Soviet Policy in Lithuania: Limits of Nationalism and Democracy Paul Southworth Copyright 1991 by Paul Southworth, all rights reserved. Distribution in unmodified form is unrestricted. Overview Section I: Theory Outlined here is Gorbachev's theoretical background on the issues of Nationalism and Democracy. The emphasis is on drawing out the significant aspects of his theories in order to use them as a lens through which to analyze actions of the Soviet government in Lithuania during the Winter of 1990 to 1991. Since Gorbachev cites Lenin as broad inspiration for his position, a few relevant works of Lenin will also be referred to. Section II: Practice This section provides information from mainstream press articles on the actions in Lithuania to be used as a demonstration of the actions of the Soviet government in practice. Section III: Conclusions The third section seeks to contrast theory with practice, pointing out consistencies and contradictions, as well as discussing accountability and control. * * * I. Theory: Defining Nationalism and Democracy Nationalism and democracy(1) are clearly two of the most critical contending theoretical issues confronting an analysis of Soviet policy in Lithuania. The highly ambiguous nature of both of these terms permits them to be applied in significantly varied ways in support of both progressive and reactionary causes. To analyze Soviet policy, it is necessary to bring specificity to this language of ambiguity. To be fair to Gorbachev, questions of national sovereignty and self-determination will be clarified and re-defined through the perspective of his own theoretical position. To further clarify, some of Lenin's theoretical analyses will also be applied, with Gorbachev's approval. For the purposes of this analysis, democracy will be considered a form of self-determination. A. Nationalism If the nationality question had not been solved in principle, the Soviet Union would never have had the social, cultural, economic and defense potential as it has now. Our state would not have survived if the republics had not formed a community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual assistance.(2) "Solved in principle" is certainly a precarious position to take on an issue that appears to be bringing the Union to crisis. While the historical accuracy of Gorbachev's claims of progress under socialism is not in question here, it may well prove that his conclusion is premature at best, and his categorization of the "community" of Soviet nations is most tenuous. 1. Soviet Pride as Internationalism vs. Nationalism as Chauvinism Gorbachev certainly acknowledges the existence of nationalism problems, but he does not place them at the center of his analysis. The term "nationalism" is used by Gorbachev only in the negative chauvinistic sense, with the positive emphasis on Soviet pride, which is equated with internationalism. He explains the sources of nationalism: "[T]he growth of educational and cultural standards, alongside modernization of the economy, leads to the emergence of an intelligentsia in every nation; the growth of national self-consciousness and the growth of a nation's natural interest in its historical roots. ... It sometimes happens that in the process a certain section of people descend to nationalism. Narrow nationalist views, national rivalry and arrogance emerge."(3) He sees the problem as one of the ignorance of youth and the failure to educate newer generations. "[O]ften the new generations do not even know how their nations have reached such heights. Nobody has told them of how internationalism has been working to their benefit, and for how many years."(4) 2. Leaning on Lenin Gorbachev subscribes heavily to Lenin's positions on all issues, especially economic policy. The implications of the comparison of Lenin's theoretical position on national self- determination and Soviet policy in Lithuania are a critical area of analysis addressed further in Section III. Gorbachev gives Lenin's position unqualified support: "The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity. His very image is an undying example of lofty moral strength, all-round spiritual culture and selfless devotion to the cause of the people and to socialism."(5) This deification of Lenin is the basis for the application of some of Lenin's theories, which can significantly clarify the theoretical basis for Soviet policy on nationalism and national sovereignty. Lenin is unequivocal in defining this basis: "[I]f we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations... by examining the historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevitably reach the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state."(6) Lenin further clarifies that the right(7) to such national self-determination is guaranteed by Clause Nine of the Russian Marxists' Programme.(8) In fact, dating from November 1917, the Union was characterized as "a voluntary and honourable union of peoples of Russia."(9) Lenin's position permits logical extension: first, nations without self-determination are not sovereign since they cannot enforce national will; and second, sovereignty is contingent upon the ability to be independent.(10) B. The Intersection of Democracy and Law 1. Rules of Acceptability Making sense of Gorbachev's position on democracy requires an understanding of how he places limits on democratic methods in the interest of maintaining order. In this respect, it is of utmost importance that Western concepts of democracy be disregarded in the analysis of Soviet policy, since the Western concept of democracy entails a program that was never envisioned by the Soviet leadership. The application of such a foreign system is therefore not a worthwhile test. Gorbachev intimates that while he supports criticism, there are still viewpoints, such as that of unmodified nationalism, that cannot be tolerated. "[W]hen somebody responds to [Leninist internationalism] with nationalist arrogance, withdraws into himself, and tries to pass his own values as being absolute, this is unfair, and cannot be accepted."