Yugoslavia and Poland:
Paths to Bourgeois Democracy and Capitalism

Paul Southworth
Copyright 1991 by Paul Southworth, all rights reserved.  Distribution in
unmodified form is unrestricted.

I.  Introduction

Opposition groups comprised of workers, led by local 
intelligentsia, and motivated primarily by nationalism and a 
drive to national independence have typified Poland's 
transition to market economy during 1989 and 1990 and 
Yugoslavia's continuing transition.  In Poland, this 
transition has meant divorcing itself from the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw pact.  In Yugoslavia, this has translated into 
dangerous ethnic conflicts at a regional level, intermittent 
successes in overthrowing entrenched incumbent leadership, 
and a high likelihood that the Yugoslavian federation will 
disintegrate.  The influence of the intelligentsia on both 
opposition movements has been mixed, although the rhetoric of 
the intelligentsia has been consistently demanding a shift 
toward Western-type rights of individuals over the rights of 
groups.

There is some added confusion in the comparison of Yugoslavia 
and Poland, since the opposition movements in Yugoslavia have 
not won broad victory at the federal level, or in a majority 
of the republics.  In this sense, the process of political 
and social transformation is not complete, and the 
possibility of success is still in the balance.

II.  Nature of the Opposition

A.  Unity

Three key factors(1) have contributed greatly to the relative 
unity of Poland's Solidarity movement, and the relative 
disunity of the Yugoslavian.  The lack of cohesion among the 
Yugoslav opposition is better characterized as unity in 
largely regional terms based on ethno-nationality, since the 
influences of the church and the lack of an identifiable 
external oppressor are of lesser importance in Yugoslavia 
than they are in Poland.  The Polish movement united around 
their ability to ascertain what Poles had in common on a 
social level, and to create an identification of those common 
attributes with the opposition movement.  To maintain this, 
it was necessary to emphasize the strength of these common 
attributes over other divisive factors.

1.  Role of Nationality

Among Poles, with 95% claiming Polish nationality(2) and most 
opposing Soviet intervention in Poland, it was an easy matter 
(relative to Yugoslavia) to find common ground and suppress 
differences, such as those based on class.

In Yugoslavia, with a plethora of nationalities, many 
religious affiliations, and without a clear external 
oppressor, there is a lack of common ground on which to bring 
together a broad, multi-ethnic movement in opposition to the 
government.  There is a consequent lack of unity on national 
grounds, since in practical terms there is no such thing as 
"Yugoslav nationalism" -- the term is one identified only 
with the rule of the Communist Party, which makes it an 
unlikely choice for mass appeal, similar to rejection of 
"Soviet nationalism" in the USSR.

Understanding regional national solidarity helps explain the 
Yugoslav opposition movements.  In the absence of tangible, 
unifying issues that can bring the entire country together, 
the regional national groups form the largest cohesive 
factions of the opposition.  Despite the federal government's 
prolonged efforts to promote "Yugoslav nationalism," the old 
national divisions have remained largely intact, and regional 
ethnic homogeneity has remained nearly absolute in the large 
republics.  While country as a whole has only 36% of the 
population considered homogeneous, the individual republics 
are internally very homogeneous -- Serbia with 89%, Slovenia 
with 92% and Croatia with 79% of the population considered to 
be of the same ethic heritage.(3)  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Montenegro have lower levels of homogeneity, 
due to their existence as composites of pre-federation 
nationalities.

2.  External Oppressor

The ability of the Polish opposition to identify, stigmatize, 
and struggle against Soviet political and economic and 
military domination was an asset of considerable ideological 
power when attempting to unify the movement.  While it was 
possible for the Polish government to identify in part with 
Polish nationalism, this position was quickly rendered 
indefensible due to the Poles' perception of the control 
exerted by the Soviet Union over the Polish political system.  
The Polish opposition was quickly and completely identified 
as the repository of true Polish nationalism, and repeated 
attempts to subvert this were highly ineffective.  The power 
of the "external oppressor" as a motivating and unifying tool 
for opposition is perhaps best seen in its absence -- the 
current disintegration in the solidarity of Solidarity 
confirms that the failure to identify an oppressor will make 
continued cohesion difficult, if not impossible.  The cross-
class nature of the Polish movement created broad support in 
the face of the common enemy -- the Soviet Union.  But 
differences appear to be dividing the movement since Lech 
Walesa's electoral victory.

