparison to some of the other uses(38): (1) military expenditure, (2) imperialist export of capital, and (3) waste. 2. Faltering Growth Evaluated through the application of Marxist-Leninist monopoly analysis, the reasons for the economic failure under Brezhnev's state monopoly are clear. Under monopoly conditions, the productive forces are increasingly held in check. The Soviet government effectively eliminated competition through state power. The process of this elimination sacrificed the productive capability and motivation of Soviet industry, which led to a continual reduction in economic growth. This was also accompanied by irrationally fixed prices.(39) Lenin explains the condition: "Since monopoly prices are established, even temporarily, the motive cause of technical and, consequently, of all progress, disappears to a certain extent and, further, the economic possibility arises of deliberately retarding technical progress. ... Certainly the possibility of reducing cost of production and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements operates in the direction of change. But the tendency to stagnation and decay, which is characteristic of monopoly, continues to operate...."(40) IV. CONCLUSION A. The Capitalist Road Throughout the period from Khruschev through Brezhnev all indicators of capitalist production relations have appeared-- not all at first, although gradually they are manifested to a greater and greater degree. 1. The means of production are primarily controlled by a social group that does not engage in production Clearly, the party leadership exercised control over the production process. The means of production were almost entirely under their influence. The workers had no opportunity to exercise economic control over production. 2. The controllers of the means of production control political power through the state In an interesting twist to traditional capitalist forms, it was true both that the controllers of the means of production used state power to control political and economic policy to their advantage, and that those in the state apparatus were the controllers. 3. Profit potential determines what and how much to produce In one of the clearest indicators of capitalist production relations, profit-based production decisions and planning were unabashedly pursued from the outset of Khruschev's rule. Regardless of the social value of the commodities, commodities were produced and planned for on the basis of their potential for high profitability. This placement of exchange value over human need remained fundamentally unchanged from the time Khruschev took office, and Zaslavskaya's perspective on this issue mirrors that of the Khruschev administration. 4. The labor of workers serves the controllers of the means of production who appropriate value created in production This process began more slowly than the others, but by the time Brezhnev had spent the time to consolidate party power over the means of production in an official manner, the appropriation of the labor of the workers of the Soviet Union proceeded quickly and efficiently. The process underwent refinement and improvement over the course of the post-Stalin period, eventually culminating in party monopoly over the means of production and right to surplus value. B. The Socialist Road? In contrast, while the fundamental features of the Khruschev administration appear to fulfill Zaslavskaya's major tests of "socialist progress", they fail to satisfy the primary socialist "essential features and goals." 1. Exploitation "the absence of any significant measure of exploitation of some social groups by others, [and] the reduction of unearned income to a minimum...."(41) The key liberty taken is that Zaslavskaya's operative definition of exploitation does not include the extraction of surplus value from the labor of others. Throughout her analysis of the Kruschevian reforms of the mid 1950s to mid 1960s, the degree to which enterprises are free to form outside of state influence is a measure of socialist progress. Considering that the extent of this enterprise may be taken to include businesses for profit with employees, there will be extraction of surplus value from the labor of the employees. Furthermore, the "degree of exploitation of labour determines the rate of surplus value."(42) So to the extent that there is profit-based enterprise, there is, by definition, exploitation. Naturally this is very basic Marxism. However, it is interesting to note that the depth of Zaslavskaya's analysis does not even go so far as to address or revise such a fundamental concept. Implicitly, she further distorts the concept of "unearned income" to exclude profits extracted via surplus value. More appropriately, exploitation occurs "in that capitalists live, partly or wholly, on the labour of others, ie, of their employed workers."(43) So viewed, privately owned enterprise for profit is inherently exploitive. 2. Standard of Living "a steady rise in living standards and the elimination of poverty."(44) Even more dangerously, Zaslavskaya rationalizes Soviet social imperialism(45) in her comparison of Western and Soviet standards of living.