(11) This position is not devoid of reason, but glasnost's much- touted philosophical position of absolute "openness"(12) is an exaggeration, since the opinion of "nationalist arrogance" that the Union should be dissolved into fully independent and non-aligned states "cannot be accepted." This in part indicates his misgivings about the concept of democracy in the sense that he feels compelled to impose personal standards of fairness, rather than democratically determining what those standards should be. 2. Using Law to Limit Criticism This imposition of fairness standards and rules of acceptability are the factors most directly translated into law. Respect for legal limits on democracy, best exemplified by the March ban on demonstrations in Moscow,(13) is central to Gorbachev's conception of democracy: "Observance of law is a matter of principle for us and we have taken a broad and principled view of the issue. There can be no observance of law without democracy. At the same time, democracy cannot exist and develop without the rule of law...."(14) While Gorbachev recognizes that people will not obey laws without democracy, the critical aspect of law being accountable to democratically popular decisions does not figure into his analysis, and certainly does not come out in practice. II. Practice: Soviet Action in Lithuania, Winter 1990 to 1991 A. Legitimacy of the Opposition Given Lithuania's plebiscite of February 10, 1990, there can be little doubt as to the popularity of the separatist actions taken by Lithuania's government. Eighty-four percent of voters participated, with 90% in favor(15) of establishment of an "independent democratic republic."(16) Gorbachev denounced the independent democratic initiative taken by the Lithuanians, perhaps because he -- as did the Lithuanians -- knew what the outcome would be. While his response was necessary from the position of giving all possible assurance to a pro-Union response, ultimately it did him no good, since Lithuanian response to Gorbachev's March 17 all-Union referendum was as unequivocal in the negative as the independent referendum had been in the positive.(17) B. Military Action With the failure of repeated threats to stem the outspoken separatist majority in Lithuania, on January 11 the Soviet government deployed troops and tanks into Vilnius to take control of the Lithuanian press center and a building used by the Lithuanian civilian militia.(18) The next day, thirteen civilians were killed and 100 were wounded when troops advanced to take the state radio station in the face of thousands of opposing demonstrators. It took 20 minutes to silence Radio Vilnius.(19) Despite this action to impose Soviet law over Lithuanian democracy, Gorbachev still appeared interested in cultivating a display of popular support for the attack. On January 10, before the deployment, Gorbachev said that "the people are demanding" Kremlin rule over Lithuania. Strikes were called by worker committees of local industrial enterprises, mostly comprised of blue-collar workers of non-Lithuanian descent. Several thousand of these strikers confronted the crowds of Lithuanian nationalists daily at the government buildings prior to the Soviet troop deployment.(20) This pro-Moscow organization which formed the "National Salvation Committee"(21) claimed to be empowered by the Kremlin to run the Lithuanian government after the take-over began.(22) It must be noted that the Lithuanian resistance, while virulent in its nationalist sentiment, was characterized by non-violence. Unlike the turbulent uprisings in the Transcaucasian republics that experienced a high degree of violence on the part of the civilian population, the Lithuanians were more cool-headed about their options. Although they collected arms and ammunition with which to defend buildings, they understood the realistic probabilities associated with taking on the Soviet armed forces. Audrius Butkeviucius, the Lithuanian government's head of the Department of Territorial Defense -- charged with organizing the building defenses -- said on the night of January 11, "We have enough ammunition to make a symbolic resistance."(23) III. Relating Theory to Practice A. Accepting Democracy and Rejecting Nationalism Gorbachev gets into real trouble in his unqualified support of Lenin. The historical record of Lenin's theoretical works is a poor basis for Gorbachev's arguments against the right of nations to be separate and independent. Dr Ronald Suny asks: "Gorbachev's dilemma is between the ends of democratization and the means to achieve it: Does the use of force against separatists halt progress toward democracy? ... Will Lenin's oft-stated goal of national self-determination (which included secession) continue to be treated as mere rhetoric, or can it be put into practice for the first time in seventy years?"(24) Considering such meager footing, Gorbachev would be well advised to be more selective in his assessment of Lenin's position, or to be more careful in adopting a patron deity. The Lenin that Gorbachev seeks to emulate is more the Lenin who formulated the New Economic Policy than the Lenin of "The Right of Nations to Self-determination." Nationalism is the contradiction in perestroika's programme of openness and democratization. To modify Gorbachev's theoretical position on the basis of practice: free and open criticism is essential so long as national independence is not mentioned; democracy is beneficial as long as it supports the status quo. B. The Illegality of Democracy It is significant that Gorbachev has refused to recognize the elected government of Lithuania continuously from the economic embargo of late Spring 1990 through the events of Winter 1990-91. The necessity of delegitimizing Lithuania's popular government stems from the contradiction between the commitment to democracy and the desire to retain the Union. Given the Lithuanian government's overtures to separation, Dr Suny explains: "The Soviet President faces the hard choice of carrying on his democratic reforms or holding the Soviet Union together. Empire has come into conflict with democracy."(25) With the open delegitimation of the independent Lithuanian referendum, it became clear that the question of who shall control the democratic process is of utmost importance. Gorbachev knew that without the ability to control the ballot process, including the phrasing of the voting issue -- setting the agenda for discussion and vote -- there was little possibility of victory for the Soviet government. With this in mind, Gorbachev announced on February 5, one week before the separatist referendum, that it was "without legal foundation."