Yugoslavia's opposition movements face greater difficulty in 
forming a broad federation-wide coalition.  In this, the 
antagonistic relationships between national groups will 
undoubtedly be a hindrance.  In contrast to Poland, where the 
liberation struggle was for the liberation of one 
nationality, if the Yugoslav federation is to remain intact 
(a question of goals, addressed in section B), the liberation 
of many nations (with contradictory interests) will be 
required.  At present, differences between national groups of 
similar worker-class background may be greater than those 
between the worker-class and the federal rulership.  Denitch 
explains regarding Slovenia:  "[the Slovene people] want no 
part of a national melting pot in their republic.(4)"

Even if the Yugoslav opposition groups were to identify the 
federal government as their opponent, they would still be 
faced (more so than in Poland) with combatting a largely 
intangible foe -- an occupying doctrine, rather than an 
occupying army.  While it was possible in Poland to formulate 
a moral and intellectual opposition, through the 
intelligentsia, to Soviet foreign policy in Poland, the 
Soviets maintained an occupying force in the region, an 
organization that was both hostile and completely foreign.  
This gave the people a common enemy.  This condition does not 
exist in Yugoslavia.  The armed forces, while comprised of a 
large number of Serbs(5), is not entirely controlled by any 
single nationality, and is certainly not a foreign occupier 
of Yugoslavia.

3.  Role of Religion

The Catholic church in Poland has been a powerful binding 
influence on the Polish opposition movement.  There were 
several logical reasons for the alliance between the church 
and the opposition movement.  First, in conjunction with the 
basis of the movement in Polish nationalism, the Catholic 
church forms an integral part of what the Polish nationality 
is(6) -- the two are essentially inseparable.

Yugoslavia, a country without a dominant religion or a 
religious institution that comprises a powerful social force, 
the effect of religion is similar to that of nationalism.  
Regionally, religion is of great importance; nationally, 
religion does not represent a common unifying issue.  The 
inter-regional religious conflict is apparent in the 
antagonism between Albanian Kosovo and Serbia.  Kosovar 
nationalism is closely tied with Islam, while Serbian 
nationalism is tied to Christianity.  This has added fuel to 
the political and military conflict between Kosovo and 
Serbia.

B.  Goals

1.  Independence

The meaning of the call for national independence is 
difficult to define.  The Yugoslav movements appear divided, 
and as the political climate changes, the goals of 
independence may evolve as well.  Given the depth of the 
inter-ethnic rivalries, it is possible that the greatest 
extent the current movements are capable of achieving is that 
of separatism and dissolution of the federation.  This, 
however, is not as simple as it appears, since there are 
significant minorities in each of the major republics, which 
would theoretically allow for endless splitting and 
separation.  In reality, the influence each republic has over 
the others (however slight that is) would be lost entirely 
with separation; each republic would contend with its own 
internal minorities in the way the majority saw fit.  In 
practical terms this would condemn the Kosovars to Serbian 
rule, and cause bitter power-struggles in the more ethnically 
heterogeneous republics.  A decision to overcome the primacy 
of the individual national independence movements will be 
required if the federation is to remain cohesive.  A balance 
will have to be found to provide inter-ethnic respect, and a 
different motivating issue must be brought forward to 
stimulate the movement.

The Poles never had to contend with this dilemma:  where 
nationalism divides the Yugoslavs, it unites the Poles.  For 
the vast majority of Poles, nationalism was a solution and 
not a problem, since homogeneity was nearly absolute.  The 
evolution of Solidarity's concept of national independence 
has therefore been easier to chart.   The movement originated 
primarily to improve the economic position of its members -- 
who were frustrated by the economic pattern of distribution 
-- and evolved under the leadership of the intelligentsia 
into a movement intent on national independence.(7)  The 
intelligentsia did not advocate this position from 
Solidarity's beginnings in the 1980s.  Under the fear that 
the Soviet government would deploy troops to halt the 
transition to Polish national independence(8), they waited 
until it became apparent that the Soviets would permit the 
move, and ultimately succeeded an electoral victory, with the 
permission of the Soviet-based Polish government.

2.  Rights of Individuals and the Intelligentsia

The influence of the urban intelligentsia in both Poland and 
Yugoslavia has been felt most strongly in their demands for 
the rights of individuals -- including rights to speech and 
assembly, democratic elections, and individual bourgeois 
economic rights.(9)  Clearly, this is where the material 
interests of the intelligentsia lie, since the rights to 
speech and press pertain directly to their ability to work 
and lead the worker movements, democratic elections will 
permit the intelligentsia to rise to the forefront of 
political leadership, and bourgeois economic rights will 
permit them to advance on an individual economic level based 
on their skills and education (which would give them a 
distinct advantage over their less-educated competition).

III.  Nature of Transition

A.  Political

Yugoslavia's political transition has been as scattered as 
Poland's has been concise and consolidated.  Where Poland has 
achieved the national political victory of excising the 
Soviets from their political system, Yugoslavia has made 
limited (although significant) victories at the regional 
level.  A common link, however, is the temper of the 
movements, which have operated through popular 
demonstrations, and secured their achievements through 
democratic elections.  In both cases the incumbent leadership 
has lost confidence in itself, and elections have occurred 
with their approval.