(46) Notably, when she makes such comparison, it is implicit that the Soviets should be enjoying the same standards as those in the West. What is demanded from such analysis, however, is that the Soviet Union utilize the same methods to garner wealth for its population. Zaslavskaya demonstrates fundamental ignorance of the fact that the privileged life of the Western masses was made possible through colonialism, not through their ability to produce goods efficiently. "[C]apitalism has now singled out a handful... of exceptionally rich and powerful states which plunder the whole world....[emphasis in original]"(47) "In the place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes."(48) As the United States has historically relied on market expansion, extraction of raw materials and capital export into developing nations(49) to satiate its domestic workers, it is absurd to imply that the Soviet Union could provide the same level of consumer goods without resorting to similar means. At very least, the Soviet Union would require a vast super-exploited class of laborers to provide material goods at low costs to the remainder of society--a requirement incompatible even with her own definition of socialism. The "bourgeoisified workers"(50) of the Western labor aristocracy cannot be compared to the workers of the Soviet Union. This inappropriate comparison of living standards can only be resolved by retaining the comparative framework of within the Soviet Union. 3. Power "workers political power, the possibility of free expression and the protection of the interests of all social groups...."(51) Considering the inherent exploitation and concentration of capital associated with the enterprise advocated by Zaslavskaya, the concept of "workers political power" is hollow. When private enterprise will be able to extract, reproduce and accumulate capital derived from the labor of workers, it will not be possible for workers to be politically powerful. Zaslavskaya acknowledges the prevalence of bribery and manipulation of the state by wealthy criminal forces,(52) but fails to make the connection that those who are successful in the new legitimate business sector will inherit the influence of the previous black marketeers by possessing the same tool: wealth. Just as "worker political power" will be quickly turned to capitalist political power, so will the "protection of the interests of all social groups" be subverted to protection of the interests of capitalists. Endnotes: 1 Zaslavskaya, The Second Socialist Revolution, Indiana University Press, 1990, p29 2 Zaslavskaya, p30, 36 3 Zaslavskaya, p30 4 State capitalism: monopoly capital controlled by state power. 5 Zaslavskaya, p11 6 Zaslavskaya, p13 7 Adapted from the introduction to W B Bland's The Restoration of Capitalism in the Soviet Union, Selecteditions, London, 1980 8 In the case of the Soviet Union it is necessary to substitute the term "control" for the term "own" since ownership per se is officially denied. Control should be considered tantamount to ownership except in name. 9 Production relations assumed to include: (1) the ownership pattern of the means of production, (2) people's roles in production and their mutual relations, (3) the pattern of product distribution. 10 G William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now?, Prentice-Hall, 1983, p10 11 Zaslavskaya, p29-30 12 Zaslavskaya, p30 13 Zaslavskaya, p32-33 14 CIA, "Unemployment in the Soviet Union - Fact or Fiction?" Division of Intelligence, Office of Research and Report, 1966, p1 cited in Jonathan Aurthur's Socialism in the Soviet Union, Workers Press, 1977, p80 15 Aurthur, p81 16 Zaslavskaya, p5 17 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, Norton Press, 1972, p58 18 Kenneth R Whiting, The Soviet Union Today, Praeger, 1962, p177 19 Zaslavskaya, p30; W B Bland, p137 20 W B Bland, p136 21 Like Liberman, a champion of relaxation of bureaucratic control of industry. 22 V S Nemchinov, "The Plan Target and Material Incentive," Pravda, September 21, 1962, cited from W B Bland, p138 23 Zaslavskaya, p30 24 Karl Marx, "The Communist Manifesto," in The Marx-Engels Reader, p337-8 25 Zaslavskaya, p31 26 Zaslavskaya, p33 27 "designed to introduce economic methods of management, extend the independence of enterprises, increase the role of profit, etc." Zaslavskaya, p35 28 Zaslavskaya, p36 29 Zaslavskaya, p36 30 Zaslavskaya, p5 31 W B Bland, p261-2 32 W B Bland, p264-5 33 All other things being equal 34 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p586 35 N Y Drogichinsky, Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems, 1972, quoted by W B Bland, p267 36 V I Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues," Speech delivered October 2, 1920 in Selected Works, 1977, p417 37 "Fictitious Ownership by Whole People in Soviet Union," Peking Review, No 29, July 18, 1975 in Social Imperialism: The Soviet Union Today, Reprints from the Peking Review, Yenan Books, Berkeley, 1977, p98-9 38 Analysis derived from study of US surplus by Joseph D Phillips, "Estimating the Economic Surplus," in Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, 1966, pp369-389 39 Zaslavskaya, p38 40 Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, p119 41 Zaslavskaya, p13 42 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1959, p197 43 W B Bland, p(i) 44 Zaslavskaya, p13 45 "'Social imperialists,' that is, Socialists in words and imperialists in deeds...." Lenin, Imperialism, p131-2 46 Zaslavskaya, p29 47 Lenin, Imperialism, p9 48 Karl Marx, "The Communist Manifesto," in The Marx-Engels Reader, p338 49 Richard Krooth, Arms & Empire, Harvest Publishers, 1980, p114-118; 50 Lenin, Imperialism, p10 51 Zaslavskaya, p13 52 Zaslavskaya, p42-43