(26) The idea that popular democratic initiatives can be called illegal by the same person so elevated by his commitment to "democracy" is indicative of a conception of democracy that is alien to Westerners. The issue, then, is whether or at what point Western conceptions of democracy can be imposed on perestroika. The concurrent question is: can Gorbachev's state-controlled system of public polling (that which is characterized by the March 17 referendum) be considered "democracy?" Or is it better defined as a machine designed to systematically manufacture public support for government policies by carefully engineering the system to yield positive results? Tatyana Zaslavskaya concurs with Gorbachev's legalistic preconditions on democracy(27) and further states: "[P]eople who live in the Soviet Union face a long process of learning the habits of genuine democracy. ... Every instance... of abuse or unwise use of a citizen's democratic rights resulting in a weakening in the rule of law is interpreted by conservative forces as evidence that these measures are 'premature'...."(28) It appears that she is entirely correct regarding the reaction of the conservative forces to flaunting democratization in the face of the establishment in the Kremlin, although her remark about "genuine democracy" implies that the acts of open demonstration, unsanctioned referenda, and illegal (by definition) civil disobedience by the Lithuanians are somehow not "genuine." To her credit, she has denounced the military action by the Soviet government. By all appearances, the "people who live in the Soviet Union" have already learned a great deal about the effective use of democracy, and their understanding of it has clearly outpaced that of the Soviet government. C. Accountability and the Use of Force While it is difficult to establish actual accountability for the military action of January 1991 in terms of origination of the military plan and the authorization, Gorbachev cannot be permitted to stand back from the bloodshed. The warnings issued to the Lithuanians by Gorbachev prior to the action were certainly indicative of a willingness to use force, and even if the command had not originated on his desk, his support for the military "solution" after the attack confirmed his position. D. Speculation on the Future of Perestroika 1. Suny: Separation or Repression But in releasing the resentments and discontents festering in Soviet society Gorbachev may have misjudged the ability of a state that itself is in disarray to control a growing revolution from below. ... Democracy has stimulated separatist nationalism that will either break up the Soviet Union or lead to a brutal crackdown -- and the end of perestroika.(29) Given that this prediction was offered in April of 1990, Suny's "brutal crackdown" appears to have already been proven correct. It is clear that the secessionists will either succeed or be crushed. As of February 12, 1991, the organized resistance has been driven completely underground. Time will tell if this situation can remain. The "revolution from below," which Gorbachev and Zaslavskaya say perestroika urgently requires(30), appears to have run away from its leadership "from above," to the unending consternation of the Gorbachev administration and the military establishment. 2. Zaslavskaya: Revolution or Stagnation Restructuring has reached a critical stage. ... Either it will assume a revolutionary character with the active support of the people and sweep away all obstacles on the road to renewal of society or... the opponents of restructuring will gleefully announce its failure and return to the previous system.(31) While the Lithuanian people have given their active support to democratic change, simultaneously have their opponents attempted to return to the previous system. The key is that the most central government proponents of perestroika are now at the forefront of reaction. Again it is clear that Gorbachev cannot any longer control the mass movement that gained momentum under his approval. He is unwilling to accept that among the fruits of democracy lies national separation. 1 Democratic process including laws and norms regarding criticism. 2 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, Harper & Row, 1987, p104 3 Gorbachev, pp104-5 4 Gorbachev, p105 5 Gorbachev, p11 6 V I Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," Selected Works, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp568-9 7 It is implied from context that the above quote should be interpreted as self-determination of nations means the ability to exercise separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state. 8 Lenin, p567 9 Viktor Kozlov, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, Indiana University Press, 1988, p29 10 Independent in the sense of a wholly separate state, sovereign in the sense that a state (or a Soviet republic) may chose to forego complete independence in favor of participation in a Union. 11 Gorbachev, p105 12 Gorbachev, p61: "to ensure the greatest possible openness in the work of government and mass organizations and to enable working people to express their opinion on any issue of social life and government activity without fear." 13 NYT, March 27, 1991, pA1, A4 14 Gorbachev, p91 15 NYT, February 11, 1991, pA2 16 NYT, February 9, 1991, pA1 17 NYT, March 20, 1991, pA8: Lithuania, along with Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia and Moldavia all boycotted the referendum. 18 NYT, January 12, 1991, pA1 19 Newsweek, January 21, 1991, p38 20 NYT, January 12, 1991, pA4 21 Ibid, pA1 22 Newsweek, January 21, 1991, p38 23 NYT, January 12, 1991, pA4 24 Dr Ronald Suny, "Test in Lithuania," The Nation, April 23, 1990, p549 25 Suny, The Nation, p549 26 NYT, February 9, 1991, pA2 27 Zaslavskaya quotes a long passage by Gorbachev regarding the interrelated nature of law and democracy in The Second Socialist Revolution, Indiana University Press, 1990, p198 28 Zaslavskaya, pp198-199 29 Suny, The Nation, p549 30 Both Zaslaskaya and Gorbachev repeatedly emphasize the importance of support "from below" for reforms. See Zaslavskaya p16, and Gorbachev pp42-43. 31 Zaslavskaya, p196