In Yugoslavia,  the Communist Parties of Croatia and Slovenia 
approved regional elections in December of 1989, to be held 
in 1990.  They further rescinded the "leading role" of the 
Communist Party.  The result has been the rise to power of 
Slovenia's Demos (Slovene Democratic Alliance) party, and 
Croatia's Democratic Union.  The success of opposition 
movements in Slovenia was mixed with the coincident victory 
of Milan Kukan, a "reform Communist" to the presidency of 
Slovenia.  Croatia's opposition won complete control of the 
Croatian government, and is prepared to secede from the 
federation if the Beograd government does not respect its 
national sovereignty.(10)  So far, the Serbian republic is 
still governed by Slobodan Milosevic, who also rode the wave 
of nationalism into political power.  Milosevic is currently 
best known for his advocacy of the forced integration of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina, two autonomous regions, into Serbia.  
The Kosovars protest the integration, which would force the 
predominantly Muslim Albanian population to be governed by 
the Serbs.  Milosevic initially requested the Politburo's 
approval for the integration, but when it was denied, he 
proceeded on his own initiative.(11)

The progress of Poland's political transformation is simple 
in comparison to that of Yugoslavia.  The opposition was 
characterized by only one major effective group -- Solidarity 
-- and the the movement was effective across the entire 
country.  After a brief breakthrough period of quickly-
escalating, nation-wide strikes in 1980-81, Solidarity 
established itself as a cross-class national union movement 
of considerable clout.  In December of 1981, Solidarity was 
banned and driven underground under conditions of marital 
law.  Seven years later, with Mikhail Gorbachev leading the 
Soviet Union, the strikes begin again, with nation-wide work 
stoppage.  Peter Cipkowski identifies this renewed period of 
strikes as the critical moment for the Polish political 
transition:

"[T]he essential revolutionary jolt was provided by two waves 
of strikes in May and August 1988.  The second wave was 
larger than the first, and resulted in the restoration of a 
banned trade union called Solidarity."(12)

As the success of Solidarity became imminent, the government 
began to disintegrate.  Finally, as a result of round-table 
negotiations between the government and Solidarity in Spring 
of 1989, the government agrees to hold elections.  Cipkowski 
relates that the incumbent leadership realized its own 
inability to rule:

"After years of repeated economic failures and political 
repression, Poland's unpopular leaders were apparently 
concluding that they could not govern the country without the 
people's support.  According to Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Poland's 
former Communist prime minister, the Party was going through 
a 'crisis of faith.'"(13)

In the ensuing elections, Solidarity won broad support, 
although criticizing the government-sponsored elections as 
undemocratic.  The second half of 1989 saw the creation of a 
new government, with Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister, 
and the election of Solidarity candidates to 260 of 261 
parliamentary seats.  On December 9, 1990, Lech Walesa was 
elected to the presidency of Poland with a 75% majority.(14)

B.  Economic

Having secured national political power in Poland, Walesa's 
government now faces its first major challenge -- how to turn 
years of dismal economic performance and low popular 
confidence into prosperity for the country.  Now that the 
Soviet influence in government has been removed, the new 
government is seeking to legitimize itself by taking 
responsibility for the economy.  For Walesa, this has meant 
embracing the West -- both the Western market style, and 
Western aid.

In Yugoslavia, also a country with a dismal economy 
throughout the 1980s, has suffered from sky-high inflation, 
declining living standards, and high unemployment.(15)  
Western aid has not helped the opposition movements (and the 
regional governments of Slovenia and Croatia) to improve 
local economies and promote democratic reforms.

1.  Embracing the Market

Poland's new government made a mad dash for marketization.  
From the beginning of the Solidarity government with 
Mazowiecki, broad marketization was advocated, and on January 
1, 1990, the government approved a broad package of reforms 
to combat the impending economic disaster that threatened 
Poland.  They agreed to remove price controls (except on 
rent), end restrictions on private property, sell all state-
owned companies, and move toward convertible currency.(16)  
While these measures succeeded (over the next few months) in 
bringing inflation from 78% to 4% in two months(17), and 
improving distribution networks, the initial price increases 
and wage decreases associated with the reforms made life in 
Poland miserable.(18)  The lack of capitalist market 
structures to support the market economy made life especially 
difficult for the new entrepreneurs:  poor distribution 
networks, no banking system, and little knowledge of business 
operation.(19)  The misery associated with these measures 
surpassed that of the Soviet-backed regime, and in late 
Spring 1990, strikes began to break out, with workers 
demanding wage increases.  Walesa and Solidarity were forced 
to attempt to end the strikes without making concessions to 
the workers.(20)  Ultimately, the Polish economy is still in 
worse condition now that it was under the rule of the Soviet-
backed government, with unemployment expected to rise to over 
10% of the population in 1991.(21)

Denitch sarcastically criticizes the economic reforms of 1988 
in Yugoslavia, which were supported by the IMF and other 
Western creditors:

"These measures are based on old familiar free-marketeer 
nostrums of producing and exporting more while cutting down 
social spending and real wages of workers -- just the sort of 
thing that has been so helpful to Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile, not to mention the host of other victims of the 
international monetary system in this era of debts."(22)

While the Yugoslav programme has not accepted the "free" 
market dimension to the same extent that Poland has, the 
likely effect of a similar rush to embrace market pricing 
would be economic disaster to parallel that in Poland.  Given 
the greater volatility in Yugoslavia, with ethnic 
antagonisms, the ensuing damage would be much more severe.

2.  Embracing Western Dependency

Poland and Yugoslavia both have requested Western economic 
aid to support their fledgling market economies, assuring the 
Western powers of their commitment to democracy and tenuous 
nature of their position.

Poland has been successful in securing international monetary 
aid from Germany, the European Community, and the United 
States.  Four billion dollars in interest on its $39 billion 
foreign debt was forgiven, and $2.3 billion in additional 
credit was offered through the IMF and Western organizations.  
Joint ventures with Western firms have been slow to start, 
considering the economic climate, and Western investment has 
been low.(23)

Yugoslavia, without a clear victory of democratic movements 
at the federal level, has been unable to secure foreign aid.  
Denitch faults the West for sabotaging democratic reforms by 
not supplying monetary aid:

"The miserly aid from the West cannot ensure economic 
reforms, and it is an open question how viable 
democratization is if it is coupled with continued economic 
hardship."(24)

C.  Comparing Yugoslavia with Poland

Denitch sees the Polish experience with democracy as one of 
greater success than that in Yugoslavia:

"[S]ubstantially free, although limited, elections in Poland 
have gone beyond the present Yugoslav reforms.  So obviously 
has the unique Polish experiment with an opposition-led 
cabinet."(25)

Denitch can be criticized, however, for not identifying the 
conditions for rapid and comprehensive Polish success in 
democratization, which do not exist in Yugoslavia.  Poland is 
ethnically homogeneous, had a clear tangible external 
opponent, and is comprised of only one primary religion.  
Patrick Brogan describes the impossibility of this in 
Yugoslavia:

"The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 was something of a 
miracle and like many miracles, it has not worn well.  It has 
turned out that six republics, three religions, ten 
minorities and two alphabets do not equal one nation."(26)

1   Michael Kennedy, Professionals, Power and Solidarity in 
    Poland, 1991, p58:  "(1) intense Polish nationalism; (2) 
    focused nationalistic hatred for the Russians; and (3) a 
    common religion."
2   Kennedy, The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil 
    Societies and Post Communist Regimes in Hungary and 
    Poland, July 1990, p6
3   Figures are from 1981 Census.  Bogdan Denitch notes (in 
    Limits and Possibilities, 1990, p81) that the 36% figure 
    is low -- 40% is the correct figure.  Unfortunately 
    Denitch does not substantiate the 40% figure.  He further 
    notes that a large number of those claiming "Yugoslav" 
    nationality can be categorized as Serbs.
4   Denitch, p79
5   Denitch, p81
6   Kennedy, Professionals..., p65
7   Kennedy, Professionals..., p65
8   Kennedy, Professionals..., p74
9   Kennedy, Professionals..., p75
10  Patrick Brogan, The Captive Nations:  Eastern Europe 1945 
    to 1990, 1990, pp168-169; Tomaz Mastnak, "Civil Society 
    in Slovenia:  From Opposition to Power," Studies in 
    Comparative Communism, Autumn/Winter 1990, p315
11  Brogan, pp166-167
12  Peter Cipkowski, Revolution in Eastern Europe, 1991, p15
13  Cipkowski, p21
14  Brogan, p71; Cipkowski, p14,28
15  Denitch, p28
16  Brogan, p74
17  Cipkowski, p34:  monthly rates from December 1989 to 
    January 1990
18  Brogan, p74:  "In ten weeks, real incomes dropped 37%, 
    and prices rose dramatically:  bread by 38%, petrol 100%, 
    meat 55%, electricity 400%."
19  Brogan, p75
20  Brogan, p75
21  Cipkowski, p38
22  Denitch, p29
23  Brogan, p75
24  Denitch, pp118-119
25  Denitch, p118
26  Brogan, p145-146